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Commission  of the European  Communities 
Comments  of 
Aeronautical Radio,  Inc. 
on the Green  Paper 
on  the  Development  of the Common  Market 
for Telecommunications Services and Equipment 
(COM(87)  290  Final) 
Aeronautical Radio,  Inc.  (ARINC),  welcomes  the opportunity 
to submit  comments  to the Commission  regarding the  "Green Paper" 
on the  Development of the Common  Market  for Telecommunications 
Services and Equipment.  These  comments reflect ARINC's 
experience as a  provider of airline telecommunications and 
information services within the United States and between the 
u.s.  and  international points including nations of the EEC. 
ARINC  offers these services as  a· communications  company  owned  by 
the air transport industry.  ARINC  provides to the aviation 
community  a  number of private telecommunications  and  information 
serv_ices  including the ARINC  Data Network Service  (ADNS),  which 
distributes safety and operational  information to the members  of 
the industry. 
ARINC  supports the initiative of the Commission  in 
formulating the recommmendations  in its Green  Paper. 
Liberalization of the telecommunications environment  in the 
European  Communities will lead to substantial  improvements  in 
technology,  flexibility and cost competitiveness for users. 
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These  advantages will translate directly to tangible benefits for 
All network subscribers by  increasing traffic and  expanding 
trade. 
ARINC  approves of the overall goal  of the Commission to 
encourage its member  states to divorce the operational  and 
regulatory sectors of telecommunications.!  Such  a  goal -- in 
conjunction with the developing case  law  on  "abuse of dominant 
position"2 -- could well  lead toward more efficient and effective 
provision of telecommunications services.  ARINC  trusts that the 
)  further work of the Commission will continue to promote the 
greatest feasible reliance on  competitive market  forces. 
) 
One  of the Commission's  Proposed Positions,  however,  may  be 
of particular concern.  Proposed Position J  recommends  the 
development  and dissemination of EEC-wide  common  commercial 
policies in such  forums  as the General  Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade  (GATT).J  ARINC  suggests that the Commission,  under this 
proposed  regulation,  seek development of a  common  and pro-
competitive European position in the upcoming World 
Administrative Telegraph and  Telephone  Conference  (WATTC), 
1  See  Green  Paper,  Figure 13,  Proposed Position G. 
2  See,  e.g.,  Italy v~  Commission,  2  C.M.L.  Rep.  368  (1985); 
Schulte-Braucks,  European Telecommunicat·ions  Law  in Light of the 
British Telecom Judgment,  23  C.M.L.  Rev.  39  (1986).  See Also 
Green  Paper,  Figure  13,  Proposed  Positions A  & B. 
3  Green  Paper,  Figure  13,  Proposed  Position J. 
6 ) 
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scheduled  for  December  1988.  As  the  Commission  is aware,  the 
WATTC  will consider regulations governing  a  host of non-public 
services  (e.g.,  value added  and private networks)  never 
previously regulated.  Although  most  of these services would 
appear to be  beyond the exclusive privilege allotted to 
telecommunications administrations under the Treaty of Rome,  some 
EEC  nations have  recommended that the WATTC  authorize  increased 
regulation. 
such an approach is inconsistent with the central pri.ncit>les 
of the Green  Paper.  As  noted by  Commissioner Karl-Heinz  Narjes 
referring specifically to WATTC: 
We  believe that the role of the  ITO  cannot be maintained by 
extending international telecommunications regulation into 
insuited areas,  but should be ensured--and confirmed--by 
making the ITU  framework  flexible enough to adjust to,  and 
to accommodate the future  open  international trading 
environment for telecommunications serivces and equipment 
which the international community needs.4 
ARINC  fully concurs with this view.  It now  only remains  for the 
EEC  to ensure that the position taken at the WATTC  by its member 
states reflects not merely the classical perspective of the PTTs, 
but the broader view of the political,  trade promotion and 
') foreign policy sectors of EEC  governments. 
Again,  ARINC  is pleased to have the qpportunity to submit 
these  comments  and welcomes  the initiatives of the Commission. 
4  Narjes,  Telecommunications Policy Reform  and  International 
Trade:  The  European  Community  View,  No.  29/87  at 9  (Dec.  4, 
1987) . ) 
COMMENTAIRES  DE  L'AFUTT  SURLES 
PROPOSITIONS  DU  DOCUMENT  DE  SYNTHESE  CONCERNANT  LE  "LIVRE  VERT"  DE  lA 
COMMISSION  DES  COMMUNAUTES  EUROPEENNES  SUR  LE  DEVELOPPEMENT  DU  MARCHE 
COMMUN  DES  SERVICES  ET  EQUIPEMENTS  DES  TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Quelques  reactions  de petits utilisateurs professionnels et residentiels 
Conscients  de  !'importance vitale et croissante des  Telecommunications  et 
d'une  coherence  communautaire pour leur competitivite,  leur qualite de  vie 
et leur securite,  les utilisateurs  - grands  et petits  - que representant 
l'AFUTT  approuvent chaleureusement les propositions  exprimees  dans  le 
"Livre vert". 
Ils apprecient l'obJectif de fournir a l'utilisateur european  des  infra-
structures et services de  telecommunications  comparables  aux meilleurs,  aux 




Les  commentaires  qui suivent sont presentes par rapport au texte intitule 
"Positions proposees"  dans  le "livre vert". 
Un  detail preliminaire  :  il serait utile que  les principaux termes utilises 
dans  le "livre vert"  soient precises,  qu'une definition en soit rappelee 
(par exemple,  qu'entend-on au juste par "droits speciaux"  des  administra-
tions des  telecommunications?). 
* 
* * 
Les petits utilisateurs souhaitent evidemment beneficier,  tout comme  les 
grands,  des  "conditions les plus avantageuses"  ;  l'utilisateur europeen 
s'attend - et c'est normal  - A beneficier de materiels et de  services, 
d'une reglementation,  d'une qualite de  service et de  tarifs aussi 
avant~geux que  leurs homologues  dans  d'autres parties du monde. 
Un  "environnement ouvert A la concurrence"  est essential  :  il est bien 
,  clair que  le monopole  est rarement  A  l'avantage de l'utilisateur. 
A)  Exclusivite ou concurrence pour les  infrastructures 
L'exclusivite,  pourquoi  ?  La  notion de  "monopole  naturel"  est depassee. 
Pourquoi  des  "droits speciaux"  A  sauvegarder  ?  Avec  un siecle d'avance  sur 
tout nouvel  operateur qui serait admis,  l'operateur des  infrastructures en 
place  (avec  d'importants  investissements faits depuis  longtemps et amortis 
pour la plupart)  est en position de  force et pour  longtemps. 
Ce  qui peut mettre en jeu la viabilite financiere  du prestataire principal, 
ce  sont les prelevements arbitraires,  excessifs et imprevisibles  que  fait 
l'Etat dans  certains pays  et non pas  des  mesures  techniques  (le danger  de 
pertes de  recettes qui pourraient resulter de  detournements  de  trafic est 
minime  en comparaison avec  les amputations pratiquees par certains Etats 
sur le budget des  telecommunications). 
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Si l'on maintient la notion de  "droits speciaux",  il conviendrait de 
pr~ciser quelles  "obligations sp,ciales"  en sont le corollaire  (voir  en 
page  11  du  document  en annexe  :  AFUTT-INFORMATIONS,  N°76,  4eme  trimestre 
1987  :  "Les  obligations du  service public des  telecommunications,  du  point 
de  vue  de  l'utilisateur") 
B)  Exclusivite ou  concurrence  pour  les seryices de  base 
L' exclusivite .est encore moins  justifiee pour les services  que  pour les 
infrastructures et elle va encore plus contre !'interet des  utilisateurs 
quel  fournisseur jouissant d'un monopole  n'aura pas  tendance  A dire que  sa 
sauvegarde  en est essentielle  ? 
Et  comment  separer le service vocal  des  autres,  alors  que  l'on en est par 
ailleurs A la technologic  du numerique  et du  RNIS  (reseau numerique  A 
integration de  services),  dans  lequel  on  ne  distingue pas  a  priori A quels 
types  de  message  correspondent les signaux transmis  ? 
C)  Offre  libre 
.)  Nous  approuvons  evidemrnent  "l'offre libre de  tous  les autres services". 
.) 
C'est une  position courageuse,  le regard vers  l'avenir. 
A propos  de  "besoins partages",  si on ne  permet pas  A plusieurs petites 
entreprises  de  partager,  par exemple,  la capacite d'une  liaison numerique 
qui serait trop  importante et trop onereuse pour une  seule d'entre elles, 
on favorise  les grands utilisateurs,  on entretient une  forme  d'inegalite 
devant le service public. 
Un  autre  domaine  dans  lequel l'acces partage A des  ressources  communes 
pourrait utilement rendre  des  technologies  avanc~es accessibles non seule-
ment  aux  grands utilisateurs,  mais  aux petits,  est celui des  communications 
par satellites.  Rappelons  A ce  propos  qu'elles sont interessantes pour les 
transferts  de  fichiers,  mais  non pour  les  communications  interactives  (les 
delais de  propagation sont trop  longs).  L'utilisation de  stations d'emis-
sion et reception  (bi-directionnelles)  doit etre libre. 
D)  Normalisation 
Des  nprmes,  oui,  mais  aussi simples  que  possible  :  ne  pas  rendre les 
materiels  ou les services plus  couteux que necessaire. 
,  L'interconnectivite europ,enne,  oui  ;  mais  mondiale aussi.  Un  niveau 
europeen d'amelioration de  la communication est une  premiere priorite, mais 
les besoins  des utilisateurs ne  s'arretent pas  lA. 
Il est curieux de noter que  les  telecommunications  sont un  des  secteurs 
d'activite les plus normalises et les moins  normalises  en meme  temps 
- On  peut  telephoner,  telexer,  envoyer des  telecopies  ou des  donn,es  dans 
le monde  entier et c'est une  tres belle realisation,  mais  (pour  donner 
quelques  exemples  d'un point de  vue d'utilisateurs)  : 
.  Les  signaux de  sonnerie  ou  d'occupation d'une  ligne ne  sont pas  les 
memes  dans  tous  les pays 
.  La  carte de  credit telephonique  ("Telecarte"  en France)  cesse d'etre 





.  11  serait normal qu'il y  ait un plan homogene  de  numerotation 
telephonique  A l'echelle mondiale  ou au moins  europeenne 
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.  Pour utiliser le radiotelephone  en se  depla~ant dans  les pays  de  la 
Communaute,  il faudrait  transporter avec  soi 10  modeles  differents 
d'appareils  (et avoir les abonnements  correspondants), 
.  On  ne  peut pas  installer un  autocommutateur  fran~ais en Allemagne,  ou 
vice-versa,  sans  de  longues  et couteuses modifications.  La portae de  la 
reconnaissance mutuelle  des  agrements  est evidemment  tres limitee si le 
manque  de  normalisation ne  permet pas d'utiliser du materiel agree  dans 
un pays  dans  un autre pays  de  la Communaute. 
E)  Exigences  generales pour !'utilisation des  reseaux 
Les  exigences  devraient etre definies par une tierce partie aussi 
independant  que  possible des  "prestataires principaux'j afin que  ceux-ci ne 
soient pas  juge et partie. 
Pour la concertation avec  les autres parties concerneesJil serait utile de 
preciser que  l'on consultera particulierement les representants  des utili-
sateurs,  qui sont les premiers  concernes et les bailleurs de  fonds. 
F)  L'offre libre d'eguipements  terminaux 
Il est certes interessant pour l'utilisateur d'avoir un choix elargi en 
dehors  des  frontieres  de  son Etat,  mais  cela n'a tout son sens  que si des 
normes  communes  permettent !'utilisation de  ces  equipements  dans  les divers 
pays  concernes. 
Bien que  cela ne soit pas  tres  important,  n'est-il est pas  dommage 
d'admettre une restriction pour la fourniture  du  "premier combine  telepho-
nique conventionnel"  ?  (qui est libre en France) 
G)  Separation des  activtes de  reglementation et d'exploitation des  reseaux 
de  telecommunications 
Une  telle separation est tres  importante.  Encore  faut-il reunir les 
conditions d'une  independance  aussi grande  que  possible de  l'organisme  de 
reglementation. 
H)  L'  .. .a.pplication du traite CEE 
Le  fonctionnement  des  operateurs principaux semble  assez loin de  l'esprit 
,  des articles 85,  86  et 90  du Traite CEE  (concurrence,  pas  de  fixation des 
prix,  pas d'exploitation abusive  d'une position dominante).  Pourquoi les 
prestataires principaux ne  devraient-ils pas aussi etre soumis  A la 
concurrence  ?  La  demonstration est faite  (en Grande-Bretagne)  que  cela ne 
fait pas  echec a l'accomplissement de  missions particulieres qui  leur ont 
ete imparties  (Mercury ne met pas  en peril l'accomplissement des missions 
de  service public de  British Telecom). 
I)  Abus  de  position dominante 
Cette notion devrait etre applicable a  tous les operateurs,  pas  seulement 
aux prestataires prives. 
J) Application de  la politigue commune 
Pas  de  commentaires. 
11 ) 
) 
En  complement  des  commentaires  de  petits utilisateurs suscites par les 
"positions proposees"  dans  le "livre vert",  l'AFUTT  exprime les suggestions 
suivantes 
1  - Participation des  utilisateurs 
Il serait interessant que  le  "livre vert"  precise la necessite d'une 
participation active des  representants des utilisateurs a  tous  les niveaux 
ou sont preparees  ou prises des  decisions  les concernant et au suivi de 
leur mise  en oeuvre  ;  c'est une  condition d'efficacite et de  satisfaction 
des  utilisateurs et une  fa~on d'eviter des  erreurs.  Cette participation 
est A encourager,  a  aider,  peut-etre meme  A subventionner. 
Par exemple,  la participation des utilisateurs A l'activite du futur 
Institut europeen de  normes  de  telecommunication nous  para1t 6tre un 
facteur d'efficacite loin d'etre negligeable.  Mais  il ne serait pas 
realiste de  mettre  comme  condition a la participation des utilisateurs le 
paiement par eux d'une  importante contribution aux frais  :  "ils ont deja 
paye",  ils financent  les differents organismes  internationaux concernes 
chaque  fois  qu'ils paient leurs factures  de  telecommunication. 
2  - Politique tarifaire 
2.1  Les  petits utilisateurs professionnels souhaitent une politique 
tarifaire leur ouvrant des  facilites telles que  les circuits loues,  dont 
le prix est trop souvent prohibitif pour une petite entreprise. 
2.2  Il faut  gommer  les frontieres  sur le plan tarifaire  :  un circuit 
loue,  par exemple,  ne  devrait pas voir son prix augmente parce qu'il 
traverse  des  frontieres  administratives entre les Etats. 
2.3  Il est particulierement important pour les petits utilisateurs 
(professionnels et residentiels)  qu'un equilibre soit trouve entre la 
verite des  prix qu'appelle une  bonne  gestion et le maintien des  perequa-
tions qu'impliquent la notion de  service public et des  imperatifs d'ordre 
soci~ et d'amenagement  du territoire. 
3  - Information sur les couts 
Deux  types  de  services sont  importants  pour  le petite utilisateur,  qui 
n'a generalement pas  un materiel assez  sophistique pour lui permettre une 
gestion appropriee  de  ses  depenses  telephoniques  : 
3.1  La  facturation detaillee,  mensuelle et gratuite des  appels  inter-
urbains et internationaux. 
3.2  La  possibilite d'utiliser des  compteurs  d'unites  telephoniques 
chez  l'abonne,  actionnes par des  impulsions  electriques  renvoyees 
sans  supplement  de  prix par l'operateur vers les lignes  des 
clients. 
. .. I  ... 
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4  - Traitement equitable des  litiges 
Les  litiges entre l'operateur et l'abonne doivent etre traites par une 
tierce partie independante  (juge,  arbitre,  commission paritaire ou 
autre)  :  ce n'est pas  au fournisseur  de  juger si son client a  tort ou  a 
raison (ni  de  decider s'il y  a  lieu ou non de  suspendre  son service). 
5  - Agrement et politigue industrielle 
L'agrement ne  doit pas etre une  source  de  surencherissement,  ni de 
delais qui pourraient retarder la disponibilite des  techniques les 
meilleures. 
Ce  n'est pas par l'agrement que  doit s'exercer la politique industrielle 
des  Etats ou de  la Communaute. 
6  - Un  "livre vert"  permanent 
Remise  a jour permanente  du  "livre vert",  afin qu'il garde  toute  son 
actualite comme  document  de  reference,  dans  un domaine  dont le contexte 





REACTIONS  DE  GRANDES  ENTREPRISES 
MEMBRES  DU  CLUB  DES  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  DE  L'AFUTT 
SUR  LES  POSITIONS  COMMUNAUTAIRES  PROPOSEES  (LIVRE  VERT) 
Il est convenu,  au depart,  que  le document  de  reference  au "livre vert" 
sera  "Les  positions  communautaires  proposees"  (art.  VI,  encadre  2). 
1  - L'  AFUTT  souhaiterait que  la notion de  "droits speciaux''  soit precisee 
(A et B) 
2  - Les  operateurs  (administrations ou entreprises)  des  telecommunications, 
a  qui seront confiees,  par les Etats membres,  la sauvegarde  de !'infra-
structure du reseau general dont elles ont la charge  (A),  devront neanmoins 
se preparer a  operer dans  un  environnement concurrentiel de nature a 
stimuler la qualite de  leur service. 
3  - Par  "infrastructure du  reseau public",  on entend "reseau de  transport 
avec  equipements  de  commutation"  (A  et B),  a !'exclusion des  services 
qui peuvent etre fournis  de  fa~on concurrentielle  (C  et F). 
4- 11  conviendrait de  preciser la definition du service public  (B),  en 
particulier ses missions  (B)  et obligations. 
5  - D'une maniere generale,  les monopoles  - qu'ils soient publics  ou 
prives  - ne  sont evidemment  pas  favorables  aux utilisateurs,  qui  souhaitent 
trouver un environement concurrentiel et par consequent appuient la concep-
tion exprimee  au paragraphe  B pour eviter une  extension du monopole  qui 
serait incompatible avec les dispositions  du Traite de  Rome. 
6  - Les  reseaux prives d'entreprise se  developpent.  A cet effet,  ils ont 
besoin de  liaisons specialisees nationales,  mais  aussi europeennes et 
mondiales  (A).  Les  Etats  doivent en garantir les infrastructures de base 
(B). 
..• 
'- 7  - L'evolution technologique ne  permet pas d'assurer la perennite du 
monopole  au service telephonique vocal,  dans  la mesureou le RNIS  ne  permet 
,  pas la separation de  la voix et des  donnees  (B). 
Paroles et donnees  sont exprimees et transmises  sur le reseau en "bits"  non 
distinguables  (B)  lorsque le dit reseau est numerise. 
8  - La  perennite des  liaisons specialisees sera-t-elle assuree  lorsque le 
RNIS  se generalisera  (A  +  C)  ? 
9  - S'oriente-t-on vers la verite des  couts  de  revient  (A  +  B)  ? 
10  - 11  est illogique de  faire payer a  des prix variables,  un service qui 
ne  supporte  que  des  couts  fixes  (A  +  B) 
C'est pourquoi la tarification des  LS  (liaisons specialisees)  au volume  ne 
serait pas  comprise par les utilisateurs  (A+ B +  E +G). 
L'AFUTT  considere qu'il y  a  la une  menace  pour !'innovation,  voire un frein 
au progres. 
15 ) 
11  - L'existence de  plusieurs operateurs  impliquera la mise  en place,  a 
l'echel1e europeenne,  d'une  fonction  regulatrice  independante  des  Etats 
membres  (C  + G + J). 
Sous  quelle  forme  :  commissio  de  coordination,  organisme  supra-
communautaire  ? 
12  - L'AFUTT  affirme  la necessite  de  normes  au moins  europeenes,  en 
priorite pour les services  de  base  (B  +D). 
13  - Les  utilisateurs souhaitent des  standards  communs  pour les reseaux  de 
commutation de  paquets et le RNIS  (B  +D). 
14  - 11  semble utile de  creer un  organisme  europeen de  normalisation qui 
aurait pour mission essentielle d'orienter et d'accelerer le processus  de 
normalisation  (pour permettre  tres rapidement l'interconectivite en Europe) 
(D  + J),  a condition qu'il n'apporte pas  une  lourdeur supplementaire,  des 
delais ou des  frais excessifs. 
15  - Les  utilisateurs fran9ais,  deja habitues a une  certaine liberte, 
approuvent  la position F  du  livre vert dans  le sens  d'une  offre libre  (sans 
restriction)  d'equipements  terminaux. 
16  - L'interconnectivite des  reseaux  demeure  un  imperatif  (D). 
17  - Tout  agrement  dans  un  des  pays membres  doit etre applicable dans  les 
autres pays  de  la Comrnunaute. 
18  - L'AFUTT  souhaite un allegement  des  procedures d'agrement qui 
introduisent des  delais et des  couts  supportes par les utilisateurs.  A 
terme,  les equipements  (materiels,  logiciels)  ne pourraient-ils pas  faire 
l'objet d'une  simple  declaration de  conformite a des  normes  ou 
specifications europeennes  ? 
19  - D'une  maniere  generate,  l'AFUTT  est pour la plus  grande  liberte 
compatible  avec les imperatifs  de  qualite,  d'exploitation des  reseaux et de 
maintenance  (G),  tout en preservant les meilleures possibilite d'inter-
conne~tion a l'echelle europeenne et mondiale.  Comme  indique  dans  le 
document  de  synthese  du  "livre vert"  (p.  2)  " ... 1es ut1isateurs 
doivent etre les principaux beneficiaires des nouvelles possiblites  ...  " 
26.01.88 
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1.0  Introduction 
The  EC  Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in  Belgium  is the sole 
organization in  Europe representing .the  views of European  companies of American 
parentage.  It  also  represents  the  interests ·of  the  European  Council of American 
Chambers  of  Commerce ·(an  association  of  13  American  Chambers  throughout 
Europe, representing some 20.000 members, $100 billion of US  investment in Europe 
and 9 million European employees) on issues concerning the  European Community 
and the Council of Europe. 
A  list  of the  companies  active  in  the  EC  Committee of the  American  Chamber of 
Commerce in  Belgium is included at the end of this document. 
The EC  Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in  Belgium, hereafter re-
ferred to as the EC  Committoe, believes that the Commission of the European Com-
munities has prepared an  excellent, comprehensive document analyzing the future 
direction of telecommunications in the Community.  The EC Committee is encouraged 
by the emphasis the Commission has placed on the need to introduce more compe-
tition into the telecommunications equipment and  services markets in  Europe.  We 
believe that  competition  is an  effective way of ensuring that the best products and 
services reach the customer at the lowest price and in the most timely fashion.  The 
Commtssion  has  recognized  that  a  healthy telecommunications  industry  will  help 
spur economic growth throughout the economy as  more and more industries utilize 
telecommunications as a vital tool to maintain and enhance competitiveness.  Indeed, 
the availability of high-quality and efficient telecommunications products, equipment 
ar1d  services provides a major benefit to a national economy by helping attract com-
merce and industry. 
Information is  more and  more widely recognized as  one of the four most important 
productivity  factors  for  economic  growth  and  prosperity.  Telecommunication  ser-
vices and applicable tariffs and regulations play an  important role in the distribution 
of such information not only to large corporations but also to eacll business entity and 
hence to each individual as an end-user.  Although the emphasis of the Green Paper 
is  on telecommunications markets and their supporting  infrastructure,  it  is  believed 
that  the Commission is aware that commerce and  industry in  general depend more 
than ever on  information technology for their efficiency and  competitiveness.  Tele-
communications  is an  integral  part of this process.  Thus,  telecommunications di-
rectly  affects  the  ability of businesses  to  create  wealth,  and  as  a  result  supports 
employment and the overall quality of life.  This being so,  there must be agreement 
that the interests of businesses as a whole should take precedence over the narrower 
lilterests of the telecommunications sector. 
The  overall  prosperity of  a  nation  can  be  significantly  improved  through  the  'Freo 
Flow  of  Information',  the  creation  of  an  environment  wtwre  infer mat  ion  is  made 
available on a timely, efficient, and cost-effective basis.  Actions like restrictive tele-
communications regulation and/or excessive tariffs serve only to stifle the rapid ev-
olution and  use of the  many information technology services  necessary for  today's 
complex society.  Any user wishing to improve his personal and corporate prosperity 
has  a  vested  interest  in  seeing  that  restrictive  telecommunications  regulations  be 
chc~nqed to  perrntt choice of efficient and cost-effective access to information.  In  the 
corltl~Xt of  ttH'  rap1d  evolution of  tectHwlogy which  is providing users with n•Hnerous 
Introduction 
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functions. features, and cost cutting options, a large variety of user requirements can 
best be met through an  open competition process.  Except  where it can  be  demon-
strated that  non-competitive provision is more efficient and  cost-effective and  does 
not limit the choice of users in satisfying their information needs, users would like to 
see that the proven concepts of open competition are equally applied to telecommu-
nications equipment and services. 
Th~ policy framework set  forth  in the Green Paper is encouraging for its liberal ap-
·proach  to  the  restructuring  of the  European  telecommunications  market.  . The  EC 
Committee hopes that the Commission will allow those Member States willing to lib-
eralize more rapidly than others the flexibility to do so.  The EC  Committee believes 
that the direction in  which the Commission is  attempting to point its Member States 
is the correct one because it is in  line with technological and market trends. 
The EC Committee's positrons on particular aspects of the Green Paper are discussed 
below. 
22 
Introduction 2.0  Summary 
'  ~  The  EC  Committee  welcomes  the  initiative  of  the  Commission  in  publishing  the 
'Green Paper on the  Development of the Common Market for  Telecommunications 
Services and Equipment', COM(87) 90 final, dated June 30,  1987, hereafter referred to 
as the· 'Green Paper'.  · 
The EC  Committee agrees with the directions expressed in the Green Paper, as well 
as with the general rules and principles detailed in  it.  We believe that the Commis-
sion's  proposals  for  action  are  a  necessary  step  towards  the  completion  of  the 
internal market by 1992. 
In the context of the public debate initiated by the Green Paper, the EC Committee's 
willingness to elaborate on some ideas should be seen as a constructive contribution 
to the process and not as a criticism of the work done by the Commission. 
In section 3 we briefly comment on the 10 proposed positions outlined in fig. 13 of the 
Green Paper. 
In  further sections we develop more extensively our comments on  specific issues 
included in fig. 13 of the Green Paper or in other parts of the ~ocument. 
These are: 
1) Standards 
We  support the efforts of the Commission  in  setting up a common standardi-
zation systen· for Europe,  but we want to highlight the  world-wide dimension 
of standards.  Also we wish  to  underline the potential risk of over-specifying 
s!andards and equipment attachment procedures, which could have a negative 
impact on thu innovation and creativeness of the business community. 
2) Open NetwQrk Provision 
\11/e  agree with the Commission that the definition of the conditions for usage 
of the network by service providers is a necessary step in opening services to 
competition.  Our views on these conditions should be seen as a contribution 
to the planned proposal for a Directive on Open Network Provision. 
3) Competition in network equipment 
We  fully  support  the  Commission's  goal  of a  fully  open  common  market  for 
terminal  equ1pment  and  for  the  acceleration  of  existing  action  lines  on  the 
opening of procurement contracts for  network equipment.  We  urge ttle Com-
mission to place greater priority on encouraging competitive bidding and open 
procurement. 
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4) The formulation and application of competition policy in the European 
telecommunications markets 
We  welcomed the Commission decision of December 10,  1982 on the 'British 
Telecom Case'  and the subsequent judgement by the Court of Justice of March 
20,  1985;  we encourage the Commission to play an  increasingly active role in 
the  application  of Community  competition  rules  to  the  telecommurrications 
sector. 
We fully support the Commission's position on the separation of regulatory and 
operational activities of the Telecommunications Administrations.  We  submit 
some ideas on the r9le of a national regulatory body. 
5) The external dimension of a Community telecommunications policy 
We  believe this is an  important area that should be addressed very carefully 
by the Commission.  In  particular,  we  point  out our views  on  telecommuni-
cations services in  the GATT Round, and  on a way to h.FJndle. the requests by 
outside providers for  interconnection  and  service provision.  We  further  ex-
press our concerns on the WATTC re-regulation process. 
6) Free flow of information 
We support the Council's ratification  of the Council of Europe Convention on 
data protection.  We expect to see intellectual property protection addressed in 
the Commission's forthcoming Green Paper on copyright. 
7)  Economic and social impact considerations 
The  EC  Committee supports all  constructive plans that  the  Commission  may 
recommend to minimize potential transitory negative consequences to individ-
uals and  enterprises.  Likewise and  with due regard for the constructive role 
each Telecommunications Administrations can play in this area, we encourage 
future actions by the Commission to harmonize the conditions for boosting the 
economic benefits deriving from the free and competitive provision of informa-
tion services within and beyond the Community. 
Summary  4 3.0  Comments on the ten proposed positions of the Green 
Paper 
A}  Network infrastructure: 
The EC  Committee has no objections in principle with the decision to continue 
the exclusive provision of network infrastructure,  provided  that the  scope of 
network infrastructure is defined in such a way as to mean transmission and 
switching facilities, and not including functions that can  be better provided in 
a competitive environment. 
However,  it  is  our view that satellite technology holds the promise of partic-
ularly valuabfe benefits towar~s the achievement of a European telecommuni-
cations dimension and should not be subject to such exclusive provision. 
Moreover, we believe that a progressive opening of network infrastructure to 
appropriately  licensed  operators  will  stimulate  innovation  and  fulfill  specific 
user requirements. 
B)  Exclusive provision of  basic services 
We  agree  with  the  Commission's  statement  that  the  exclusive  prov1s1on  of 
services  must be  narrowly construed and  be  subject to  rev·iew  within  given 
time intervals. 
We  also agree with the Commission that voice telephony is the only obvious 
candidate to be a reserved service, provided that it refers only to  basic voice 
services over public switched voice networks and  not to any other voice ser-
vice. 
In  changing the telecommunications environment, it is essential to ensure that 
continuity  of  services  is  maintained  whilst  new  services  and  operating  ar-
rangements are  introduced.  One of the most  important services  which  tele-
communications facilities provides is the telephone service.  It reaches across 
domestic and  business subscribers and represents an  essential component to 
customers and  users while providing a major revenue source and responsibil-
ity to the existing Telecommunications Administrations and Operators. 
Consistent with the introduction of competition, a transition phase must there-
fore be agreed upon in order to protect this aspect of the operation.  Each  na-
tion should be given a sufficient amount of time to complete this transition, yet 
allow for competition in both national and internat1urwl services to be gradually 
introduced.  · 
~..:l,rdments on the ten prornsed rosition~ of the Grr>en Paper  5  _____________  ... _________ _ 
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C)  Unrestricted provision of competitive services 
The debate on what is 'Basic' and what is 'Value Added' has been taking place 
for some time with little or no agreement on a definition.  The terms 'Reserved 
Services' and 'Competitive Services' as proposed by the Green Paper are bet-
ter and more constructive descriptions. 
The  network owner/operator should  be allowed to engage in  competitive ac-
tivities on  the same terms and  conditions as  a non-network operator.offering 
competitive services. 
The  independent regulatory arrangements proposed should ensure that Tele-
communications Administrations, the providers of the  network infrastructure, 
do  not  abu&e  their  monopoly position  to  participate  in  competitive  markets 
~ithout adequate safeguards to prevent unfair competition. 
The EC  competition law and commercial policy can be utilized to support this 
proposal.  Public service objectives should align with  a  competitive environ-
ment in  such  a  way that  end  users and  operators optimize the usage of the 
network infrastructure to the best possible mutual advantage. 
D)  Requirements regarding standardized services 
We  support the  Commission's  goal  of efficient  Europe-wide  and  world-wide 
communications.  We  disagree,  however,  on  the  perception  that the  partic-
ipation of Telecommunication Administrations is a pre-requisite to accomplish-
ing  such  a  goal.  This  imposes  an  obligation  upon  Telecommunications 
Administrations and can be considered as an extension to their public mandate. 
We  believe that a  wide choice of telecommunications services across Europe 
can best be achieved under a regime of open competition.  TJ.Iecommunication 
Administrations should be encouraged to  participate where there is a reason-
able demand for their products.  A clear separation between competitive and 
reserved  activities of Telecommunications  Administrations  should  be  a  pre-
requisite for their participation in the competitive marketplace. 
There is a need to harmonize standards for interfaces to public services and for 
attachment  of terminal  equipment  to  the  network  infrastructure.  Mandatory 
standards should be  based solely on  safety and  on  'no harm to the  network' 
requirements and  should not include functional or performance requirements. 
Functional or inter-operability requirements should be part of a voluntary cer-
tification process.  Users may request manufacturers to declare conformity with 
a particular service. 
Comments on the ten proposed positions of the Green Paper 
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E)  Open Network Provision: 
We  fully support the  aim of the Commission to propose a Directive on Open 
Network Provision (ONP).  In principle, we agree that the Telecommunications 
Administrations, in consultation with users and competitive service providers, 
should  develop  and  adopt  common  principles  regarding  the  standards  and 
interfaces offered for interconnection to the  network, tariff principles, and the 
allocation of frequencies.  This is  needed to stimulate an  integrated European 
market for value-added services.  Common network standards and  interfaces 
should be established that are open to providers of competitive services on the 
one hand, and that do not overly constrain the evolution of the network archi-
tecture of the network providers on the other.  Achieving a balance between the 
two will require the cooperative participation of all interested parties. 
Details of the Directive will be prepared in the framework of SOG-T.  In this re-
spect  we  would  appreciate  guidelines from  the Commission to the  Member 
States to ensure that users and the information technology industry can effec-
tively participate in the development of an ONP framework at the Member State 
level and at the Community level. 
F)  Unrestricted provision of terminal equipment 
We agree with the Commission's support for unrestricted provision of terminal 
equipment.  We  believe that the provisioning of the first (conventional) tele-
phone should not be excluded or, at most, a precise timing for open provision 
should be specified.  We also believe that any network t~rminating equipment, 
to either analog or digital networks, should be provided i~ open competition. 
The installation and maintenance of terminal equipment, including satellite an-
tennas, should be open to anyone who has the technoiQgy and the capability 
to do so.  Further, the number of installation and maintenance service providers 
should not be arbitrarily pre·set.  · 
We  support the initiatives of the Commission towards a mutual recognition of 
type approval for terminal equipment.  We  also suggest that the Commission 
encourage the acceptance of tests performed by manufacturers. 
Comments on the ten proposed positions of the Green Paper  7 
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G)  Separation of regulatory and operational activiUes: 
One of the most important factors that will create a basis for introducing change 
in telecommunications at  the national level is the separation of the regulatory 
and  operational  responsibilities.  Therefore,  the  EC  Committee strongly sup-
ports the  establishment  of  an  independent  regulatory  entity  at  the  national 
level.  · 
It  is recognized  that each country needs to evaluate how this separation can 
be achieved and which type of organization will emerge. 
Examples of an independent regulatory body are the FCC  in the United States 
and  OFTEL  in  the United  Kingdom.  In  both  nations, certain advantages and 
disadvantages can be observed; but an  important factor is apparent in both of 
.these situations: competition in  services and terminal equipmer.~ ( and also in 
the provision of infrastructure ) is thriving, and all interested parties participate 
in the regulatory debate. 
Even in a situation where the telecommunications facilities remain the respon-
sibility of one entity and competition is not encouraged, an  independent regu-
latory organization  is essential to the equitable use of resources for national 
and international services by end users and as a means of introducing changes 
when timing and national objectives are appropriately positioned. 
The establishment of a new regulatory environment is essential if competitive 
telecommunications services are to become a trigger for economic advance-
ment.  Replacement of existing regulations that protect the telecommunications 
regime by new, equally protective arrangements is not an acceptable alterna-
tive.  Again, separation of operations from the  regulatory arrangements could 
prevent such a situation from developing. 
The establishment of an  international regulatory authority is not seen as a re-
quirement at this time.  Such an  entity should only be considered, if at all, after 
the national arrangements have been implemented. 
H  & I)  Strict continuous monitoring of commercial activities of Telecom-
munications Administrations and of private providers 
In both areas, the requirements for continuous review of commercial activities, 
for  a  thorough  understanding  of the  national  Telecommunications  Adminis-
trations,  and for detailed knowledge of local market conditions would seem to 
require some substantive local  involvement in  coordination with the Commis-
sion.  Should this involvement be  the responsibility of the national regulatory 
body -as  it  seems appropriate- the requirement of its true independence from 
the Telecommunications Administration is very important. 
Comments on the ten proposed positions of the Green Paper  8 
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J)  Common Commercial Policy: 
We  have developed some comments on  the GATT Round and on the WATTC  in 
section 8.3.  We  agree with the statement made by the Commission that  'The 
WATTC  88  conference will have a major influence on  the Community's future 
external  relations  in  telecommunications'(  p.  172  ).  But  we  also  think  that 
WATTC  88  will have a major influence in  the procompetitive environment en-
visaged by the Commission.  It is unfortunate that the monopoly views and in-
terests of the  individual  Telecommunications  Administrations  and  operators, 
rather  than  those  of the  competitive  service  providers,  the  users,  and  the 
Community, may have played a disproportionate part in developing the present 
draft regulations. 
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4.0  Standards 
The EC  Committee is supportive of the Commission's objective of removing barriers 
to the provision of telecommunications equipment and services between its Member 
States.  The  Commission's  emphasis  on  the  development and  implementation  of 
pan-European standards w·ill  make a substantial contribution to this objective. 
We want, however, to make the following general remarks: 
•  The telecommunications business is now more than ever a truly global business. 
The Commission's efforts to create a truly common European market must take 
into account developments in  other markets and  should  not erect barriers  be-
tween  the  European  market  and  these  other  markets.  Encouraging  European 
standards to move towards total compatibility  with  international  standards  will 
facilitate the participation of European companies in the larger total marketplace 
and will facilitate a freer exchange of technology among nations. 
•  Mandatory application of standards should be restricted to aspects of safety and 
protection of the network and personnel against injury. 
•  Other aspects of the standards sh<?uld  be complied to voluntarily by manufactur-
ers. 
We fully support the concept of mutual recognition of type approval as a way to sim-
plify the currently expensive and time consuming procedures for type approval by 
avoiding  repetition  of tests  and  approval  processing  in  every Member State.  The 
extension of the current directive on  mutual recognition of test results to a full re-
cognition of type approval will benefit users and manufacturers. 
We are concerned, however, over the following specifics of the process for develop-
ment and standardization OF NETs (Normes Europeenes de Telecommunication). 
4.1  Scope of NETs 
The directive on  the initial stage of mutual recognition of type approval for telecom-
munications terminal equipment ( 86/361/EEC ) states that common conformity spec-
ifications,  on  which  NETs  are  based,  should  be  drafted  on  the  basis of essential 
requirements; four essential requirements are listed in the directive.  While we have 
no objection to the first 3 requirements -which are based on safety considerations-
we express concern over the fourth requirement which refers to 'interworking of ter-
minal equipment in justified cases'.  lnterworking of terminal equipment should be 
based on international standards and the compliance voluntary.  When  users buy a 
product for connection to a given service, they expect compatibility with that service 
as  well as the ability to interoperate with other terminals attached to the same or to 
a compatible service.  In order to fulfill user requirements, manufacturers· will comply 
with  the  established  standards;  otherwise  they  will  be  out  of  that  marketplace. 
Therefore,  interoperability requirements  need  not  be  made  mandatory.  If  require-
ments  other than  the  minimum  necessary- to  ensure  personal  safety  and  network 
protection are made mandatory for type approval, the tests will become more com- -
plex. costly and  time consuming.  The  manufacturer will be constrained by type ap-
proval costs and  delays every time tw wants to introduce new technology, either to 
Standard:;  10 
30 
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I reduce cost or to upgrade a product by incor.porating additional features or functions. 
We  support, instead, a voluntary certification process for functional compliance on an 
European and international basis. 
4.2  Development of NETs 
CEPT  (whose membership is restricted to Telecommunications Administrations) has 
been given the responsibility for NETs development.  We  are encouraged by the re-
cent decision of CEPT  to  allow the industry to participate in the NETs  development 
process.  We  believe,  however,  that  effective participation  of industry  has  not  yet 
been achieved.  Because NETs  will have a significant impact on industry and users, 
with users being the ultimate payers for services and  equipment, we advocate par-
ticipation of both  industry. and  users on equal terms with Telecomm11nications  Ad-
ministrations.  These  terms  should  include  -among  others- participation  in  the 
establishment of priorities and  schedules, and  involvement  in  the  TRAC  (Advisory 
committee of CEPT) decision process.  We consider also that CEPT's limitation on the 
number of industry representatives on  national delegations to technical sessions is 
an arbitrary one.  Open representation should be encouraged. 
4.3  Standards Institute 
We  note the fact that since the publication of the Green Paper, CEPT  has on its own 
proposed the creation of a European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). 
We  certainly hope that it will not produce an  undesirable period of uncertainty and 
adjustment, as  well as potential overlapping with other standardization bodies.  We 
do see, however, this initiative as a way of improving current CEPT procedures in the 
development of NETs  and of allowing an  effective participation of industry and users 
on equal terms with Telecommunications Administrations.  CEPT  activities in stand-
ardization,  other  than  NETs  development,  should  be  conducted  under  current 
CEN/CENELEC  voting  procedures.  In  the  long  term  an  integration  or the  multiple 
bodies  developing  standards  in  Information  Technology  and  Telecommunications 
should  be  considered.  This  integration,  leading  to  the· creation  of an  European 
Standards Institute -not restricted to telecommunicat''ltlS-, should foster a close co-
operation with international organizations such as  IEC,  ISO and CCITT. 
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5.0  Open Network Provision 
We fully support the Commission's intention to propose a directive on Open Network 
Provision.  We consider that  it  is  a  crucial  step to achieve effective competition  in 
telecommunications. 
Details of the directive will be prepared in the framework of SOG-T.  In this respect, 
we suggest that the Commission provide guide  lines to THE Member States to ensure 
that users and the information technology industry can effectively participate in  the 
development of an ONP  framework at the Member State level and also at the Com-
munity level. 
5.1  The  network boundary 
The definition of the boundary of the network is key to the overall objective of the di-
rective.  We  believe that  the  boundary should  be  clearly defined  and  be as  inde-
pendent of the technology as  possible.  In our view, the boundary should be defined 
at  the line termination of the  local  loop that links the central exchange to the cus-
tomer's premises. 
We are encouraged by the Commission's actions in favor of competitive provision of 
network terminating equipment (modems) for analog networks.  However, in the case 
of digital technology, the Council Recommendation on ISDN recommends a standard 
physical interface at the CCITT 'S' or 'T' reference points and it states that 'at least 
the NT1  function is provided by the public operator'.  This recommendation  leaves 
part of the equipment installed at customer's premises out of the competitive market. 
The  provision  of NT1  (Network  Termination  1)  equipment  in  open  competition  re-
quires a  standardized interface at  the CCITT 'U' reference point (interface between 
the NT1  and the line termination).  Some argue that this standardization is not feasible 
because  it  is  dependent on  loop technology and that the loop maintenance cannot 
be performed if the providers of the network don't provide at the same time the NT1 
equipment.  We  believe that, as  in the case of analog technology, a set of signal lev-
els  can  be  specified  as  well  as  the  requirements  for  the  loop-back  function.  Re-
stricting  the  NT1  equipment  to  exclusive  provision  by  the  Telecommunications 
Administration will prevent manufacturers from achieving economies of scope gained 
by incorporating NT1  function  within the terminal equipment as in  the case of inte-
grated modems. 
5.2  Interlaces to the network 
Whatever access a network owner/operator provides between its local central office 
and  its own value-added services. it  ought to provide that sar:ne  access to any pro-
vider of competitive services in a similar manner, under the same conditions and at 
the same tariffed rates charged to its own competitive services. 
It  is  also  necessary  that  diagnostic  and  control  information  is  made  available  to 
competitive  services  providers  in  orcler  that  they  can  achieve  an  efficient  service 
managem~nt. 
Open NetWork Provision 
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We  welcome the Commission's activity in  the definition of Open  Network Provision 
under the framework of GAP  ( Group of Analysis and  Forecasting of SOG-T ).  We 
think the Commission should encourage standardization in the ISDN area to allow an 
effective provision of a wide range of value-added services.  In particular, we believe 
that standard interfaces at  reference point 'M' for specialized service providers, and 
at  point 'P' for specialized network resources, as designated in the CCITT ISDN ref-
erence model, are urgently required. 
'  ; .  '  :(; 
5.3  Usage conditions 
Development of existing market potential in  competitive services requires the elimi-
nation  of  most  of  the  restrictive  conditions  related  to  the  usage  of the  network 
infrastructure by many Telecommunications Administrations.  These conditions are, 
in fact; barriers to trade in services. 
This is just a sample list of restrictions : 
•  Forcing  service providers to build  up their offerings over public switched net-
works· 
•  Plans or statements to phase out leased lines 
•  Prohibitions to interconnect private networks to public networks 
•  Prohibitions or surcharges on third party traffic 
•  Prohibition of 'message switching' 
•  Prohibition  to  optimize  network  utilization  by  multiplexing  with  user provided 
equipment 
•  Restrictions on the attachment of terminal equipment of the user's choice 
•  Prohibition of resale 
•  Usage sensitive tariffs on leased lines 
Very often the rationale for those restrictive conditions is the preservation of financial 
viability  of  Telecommunications  Administrations  and  the  prevention  of  'cream 
skimming'.  We are concerned that those conditions are in conflict with the competi-
tion  rules of the  Treaty.  The Commission's decision of December 10,  1982  on the 
'British Telecom Case' seems to give support to our concerns. 
We  suggest  that  the  Commission  make  an  exhaustive  analysis  of all  existing  re-
strictions and take a further decision in light of the competition rules of the Treaty. 
In  the next section, we develop some considerations on  'cream skimming' related to 
resale and usage sensitive tariffs for leased lines. 
5.4  Tariff principles 
We  endorse  the  Commission's  intention  to  promote  a  cost  oriented  approach  for 
telecommunications tariffs for reserved  services.  We  also share the view of an  in-
evitable trend towards rebalancing  local and  long distance  t~riffs.  Based on costs, 
the  tariff structure should  allow a reinvestment capability for  the  continuous devel-
opment of network infrastructure. perhaps supplemented with access to other finan-
cial resources.  . 
We  do  not  agree.  however, on the  1  .rception that  there is an  inevitable conflict be-
tween the  'universal service' obligations and cost-orientation prmciples.-- - ·-
.  .(.. 
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A fully cost based tariff scheme will produce. in our view, the following effects:. 
•  An  increase in  local rates and a decrease in  long distance rates.  While this will 
have an  immediate positive  effect  on  the  business community,  it  will  also be 
beneficial for the whole of society as  it  will  help offset the inequities between 
residents of large urban areas and those in remote regions.  If there is a social 
need to subsidize local rates, it should be done in a 'transparent' way, either from 
public funds or from revenues of the same service (i.e. telephone service). We 
see it  as  unfair to cross-subsidize among  different types of services  (~.e.  tele-
phone service subsidized from public data network service or vice-versa). 
•  A  reduction  in  the potential for resale ( i.e.  offering voice services over leased 
lines)  · 
Many Administrations are concerned about  'voice resale'.  We  belie·1e  that a  cost 
based· tariff scheme will reduce the room for resale.  The Commission seems to be 
in favor of banning simple voice resale as  a response to the Administrations' con-
cerns; we do not object to this approach provided that it is limited to a fixed transi· 
tional period after which the whole situation should be revisited. 
We do not agree with the Commission's perception that a usage sensitive mechanism 
for leased lines is a reasonable approach to  prevent 'cream skimming' or 'resale'. 
Usage sensitive tariffs will prevent voice resale, but at the same time will  produce a 
negative impact on value-added and data services offerings and on users. 
Users and service providers select leased lines not by chance, but for reasons such 
as security, reliability, response time, network management, etc.  Users have already 
invested in  applications that will  not  work properly over public switched networks. 
We  strongly argue for the availability of leased  lines  at  flat  rates  in  and  between 
Member States.  To  do otherwise· would  be  detrimental to existing applications as 
well as to the development of new and  innovative ones. 
5.5  Service performance criteria 
Telecommunications Administrations should be  legally obliged to provide and main· 
tain  their reserved  services and  network infrastructure -when they are the sole or 
privileged  providers- to  minimum  pre-determined  parameters.  These  parameters 
should be set by a European Standards Institute (as described in section .4.3) dealing 
with  information  technology  and  with  telecommunications  standards.  Again  user 
representation in this body is essential to its functional fullness. 
3  .. 4 
,• 
Open Network Provision  14 EC  Committee  Nov. 1987 
6.0  Competition in  network equipment 
In  addition to the Commission's proposed positions discussed in  section 3.0 of our 
comments, tt)e Green Paper also includes within the Acceleration of Existing Action 
Lines  a  proposal  that  Recommendation  84/550/EEC  on  public  telecommunications 
procurement be replaced on a phased basis by a Council Directive (p~ 188).  The EC 
Committee strongly supports the acceleration of this action line because we believe 
that the opening up of procurement for network equipment to competition is critical 
to the achievement of the Community's objective of 'a technically advanced, Europe-
wide, and low cost telecommunications network'. 
A truly integrated, competitive European market for telecommunications services and 
equipment would be incomplete without the inclusion of network equipment as a key 
component in the Commission's program.  Because network equipment is the foun-
dation for the telecommunications network infrastructure over which services travel 
and to  which terminal equipment is attached,  lack of competition  in this important 
market segment has direct implications for telecommunications users.  Indeed, the 
same advantages that will  accrue to users, to European industry and to network pro-
viders from the establishment of a competitive market for terminal equipment and for 
certain services are just as significant for the network equipment market.  Advanced 
telecommunications networks are the results of efficient, feature-rich  hardware and 
software.  Both the providers of services and the users benefit if the network equip-
ment products are developed and delivered in a climate of competition. 
Likewise, network equipment standards should. be included in the Community's effort 
to develop common pan-European standards for telecommunications equipment and 
services.  It  is  imperative  that  network  equipment  standards  be  set  to  enable 
European suppliers to  participate in  the global marketplace.  This  implies that pan-
European network equipment standards should support international standards. 
Thus, the EC  Committee agrees with the Commission's recognition of the importance 
of creating a truly open, common internal market for network equipment in order for 
European suppliers to achieve the necessary economies of scale.  (This position is 
also supported by UN ICE's statement on 'A Telecommunications Policy for Europe'). 
As  the  Commission  has  noted,  the  research  and  development  costs  for  network 
equipment have become so great that they can  no  longer be supported by a  single 
national market. 
The  Green  Paper  states  that  'The  development of a  common  market  in  network 
~~c;I.Jipment must therefore go  hand in hand with a substantial increase in the trans-
parency of procurement procedures of the  Telecommunications  Administrations,  in 
order to  ensure an open market in telecommunications equipment'.  (p. 91).  In order 
to achieve a fully open, common market by 1992,  the Commission recommends the 
accelerated development of common specifications for network equipment and their 
use  in  public  purchasing.  The  Commission  also  recommends  accelerated  imple-
mentation  of  Council  Recommendation  84/550/EEC,  which  encourages  Member 
States to ensure that  Telecommunications Administrations provide opportunities for 
undertakings  established  in  other  Community  countries  to  tender  on  a  non-
discriminatory basis tor at  least  10°/o  in  value of their annual orders regarding con-
tracts for switching and transmission apparatus. 
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The Commission has proposed that initially the recommended rate be increased from 
10°/o  to  40°/o  and  that  in  1989  the  recommendation  be  made a  directive.  The  ~C 
Committee would like to underscore the critical nature of the timing of this proposal 
if a  fully  open,  common  market  for  network equipment  is  to  be  achieved  by 1992. 
First. the increase from 10°/o  to 40°/o  is critical in the immediate future because ·a  10°/o 
share generally will not  be  suff-icient  to  support the  necessary adaptation costs in-
curred by a new supplier.  Second, the 1989 (or earlier date) for the directive is critical 
because  netwo1 k  equipment  procurement  contracts  are  generally  long  term.  and 
contracts entered into in 1989 (and earlier) may well foreclose significant portions of 
the market beyond the 1992 target date. 
Thus, the EC  Committee fully supports the Commission's goal of a fully open, com-
mon  market  for  network  equipment  and  the  Commission's  proposed  accelerated 
action to achieve that goal. 
C .J •• l._, ..... ;i..vll  111  network equipment 
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7.0  The formulation and application of competition policy in 
the European telecommunications markets 
The objective of the Green Paper is to encourage the harmonious development of a 
competitive telecommunications market in the Community, at least for the markets in 
non-reserved services and for terminal and network equipment.  The role of increas-
ing competition in stimulating innovation and demand is clearly central in the Com-
munity's proposal.  There is, therefore, a  need both for the legal framework of the 
applicable competition laws to be made clear, and for an administrative structure that 
ensures that those laws are e.ffectively applied. 
The  EC  Committee therefore welcomes and supports a clear commitment from the 
Commission to the full and effective application in the telecommunications sector of 
the Rules on  Competition  in the EC  Treaty (Articles 85-90).  In  this context, the EC 
Committee has favourably noted the Commission's willingness to take specific action 
against anti-competitive practices in the telecommunications sector by the national 
PTT  monopolies,  as  is evidenced  by the  British  Telecom  decision  and  the  action 
against the Deutsche Bundespost in respect of modems and cordless telephones. 
In  the field of telecommunications, all goods and services (including basic services) 
have  at  least a potential affect on trade between Member States.  The competition 
l~ws of the EEC  Treaty should therefore  serve as  the European  framework for fair 
competition in telecommunications.  The concurrent application of two or more, pos-
sibly conflicting, competition laws in different Member States can create unnecessary 
handicaps to the expansion of the telecommunications market, and impose adminis-
trative burdens on firms in dealing with all the relevant agencies involved. 
7.1  Thoughts on· greater coordination of competition policy between the 
European Commission and national regulatory bodies 
While recognizing, therefore, the desirability of a single set of principles applicable 
without discrimination throughout the Community, the EC  Committee recognizes that 
it  may be unrealistic to expect the European Commission to  undertake the burden of 
supervision and ·enforcement unassisted.  On  the other hand,  it  is clearly desirable 
that competition policy in this area should be centrally coordinated, and consistently 
applied in the different Member States. 
To assist the Commission in enforcement, one possible approach might be to estab-
lish a framework in  which national regulatory agencies (e.g.  OFTEL in the UK) would 
be responsible for the specific application of EC  competition laws in the telecommu-
nications sector to undertakings in their territory, and would do so in accordance with 
principles laid down by the Commission.  The Commission would have a supervisory 
role, but could also have the power. either on  its own  initiative, or at th<"'  request of 
one of  the parties involved, to  'call-in' specific cases  (e.g.  an  agreeme11t  involving 
undertakings in  several Member States).  Such a framework could ser-ve  to resolve 
inconsistencies in  the application of competition law among Member States.  Further 
consideration .~auld have to be given to procedural aspects (e.g. rights of appeal) but 
1  lles~ would· appear to he solvable.  - ·- ··· 
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The concept of the application of EC  competition Jaw  by national agencies· is not un-
. usual.  Article 88 of the EEC  Treaty envisages the application by national authorities, 
and Article 89 provides for their cooperation  and assistance. The possibility of parallel 
application of EC  competition law by competent national authorities is also expressly 
envisaged  in  Article 9(3)  of Council Regulation  17  of 1962,  which  is the base regu-
lation concerning EC competition procedures. 
Of  cqurse,  there  may well be  several  legal or administrative methods (such  as  di-
rectives under Article 90)  that would  no  less effectively meet the twin objectives of 
consistent application and effective enforcement of EC competition policy in the field 
of telecommunications. The EC  Committee's objective at this stage is merely to draw 
attention to what seems to it to be an  important issue, and perhaps to contribute to 
the debate. 
The  EC  Committee expecrs to contribute further to the debate with auditional com-
ments on the formulation and application of competition polk:y in ·the European tele-
communications markets. 
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8.0  The external dimension of a Community 
telecommunications policy 
8.1  Trade in  Services under GATT 
Nov. 1987 
The  EC  Committee agrees with the Commission that telecommunications services 
are likely to be discussed during the trade in services negotiations conducted under 
the auspices of the Uruguay Round of GATT  negotiations.  It  is unclear to the EC 
Committee, however, which telecommunications services the Commission would re-
commend for  inclusion in a  GATT agreement on  trade  in  telecommunications ser-
vices.  The EC  Committee agrees with the Commission that 'An agreement on what 
constitutes tradeability will therefore be an essential element in the negotiations'  (p. 
151)  and believes, therefore, that not all telecommunications services are appropri-
ately covered in the context of trade negotiations.  Trade negotiators should under-
stand  how telecommunications services are provided between countries, how they 
are utilized for trade in other products and services, and then determine the most 
productive way in which to address telecommunications issues during trade negoti-
ations. 
Trade  negotiators need to recognize the central  importance of telecommunications 
services for all  service companies  wishing  to  provide their particular services be-
tween and  within other countries.  Because all  service firms rely on  telecommuni-
cations services to manage their operations and/or to deliver their service products 
to customers, they share an interest in maintaining reasonable. liberal access to and 
use of public telecommunications services.  This general need for access to  and use 
of public telecommunications services on reasonable terms and conditions no less fa-
vorable  than  domestic  equivalents  should  be  addressed  in  a  general  framework 
agreement for trade in services. 
Because jointly-provided, basic  international telecommunications services are pro-
vided through cooperative  arrangements  between the telecommunications carriers 
and/or administrations of each country, it is very difficult to envisage how trade prin-
ciples would be applicable to them.  In general, telecommunic~tions administrations 
and carriers do not wish to provide basic transport services within other countries : 
i.e.  they do not desire market access with respect to such services.  Their inclusion 
in  multilateral  trade  negotiations  could,  therefore,  present  negotiators  with  over-
whelming difficulties, as well as serve to obscure the more essential objectives of 
access to  and use of telecommunications services. 
The ability to compete in the provision of value-added telecommunications services 
raises additional types of issues.  The EC Committee believes that such issues would 
best  be  resolved  in  sub-negotiations  on  a  sector-specific  agreement  (or  trade  in 
value-added services.  Existing GATT principles do not  address these require.ments 
fully, but they must be met for trade in  value-added services to develop its full po-
tential. 
Some important requirements to compete internationally in value-added services are: 
•  Fair market access: Removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers which !imit the ability 
of foreign firms to offer services in national markets. 
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•  Non-discrimination:  Non-discriminatory  market  access  for  non-local  firms  (na-
t ion  a  I treatment) 
•  Transparency:  Simple,  clearly-defined  market  entry  requirements  or  licensing 
procedures. if any. 
•  Publicly sanctioned monopolies: Assuring a monopoly or cartel does not have the 
~ffect of restricting services trade. 
•  Unrestricted movement of information:  Principles to govern restrictions on the 
nature, content or volume of information both within and between countries. 
•  Access  to  and use  of public telecommunications services:  Effective  access to  a 
range  of public telecommunications  services between and within countries on 
reasonable terms and .conditions. 
•  Standards code: Any ·technical requirements consistent with the GATT standards 
code, i.e., such requirements should not significantly increase the cost or time for 
obtaining approvals and should be limited to valid domestic purposes such as 
preventing harm to individuals or networks. 
•  Government procurement code: The  existing code on government procurement 
should be expanded to include telecommunications products and services. 
•  Safeguards:  A  code  designed  to  address  trade  in  value-added  services  must 
provide safeguards to  ensure that when the  network infrastructure is  provided 
exclusively by a single operator, it does not enjoy advantages in competition with 
other value-added  services providers, for  example through cross-subsidization 
or unequal access to the network infrastructure. 
8.2  Regulations by WATTC 
The  Green  Paper  makes several references to WATTC  and correctly notes the  po-
tential of the new international telecommunications regulations that will be produced 
by  the  WATTC  in  November 1988 to limit the scope for agreements which  may be 
negotiated within the GATT framework. 
The  CCITT  committee charged  with  preparing the  draft  international telecommuni-
cations regulations which will be considered by the WATTC  has completed its work. 
It is a matter of great concern that the draft regulations it has produced are capable 
of being applied in a way which can impose restrictions on any type of international 
telecommunications service, provided by any entity. 
The definition of international telecommunications service.contained in the draft reg-
ulations is  very wide  indeed, and  the option to  require any service to comply with 
CCITT Recommendations can limit the range of services that may be offered and is 
against the spirit of openness in the provision of non-reserved services contained in 
the Green Paper.  Moreover, the draft regulations were produced without the agree-
ment of the delegations of all m·embers of the Community; it is also noteworthy that 
the delegations from  all countries which  had  more liberal regulatory regimes  and 
which also included user representation did express severe reservations on the draft 
regu I  at ions. 
The  new  international  telecommunications  regulations  will  apply to  ITU  membe~s  •• 
and  will thus affect both intra-Community and extra-Community telecommunications. 
While  a  liberal  interpretation  of  the  new  regulations  could  be  applied  within  the 
Community, it  w1ll  be  itl the interests of the European information and  telecommuni-
cations services industry, which must be able to export its services, for the interr\a-
tional telecommunications regulations to be minimal and framed in a way that willliot 
enable a restrictive interpretation. 
t. 
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The  European  members of the ITU,  working together and presenting a common po-
sition. have the ability to bring considerable influence to bear on the outcome of the 
WATTC.  It  is  unfortunate that  the  monopoly  views  and  interests of the  individual 
telecommunications administrations and operators rather than those of the compet-
itive service providers, the users, and the Community, may have played a dispropor-
tionate part in developing the present draft regulations.  This must be corrected, but 
time is short and the Commission is urged to take action to facilitate the development 
of a common position by all  member states with the active participation of all con-
cerned parties.  The Green Paper indicates that the view of member stateS' and  ad-
ministrations has  changed  or is  changing and  it  appears unlikely that the present 
draft international tetecommunications regulations for the WATTC  would have been 
produced if the process had started today. 
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9.0  Free flow of information 
The development of the telecommunications market in the Community will in part be 
driven by the supply of and demand for services which use telecommunications, in 
particu Jar  those providing information.  The development of these products and ser-
vices requires, however, a  clear legal framework in  which the activity 'of compilation 
and dissemination of information is appropriately protected from unfair competition, 
whilst at the same time recognizing the interests of all Community citizens IN  unre-
stricted access to mankind's cultural and scientific heritage.  It is arguable that the 
laws affording protection for intellectual property in various Member States may no 
longer be appropriate to maintaining this balance. 
The EC  Committee understands that this is an  issue which may be addressed in  the 
forthcoming Commission Green Paper on copyright.  It would merely comment here 
that telecommunications provide,  in the final  analysis, only a  means to transmit in-
formation from one place or person to another, and the demand for that facility is ul-
timately  dependent  on  the  varieties  of  information  that  some  people  supply  and 
others want.  While there should be  no  restrictions on the provision of a  variety of 
information, the protection of individuals' privacy,  of intellectual  property, of public 
health and safety, and of national security have to be recognized.  In this respect. we 
are supportive of the· Council ratification of the Council of Europe's Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. 
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10.0  Social and Economic impact considerations 
The  EC  Committee agrees that the social impact of restructuring and establjshing a 
new telecommunications industry structure will be considerable. 
It  must be recognized that, as with all major changes, a transitory negative impact 
may be experienced.  We look to the Commission for their plans on minimizing indi-
vidual and enterprise hardship during the transition period.  the EC  Committee looks 
forward  to  the  opportunity to  comment  on further discussion  documt!nts from the 
Commission addressing how these effects can  be minimized while benefits for en-
terprises and for individuals in the Community can be maximized. 
It  is  possible  that the  restructuring,  due to the  penetration  of the  new electronic 
technologies  into  the  telecommunications  infrastructure,  may  cause  a  situation  of 
overmanning.  We consider this not a liability but an opportunity for the Commission 
and the Telecommunications  Administrations to  provide retraining opportunities to 
basically  skilled  staff  in  order to  help  offset  the  expected  shortfall  of  information 
technology personnel.  This will require, both on a  national and regional level, con-
siderable allocation of resources and expertise in order to meet individual and func-
tional  requirements.  We  would  welcome  the  Commission's  views  on  how  the 
American Chamber of Commerce can participate and assist in this process. 
We  believe that there is a  huge potential for new services in the medium and small 
enterprise sector.  This potential can be better stimulated by the competitive offering 
of services.  While Telecommunications Administrations can  play an  important role 
in  this area because of their economies of scale and broad geographic coverage, a 
clear separation between competitive and reserved activities of the Administrations 
must be a pre·requisite for their participation  i~ the competitive  marketpla~e. 
As  the  Green  Paper  states,  the financial  viability of Telecommunications Adminis-
trations should be preserved.  To this end, public switched voice telephone service 
may be reserved for the near term.  Provided that there is a clear separation and no 
improper cross-subsidies between reserved and competitive operations of Telecom-
munications Administrations, the EC  Committee would also support the participation 
of Administrations in  competitive activities.  It  should be  recognized, also,  th~t the 
offering of competitive services by other companies will stimulate user demand for 
new types of services, thereby increasing basic underlying transmission demand and 
improving  revenue  flows  to  the  Telecommunications  Administrations,  while  at  the 
same time reducing their risks and investment requirements. 
The  requirement  for  cross-border  provision  of services  in  the  Community  is  well 
stipulated in the Green Paper.  Although clearly stated  it should further qualify that 
no  other  barriers  be erected  which  restrict  the  provision  of services  beyond  the 
Community.  This elimination of barriers would help stimulate the export of informa-
tion  technology services outside the Community thereby promoting European tech-
nology, know-how and indeed a broader 'European mentality'. 
Finally, the EC  Committee would like to stress the need to ensure the consistency of 
other activities and initiatives of the Commission addressing the information services 
market at  large with the objectives and actions stated in  the Green Paper.  Equally, 
we encourage Commissiqn initiatives which would speed up the development of legal 
structures and  institutional changes  more  appropriate  to  the  emerging Information 
World. 
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3M  Europe 
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Procter & Gamble 
R.J.  Reyno·lds 








Baker & McKenzie 
Belmont European Community Law Office 
Continental Bank 
Coopers & Lybrand 
De Bandt, Van Heeke & Lagae 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York 
Nolst Trenite Houthoff Star Busmann 
Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly 
Nicholas Philips 
Price Waterhouse 
Rycken, Burlion, Bolle & Houben 
Sibbern International 
Van  Bael & Bellis 
Nov. 1987 
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Mr.  Michel  Carpentier 
Director  General 
Telecommunications,  Information  Industries  and  Innovation 
Com.1ssion  of the  European  Communities 
Rue  de  la lo1  200 
1049  Brussels.  BelgiuM 
Te1ex:  21877  COMEU  B 
41  22  838542  P.02 
The  EC  Committee  of the American  Chamber  of Commerce  in  Belgium  will  shortly 
send  you  its comments  on  the  Green  Paper  on  the development  of the  common 
market  for  telecommunications  services  and  equipment.  These  comments  will  be 
contained  1n  a position  paper  which  the  Telcommunications  Working  Group  of 
the  EC  Committee  has  prepared  in  the course  of the  last 4 months.  The  Group 
recently  invited  Dr.  Ungerer  to  attend  a meeting  in  order  to give  him  a 
gerneral  overview  of its work  ;n  this area. 
The  EC  Committee  is the sole  o~ganization in  Cu~ope  ~epresenting the  views 
of European  companies  of American  parentage.  It also  represents  the  interests 
of  the  European  Council  of American  Chambers  of Commerce  (an  association  of 
13  Amchams  throughout  Europe)  on  issues  concerning  the  European  Community. 
-he  membership  of  the  EC  Committee  includes  over  SO  major  US  corporations 
representing  users,  manufacturerers  and  services  providers  in  the  te1ecom-
mun1cat1ons  sector. 
Regards. 
Antonio  Patron 
Chairman 
Telecommunications  Working  Group 
EC  Committee 
cc.  Or.  Herbert  Ungerer 
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van Oaemenstraat 88 
1013 CN  Amsterdam 
Telefoon 020·27 9111 
Telefax 020-22 45 25 
Telex 11949 TCA nl 
Memocom 1271  NlX 985 
datu"TI 
20.1.1988 
ons  kenmerk 
,JE/88/111 
Geachte  Da~~s en  qeren, 
De  F.urop~se Commissie, 
'l:'a,,  Directoraat XIII 
1)e  heer  T.~·1.  Schuringa 
Jozefstraat II  37 
t3russel 
uw  kenmerk  onderwerp 
evaluatie Green  Paper 
De  ~~sterda~se Raad  voor  Informatica en  Telecommunicatie heeft kennisgenornen 
van het document  "Presentation of the Green  Paper on Telecommunications" uit-
qegeven  door  de  Commission  of  the European  Communities  dd  30  juni  1987. 
De  richtlijnen hebben  in hoofdzaak betrekking op de hierna volqende punten,  te 
weten: 
1.  ne  primaire taak van  de  PTT's dient gericht te  Z~Jn op de  transportfunctie 
binnen het gebied van  de  telecommunicatie  Cinfrastructuur); 
2.  Richtlijnen op het gebied van  de  standaardisatie dienen in internationaal 
verband te worden vastgelegd,  waartoe de oprichting van  een  European 
Standardization Institute wordt aanbevolen; 
3.  Diensten  oo het gebied van  de  Value  Add~ ~etwork Services dienen op basis 
van vrijheid door aanbieders  van deze diensten geboden te kunnen  worden  in 
een marktgerichte omqeving  waaraan  de  PTT's  op voet van gelijkwaardigheid 
deel  zouden kunnen  nemen; 
4.  Aan  de  leveranciers van hardware en  software dienen geen beperkingen te 
worden  opqelegd anders dan uit hoofde van richtlijnen op het gebied van de 
standaardisatie. 
I. ALGEMEBN 
De  Raad  heeft gemeend  op het document  een reactie te moeten  formuleren,  die zij 
u  hierbij voorlegt. 
In  haar reactie heeft de  Raad  zich laten leiden door  "kader  2"  van  het Groen-
boek~ waarin de  voorgestelde  standpunten  puntgewijs worden  opgesomd.  De  Raad  is 
op alle voorstellen kort ingegaan. 
Vervolgens heeft de  Raad  een aantal onderwerpen  opgevoerd,  die zij node  gemist 
heeft in bet Groenboek. 
Tenslotte heeft de  Raad  besloten,  naast haar commentaar  op het Groenboek  zelf, 
nog  enige specifieke  A~sterdamse accent~n aan  te brengen. 
lngeschreven in net StichtingsregiSler onder.nr  S  206540. Postgaro rek.nr. 4900066. Bank rek.nr. 49.59.54.543. ,4!!1STFRDAAtf.CJFlllJIID flOOR INFDR!t!JI'.T!Cll EN  TElEC0,.~1,1.!f!l11 !C/JT!.~ 
....  .L 
1\.  Hnnrlhn.ving  van  het  orincipc rln.t:  d~  t~lecoTfVrnmit:::ntiead'ili.nistrati~!';  ~Y.clu­
sievP.  of  soecial'=  r.~chten  hebben  rn~t  b~trekki.nq tot  h~t  n..:tnb.i.erl~n  ~n de 
~xploi  tati~ van  tin  n~twe~ld.nfr.:tstr.ur:tunr.  A.ls  e~n T  .. i.n-staat V'>0r  h~t gr:!heloe 
net\-lerk  of  voor  bepaalde delen  daar.van  een libaraler stelsel verkiest, 
d i.~nt  de  i11tec:rri t~it va11  de  alqemene  netwerltinfrastruct'l'l!'  op  korte  1'9n 
lange  termi.in  qewaarborqrl  ?.iin. 
F:en  beoerkt  aanbod  van  concurrerende  sa  tell  ietcammunict  iesyste.rnen  m~t twee-
rif"!hti.nqsverk~er  VP.r~ic;t  vert1er~ analyse.  Per gevi\1  ?.OU  goedkeur.i.nq  moet~n 
"'orden  VP-rleenti  als rJat  nodiq  is v0or  de  ontwikk:"!ling  van  1ienc;t~n on 
P.urones~ schanl,  ~n als de  fin;:mr.iel~ rlraaqkr.acht  va11  tie  hoofdaanbi.~de!'(s) 
hierdoor niet qeschnad  wordt. 
Ad  A.: 
De  Amsterdamse  Raad  voor Informatica en Telecomunicatie wijst erop, dat 
vrije mededinging in de openbare infrastructuur zal kunnen  leiden tot sti-
mulering van grotere efficiency in bet bebeer van bet net en tot verbete-
ring in bet openstaan voor de wensen van de qebruikers van bet openbare 
net. 
De  Raad  beeft echter geen bezwaar teqen het vooralsnoq op nationaal niveau 
handhaven van exclusieve en speciale rechten voor het beheer van de 
bestaande openbare infrastructuur, indien en voorzover deze term beperkt 
wordt gedefinieerd tot bet fysieke net, de directe overdracht van siqnalen 
en de  schalc:el functies,  en daarmee niet de functies worden bedoeld die bet 
beste in vrije mededinging kunnen worden geboden. 
Bi  j  de ontwikkeling van  nieuwe technologie met betrekkinq tot de infra-
structuur dient steeds opnieuw bezien te worden of bet creeren van een 
monopolie-positie gerechtvaardigd is. 
B.  Handhaving  van  het principe dat de  telecommunicatiead~inistraties exclusie-
ve of  speciale rechten  hebben  met  betrekkinq tot het aanbieden  van  een 
beperkt aantal basisdiensten,  voor.  ~over deze exclusieve rechten  in dit 
stadium essentieel worden  geacht om  de  taak als openbare dienst naar beho-
_)  ren te vervullen. 
Dit beqinsel  van exclusieve dienstverlening moet  in  enqe  zin worden  opgevat 
en  reg~lmatig opnieuw  in overweging worden  genomen,  om-rekening te houden 
met  de  technologische ontwikkelingen  en  in het bijzonder de  ontwikkeling 
naar een digitale infrastructuur·.  Er  mogen  geen  •gereserveerde diensten" 
worden  gedefinieerd waardoor het monopolie wordt uitgebreid op een wijze 
die in strijd is met  het Verdraq.  De  eniqe dienst die hiervoor oo dit ogen-
bli~ op  het eerste gezicht in aanmerking lijkt te komen,  is, gezien de al-
gemene  opvatting in de  Gemeenschap,  spraaktelefonie. 
Ad  B.: 
De  Raad  kan  instemmen met het standpunt van de Europese Commi.ssie,  dat "de 
exclusieve en speciale rechten tot het aanbieden van basisdiensten" in enge 
zin moet worden  opgevat en  (eveneens)  regelmatig opnieuw in overweging moet 
worden  genomen. 
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~on~urrenti~  w~nn~~r  ~ii  k11nn~n  nanton~n,  ~~t  ~-=t  bel~ng  v~n  ~~ qehruik~rs 
r'l i~t wordt  qerH~nri door  co:1~'1r.r.enti~  n:->  dat  h~tr~ffend~ terre  in. 
1\.  f0rti..ori  q~lrlt  nez~ m·~ni.ng  ·.mor  brisi.sdi~nc;ten.  T)P.  Rn~ri  is  V.'\:1  I')Or.d~~l t 
~at qeen  enk~lc basi.sdienst  voor  monoooli.serinq  in  aanmerkinq  komt.  De  Raa1 
'e~ijr-;t  drin  ook  ecn  m0nopolie  voor  spr~al<telefonie principieel af. 
Een  dergelijk standpunt  ten  aan?.ien  \'an  basisrliensten ware overiqens  in 
alle  d~arvoor qeeiqende  (Burooe~e)  wetten  on  te  n~en. De  nieu~re  Ned~rland­
~e wetgevinq  kan  terzake als  voorh~eld  dien~n. 
C.  Vri  j  aanbod  ( zonder beperkingen)  van alle andere diensten  ( • concurrerende 
diensten•, met  name  de  "diensten met  toegevoeqde waarde")  binnen  de  Lid-
Staten en  tussen de  Lid-Staten  (in concurrentie met de telecommunicatie-
administraties), die door de gebruiker kunnen worden qebruikt voor zijn 
eigen behoeften, die hij met andere gebruikers deelt, of voor bet verlenen 
van diensten aan derden,  onder de voorwaarden voor qebruik van de netwerk-
infrastructuur te definieren onder punt E. 
De  •concurrenrende diensten•  zouden alle diensten moeten omvatten behalve 
de basisdiensten die expliciet aan de  telecommunicatieadBinistraties zijn 
voorbehouden  (zie B). 
Ad  C.: 
Met  de  Commissie  is de  R~ad van oordeel,  dat alle diensten, die niet bij 
regelmatige toetsing  (nogl  strikt gerechtvaardigd bliiken te zijn voor.be-
houden  aan  de  PTT's,  onder vrije mededinging moeten  kunnen  worden  aangebo-
d~n. 
Oit princioe moet  een  basis vinden  in  de  algemene  telecommunicatie-wetge-
ving,  o?dat  de  te signaleren neiging  v~n de  PTT's  om  ook  o~ niet-qeregu-
leerde aspecten  invloe~ uit te oefenen,  vide de  voorwaarden die  sommige 
PTT's  stellen aan  leverancier.s  v~n  informatiedienst~, kan  woroen  tegenge-
gaan. 
D.  Strikte eisen in verband met de normen voor de netwerkinfrastructuur en de 
diensten die worden  aanqeboden door de teleoommunicatieadministraties of 
door aanbieders van diensten van verqelijkbaar belanq,  Olll  interoperabili-
tei  t  op Europese schaal te handhaven of tot stand te brengen. 
Bij deze eisen dient vooral te worden uitqegaan van Richtlijnen 83/189/EEG 
en 86/361/EEG en Aanbeveling 86/659/EEG. 
De  Lid-Staten en de Gemeenschap dienen ervoor te zorgen dat de telecannumi-
catieadministraties efficiente oommunicatie op Europese en wereldschaal 
aanbieden en dienen dit aanbod te stimuleren. Dit qeldt vooral voor 
diensten  ( al dan niet qereserveerde diensten) ,  waarvoor is aanbevolen aa ze 
op Gemeenschapsniveau  aan te bieden,  zoals de in Aanbevelinq 86/659/BEG 
omschreven diensten. 
Ad  D.: 
De  eerder genomen  EEG-besluiten,  waarbij  werd  voorgesteld dat Lid-Staten 
een  uitqebreid menu  aan  standaard diensten op  ~uropese schaal  door  de  PTT's 
moeten  waarborgen,  of hier al of niet vraag  naar is,  zouden  de  PTT's  kunn~n 
afhouden  van  hun  essentiele infrastructurele verolichtingen. 
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n~  ~a~d  on~0rstr~~nt  hi~rbii nnninuw  d~ rnening,  ~at  ~e  stan~aardi5atie op 
~i"lsi.s-i.:lfr.:"tc;+-_ru~ture~l  niv~au t0t  d0.  pri.;n:t.i.r?.  v~rnnt·~oordeliikh~id van  de 
P'T'T' s  h~hoor:..  Vnn  ri~ZP.  v~rnnt\.JOOr<ieliik mrtq  echt~r.  q~en stnndat'lroisat:\.c 
V·1'1  hP.t:  d j_ens  t.·~nnnldc~t  ,..,.ord~l"\  a fqeleid. 
t-1~1  ma11  vrtn  ~~  PTT' s  vet'wacht  wor.d~n, dnt zi  j  voortdurend  ond~r7.o~lt  ~leqen 
n.:)ar  de  omva:1q  van  de  vraag  naat'  aanqeboden  P.n  nog  .=:J.an  tP.  bieden diensten, 
op1at  de  infrastructuur steeds  in staat is rlie  rliensten,  waaraan de  behoef-
te  is  q~hlP.~~n,  ontL~aal door  te qeven. 
E.  Duidelijke omschrijving,  door middel  van  een richtlijn.van de  Gemeenscbap, 
van de  algemene eisen voor het gebruik van bet netwerk,  die door de tele-
communicatieadministraties worden gesteld aan  de  aanbieders van concur-
rerende diensten. 
Hierdoor dienen ook duidelijke verplichtingen op bet gebied van aansluiting 
en  toeqang te vall  en, die door de telecomnmicatieadministraties worden op-
qeleqd aan de  aanbieders van grensoverschrijdende diensten, an de kans op 
inbreuken op bet Verdraq  zo klein mogelijk te maken 
Er dient overeenstemming te worden bereikt over de normen,  frequenties en 
tariefbeqinselen, teneinde de algemene voorwaarden te CJilschrijven,  waaraan 
de dienstverlening in de  ooncurrerende sector onderworpen is. 
De details van deze ricbtlijn inzake bet aanbieden van een open netwerk aan 
gebruikers en aanbieders van diensten  (Open  Network Provision,  •ONP•)  die-
nen te worden opgesteld in over  leg met de Lid-Staten, de telecoan1Dlicatie-
administraties en de  andere betrokkenen in het kader van de groep van hoge 
ambtenaren voor telecommunicatie  ( SOG-T) • 
Ad  'P..: 
De  Raad  onderschrijft het  fundamentele  belanq van  een  Open  Network 
Provision:  een  open  netwerk  is absoluut noodzakelijk opdat alle betrokkenen 
hieroo toeqang  hebben.  Hierop maq  niet worden  afgedongen. 
Absolute  open  toegang tot de  openbare  infrastructuur op gelijke voorwaarden 
en  tegen tarieven volqens het kostprijsbeginsel  is essentieel voor de ont-
wikkeling  van  telecommunicatiediensten  in vrije rnededinging. 
Het  resultaat van  richtlijnen van de  REG  moet  dan ook zijn, dat wettelijk 
wordt vastgelegd dat de regels die gesteld worden  aan  informatieleveran-
ciers alleen dan gerechtvaardigd zijn,  indien en voorzover deze noodzake-
lijk zijn,  bezien vanuit een ~ogpunt van een correct funetioneren van het 
netwerk als zodanig. 
F. Vri  j  aanbod  ( zonder beperkinqen)  van randapparatuur in de Lid-Staten en 
tussen de Lid-Staten  ( concurrerend met de telecarmunicatieadministraties) , 
onder voorbehoud van type- of modelqoedkeuring volgens procedures die in 
overeenstermning zijn met bet Verdrag en de bestaande ricbtlijnen. Eventueel 
kan  voor de  lever~ng van het eerste oonventionele telefoontoestel tijdelijk 
een uitzondering worden gemaakt wat dit vrije aanbod  zonder beperkingen 
betreft. 
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Pn  ui.t~luit:o:~nn  voor  ont:Vil!lqst  tl'~;,t~"Tlr]r~  '1'!:"0i\ti~t<ltin!1~  (~~c~iv~ Onlv  B.:trth 
St~tinn - R08S)  voor  s~telli~tverhin~inqen  nien~n  t~ word~n q~lij~qest~ld 
ar:tn  t~rminals,  zodat  zii  slechts ann  een  qoedJ.ceuringsprocedur~ behoeven  te 
•  ..  mr<i~n ondcn·10rpen. 
Ad  F.: 
De  Raad  is van oordeel dat zowel digitale als analoge apparatuur voor aan-
sluiting aan het openbaar net  (de  zgn.  network tenminating equipment)  in 
vrije mededinging moet  kunnen  worden  aangeboden. 
De  Raad  ondersteunt volledig de doelstelling van de Europese Commissie  om 
tot een vollediq vrije markt voor randapparatuur te komen. 
Ret beginsel moet volgens de  Raad  zijn: 
centraal staat de  zqn  common  carrier met een speciaal regime; 
al hetqeen daar buiten staat is per definitie vrij  (dus oak:  het eerste 
telefoontoestel, de  zgn.  ROES  en het zendende Earthstation) • 
Uiteraard,  en hierover wil de Raad  geen misverstand doen ontstaan, is een 
beheersfunctie van het frequentie-spectrum in de ether noodzakelijk. 
G.  De  activiteiten van  de  telecommunicatiead~inistraties op  het gebied van  re-
gelgeving en exploitatie dienen van  elkaar te worden  gescheiden.  De  regel-
geving  heeft onder meer  betrekking op het verlenen van  vergunningen,  con-
trole van  typegoeokeuringen  en  interface-specificaties,  toewijzinq van  fre-
quenties  en  algemene  controle oo de eisen die aan het gebruik van het net-
werk  worden  gesteld. 
Ad  G.: 
!-let  de  Commissie is de Raad  van mening,  dat het essentieel is, dat de 
operationele en regelqevende activiteiten van de  PTT's qescheiden dienen te 
worden.  De  regelgevende instantie dient werkelijk onafhankelijk te zijn van 
de operationele activiteiten van de  PTT's en dient alleen regelgevende 
aspecten te bevatten  (zie B.). 
~.  Nauwgez~tte Permanente controle van  de  commerciele exploitatieactiviteiten 
van  de  telecommunicatieadministraties overeenkomstig artikel 85,  86  en  90 
van  het EEG-Verdrag.  Dit geldt vooral  voor  de  subsidiering van activiteiten 
in de  sector concurrerende diensten en  van produktieactiviteiten. 
Ad  H.: 
Het duidelijke standpunt van de Buropese Commissie betreffende de wijze 
waarop de  Prr  • s  zich dienen te gedragen is bemoedigend. 
Wel is de Raad  van mening, dat de Camnissie de door haar genoemde artikelen 
nader moet  uitwerken en met name  richtlijnen moet geven aangaande het voor-
kamen  van kruissubsidies en  andere oneerlijke concurrentie door PTT's,  zo-
lanq deze speciale rechten genieten en gebruik kunnen maken  van •exclusieve 
dienstverlening•. 
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I. Natr....ge?.ette  permanente controle van  alle particuliere aan!:>ieders  van diens-
ten  in de  voor concurrentie opengestelde sectoren, overeenkomstig artikel 
85  en  86,  oro  misbruik van rnachtposities  te verrnijden. 
1\d  I.: 
Dit voorstel  behoort overbodiq  te zt)n.  De  normale  toepassing van  de  alqe-
m~ne  "con~urrentiP--req~ls" van  het Verdrag  richt  zich  reeds  teqen l"lisbruik 
van  macht90sities,  die niet qeqarandeerd  ziin door  '~ttelijke monopolies. 
J. Toepassing van het gemeenschappelijk handelsbeleid op .telecommunicatie. 
Kennisgeving door de telecomrnunicatieadministraties, uit hoofde van Veror-
dening nr.  1762,  van alle onderling of met derde  landen gesloten overeen-
komsten die gevolgen kunnen  hebben voor de ooncurrentie in de Gemeenschap. 
Verstrekking van inlichtingen, voor  zover door de  Gemeenschap gewenst,  ten-
einde een samenhangend  Gemeenschapsstandpunt te bewerkstelligen voor  ~TT­
onderhandelingen en relaties met derde  landen. 
Ad  ~J.: 
De  ontwikkeling  van  een  gemeenschappelijk commercieel  beleid  zal de  doel-
stelling van  de  Commissie  o~ het gebied van  internationale vrije mede-
dinging  in  de  volgende  C~TT-besprekingen bevorderen. 
Het  zal handelsbarrieres op  het gebied  van  telecommunicatiediensten kunnen 
verminderen. 
Tevens  zal  hiermee  het risico kunnen  worden  beperkt,  dat de  ITU  t~TTC 
(International  Telecommunic~tions Union  - ~~orld Administrations for Telenh-
one  and  Telegraph Conference)  in  1988  reqelgeving  ~et zich brengt, die naar 
verdere  beperkingen  aanq~ande vrij~ concurrentie van  internationale tele-
comrnunicatiediensten  tend~ert. 
De  Amsterd~mse Raad  voor  Informatica  en  Telecommunicatie heeft op dit 
moment  de  stellige indruk,  dat wanneer niet wordt  inqeqrepen,  bijv.  door  de 
P.uro9ese  Commissie,  daar  juist zeer  be~erkende afspraken gemaakt  zullen 
kunnen  worden. 
)  III. VERDERE  EVALUATIE 
Aan  de  in het Groenboek  vermelde voorstellen en  aanbevelingen dienen vol-
qens  de  Raad  de  volgende  kanttekeningen te worden  toegevoegd op grand van 
het feit, dat volgens  haar aan  een aantal essentialia is voo~bijgegaan, 
c.q.  aan een aantal  juist voor  de  Amsterdamse  regia belangrijke  zaken geen 
aandacht is besteed: 
a. Gemist wordt  een voorstel ten aanzien van de  TV-kabelproblematiek. Juist 
de  mogelijkheid  om  kabelnetten  in  de  toekomst beter te benutten is voor 
de  Amsterda~se regia,  gezien de  zeer grate penetratie-graad van dezenet-
werken  van groat belang,  omdat  hier een groot toepassingsveld wordt ge-
zien voor  nieuwe  informatietechnologie; 
b.  Gemist  wordt  een voorstel  om  door middel  van  met  de  nationale  PTT  op te 
zetten  joint-venture een aantal nieuwe  ontwikkelingen te doen starten, 
die vooralsnog door  de  huidige  (verouderde)  wetgeving kan  worden belet: 
c. Gemist  wordt  een richtlijn voor  het reguleren van de  tarieven volgens 
het kostprijs-beginsel; 
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in  sf:.-l.1t  ?.i"jn  t~  l~v~rn.n  {"if~t:  r::nnv~ni.~Art  nns  0p  rH  .. t  'llOJ1113nt  ni~t"); 
f.  r.~r:1ist  .,,0rcit  e~n ri.chtli.in  voor  di.e  g~vo'lll~n,  w~ar et:!n  nieu~ (n.::ttio-
n:!ile)  telecomrnuni.c.:tti.P.-H~bJ~v.i.nq  in  .,trii-1  ~0mt met  reeds eerder cloor 
q•~br.u  i. kers  ven.,orv~n  r.echt~n. 
1 •  D~  ~~a·i  .,:->re~~<t  ha"lr  qrote  ~·la•1ni~rif1'1  u.i. t  ,,nor  rte  tolt i ze  waaroo  cle  P.uro-
n~~e  ~omMtRsi~ ~~ar voor~t~ll~n  h~eft o~fornul~er.n~ 
?..  ne  ~aa~ wijst  ~ro~,  d~t hP.t  noodzak~liik  t~  om  ~P.n  ~no~re overleq-stru~­
tllllr  te or.gnniseren  ciitn  tr~ci  itinnP.~  l  !.,e~tol!.=\t  om  cie  <iot! 1st~  t 1 inqen  Wln 
h~t  Gro~nbo;;'!k te ·(do~n)  r~~liser~n; 
3.  D~  ~aad i.s  vnn  oordeel  cio'lt  in  de  reqio  .:mstF!rtiam  de  voorstellen bi  i  uit-
stek  o!:>  h·.1n  ~·T·'iar~e  ~unnen  ~·1orn~n qetoetc;t: 
4.  ne  ~aart wijst erop,  dat  in  ~en regia  ?.oals  bv  Amsterna~ speciale wensen 
en  behoeft~n kunnen  hestaan,  m.n.  op het qebied  van  cie  infrastructuur; 
zij  ~eent nat het echter van  nationaal  belan~ is om  een  nationale  PTT  in 
staat te stellen  in deze  regio tijnig en  teqen  redeliike voorwaarden  te 
leveren: 
5.  De  Raa·i  wijst hi.erbij  op  het feit,  dat  in  ~e reqio A--nsterda;-n  thans 
joint-ventures met  de  nationalP.  PT'J"-T  worden  beproP-fn  (vide o.a.  Tele-
rx>rt  Arnsterna.-n) ; 
ry.  ne  ~aad biedt hierbij aan  om  in  n~ reqio  ~~st~rda~- beqeleirl door het 
Directoraat XIII - oo  zodaniqe  wij?.e  een  gebrui~ersinbreng te  ont~ik­
kelen,  dat tot  e~n werkel ijk ()ryen  ~·Jet,..;ork  Provision-situatie  qekom~n kan 
wordP-n  in  de  vo~ van  exnertise,  qeqeven  zij~ huidi~e  re~ds  function~ 
rende  orqanisatie-structuur. 
ne  ~a.::tci  ste  1 t  het  zeer  op  r.>r i is op de  door  n  voorqeschre'T~n ,.,i j ze  in de 
qelegen~ei.d qesteld te zijn van  haar  gevoel"=!ns,  ter zake  van  tie  ontwikke-
lingen van  de  telecommunicatie  in  Ruropa,  blijk te qeven. 
tekent met  de meeste hooqachting, 
,J. H.  Bnq~  l  , 
\  ~ 
P.H.P.  'rri.p, 
voorzitter. 
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POSITIONS  ET  COMMENTAIRES  DE  BELTUG 
SUR  LE  "GREEN  PAPER"  DE  LA  CCE  RELATIF  AU  DEVELOPPEMENT 
DU  MARCHE  COMMUN  POUR  LES  EQUIPEMENTS  ET 
SERVICES  DE  TELECOMMUNICATION. 
BELTUG- \Bel-gian  Teleco.mnnmication  Users  Groug)  represent·e  un  grand  nombre 
d 'utilisat.eurs=-proftmsiOnnels- d~ · tel"ecommunications  en·  Belgique~  BELTUG  a 
analyse  _le  "Gre_en  Paper"_ de  la Commission  des  Communaut.es  Europeennes  sur  le 
developpement  du- -marche  commun  des  equipements  et  services  de 
telecommunication. · 
Dans  1'  ensemble,  nous  apprecions  1'  initiative  de  la Commission  et  approuvons 
largement  1'  idee  generale  du  document,  encourageant  la  concurrence, 
l'ouverture des  reseaux et l'independance des  orcanismes de  realementation. 
Ci-dessous,  nos  commentaires  plus detailles  sur les 10  propositions du  tableau 
13  du  rapport de la CCE. 
A)  CCE; 
Acceptation  du  maintien  du  principe  de  l'exclusivite ou  de  droits  speciaux 
des  administrations  des  telecommunications  en  ce  qui  conceme  1 'offre  et 
!'exploitation de  !'infrastructure de  reseau.  Lorsqu'un Etat  ~embre choisit 
un  regime  plus  liberal,  pour  !'ensemble  ou  pour  certaines  parties  du 
reseau,  1'  intearite  i.  court  et a long  terme  de  1'  infrastructure du  reseau 
general doit etre sauvegardee. 
L'offre  concurrentie11e,  strictement  encadree,  limitee,  de  systemes  de 
communications  bi-directionnelles  par  satellite demandera  une  analyse  plus 
fouillee.  Elle  devrait  etre  autorisee  cas  par  cas  lorsque  cela  est 
necessaire  pour  developper  des  services a l'echelle Europeenne,  et  lorsque 
cela  ne  met  pas  en  jeu  la  viabilite  financiere  de  (des)  prestataire(s) 
principal(aux). 
Une  conception et  une  definition  communes  concernant  la mise  a disposition 
de  1' infrastructure  devraient  etre  atteintes  dans  le  cadre  du  point  E) 
ci-dessous. 
Les  utilisateurs  peuvent  admettre  que,  a court terme,  les Administrations 
des  telecommunications  continuent  a pourvoir  et a assurer  i•exploitation 
des  infrastructures  de  base  des  reseaux.  Ce.droit  davrait  cependant  etre 
sujet a revision  et  une  concurrence  en  la  matiere  devrait  etre  retenue 





55 - 2  -
Les  nouvelles  techniques,  qui  ne  requierent  pas  de  cabla&e  dans  le 
domaine  public,  telles  que  les  systemes  de  communications 
bi-directionnelles  par  satellite  et  lea  liaisons  par  ondes  courtea. 
devraient  etre  progressivement  retirees  de  la notion  d'infrastructure  de 
base. 
BELl1JG  voudrait  aussi  souligner  ici  la  position  exceptionnelle  de  la 
Belgique. avec  la  densite  elevee  de  son  reseau  de  teledistribution  par 
cible  pret a etre  exploite a d'autres  fins.  Cet  enorme  potentiel devrait 
etre  ouvert  a  de  nouvelles  applications,  offrant  ainsi  a  1'  industrie 
belge !'occasion de se positionner dans  ce domaine de pointe. 
B)  ~. 
Acceptation  du  maintien  du  principe  de  l'exclusivite ou des droits speciaux 
des  administrations  des  telecommunications  pour  ia  prestation  d 'un  nombre 
limite  de  services  de  base,  dans  le cas  ou cette exclusivite est consideree 
comme  essentielle,  a  ce  stade,  a la  sauvegarde  de  la  mission  du  service 
public. 
Le  principe  de  prestation  exclusive  doi  t  etre  interprete  de  fa~on etroi  te 
et  dolt  etre  susceptible  d 'une  revision  a  intervalle  regulier'  en  tenant 
compte  du  developpement  technologique  et  notamment  de  !'evolution vera  une 
infrastructure  numerique.  La  definition  des  "services  reserves"  ne  peut 
etendre  le  monopole  de  fa~on incompatible  avec  le traite.  Actuellement,  et 
compte  tenu  de  la  conception  generale  de  la  Commtmaute,  il  semble,  a 
premiere  vue,  que  le  service  telephonique  vocal  soit ·le  seul  service 
susceptible d'etre choisi. 
BELTUG 
Nous  sommes  d • accord  avec  une  interpretation  Ctroite  du  terme  "services 
de  base"  et  considerons  que  le service  telephonique  commute  est  en effet 
le  seul  domaine  ou  les  Administrations  des  telecommunications  peuvent 
conserver  temporairement  des  droits  exclusifs.  Comme  au  point  precedent, 
les utilisateurs estiment que  cette situation doit  pouvoir  etre sujette a 
revision.  Notre  position  est  que  1 • interet  general  est  mieux  servi  par 
une libre concurrence que  par des droits speciaux et exclusifs. 
Les  services  a valeur  ajoutee  dans  le  "traitement vocal"  ne  doivent  pas 
etre  inclus dans  lea services de base. 
C)  CCE. 
Offre  libre  (sans  restriction)  de  tous  les  autres  services  ("services 
concurrentiels"  y  compris  notamment  les  ·"services  a valeur  ajou-e.~~·.),  . au 
sein  des  Etats  membres  et  entre  les Etats  membres  (en  concurrence  ·v~c les 
Administrations  des  telecommunications),  destines  a  un  usage  par. 
1 • ut ilisateur  pour·  ses  prop  res  besoins,  pour  de.$  besoins  partAges . ateh 
d' autres  utilisateurs,  ou  pour  la  prestation  de  services  a  des  til!ts. 
soumise  aux  conditions  d 'utilisation  de  . 1' inf,rastructure  du  res~a\J  a 
definir dans  le cadre du  point E). 
.I  • • 
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Les  "services  concurrentiels"  couvriraient  tous  lea services,  A !'exception 
des  services  de  base  reserves  explicitement  aux  administrations  dea 
telecommunications  (voir B). 
BELTIJG. 
Lea  utilisateurs  sont  d'  accord  pour  une  offre  libre  et  sans  restriction 
des  "services  a  valeur  ajoutee".  c'  est  par  l'usage  de  ces  possibilites 
que  de  nouvelles  applications  commerciales  s'ouvriront  et  que  la 
productivite  de  celles  existantes  pourra  s'accroitre.  Cette  situation 
beneficiera  aux  usagers  belges  et offrira la possibilite a  nos  industries 
d'elargir leur marChe. 
La  libre ·concurrence  dans- les -sirvices_a _  vale·in:~-·ajoutee. depend .fortemellt 
des  principes  de  tarificati~- retenus  pir--les  Kdministrations  des 
telecommunications  pour  1'  infrast_ructuu  ..d,e_  ·base ..  et  des  possibilites 
d'acces  a  celle-ci,  en  particulier si ces Administrations desirent entrer 
dans le marChe  des  services  concurrentiels.  Les  recommandations  formulees 
au  point E)  coneement  egalement ·cette ques·tion. 
D)  CCE. 
Exigences  strictes  concernant  les  normes  regissant  !'infrastructure  de 
reseau  et  les  services  offerts  par  les  administrations  des 
telecommunications  ou  par  des  prestataires  de  services  d'importance 
comparable,  afin de  sauvegarder  ou  de  creer l'interconnectivite a  l'echelle 
europeenne.  Ces  exigences  doivent  s'appuyer  en  particulier  sur  les 
directives  83/189/CEE  et  83/361/CEE,  la  decision  87/95/CEE  et  la 
recommendation 86/659/CEE. 
Les  Etats  membres  et la Communaute  devraient  assurer  et  promouvoir  l'offre 
par les administrations  des  telecommunications,  de  communications  efficaces 
a  1 • echelle  europeenne  et  mondiale,  notamment  en  ce  qui  concerne  les 
services  (reserves  ou  non  reserves)  dont  1 'offre  a  une  echelle 
communautaire  a  ete  recommandee,  tels  que  les  services  definis  dans  la 
recommandation 86/659/CEE. 
BELTUG. 
Les  services  offerts  par  les  reseaux,  au  sens  large  du  terme,  doivent 
etre  transfrontaliers  et  batis  sur  des  stan4ards  internationaux,  afin  de 
preserver l'usage d'equipements et d'interfaces standardises. 
Une  participation  plus  large  des  utilisateurs  dans  le  processus  de 
preparation  et  d •  agrement  de  standards  est  proposee.  Cela  aiderai  t  la 
demarche  de· standardisation actuellement  freinee  par  des  protectio~ismes 
nationaux,  des obstructions,  des  longs delais et des  compromis  complexes. 
Le  support  actif  ~es standards  internationaux existants devrait preserver 
un  champ  libre  permettant  le  developpement  creatif  de  produi ts  nouveaux 
et de  futures normes. 
. I .. 
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E)  ~; 
Definition  claire,  par  le  truchement  d 'une  directive  communautaire,  des 
exigences  generales  pour  !'utilisation  du  reseau,  imposee  par  les 
lldministrations  des  telecommunications  aux  prestataires  de  services 
concurrentiels,  incluant  des  definitions  concernant  la  mise  a disposition 
de !'infrastructure du  reseau. 
Ceci  doi  t  comporter  des  obligations  claires  d 'interconnextion  et  d'  acces 
imposees  par  les  administrations  des  telecommunications  en  faveur  des 
prestataires  de  services  transfrontaliers  afin  de  reduire  lea  infractions 
au traite. 
Un  consensus est necessaire sur les normes,  les  frequences  et les-principes 
de  tarification  pour  definir  les  conditions  generales  imposees  au_secteur _ 
concurrentiel  en  ce  qui  concerne  la prestation de  services.  Les  details  de 
cette  directive  concernant  1 'offre  d 'un  reseau  ouvert  aux utilisateurs  et 
prestataires  de  services  (Open  Network  Provision/"0  N  P")  devraient  etre 
prepares  en  concertation  avec  les  Etats  membres,  les  administrations  des 
telecommunications  et  les  autres  parties  concernees,  dans  la  cadre  de 
groupes  de  hauts  fonctionnaires  sur les  telecommunications  (SOG-T). 
BELTUG~ 
Les  utilisateurs  sont  entierement  d'accord  pour une publication rapide et 
precise des definitions et  conditions  sous  lesquelles !'infrastructure de 
base  peut  etre  utilisee  par  les  fournisseurs  de  services.  Celles-ci 
doivent  etre  elaborees  par  un  organisme  international  de  normalisation 
representant  toutes les parties interessees. 
La  representation  Belge  a  cet  organisme  doit  comporter  des  membres  de 
toutes  les  parties  concernees,  y  compris  lea  utilisateurs  et  les 
fournisseurs  de services. 
La  politique  de  tarification  doit  faire  l'objet  d 'une  attention 
particuliere.  Les  tarifs  doivent  refleter  fidelement  les  COUtS  reels, 
eliminer  les  subventions  croisees  et  artificielles,  de  meme  que  les 
considerations  exterieures  aux  couts  (ex.  la  tarification  au  volume  sur 
ligne louee). 
La  tllrification  d •une  ressource  determinee  doit  itre  independante  de 
!•utilisation particuliere qui  en est faite,  que  ce  soit  par  la volx,  les 
donnees,  le transfert d'image •••• 
F)  CCE. 
Offre  libre  (sans  restriction)  d' equipements  terminaux,  dans  les  Etats 
membres  et  entre  les Etats  membres  (en concurrence  avec les adminlatr•tions 
des  telecommunications),  sous  reserve  des  procedures  d'homoloil~lon  et 
d • agrement  conformes  aux  obligations  du  Traite  et  aux  tl~e~ti~~­
exi stantes.  Le  fourni ture  du  premier  combine  telephonique  coht~ntion.riel 
pourrait  etre  temporairement  exclue  de  l'offre  concurrentielle  sans 
restriction·.-· ·  -· 
.I  . . 
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Les  stations  terriennes  de  reception  (Receive  Only  Earth  Stations  - ROES) 
pour  les  liaisons  par  satellite  desendantes  devraient  etre  assimilees  aux 
terminaux et soumises uniquement a une  procedure d'aarement. 
BELttJG. 
Les  utilisateurs  sont  pleinement  d'  accord  sur  une  offre  libre  et  en 
concurrence d'equipements  te~inaux. 
L'agrement  par  un  laboratoire  reconnu  et  independant  devrait  suffire  a 
permettre !'installation dans  tous  les Btats membres  de la CEE.· 
Nous  ne voyons  aucune  raison d'agrement  de  quelle  nature  que  ce  soit  des 
stations  terriennes  de  reception  (Receive  Only Earth Stations - ROES),  vu 
que celles-ci ne comportent  aucun lien physique  ~ un reseau. 
G)~. 
Separation  des  activites  de  reglementation  et  d'exploitation  des 
administrations  des  telecommunications.  Les  activites  ·  reglementaires 
concernent  particulierement  !'attribution _des  licences,  le  controle  de 
1 'agrement  et  des  specifications ·  des  interfaces,  1 'attribution  des 
frequences,  et  la  surveillance  generale  des  conditions  d •utilisation  du 
reseau; 
BELTUG. 
Il  est  essentiel  aux  yeux  des  organisations  d'utilisateurs  que  les 
activites  de  reglementation  deviennent  du·  ressort  d'une  organisation 
independante,  sans  aucun  lien  avec  les  Administrations  des 
telecommunications, ni aucune  fo~e de  controle de celles-ci. 
II)  .Q~. 
Suivi  strict  et  continu  des  activites  d'exploitation  des  administrations 
des  telecommunications,  conformement  aux  articles  85,  86  et  90  du  Trai  te 
CEE.  Ceci  s 'applique  tout  particulierement  aux  pratiques  de  subvention 
croisee  des  activites  dans  le  secteur  des  services  concurrentiels  et  des 
activites de production; 
BELTUG. 
No us  sommes  d • accord.  Les  administrations  des  telecommunications  doi  vent 
satisfaire  aux  reglementations  de  la  CEE,  COllUDe.  toute  autre  entreprise 
commerciale. 
. I . . 
59 - 6  -
I)  CCE. 
Suivi  strict  et  continu  de  tous  les  prestataires  prives  dans  les  secteurs 
nouvellement  ouverts  a la  concurrence,  conformement  aux  articles  85  et  86, 
afin d'eviter l'abus de  positions dominantes. 
BELTUG. 
Nous  sommes  d'accord  que  tout  abus  possible  de  positions  dominantes  dolt 
faire l'objet d'un suivi strict et continu  • 
. :)  J)  CCE. 
Applications  aux  telecommunications  de  la  position  commerciale  commune  de 
la Communaute.  Notification par  les  administrations  des  telecommunications, 
au  titre  du  reglement  17/62,  de  tousles  accords·conclus  entre  elles  ou 
avec  des  pays  tiers qui  peuvent  avoir une  incidence  sur la  concurrence  dans 
la  Communaute.  Communication  des  informations,  dans  la mesure  requise  par 
la  Communaute,  a fin  d' elaborer  une  position  communautaire  coherente  pour 
les negociations du  GATT  et les relations  avec les pays tiers. 
BELTUG. 
Nous  sommes  egalement d'accord avec  ce point. 
Cette situation serait certainement  amelioree  par  une  representation  plus 
equilibree  de  toutes  les  parties  concernees  dans  les  delegations 
officielles  belges  aux  instances  internationales  de  telecommunications 
(ex.  CEPT,  UIT,  CCITT,  etc  •••  )~ 
Il  y  va  de  1' interet  de  la  CEE,  quI a  long  terme,  plus  aucune  barriere 
artificielle  ne  s •  oppose  aux  developpements  de  services  efficaces  de 
telecommunication. 
En  conclusion,  BEI..TUG  est  favorable  a une  ouverture  coordonnee,  mais  neanmoins 
radicale,  du  marche  des  telecommunications  en  Belgique  et  au  niveau  Europeen, 
ou  de  nouveauX  et  meilleurs  services  peuvent  etre  introduits  plus  rapidement 
et a meilleur cout  qu'actuellement. I 
) 
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BELTUG  POSITION  AND  COMMENTS  ON 
THE  CEC  .. GREEN  PAPER"  ON  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  COMMON  MARKET 
FOR  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  SERVICES  AND  EQUIPMENT 
BELTUG  (Belgian  Telecommunications  Users  Group},  represents  a large 
community  of  professional  telecommunications  users  in  Belgium.  BELTUG  has 
analyzed  the  Green  Paper  from  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  on 
the  development  of  the  Common  Market  for  Telecommunications  Services  and 
Equipment. 
In  general,  we  welcome  the  initiative of  the  Commission  and  largely agree 
with  the  overall  perspective of  the  document,  promoting  competition,  open 
networks  and  independent  regulatory  organisations. 
Here  follow  more  detailed comments  on  the  10  proposed  positions,  outlined 
in  figure  13  of  ~he CEC'report.  . 
A)  CEC  : 
Acceptance  of continued  exclusive  provision  or special  rights for  the 
Telecommunications  Administrations  regarding  provision  and  operation 
of  the  network  infrastructure.  Where  a Member  State chooses  a more 
liberal  reg;me,  either for  the  whole  or  parts of  the  network,  the 
short  and  long  term·  integrity of  the  general  network  infrastructu~e 
should  be  safeguarded.  .  . 
,  I  . 
Closely  monitored  competitive  offering_ of  two-way  satellite 
communications  syst,ems  will  need  further  analysis.  It should  .be 
allowed  on  a case-to-case  basis,  where  this  is necessary  to  develop 
European-wide  services  and  where  impact  on  the  financial  viability of 
the  main  provider~' i's  not  substantial. 
Common  understanding  and  definition  regarding  infrastructure provision 
should  be  worked  out  uhder  (E)  below. 
BELTUG  : 
11, 
The  users  can. in  the  short  run  agree  the Telecommunications 
Administrat1pP.s  cpntinue  to  provide  and  operate  the  basic  network 
infrastructune~  .This  right should  however  be  subject to  review 
and  the  opt1or.  for  future  competition  should  be  retained •. 
New  emerging •techniques,  that  do  not  require cabling  in  the  public 
domain,  such  as  two-way  satellite communications  and  micro  wave 
links  should  be  progressively  excluded  from  the  bas·ic 
infrastructure. 
BELTUG  would  also  like  to  stress here  the  exceptional  po~ition of 
the  cable-TV  in  Belgium  with  a high  density  network  in  place, 
·ready  to  be  exploited  for  other  purposes.  This  enormous  potential 
~•  should  be  opened  for  new  applications,  giving  the  Belgian  industry 
an  opportunity  to  lead  in  this field. 
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B)  CEC  : 
C) 
Acceptance  of  ~ontinued exclusive  provision  or  special  rights for  the 
Telecommunications  Administrations  regarding  provision  of a limited 
numb~r of  basic  service~, where  exclusive  provision  is considered 
essential  at this  stage  for  safeguarding  public  service goals. 
Exclusive  provision  must  be  narrowly  construed  and  be  subject  to 
review  within  given  time  intervals,  taking  account  of technological 
development  and  particularly the  evolution  towards  a digital 
infrastructure.  "Reserved  services"  may  not  be  defined  so  as  to 
extend  a Telecommunications  Administration  service monopoly  in  a way 
inconsistent with  the  Treaty.  Currently,  given  general  understanding 
in  the  Community,  voice  telephone  service  seems  to  be  the  only  obvious 
candidate. 
CEC  : 
BELTUG  : 
We  agree  wit~ the.  narrow  interpretation of the  term  "basic 
services  ..  anct'consider  public  switched  telephone  services  indeed 
as  the  only  area  where  the  Administrations  temporarily might  keep 
an  exclusive ·right.  As  in  the  previous  point  however,  the  users 
believe  this situation should  be  subject  to  review.  Our  position 
is  that the  general  interest is better served  by  opening 
competition,  than  by  exclusive  licences. 
Value  added  services  in  the  .. voice  handling
11  area  should  not  be 
seen  as  part of  the  basic  services. 
'I 
Free  (unrestricted),provision of all  other services  ("competitive 
services  .. ,  including  in  particular  .. value-added  services")  within 
Member  States  and  betw~en Member  States  (in competition with  the 
Telecommunications4,1dministrations)  for  own  use,  shared  use,  or 
provision  to  third.~arties, subject  to  the  conditions  for use  of  the 
network  infrastruct~re~to be  defined  under  (E). 
I 
BELTUG  : 
,I. 
The  users  ag~ee that there  should  be  a free  and  unrestricted  right 
to  provide  .. value ,added  services".  It is through  the  use  of  these 
facilities  t~at new  ways  of doing  business  become  possible  and 
that increasedtproductivity  in  existing applications can  be 
achieved.  ~his will  benefit the  Belgian  users  and  offer 
opportunities  to  our  industry  to  operate  in  a wider  market •. 
; 
Fair competition  in  value  added  services  depends  heavily  on 
Telecommunication  Administration  pricing  policy for  the  tommon 
infrastructure and  access  facilities,  in  particular when  these 
Administrations  want  to  enter the  competitive  service market. 
The  reco~Hf:lndations made  under  point  (E)  also address  this 
problem. 
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D)  CEC  : 
E) 
Strict requirements  regarding  standards  for  the  network  infrastructure 
and  services  provided  by  the  Telecommunications  Administrations  or 
service providers  of comparable  importance,  in  order  to  maintain  or 
create Community-wide  inter-operability.  These  requirements  must 
build  in  particular on  Directives 83/189/EEC  and  86/361/EEC,  Decision 
87/95/EEC  and  Recommendation  86/659/EEC. 
Member  States  and  the  Community  should  ensure  and  promote  provision  by 
the  Telecommunications  Administrations  of efficient European-wide  and 
worldwide  communications,  in  particular regarding  those  services  (be 
they  reserved  or  competitive)  recommended  for  Community-wide 
provision,  such  as  according  to  Recommendation  86/659/EEC. 
g£: 
BELTUG  :  t'  I 
Networking  services  in  the  broad  sense  of  the  term  should  be 
available across  borders  and  be  based  on  wor·ldwide  international 
standards,  so  that standardised  equipment  and  interfaces  can  be 
used.  •  · 
More  active  participation of  the  user  community  in  the  process  of 
the  standards  preparation  and  approval  is proposed.  This  should 
help  the  process  of standardisation which  is presently  slowed 
down  by  national  protectionism,  obstructions,  long  delays,  and 
complex  compr9mise  solutions. 
I  I 
The  active support  of  the  existing  international  standards  should 
leave  room  for'creative,  new  products  opening  the  way  to  new 
services  and  future  standards. 
..  ' 
f 
Clear definition  by  Co~unity Directive of  general  requirements 
imposed  by  Telecommunications  Administrations  on  providers  of 
competitive  servio~s for  use  of  the  network,  including  definitions 
regarding  network•infrastructure  provision • 
.  '  I 
This  must  includerolear  interconnect  and  access  obligations  by 
Telecommunicatio~s Administrations  for  trans-frontier service 
providers  in  order  to  prevent  Treaty  infringements. 
I 
Consensus  must  be  achieved  on  standards,  frequencies,  and  tariff 
principles,  in  order  to  agree  on  the  general  conditions  imposed  for 
service  provision  on  the  competitive  sector.  Details  of.this  . 
.  Directiv~! on  Open  Network  Pr-ovision  (0  N  P}  should  be  prepared  in 
consultation with  the  Member  States, the Teleconrnunications 
Administrations  and  the  other  parties concerned,  in  the  framework  of 




E)  CEC  :  (cont
1d) 
BELTUG  : 
F)  CEC 
The  users  fully agree  that there  should  be  a clear and  promptly 
published  definition of  the  conditions  under  which  network 
infrastructure can  be  used  by  service  providers.  These  should  be 
worked  out  by  an  international  regulatory  body  representing  all 
interested  parties.  -
The  Belgian  representation  to  this regulatory  body  should 
represent  there  the  interests of  all  concerned  parties,  including 
users  and  service  providers. 
Particular aftention must  be  given  to  the  guidelines  on  tariff 
setting.  Tariffs should  reflect closely actual  costs,  and 
eliminate  crQss-subsidies  and  artificial,  non  cost  related 
approaches  (e.g.  volume  based  tariffs on  leased  data  lines). 
The  use  of  a :given  facility,  for voice,  data,  image  or  other 
purpose  should  not  be  relevant  to  the  pricing of  this facility. 
·I 
Free  (unrestricted)'pr.ovision  of  terminal  equipment  within  Member 
States  and  between  Member  States  {in  competition  with 
Telecommunications  ~dministrations), subject to  type  approval  as 
compatible  with  Treaty obligations  and  existing Directives.  Provision 
of  the  first (conventional)  telephone  set could  be  excluded  from 
unrestricted  provision' on  a  temporary  basis. 
~I I  .  ' 
Receive  Only  Earth.,Stations  (ROES)  for  satellite down-links  should  be 
assimilated with  terminal  equipment  and  be  subject to  type  approval 
only. 
BELTUG  : 
The  users  ful)y  asree  that the  tenminal  and  end-user  equipment 
market  shou.l
1q
1'pe  open  for  competition. 
I 
Type  approval  from  a recognised,  independent  laboratory should 
suffice to  allow  installation in  any  EEC  country. 
For  Receive-Only  Earth  Stations,  we  see  no  reason  why  this should 
be  subject  to  any  kind  of approval,  since they  have  no  physical 
attachment  to  a network. 
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G)  CEC  : 
Separation  of regulatory  and  operational  activities of 
Telecommunications  Administrations.  Regulatory  activities concern  in 
particular licensing,  control  of  type  approval  and  interface 
specifications, allocation of  frequencies,  and  general  surveillance of 
network  usage  conditions. 
BELTUG  : 
It is essential  in  the  eyes  of  the  user  organisation  that  these 
regulatory  a~~ivities become  the  responsibility of  an  independent 
body,  without  any  tie with  the  Telecommunications  Administration 
and  not  reporting  to  them. 
H)  CEC 
I) 
Strict continuous  review  of  operational  (commercial). activities of 
Telecommunications  Administrations  according  to Articles 85,  86  and 
90,  EEC  Treaty.  Th~s applies  in  particular to  practices  of 
cross-subsidisation1 of activities  in  the  competitive  services  sector 
and  of  activities in  manufacturing. 
CEC  : 
BELTUG  : 
We  agree,  the  Telecommunication  Administrations  should  comply 
with  the  regulation of  the  community,  as  any  other commercial 
organisation .4, 
1 
I  . 
Strict continuous  1~eview of all  private  providers  in  the  newly  opened 
sectors  according,to Articles  85  and  86,  in  order  to  avoid  the  abuse 
of  dominant  posi~ions., 
I  't  BELTUG  :  .  I  I 
I 
We  agree.that possible  abuses  of dominant  positions  should  be 
under  continuous  review. 
J)  CEC  : 
Full  application of  the  Community's  common.commercial  policy  to 
teleconmunications.  Notification  by  Telecommunications 
Administrations  under  Regulation  17/62  of  all  arrangements  between 
them  or with  Third  Countries  which  may  affect competition  within  the 
Community.  Provision  of  information  to  the  extent  required  for  the 
Community,  in  order  to  build  up  a consistent Community  position  for_ 
GATT  negotiations  and  relations  with  Third  Countries. 1 
) 
J)  CEC  :  (cont'd) 
BELTUG  : 
6 
We  again  agree  with  this  point. 
A more  balanced  representation  of  all  concerned  parties  in  the 
official  Belgian  delegations  to  the  International 
telecommunications  organisations  (e.g.  CEPT,  ITU,  CCITT,  etc •• ) 
would  certainly  improve  the  situation. 
It is in  the  long  term  interest of  the  European  community  that  no 
artificial  barriers  be  maintained  that slow  down  the  development 
of  effective Telecommunications  services. 
(. 
As  a conclusion,  BELTUG  is  in  favor  of  an  orderly  but  nevertheless  radical 
and  active  move  to  a more  open  European  telecommunications  market  in  Belgium 
and  at the  European  le~el, where  new  and  better services  can  be  implemented 
faster and  at lower  cost  than  today. 
·I 
I  'i 
I  I 
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COMMENTS  FROM  BRITISH  TELECOM  ON  TBE  EUROPEAN  COMMISSION'S 
GREEN  PAPER  ON  TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Introduction 
1.  British Telecom  shares the Commission's  view that it 
is essential to create as  far  as  possible an  integrated 
European market for  telecommunications  goods  and  services 
and  that the most  appropriate means  of achieving this goal 
would  be the introduction of wider  competition on  a 
Community-wide  scale into  those markets.  We  therefore 
support the aims  and  principles set out ~the Green  Paper. 
In the  following  comments  we  seek  not  to examine  in detail 
every argument  and  proposal  set out'in.the Green  Paper  but 
rather  to draw  to the attention of  the Commission  those 
aspects of  the Green  Paper which,  in our  experience as  the 
major  operator  in Europe's  most  liberal  telecommunications 
environment,  most merit scrutiny if the objectives of  the 
Green  Paper are to  be  achieved. 
2.  Whilst we  share the Commission's  concern  that its 
proposals  should  be  put  into effect as quickly as  is 
practicable and that the vested  interests of  no  member 
state•or industrial sector  should  be  allowed  to delay the 
creation of  a  more  integrated European  telecommunications 
market,  we  feel  strongly that it is essential that the 
Community's  eventual  policies are properly formulated  and 
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research,  thought  and  analysis,  which will  inevitably take 
time.  The  risk that taking  time  might detract  from 
momentum  of  the  Commission's  initiative must  be  balanced 
against the risk that an  over-hasty  approach  to this 
extremely  complex  subject might  result  in  ineffective 
legislative proposals  which  would  squander  the opportunity 
for  reform created by  the Commission.  Even  in the United 
Kingdom,  where  there was  no  need  to  reconcile conflicting 
national  interests,  the  process  of  introducing 
liberalisation into  the markets  for  telecommunications 
goods  and  services  took  almost  five  yea~s.  Whilst  we  do 
not  necessarily  suggest  that the  Commission's  timetable 
should  follow  this,  we  believe  that-~t should be  seen as  a 
realistic example  of  the  time  which  may  need to  be  spent  in 
working  from  first  proposals  to  completed legislative 
enactments. 
The  Infrastructure and  Telecommunication  Services 
3.  We  agree wholeheartedly with the Commission's 
conclusion  that  any  liberalisation of  the  telecommunication 
services market  must  not  jeopardise the  integrity of  the 
existing  and  f11ture  telecommunications  networks  in  the  ., 
Community.  The  national  Telecommunications  Administrations 
(TAs)  must  remain  able  to  finance  the  provision of 
telecommunication  services wherever  there  is reasonable 
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demand.  The  member  state governments  are probably best 
qualified to determine  the  circumstances 
and  telecommunications  needs  of their societies,  and the 
freedom  to reserve special  infrast.ructure and  service 
provision rights to the TAs  should  remain with  the member 
state governments. 
Whilst we  support this as  a  general statement of principle, 
we  feel  that there are certain issues  on  which  more  thought 
will  be  necessary. 
3.1  It will  be  necessary to define  w~th some  degree of 
precision and care  the  scope of  telecommunications 
infrastructure and  services for  the ~urposes of the 
Community  policies.  Too  broad  a  definition may  subject to 
eelecommunications  regulation related activities,  such as 
broadcasting,  which  are not  properly thought of as 
telecommunications.  On  the other  hand  too  narrow  a 
definition may  have  the effect of  introducing  regulatory 
distortions  into commercial  decisions.  For  example,  any 
definition drawn  by  reference  to  the  technology  used or  the 
kind of  signal carried  <such  as,  for  example,  one-way  cable 
television  systems)  would  tend  to  influence commercial 
decisions  in  favour  of  the unregulated  technology.  In  •• 
order  to develop properly,  the  telecommunications markets 
need  to be as  free  as  ppssible of  regulatory distortions 
and must  certainly not  be  diverted by  regulatory pressures, 
AWG~ however  inadvertent,  into technological  and  commercial 
backwaters.  To  continue  the  example  of  cable television, 
it would  be  unfortunate  indeed  if modern  interactive 
systems  were  to  be  subject  to  regu~ation as 
telecommunication  systems  <which  they  undoubtedly  are)  but 
one-way  systems  were  left unregulated.  This  would  tend  to 
encourage  market  entrants to adopt  the older  technologies 
of the one-way  systa~s so  as  to  avoid  regulation  and would 
deprive the development  of  interactive services of an 
important market  impetus. 
3.2  Any  proposal  to  create a  regulat9ry distinction 
between  TAs  and  others  in  the  telecommunications  industry 
will  need,  as  one  of  its bases,  a  so~nd and  logical 
definition of  the point at which  theTA's  public  network 
infrastructure gives  way  to  the user's private equipment. 
Developments  in  technology will  make  it increasingly 
possible to locate special  features  in the  network or  in 
c~stomers•  ~quiprnent,  and  it will  be  in  the  interests of 
both  the  TA  and  the  user  that  there  should  be certainty as 
to where  the  network  termination point  is to  be  found. 
Cpen  markets  in  terminal  apparatus  and  value added  services 
will  be  impossible  if the  TAs  are able  to  extend their 
monQGoly  of  public  networks  to  incorporate terminals  and 
value  added  systems.  Conversely  the  special  rights 
reserved to  the TAs  wil~ be  significantly diminished if 
users  are  permitted  to  push  back  the  network  boundary  into 
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theTA's  system. 
3.3  Community  policies should make  it clear that the 
Co~ission is not  insisting that the TAs ~  be·given 
special rights with  regard to infrastructure and  reserved 
services.  Although  the Green  Paper  states that the 
Commission  accepts  that member  state governments may  grant 
such  special  rights,  this  seems  to  be  widely interpreted as 
a  mandatory,  rather  than  permissive,  proposal.  British 
Telecom is firmly of  the opinion  that controlled 
competition  in the provision of  both  inffastructure and all 
telecommunication services  (including voice telephony, 
telex and  data  transmission)  is  comp~tible with  the 
obligation of one or more  TAs  to  provide telecommunication 
services wherever  there is reasonable  demand.  The  benefits 
of  such  competition are that it stimulates efficiency, 
gives  strong  incentives  to  base  prices  on  costs and 
generally offers  a  more  effective and  equitable alternative 
to constant regulatory supervision. 
4.  The  Commission's  proposals,  that privately-provided 
satellite uplinks  should  be  permitted on  a  case  by  case 
basis  and  that receive  only  earth stations  should  be  ,, 
treated as  ordinary  terminal  apparatus,  cause us  great 
concern.  The  satellite is as  much  a  part of the 
infrastructure as  cables  in the  ground.  Although 
AWGAAM 
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satellites and terrestrial infrastructures  have  certain 
differing specialised features,  they  both  perform 
essentially the  same  functions  of  conveying 
telecommunication  signals  and  shou~d therefore,  in our 
view,  be  treated in like manner.  A particular risk of 
permitting the private provision  of  satellite services  is 
that it will  introduce  regulatory distortions of  the kind 
described  in 3.1  above.  The  capacity of  telecommunication 
satellites is finite,  even  in theory.  It would  be  a  waste 
of  that resource if the existence of  more  relaxed rules was 
to divert to satellite a  number  of  services which  could 
with  less  cost  be  provided  by  terrestria~ means.  The 
services offered  by  the TAs  at present provide all the 
functions  which  privately-provided  s~t~llite services  could 
offer.  We  therefore  see  no  reason  to  change the existing 
rules. 
Tariffs 
5.  We  are  concerned  about  inconsistencies  in  those 
sections of  the  Green  Paper  dealing with tariff issues. 
There  seem  to  be  three main  strands: 
- recognition  of  social  goals  and  a  consequent  need  for 
•• 
tariff flexibility; 
- the desirability of  moving  towards  cost-based tariffs; 
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the aim of moving  towards  harmonised  tariff principles 
and,  perhaps  ultimately,  to a  unified European  tariff 
zone. 
These  ideas  seem  to us  to exhibit mutual  inconsistencies 
and  to give  insufficient weight  to the diversities which 
exist among  the European  TAs  at present.  Most  TAs  are 
state-owned,  and  outside the  United  Kingdom  they fix their 
tariffs without  regard  to the pressures of  network 
competition.  All  have different financial  and  commercial 
objectives  (whether  set by  Government  or  by  market 
expectations>:  and different  arrang~e~ts apply for 
taxation,  accounting and  transfer charging  between 
state-owned enterprises.  These,  added  to  the different 
levels of productivity and  different geographical  factors 
in  each  member  state,  suggest  strongly that cost-based 
tariffs would  not  be  uniform  throughout the Community.  The 
imposition of  uniform tariffs which  are  not underlain  by 
uniform costs would  cause  economic  harm  rather than 
benefit. 
Moreqyer,  any  suggestion that,  if tariffs are cost-based, 
restrictions on  competition are  needed  to  enable  TAs  to 
finance  the  provision of essentially unprofitable  "social" 




services.  Even  in  a  competitive environment  such  services 
can  for  example  be  financed  by  direct government  subsidy or 
by  requiring theTA's competitors  to contribute a  fair 
share. 
Aooaratus  and  Standards 
6.  It seems  to  us  self-evident that there should be  a 
Community-wide  free market  in approved  terminal  apparatus 
and  that the conditions  for  obtaining  and  documenting  such 
approval  should  be  as  open  as  possible.  This aspiration 
must,  however,  be  viewed  against the background of the 
I 
variety of  technical  specifications of the national 
telecommunications  networks.  In  tha~ _environment  perhaps 
the  best which  can  be  expected  is that Community  rules  on 
the mutual  recognition of testing and  certification 
procedures  should  be  followed  according to their spirit as 
well  as  to  the letter.  Meanwhile  the  Community  should make 
all possible progress  towards  ensuring that se;vices  in 
future are technically compatible  among  member  states and 
towards  writing  the  NETs  which will  be  needed.  In this 
respect we  support the  proposals  of  CEPT  for  the creation 
of  a  European Telecommunications  Standards Institute. 
,, 
It is vital that there  should  not  be rival standards 
bodies  and  that European.standards  should  not  isolate 
Community  manufacturers  from  world markets. 




Separating the Commercial  and  Regulatory Activities of TAs 
7.  We  agree  that  the  separation of  the  regulatory  and 
operational  functions  of  the TAs  will  be  essenti~l to the 
-·  """. 
establishment and administration of  truly competitive 
telecommunications markets  in the member  states.  However, 
great  car~ must  be  taken to  ensure  that this separation is 
accomplished  properly  and  that the body  entrusted with  the 
national  regulatory authority is  not  biased  towards 
indigenous  enterprises,  particularly the TA  from  which  i.t 
was  created.  There  may  be  merit  in  the~Commission's 
setting out the basic functions  of  a  national  regulatory 
authority and  some  basic criteria  wh~ch it is to apply  in 
the discharge of  those functions. 
Aoolication of  the  Comoetition  Rules  of  the Treaty of  Rome 
8.  We  accept that the relevant  provisions of  the Treaty 
should  be  fully applied to  both  public  and  private 
suppliers  of  telecommunications  equipment  and  providers  of 
telecommunication  services.  The  rules  should  be  applied 
equally to all:  the  TAs  should  not  be  subjected to more 
oner~ps rules  simply  by  virtue of  the status of TA. 
Questions  of market  dominance  must  be  addressed generally 
through  the  Community's .competition rules  in  recognition of 
the fact that market  dominance  may  arise  through  a  de  facto 
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position  in  supply of  terminal  and  network  ~pparatus as 
well  as  from  the de  jure or  de  facto  position of the TAs. 
9.  In  the  enforcement  of  the Treaty rules,  due  weight 
must  be  given  to  the  need  for  co-operation between  TAs  in 
order  to provide  for  the  proper  conduct of  inte~national 
telecommunications  so  as  to meet  the  needs  of users. 
Without  appropri~te bilateral and  multilatera~ a9r~~ents 
and  understandings,  international  telecommunications  would 
be  impossible.  It is not,  in our  view,  sufficient to say 
that agreements  which  genuinely  benefit consumers will  be 
eligible for  exemption  under  Article 85(3).  Exemption 
under  that Article would still have  to  be  sought,  and  the 
burden of  notifying all existing  agre~~ents would  be 
enormous.  Likewise  the  Commission's  DGIV  would  be  unable 
to  respond  in  any  reasonable  time,  and it would  b• 
potentially disastrous if Europe's  telecommunications were 
to  be  run  for  years  on  the  basis  of  agreements  which  could 
be  declared  invalid overnight.  We  believe that  for  these 
reasons  some  exemption,  or at least opposition procedure, 
should  be  available  in  respect of  international operating 
agreements. 
10.  "A particular  problem which  the Community's 
competition  rules  must  confront  is the  tendency of  member 
state governments  to  use  public  funds  to  finance  the 
provision of  services  seen  by  the  government  as  innovative 
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or otherwise socially or politically desirable.  Such 
practices are clearly  inimical  to fair  competition,  whether 
between  TAs  or  between  the  TA  and  private  service 
providers,  and  must  be  prevented  by.  the Commission  if a 
fair market  is ever  to develop. 
11.  We  feel  strongly that  the existing  Community 
institutions are perfectly adequate to administer  and 
enforce  the Treaty rules  in  the  telecommunications 
industry.  The  creation of  a  European  telecommunications 
regulatory authority would,  in  our  view,  merely add  to the 
costs of regulation,  duplicate  national ~supervision, 
increase regulatory uncertainty,  and  obscure,  if not 
actually hinder,  the  implementation ·o~  the policies set out 
in the Green  Paper. 
Common  Commercial  Policv  and  External  Relations 
12.  We  recognise  the desirability for  Europe_to  present 
a  strong  and  coherent front  in  international  negotiations 
and  believe that this can  best  be  achieved  through  a 
continuous  process  of consultation and  negotiation.  This 
will doubtless  be  facilitated by  the  gradual  implementation 
of  th~ various aspects  of  community  telecommunications 
policy.  However,  we  are concerned  about  the  issues 
addressed  in the  Green  Paper  on  this  subject.  It is 
essential  that  the  freedom  of all  telecommunications 
.... 
AWGAAM operators,  including TAs,  to contract with others 
outside the  Community  should  be  respected.  Each  TA  is in a 
different commercial  position;  and  what  makes  sense  for  one 
will  not  necessarily  be  suitable for  another. 
Procurement 
We  are concerned about  the  proposals  to extend  the coverage 
of  the  procurement  recommendation  and  to replace it with  a 
directive.  A  substantially greater  burden  than  now  exists 
would  have  serious  commercial  implications  (in  terms  of 
actual  costs  and  premature disclosure of.market  intentions> 
' 
for  operators  facing  competition  and  would  not  in these 
circumstances  provide  real  benefits ·tp.suppliers. 
Procurement  rules are necessary  only where market 
distortions resulting  from  the  existence of monopolies 
prevent  fair  access  to markets.  Where  there  is 
effective competition at the  end  user  level  in the supply 
of  network  services  (in  relation to procurement.of  network 
equipment),  or  in the  supply of  customer  premises  equipment 
(in relation to  procurement  of. that),  purchasers  are forced 
to apply  commercial  criteria.  Reversed distortions would 
in fact occur  if rules were  applied only to selected 
perso~s in  such markets.  Any  procurements must  therefore 
be  applied  even-handedly  to all participants in any  market 
and  should  be  minimised  ~n competitive markets:  that is, 
they  must  be  structured in  such  a  way  that  they do  not 
AWGAAM 
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~o be  tranaaitta~ by  tax to Michael  Har~y,  '\ 
Director  or DGX11E  ot the  CEO 
OECUA  Coaaenta  on  the Communications  Gre•n Paper 
"A  Europe-Wide  Telecommunioat:S.ona  Market"  dat•cl  June  1907 
These  comments  are  submitted  by  tax,  and  apologies  are  made 
for  any  errore of  omieaiona  due  to  their  being  trans~itted 
during  the President's  absence  from  his office in connection 
with  buaineaa  commitments.  Any  requests  for  amplification or 
modification  by  the  Commission will  be  actioned immediately 
they  are  received. 
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1 .  Comments  on  General Issues 
CECUA  welcomes  the  opportunity  to  submit its  vie~e on  the 
Community  Green  Paper 
"A.  Europe-Wide Telecommunications  Market  ..  dated Jupe  1987. 
Tne  following  general  comments  provide  the  background  to 
our  more  detailed  commonts,  Rnu  indicate  the  ueer  view  on 
the Green Paper,  and  likely future  developments.  They  are 
as  follows:-
• 1  Telecommunications  wi.ll  be  the vital key  to building 
up  tomorrow•s  services wbion will  become  a  dominant 
aector or  industry.  as  time  goea  on.  The  concept of a 
single European  i.nt·raatructure ia commended  and. 
supported  • 
• 2  Development  of unified  ~nd univ•rsal  co~unications 
standards and  services will  be  the key  to the  open 
Europe  of 1992  and  the  open  guropean market. It 
communication aervicee  are developed in baraony with 
tho  relaxation of market controla,  this will have  the 
joint ertect of strengthening and  unifying Europe  -
which is believed  to  be  the Com•ission'a intention. 
Since  a  considerable  number  of IT  systems will 
necessarily interface  to  the  future  oommunicationa 
eervioeo,  using appropriate standar4a,  a  mi~ed  . 
supplier approach io implicit,  and  indeed  vital~ The 
commitment  and  support  of the auppliete to provision 
or  appropriate standards ie vital,  and  CEOUA  applaude 
the oonatructive attitude alread7 taken by SPAG, 
pa~ticularly within its guide  to  tbe use of atandarda, 
and  the  constructive approach  being  taken  by its newer 
counterpart,  SPAG  Services  • 
• 4  It is  believed  that OSI  standards will  become  dominant 
in  the  short  term - since  they are  now  nearing a 
reasonable  stage  o! development.  In  the  longer  term it 
is believed  that  ISDN  services in combination vith a 
developed  version of  tne  OSI  upper  layers will  be 
require~,  and will  emerge  as  the  dominant  standards 
eet  • 
• 5  Many  future  industrial  ele~enta and  services will 
be  ba~ed on  value  added  netwOTkB.  It is deoirable  to 
statutorily require  that  these  align  ~ith appropriate 
standards  - in  the  short  term  OSI.  The  repre5entations 
made  by  NCUF  in  the  U.K.,  which  resulted  in  the  U.K. 
Government  requiring  Value  Added  Network Services  to 
align with  OSI  within  a  reasonable  timescale is  a 
policy  w~ would  com~end  to  the  CEO  as  being  ~orthy of 
consideration as  a  cross~European policy.  This 
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suggestion has  alrady  been  made  to  the Commieaion  in a 
CECUA  briefing  • 
• 6  Security will  become  increa~ingly importapt as  ayot•ms 
converge  on  common  standards.  In  particular  tbe 
following  elements  are  likely  to  become  1mportent:-
•  confidentiality 
•  integrity 
•  access  control 
•  authentication including  tho  uae  of encryptins 
devices  for  au then  t:1.oa tion 
•  repudiation or  Pl8SSages 
•  disguising trattic flows 
The  urgent  requirement  for  encryption alsoritbm 
atandarda  to  provide  confidentiality and 
authentication featuree  has  already  been  reoorde4 in a 
previous  briefing to  the  Commission  - cta·ted · lovnber 
1986  • 
• 7  In  addition to  standardo which  facilitate 
interconnection,  common  standards are urgently n•e4od 
for  diagnostics  and  error  reporting  • 
•  8  It ie anticipated  that  the  development  standards will 
be  progreeaive.  and will  progressiv~lf include  the 
following  capabilities:-
•  'a capability to  enable  connection to  occur,  and 
data interchange  to  occur 
•  standard&  which  permit  full  interwotkins including 
interactive intetworking 
•  standards  which  permit  the  interchange ot unite 
which  are  functionally identical,  and  physically 
similar.  The  latter standards  aatiofy the lattet 
requirements,  are  complex  in nature.  since 
equipment  must  essentially  be  dosigned  to  the  same 
detailed  stAndards  to  achieve  thia  godl • 
• 9  Quality  of  service will  be  extremely important,  and 
this is  an  area  which  may  need  to  be  researched  as 
plane  develop  • 
• 10  Contingency  planning  ie  important.  and  may  be 
considerea  to  be  a  part  of  security,  it is a  subject 
in  its  own  right.  For  example,  "lost  meesages"  may 
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nAed  to  be  stored  in  a  buffer  etore,  until tho  aen~er 
or  intended  receiver  can  bo  advised,  and  appropriate 
recovery ac\ion taken  • 
• 11  With  regard  to  the  spread  of  services  and  penetration 
of rural  areas,  the  provieion  or servioea on  the 
widest  poaeible geographical  basis ia applauded  and 
eupported.  So  also is the  principle ot 
crosa-aubaidieation  ~  using  revenues  from  the 
lucrative urban areas  to  subsidise service• in the 
aparaely populated rural soctore.  Indeed,  the 
provision of good  communication  aervioea -111  play  a 
major  part in maintaining  and  hopefully increaeina tne 
population of rural areas. 
.12  The  development  ot universal  communication atandarda 
will  open  up  new  technical areas  ~  which  need  to  be 
ooneidered at this point in time  and  indeed  the·seoond 
ot theae is already under  study.  They  are aa  tollowas-
•  distributed databases  - where  the  degree of 
distribution of databases ia ultimately de,era!ned 
by  the  tariffs applied  by  the  varioue service 
suppliers. 
•  information,  formatting  and  repreaentation - whicn 
is  the  key  to  electronic data  intorobange ••ntione4 
in the Cteen Paper.  The  Commission's  tedie 
initiative is supported,  and  it is believed  that 
that initiative oan usefully draw  on  the  previous 
odette  and  citpro initiative. 
•  provision of cross  community  aervicea will raise 
legal issues  not· yet  found  within  the Green Paper 
'so far  as  can  be  determined.  The5o  include  tbe 
following  although this is not  an  exhaustive liet:-
•  authentication - with particular reference to 
the  legal signi!icanoe of on  authenticated 
transaction  tranemitted wholly  by  electronic 
means  - such  &$  signature  on  a  contract 
•  the  right  to  inspect data in transit - which  may 
or  may  not still apply in certain PTT  domains 
•  the  legal significance  and  effects of 
non~repudiation of  mes&ages  ~hich corresponds  to 
the  legal action of  "process  aerving"  in certain 
circumstances. 
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85 2.  Comments  on  a  Number  of Specific Technical Points 
CECUA  baa  the  following  observations  - which  ahould  aot  be 
regarded  ae  an  exnauative  analysis at this point in  time. 
They  are  as  follows:-
•  In  seotion 1.4  reference is made  to  a  multi-function 
PABX  - which  can  bo  replaced  functionally  by  a  high 
speed  local area  network  and  a  gateway  to wi4e  area 
network  services.  Which  or  these  two  optiooa ie io  be 
preferred ana  developed?  In  general  ~ult1·£~Dotion 
PABx•s  are  slower  than  local area  networks  - although 
aome  typoa  or local aroa  network  - eapecia·lly OSHA/CD 
do  have  reoponse  time  problems  under  heavt  load 
conditione. 
•  In 3·2 reference is made  to  basic  servioaa  and  CECUA 
would  suggest  that  ISDN  should include all  ~he 
services aentioned  inoludingt-
•  video  text  baaed  on  tho  CEPT  or  a  later  atand~d 
which  accommodates  the  U.K.  ~nd French •1•'-•• 
•  teletext aervicea  where  the  key  to  succees ia a 
common  protocol illlplementation  oontormaAQ.e 
etateme~t (PICS) 
•  electronic mail  services  - which  should  hopat~lly 
be  baaed.  on  a  harmoniaed  version  or  the X.400 
standard 
Two  issues not  clearly identified within the  report 
torm  the  aubjeot  ot·tne next  two  comments  vhich are  aa 
f'oli.ov.s;-
•  the  migration  path  from  present analogue circuits 
needs  to  be  carefully planned  - otherwise  such 
oircuita will oroate  bottle-necks  ~ithin the 
anticipated  trans-European  networks.  The 
reliability of analogue  circuits also  givao  cause 
for·concern  in certain circumstances  aDd  ~eeas to 
be  carefully considered. 
•  tariffs are vital - as  mentioned  in 4·3·5  and  are 
the ultimate determinant  influencing system design. 
To  amplify  this  comment  further  - if tariffs are 
low  systems will  tend  to  be  centralised,  and 
information wil  be  taken  to  and  from  resource 
86 
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~harin~ systems  for  proceeein~. If on  the  other 
hand  tar~ffe are  high,  the  amount  of communication 
used  will  be  minimiaed.  and  local  eysteme will be 
built up  to  the  largest p088ible  size to  ~inimiae 
the  use  ot expensive  communication  used. 
3·  Outline Propoaala 
CECUA  submits  the  following  outline proposals tor 
consideration:-. 
• 1  Harmonisation  of standards implementations is the key 
to  auccesa  in many  communication areaa,  and  the 
possibility of implementing key  aortware entities auch 
as  the  ACSE/Preaentation/Session  ele~enta ot OSI,  and 
then  distributing the  correoponding sottw•r• tree of 
charge  (following  the  example  or  the u.s.  Procomm 
System)  ia recommended  to  the  Commisaio·n.  Th:La 
philosophy vas  supported  by  a  CECUA  aponaore4  OSI 
workshop  bela in the  U.K.  in September • 
• 2  The  absence  of  trans-European  encryption standards 
under  total  ~uropean control is currently a  problem -
and  this problem bas  again  been  brought  to the 
attention or  the  Commission  for  conedieration. 
Proliferation of proprietary encryption  standards -
particularly Americen  oriented  etandardo  could  lead  to 
very considerable investment in di!£ering encryption 
devices,  and  increase in  the  comple~ity ot systems  and 
therefore deoreaeo  in their  reliability,  and 
ultimately total chaos  within  the European  community. 
Access  control is vital - since  access control 
becomeo  a  vital security  and  control element  as  open 
systems  become  a  reality.  It is sugge$t  tno  Co~misein 
carefully monitor  the  progress of an  Open  Security 
Project vithin the Rae  Programme,  a  proposed  Open 
Security Project within  DG13E.  and  other Security 
Projects including experience  ~ithin the  ESPRIT 
Programme • 
• 4  Basic  services  need  to  be  harmonieed  ~  in such  a  way 
that  they  can  be  successfully integrated with  the 
forthcoming  ISDN  services  atandarde  and  features.  It 
is  therefore  recommended  that  such  baaio services  be 
harmonlsed  across  Europe  in terms  of  the  servicee 
provided  - including  such  factors  euoh  ao  opeed  of 
operation,  protocols  used  for  transmission,  error 
recovery  and  contingency  featurest  and  tariffs  • 
• 5  Value  added  services  need  not  be  harmoniaed  across 
Europe  as  long  as  the  accesa  standards  are  harmoniaed, 
and  acceaa  to  each  European  value  kdded  service is 
available  to  interested  partiea witnin  the  C6~munity. 
- 6  -.6  The  dyn~~tc allocation  of  communication  opaoe  between 
data  transfer  and  voice  transfer is important  to  many 
user  organisations,  and  any  technical  restrictions 
which  inhibit such  dynamic  allocation of  c~mmunication 
space  should  be  resolved  or  removed  as  aoon  aD 
feasible. 
.7  Wi tllin the  standardis4 tion area,  the  most  o bvlous  gape 
in  the  OSI  standards set are  the  standards tor 
directories,  and  the  general management  of OSI 
transfers.  It is therefore  recommended  that  the 
Commission  exerts all possible  pressure  on  CEN/CBHBLKC 
and  ISO  to  produce  working standards  and 
implementations  within  these areas  by  1982. 
CECUA  believes  this is an  important initiative, wbion  it 
fully  supporta  in principle.  It will  be  willina  t~ assist 
with  the  progression or  resolution of all tbe it.-s listed 
within  this section,  togetber with  other  itema  wh~CJl may  be 
referred  to  the  Coamiseion  by  other  interested parties  • 
.  ~.-.~:.~  ..... 
(fJ"F  E Taylor 
10 Deceaber  1987 
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N/Kff.  87  539  le  23  juillet  1987 
STRAT!CII  D!  LA  C.C.E.  DANS  L!  DOMAIN!  D!S  TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
COMHENTAIIBS  DU  LIVR!  VERT  PAR  L!S  CRAND!S  ENTRIPRISIS  FRANCAIS!S 
1.  L!S  CONTRAINTIS  !T ATTENT!S  DES  UTILISATIURS 
1.1  Les  utilisateurs  veulent  pouvoir  d~velopper dee  rtaeaux  europ4ene 
unique•  dana  le•  domainea  ,Commutation  de  paquete,  Vid4otex.  Rtns. 
~tc.  e'e•t-l-dire  l'enaemble  du  aecteur  appartenant  aux  actuelles 
ou  anciennes  AdmiRietrationa  dee  T414cornmunieationa,  et  done. r4ai 
par  un  monopole  et  une  r6alementation. 
CeLt  impl ique  : 
* Une  normaliaation  4!ventuelle  europt!enne  unique  ou  dea  &ate-way 
per~ettant de  suppl4er  l'absence  de  norm~a entre  Lee  r4seaux  dee 
pays  membres. 
* La  disposition d'un m•ttre d'oeuvre  uni~ue europ,en  pour  un  aer-
vice ou  une  liaison ap6cialis4e,  y  compria  pour  la maintenance. 
* La  mise  en  place  de  filiale•  co~unea de  dimeneion  europ4enne. 
charg~es  de  la  fourniture  unifide  europ~enne  dea  services  en 
cause. 
t' I  ~  •  ..  -
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l.2 Services  l  valeur ajoutfe 
Ils  ae  d6veloppent  lt  partir  dea  ayatl!mea  d'informatioa  d'entre-
prises  actuellement  e~istants,  c'eat-l-dire en  l'abtence  tot&le  de 
r~glementat  ion.  Pour  nous,  cea  aervices  ae  caractfriaent  par  les 
fl~menta suivants  : 
*Absence  d'agrfment,  t~auf  imposition  d'une  norraali,lation  euro-
p4enne  unique  ~  moyen  terme  (il  convient  ~  court  terme  de  pou-
voir  amortir  convenable~ent  lea  inveatiaaements  faita). 
*  Interfonctionaement  europ4en  du  aervice  au  niv.au  du  protocole 
de  t414communicatlons  commun,  qui  eat  du  domaiae  de  comp•tence 
d'une  normali1ation  propre  l  chaque  aecteur  4coaomi~ue.  Cela ia-
plique  l'or&anisation  d'un  dialogue  entre  lea  fourniaaeura  et 
lea  seeteurs  dconomiquet  concern4s,  et  une  diaeuesion dea  diff~­
renta  accteurs  'conomiques  entre  eu~,  en  liaison  avec  les 
Administrations  dea  Tdli~ommunlcations et  la  C~uo•utf. 
* Un.tel  r4aeau  a  en  principe une  dimeneion  europ,anne. 
* Il  appartienc  l  une  entrep~i•••  •  un  aroupe  d'ent~epri•e•.  l  une 
profession ou  l  un  preatataite. 
Le  probl~me  de  la  revente  de  trafic  num4rique  ou  vocal  1  11ext4-
rieur  ae  poae,  soit  directement.  aoit  par  le  caaal  d'un  p~eatatei­
re. 
* L'interfonctionnement  doit  acre  assur4 avec d'autrea  r4aeaux pri-
v4s,  ou  avec  le  r~seau  g6n~ral. 
Lee  probl~mea technique  (normes,  interface•  correapondante) et de 
tarification,  doivent  @tt~ r6al4t  •  la  •atiafaction du  marchd. 
*  Relations  avec  d
1autrea  cypea  de  r•aeaux  pour  la voix ou  pour  lea 
donn~ea  (rdseaux  par  satellite,  r'aeaux  clblfa  locaux  de  diffu-
sion de  t4l~vi•ion. etc.). 




2.  STRUCTURE 
Oana  chaque  pay•  ~embre,  la  atparation  dea  fonctionl  r4alementaire 
et  d 1exploitation  est  esaentielle.  C'est  un  dea  points  c14•  de  la 
proposition de  la  Communautf  d4na  le  livre vert. 
On  doit  avoir  la  mfme  atructure  au  niveau  europfen  avec  l'autoritf 
suffieante et  reconnue  par  lea  in1tancea  del  pay1  membree. 
3.1 Hi••  en  place d'un In•citut !uropden de  normalieation 
Quellee  en  aeront  lea  fonc:tiona,  atatut •  relations  avec  la 
Communaut~ et  lea  Adminiat~ationa dea  paya  membre1  1 
Une  des  ·fonct ion a  easent ielle.e  ~  organiser  e1t:  la  fonction  de  cer-
tification  : 
* pour  lea  protocolta  r••eaux. 
* pour  lea  proc:•durea  application, 
11  e'!:  n~cessaire dft  d;.tepC'l'er  ~.  e~ sujet  d'une  ~t~\Jcture  eu.ropCe~ne 
forte. 
3.2 Autorit• europ4enne  pour  la  r~glementation et  l'aar4ment  en  1iai•on 
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NATIONAL COMPUTER USERS FORUM 
PGR/DS 
13  July  1987 
Dr  F E Taylor 
P 0  Box  S 
Toft  Road 
Knutsford 
WA16  9DU 
Dear  Frank 
NCUF Secrtttrilt; 
c/o Tht Nattontt Computing Ctntrt Limited, 
Oxford Road, M1"chester M1  7ED. 
Ttltllhoftt: 081·228 8333 Telex: 668962 
W  i t h  r e f e r en c e  to  you r  1  e t t e r  of  the  26th  J u  n·e •  1  am 
responding  concerning  the  Green  Paper  "On  the  o.evelopment  of 
the  Common  Market  for  Telecommunications  Services  and 
EQuipment". 
Although  not  a  specialist  in  telecommunications  and 
therefore  not  competent  to  comment  on  most  of  the  Green 
Paper.  I  nevertheless  picked  up  a  matter  concerning  Data 
Protection  which  gives  me  cause  for  concern. 
I  refer  to  the  section  in  Chapter  8,  page  t42,  sub~heading 
3.2.1. ·where.  it is  suggested  in  the  middle  of  page  143  that 
"harmonising  community  legislation  is  introduced  based  on 
existing  international  conventions  and  declarations".  My 
problem  here  is  with  the  word  "existing"  since  tt seems  to 
me  that  the  presen.t  international  conventlO·n,s.  even  the 
principles  involved.  are  based  very  much  on  the  technology 
as  it was  in  the  60's/70's  and  need  rethinking  in  the  light 
of  current  and  future  developments.  I  believe  very  strongly 
that  a  totally  new  initiative  ts  needed  in  this  area. 
1  hope  you  can  include  this  point  ln  any  response  made  to 
the  Commission. 
Best  wishes 
Yours  sincerely 
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t041  IRUXILLIS 
tlll-D6-Z3 
Betrifft  :  ••••ln•a•er Hark\ fQr  die Te1ek..-unikat1on 
Seh~ gethrter Kerr  Dr.  Marjtel 
Da •  ZUftl  o.bigtn  Th•••  kGrz1ich  vtr6ffent1ic:htt  •ranbuch wurdt  von  den 
CEN/CENEL,C·C1 ..  itn  •it  Inter••••  zur  Ktnntni•  ••n~n. Aua  una•r•r 
Sieht  tn~hl1t  ••  tint  gute  Analyae  der  w•••ntlichtn  Probl.-. und 
ub•rwiegend  Zitla~rebige  Vorachlltt  zur  Rtaliaierung des  6tMeinsamen 
Harktes  auch  in dit••• t•r•Lch  und  tiner d&tau•  rtsultierenden Stirkuna 
der  Wirtachaft  die•••  Raumts  d~rch  laalitiarung  tinar 
zukunftaoriantierten  tnfraatruktur. 
Die  engert  Definition dtr ttrtn& retl  ...  ntitrttn Te1tko.munikationa-
btre1ehe  und  tint  Erweiterung  ~••  Wtttbewerba  wird  aichtr  tine 
weaentlich•  Rolle  bei  de·r  Sc:haffung  Cltl l"tinaa•n Harletea  bi•  ltiZ 
api•len. 
Oberraacht  habtn  una  i• &rOnbuch  ~11 Auaaagen  zuM  Bereich der Hormung, 
d1e==in  tam  Vorschlag  zur  lildur&  tlDtl  Europiiachtn  Jnatituta  fQr 
J Telekommunikationtnprm•n  gtp'•ln.  W1r  att..en zwar  dtM  Urtt11 darub•r 
zu~  da&  tine weitert  tntensivierung der bLaherigen  I..Ohunaen  n6tig 1st. 
Wir  btatrtiten  ~tdoch. dll dit Einrichtunt  ~•• vor;eachlagenen  Instituta 
•ina teattrun; veraprieht- Sit wOrd•  vitlatbr dit schon  ~etzt 
btatehanden  Schwier!;keiten noc:h  vertitftn, die  naeh  unaarar  Oberzeugung 
in  einer  unzuraichtnden  ltr6cksicbtigung  dtr  zune~nden Vtrzahnune 
~w1  s.chen  Infor•at1onaverarbt1tunga- und  Jnfonaationa0bera1ttlvnga-
Ttehnik  sow1e  dtm  fortdauerndtn  Antpruch ••r Httzbetre1ber  (organiaitrt 
im  Rahmen  von  CEPT)  auf  t1;enatlnd1ge  legelungen  fur  IT-Endgerite 
liegtn. 
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Daa  GrOnbuct\  wtiat  der  lnfor~aationat•chnik,  dJA  .. ,_.;a,  heute weittr 
;efalter  ·Oefinition  die  Telt.kOMUnikation  taeLAftaltlt,  tint 
scnlu•••lroll•  fQr  di• zukOnftige  lttchiftieu....-~1tik ~  c  ...  in••••n 
Markt  zu.  Ea·  iat daher  er-torderlicl\,  dal auch  1la  Inter•••• dtr Schaffung 
von  auareich•nd•n  Harktvolu.tna  auch  fur  tt.in•~•  und  Mittler• 
Unterne~a  •Ln•  Vereinhe1t11ohung  lNo~nf) von  PuaktiOftiMertM&len  von 
In1ormat1onatecbn1k-Endglrlten,  wie  ale 1M  uefangre1chen  Kale  aowohl  in 
Computernetzen  ala  auch  Mlhr  und  •thr  in  zukGnftig  int•;riarten 
Telekommunika~io"a-Netzen  •t~a•••~zt  w~rdtn,  vorttaoMmln  wird.  Es  iat  • 
daher  d1r  lrundaatz  aft&u•trtbtn,  dal  tleicne  lerit•  fOr  gleicht 
KomMUnikationaanw.ndvn;en  nach  gleichen  Hoc.-e  konzip1ert  w.rdan 
sollten,  u~ibhlngig  davon.  ob  111  1n  privaten  oder  6ffentl1chen 
digital"' KollllllVnitcationanttzen  tin1•••tzt w.rdea.  • 
Wir  sind  dahtr  der  Oberzeugung,  dal  fur allt betroffenen Kreise.eine 
befr1td1gendi  lttel.unv nur  taei  Konzentration der  ito~narbeit 111  Rahmen.  •. 
eintr einheitlichtn Struktur gefundtn w.rdan  kaftft,  die die 
gleict\btrtchtigtl Hitarbeit aller btirofftntn Krt1at,  alto vor  all.m dar 
Hetzbttreiber,  der  Herat•ller un4  de~ Anw.nd•~• ltltattet. Wit  &.1.  in 
den  Vert~l;tn  zwiachen  KEt  uftd  CIN/C!MEL!C  vertiabart.  iat •• die 
auadrucklicha  Aufaabe  .der.Nor..norganiaationeft,  d1t  fOr  den  EG·Iertieh 
in  tEN  und  ClN!L!C  zuaaa.efttt:taaat  aincs.  IIW.•·  Zusa&~Denarbeit  zu 
organJ.siertn  und  lrgebnia tt nach d ..  Kan,atn•·Pl'i~z.lp zu  produzieren. 
Dabe1  wird  nicht  bettritten,  daa~  dit Netz~trelb•~ ain  vorrangigea 
Entacheidun~srecht  fOr  all• Fragen  ha~en ~~•••n, die eLn•n  ungest6rttn 
Batritb  ct.•r  Te1ekomnaunikationld1enate  be.treffen..  S!t  •u•••n  daruber.  t 
hinaua  auch  dit  K6g11obkti\  ha~en. den  fOr  •'- w~chtigtn  Featlegu~gen 
aus  ;emeinaa•  erazbeiteten Hor ..  n  du~ob eioenatlftdit• lntseheidun;  fur 
ihren  ltreLch  Bindun;~irkung  zu  verleihan.  D1ta  kann  durch  daa 
Instrument  NET  durchaua  in  ~•r Weiat  gtteheh•n,  datt auf europiiache 





CEH  und  CENELEC  haben  zu  dieser  frage  detailliert•r•  Yor•chlige 
•ntwickelt,  dit  nach  unstrer  Oberzeueung  die  geeignttt laais  f~r die 
kon,equentt  Durchfuhrun;  der  einaenli;igen  Rataentscht1duno•n. 
Rat•btscnliUaae,  Ratst~fthlungen  und  der  biaher  tttrofftntn 
Vertinbarungen  darattlltn.  Eint  Einigung  &uf  dillll Konzept  wurdt dit 
Grundun;  tin••  neuen  Instituta  und  d&raua  •6gl1cherweitt  reaultiertnde 
Konfliktt gegtnatandalos  m•chtn. 
Wir  bitten  tindr1nslich  darum.  unt  kurzfriatig Gele;tnheit zu  ;eben, 
Ihnen  unsere  VoratelLungtn nlhar zu  erllutern. 
e.  VAUC£LLE 
CEN-Prisident 
R.  KIRKHAM 
CENELEC-Priaidtnt I 
---·-
Comments from the point of view of CERN/HEP /RARE. 
Although  the  Green  Peper  covers  many  topics  which  concern  us,  its 
title clready  indicates  thet it  is mainly  concerned  with the  market  for 
telecommunications  services and  equipment, not  e)(plicitly on  current doto 
networks, on  our PTT  problems, on  RARE/Cosine,  on  improving the protocol 
situation, to give examples of matters which RARE  is concerned with. 
The  emphasis  is  on  regulation  ond  on  re-regulation  to enlarge  the 
ability of Community  firms to compete  for contracts to  supply PTTs  and 
users  with  network  equipment  - terminals,  switches,  transmission 
systems,  and  to  set  up  end  operote  value  added  services  over  the  ~TT 
infrastructure  without  most  present  day  constraints.  The  PTTs  would 
mointoin  monopoly  of  the  tn.nsmission  infrastructure  with  some  basic 
service(s) to allow them to gain the resources to run and expend the system. 
The voice telephone is said to be  the only sui table service to be  reserved to 
the PITs. 
The  measures  proposed  would  certainly  ell ow  HEP,  or  a  lorger 
RA~E/Cosine group, to set up a private data network using  leased lines at 
reasonable tariffs, since the only constraint suggested is that leased lines 
should  not  be  used  for  cream-skimming  voice  traffic on  popular  routes. 
Other bodies who wished to run general dote networks could  do  so,  end  HEP 
could subscribe to one of those, rather than run its own network. 
The  development  of  ISDN  is seen  as  the  future  general  network for 
telecom services, and the Commission is axing its proposals to get ISDN and 
terminal equipment available on c Europe-wide bos1s. 
The  need for getting standards  developed and  introduced more quickly 
is stressed, 'Nith the proposal  to set up  a stondords institute as a backbone 
for more intensive collaborative work between industry, PTis and users. 
The  present ·tariff  structures  ond  levels  ore  criticized  politely, 
quoting  other  bodies,  and  the  recommendation,  ond  projection,  is  that 
tariffs, particularly for ISDN,  should be  less distance dependent, should not 
toke  note  of crossing  notional  boundaries,  ond  should  move  more  towards 
real  costs. This would imply, as  now  in USAI  decreases  for long  distances 
with compensating  increases for locol  troific, not a politically o popular 
move. 
Thus most of the proposals are positive from our point of view., so far 
as  changes in regulations con help. The  \¥eokness is that the more proctical 
actions proposed by  the  Commission ore limited, ond not oimed  to help us in 
the  next  5  yeors  or more.  Almost oll  the  money  for telecoms  in  the  new 
Framework  Programme  for  R&D  is  for  RACEI  BOO  MECU  for  a  future 
broodbond  ISDNI  ond  STAR,  780 MECU  for improvements in Greece,  Portugol 
etc.  No  port  of  their  programme  i~  aimed  at  supporting  intermediate 
developments~ e.g.  2  Mb/s  ISDN,  high  speed  pocket  networks~ gotewoying 
LANS  to  WANS  ot  high  speeds,  network  control  systems. _so.me  of  these 
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topics might get  sm~ll support from other EEC  progr~mme$~ lik.e ESPRIT  or 
COST,  but  they  are  not in the main line of those  programmes,  end  are  not 
likely to get high priority there. 
Furt~er, there is a major absence in the Green  Peper, end  that is the 
USER  of  an  the  systems  and  services  discussed.  He  i,s  mentioned 
occosionally  en  passant,  but  almost  everywhere  as  a  dumb  consumer  of 
services  provided  by  others,  whose  basic  aim  ..  in the  competitive  world 
described by  the Paper,  is to take  the  consumer's  mone.y  .end  give  him as 
little as possible in return. 
The  Commission hos  to be  told again  and  again  two things: one,  thot 
network  services  set  up  without  real  user  particpe.tton  ore  too  often 
fallures, and  second, thot it  should see  th~t it  has  a role as a user advocate, 
and not only follow sheep like behind what the PTTs and computer finns tell 
it. There  ore  telecom user associations  ..  trade oriented,  whose ·Y1ews  are 
quoted once or tw1ce, but who represent more a business lobby ·than a group 
who actually do things with networks, os  we and other parts of the science 
and  technology community do, os reel-life developers AOS1-users of edvonced 
communi cot  ions systems. 
Europe  needs  to repeat  the three big  success stories in our field: the 
Arpanet,  done  by  the  US  scientific  user  community;  the  development  of 
Jonet  ..  driven by  the  UK  high  energy  physicists end  other scientific users; 
the Hinitel, done by the French public. In all three there were two necessory 
factors to get o new technology into wide public use:  the .YU[1 did much of 
the work  ..  and  they got it for free.  Counter examp.Jes  ore  ATT·s ebondoning 
its proposed  public pocket net ofter spending  1 6$,  IBM~s feUure with SBS, 
the  UK  and  German Pns· with their videotext systems, ell of which were 
engineer driven with little user involvement before collapsing. 
The  Commission  should  be  putting  101  of  its  RACE  budget 
( 15  NECU/yr) into paying for people in HEP and other user/development lobs 
~ 
to  build,  operote,  ond  use  o Cosine  network,  with  development  work for 
higher performance odd-ons os soon os technically feosible. 
Meonwhila,  the  Commission  should  use  the  generol  agreement  it has 
for the  brood  trend  to  re-regulotion of PITs which it proposes,  to get o 
generol  CEPT  dispensation  from  third  party  traffic  constraints  for 
RARE/Cosine  networks,  as  a  stimulus  to  rapid  development  of  usable 
connected  networks  in  Europe.  It  should  also  put  money  into  protocol 
converters as the  best  way  to  move  communities to OSJ  ·os products  come 
available. 
Finolly, the Commission should  toke many  more  skilled users onto it• 
advisory commi tlees, with poy  if needed,  to confront/agree with  the  othe~ 
interested  porties while  Commission  policy  is being  m~de end  opphed.  It 
could  orgonize and  fund  o forum  for octive users on  a continuing bosis, tb 
encourage users to get together, ond to  have o pool  of  known useful advisers 
to lop. ) 
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(0~  ~T(lf'Pl[ CLUB  tNFORMATiqUE DES GRANOES  ENTREPRISES FRANCAISES  ~i.La  lL ~ 21, avenue de MesStnt. 75008 Paris, til6ohone  u  .. 2,,. 
N/R~f.  EP/JS  - 87  821  le  10  d~cembre 1987 
COMMENTAIRE  DU  LIVRE  VERT  PAR  LES  GRANDES  ENTREPRISES  FRANCAISES 
1  - Position  C~n~rale. 
II  - Commentaire  des  "Positions  propos~es" par  la Communautt! 
dans  la Figure  13. 
Annexe  - Le  point  de  vue  des  Grandes  Entreprises  Fran~aises sur 
l'~volution de  la  r~glementation des  T~l~communications 
(note  de  28  avril  1987) 
I  - POSITION  GENERAL! 
1.  REMARQUES  PRELIMINAIRES 
Les  Grandes  Entreprises  sont  particuli~rement sensibles  l  la  perspective 
du  grand  march~  de  1992  qui  les  obligera  l  acct1lt!rer  les  e!volutions  en 
cours  et  l  op~rer  de  fa~on  syst~matique  sur  1'  ensemble  du  territoire 
europ~en. C'est  pourquoi  !'initiative de  la  Communaut~,  que  repr~sente le 
Livre  vert,  a  ~t~  per~ue  comme  particuli~rement  importance.  D'une  fa~on 
gt!n~rale,  les entreprises  fran~ais.es  se  ft!licitent  de  cette initiative et 
sont  pr@tes  l  la  soutenir  en  ce  qui  les  concerne. 
Le  CIGREF  a  d 'ai  I leurs  d~jA  exprim~  sa  position  l  1 'usage  des  Pouvoirs 
publics  fran~ais.  Ce  document  s'applique t!galement  au  niveau europ4en.  Il 
est  joint  en  annexe. 
Il convient  de  remarquer  que  le  pr~sent document  ~mane d'un  groupement  de 
grandes  entreprises  qui  sont  strictement  utilisatrices,  bien  que  cons-
ciences  des  contraintes qui  sont  celles  de  !'ensemble des  acteurs  du  mar-
ch~,  et  en  particulier  celles  de  leurs  fournisseurs  (emploi,  contrainte 
de  p~rennitt! des  opt!rateurs,  rOle  dans  le  d~veloppement rt!gional) • 




Le  commentaire  des  entreprises  est  ind~pendant  du  statut  des  organismes 
charg~s  en  Europe  de  pourvoir  les  services  de  t~l~communications 
(Administrations  ou  Entreprises  publiques),  les  uns  et  les  autres  d~nom­
mt!s  ici  "Entreprises  de  t~l~communications". 
a.  Les  t~l~communications  sont  un  des  moyens  essentiels  de  la  mutation 
que  repr~sente le  grand  march~  europ~en.  La  r~flexion sur  ce  probl~me 
en  cours  au  niveau  national  et  europ~en ne  peut  done  @tre  le fait  des 
seules  administrations,  mais  concerne  aussi  le  march~  au  premier 
chef. 
L'action  des  Grandes  Entreprises  est  maintenant  et  sera  dans  l'avenir 
de  plus  en  plus  europ~enne et  mondiale,  quel  que  soit  le secteur  ~co­
nomique. 
Les  services  que  nous  trouvons  d~jA  aupr~s des  Administrations  de  t~­
l~communications seront  compl~t~s dans  l'avenir par  des  services Ava-
leur  ajout~e,  !'ensemble  se  pla~ant  dans  le  cadre  d'une  nouvelle 
g~n~ration de  syst~mes d'information  reliant  non  seulement  les  diff~­
rents  op~rateurs d'une  entreprise,  mais  l'ensemble  des  op~rateurs d'un 
secteur  ~conomique  avec  leurs  partenaires  (banquiers,  transporteurs, 
etc.)  et  m@me  ult~rieurement !'ensemble des  secteurs  ~conomiques entre 
eux  dans  un  vaste  r~seau unifi~ unique. 
11  y  a  done  une  importante  mutation  des  t~l~communications qui  induit 
une  mutation  non  moins  importante  des  proc~dures et  modalit~s de  rela-
tions  entre  op~rateurs  ~conomiques. 
Le  RNIS  va  nous  donner  un  r~seau  unifi~ voix,  donn~es,  images,  qui  ne 
peut  ~tre que  de  dimension  au  moins  europ~enne. 
Notre  comp~titivit~ exige  done  la  mise  en  place  rapide  d'~changes au-
tomatis~s  de  donn~es.  Un  nombre  croissant  de  secteurs  industriels  ou 
tertiaires  r~fl~chit  au  probl~me.  De  toute  fa~on,  si  les  op~rateurs 
europ~ens (Administrations,  lndustriels,  Soci't's de  services)  ne  sont 
pas  capables  de  s'organiser  pour  d~finir  les  proc~dures  d'~change de 
mani~re  satisfaisante,  les  grands  "carriers"  des  t~l,communications 
mondiaux  tels  que  IBM,  EDS,  etc.  le  feront  A notre  place sur le grand 
march~  europ~en. 




b.  La  croissance  en  volume  dans  la  part  des  t~l~communications  dans  le 
PIB  europ~en est  ~  la veille d'une  croissance  tr~s forte.  On  attend  un 
triplement  de  la  part  du  PIB  consacr~  aux  t~l~communications d'ici  ~ 
1992. 
La  croissance  des  R~seaux  ~  Valeur  Ajout~e est  ~galement  pr~vue  dans 
un  rapport  3,5  entre 84  et  90. 
Les  grandes  organisations  pr~voient  presque  un  doublement  de  leur 
pourcentage de trafic donn~es, mais cette ~volution ne fait que  poursui-
vre  celle  d'j~  r~alis~e dans  les  ann~es  pass~es,  puisque,  pour  les  en-
t reprises  i ndust rielles,  le  nombre  de  transact  ions  trans-europ~ennes 
est  pass~ dans  un  rapport  de  6  A 4800  entre  79  et 86  (chiffres extraits 
du  rapport  de  1987  sur  les  t~l~communications  de  la  table  ronde  des 
Industriels  europ~ens). 
c.  La  d~n!gulation  du  secteur  T~l~communications  aux  Etats-Unis  et  au 
Japon  est  aujourd'hui  engag~e,  de  telle  fa~on que  les  anciennes  admi-
nistrations  dans  ces  r~gions du  monde  sont  en  position de  concurrencer 
les administrations  europ~ennes. Le  processus  est d'ailleurs  largement 
engag~ en  Europe.  Les  administrations  traditionnelles  qui  existent  en-
core  sont  done  amen~es A envisager  une  mutation  tr~s rapide. 
Le  Livre vert  ~mis  par  la  Commission  des  Communaut~s  Europ~ennes doit 
~tre  salu~ comme  un  document  tr~s  important. 
Les  Utilisateurs  ressentent  le  besoin  d'un  pouvoir  T~l~communications 
en  Europe,  et attendent  de  la  Communaut~ qu
1elle  g~n~re cette fonction 
et  facilite  son  ~mergence. 
2.  LES  SERVICES  DE  BASE 
Le  Livre  vert  nous  apparat t  prudent  dans  la  me sure  oO  i 1  envisage  le 
maintien  possible  d'un  monopole  pour  lea  infrastructures  et  les  services 
vocaux. 
a.  Les  infrastructures 
Le  projet  de  loi  francais  pr~voit  la  possibilit~  d'op~rateurs autres 
que  la  DGT  pour  les  services  de  base,  sous  r~serve d'un  agr~ment at-
tribu~ par  l'autorit~  r~glementaire,  la  CNCL. 
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La  porte  est  done  ouverte  A  l'implantation  en  France  de  transporteurs 
europ~ens,  ce  qui  pose  le  probl~me de  l'agr~ment au  niveau  europ~en. 
La  proposition  du  Livre  vert,  d'apr~s  laquelle  les  agr~ments  locaux 
devraient  @tre  valables  dans  toute  l'Europe,  est  un  premier  ~l~ment de 
r~ponse A ce  probl~me.  Mais,  A notre avis,  il faut  pr~voir une  coordi-
nation  europ~enne  au  moyen  d'une  autorit~  qui  verrait  logiquement  sa 
comp~tence  s'~tendre sur  les  points  suivants  : 
•  Choix  de  normes  dans  les  r~seaux et  services  de  base • 
•  Choix  de  principes  tarifaires  communs  en  vue  de  pousser  A une  har-
monisation  tarifaire  ;  de  toute  fac;on,  la  tarification  devient  de 
plus  en  plus  ind~pendante de  la distance.  Le  passage  d'une  fronti~­
re  ne  doit  pas  se  traduire  par  un  coOt  plus  ~lev~. 
b.  L'attente du  march~ pour  les  services  de  base 
Les  r~seaux  priv~s d'entreprise  se  d~veloppent. Le  r~cent  d~cret les  a 
autoris~s  en  France,  mais  nous  souhaitons  en  disposer  dans  une  dimen-
sion  europ~enne.  Cela  n~cessite des  liaisons  sp~cialis~es  europ~ennes 
avec  n~cessit~ de mattrise d'oeuvre  (installation et maintenance),  que 
proposent  de  toute  fac;on  les  carriers  am~ricains. 
Les  services  de  base  doivent  @tre  normalis~s.  L'~chec de  la normalisa-
tion  du  vid~otex en  Europe  montre  que  la  question  pos~e n'est  pas  un 
faux  probl~me,  malgr~ les  promesses  faites.  Les  Utilisateurs  entendent 
disposer  d'une  communaut~  de  standards  en  Europe  pour  les  r~seaux  de 
commutation  de  paquets  et  le  RNIS. 
L'~chec  de  cette  normalisation  serait  un  ~chec  flagrant  des  Communau-
t~s et  des  Administrations  europ~ennes. 
Les  tarifs  doivent  @tre  ind~pendants  des  fronti~res.  M@me  principes 
tarifaires,  et si possible  m@me  niveau  (cf.  ci-dessus). 
Nous  souhaitons  l'~mergence d'entreprises  europ~ennes  de  t~l~communi­
cations  publiques  ou  priv~es.  Certaines d'entre elles  pouvant  @tre  des 
filiales  communes  des  Administrations. 
.  .. / ... 
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c.  Le  probl~me du  trafic vocal 
Le  maintien  du  monopole  pour  le  trafic  vocal  induit  une  dualit~  :  r~­
seaux  publics  et  r~seaux  priv~s.  Si  le  trafic  vocal  n'est  pas  totale-
ment  libre  sur  les  r~seaux  priv~s,  on  court  le  risque  d 'une  sous-
optimisation  des  investissements  faits  en  infrastructure.  De  toute 
fa~on,  le  RNIS  ne  permet  pas  cette  s~paration. 
La  revente  du  trafic vocal  ne  peut  pas  @tre  interdite quand  on  autori-
se  la  revente  du  trafic  donn~es, et  que  les  r~seaux sont  utilis~s pour 
voix et  donn~es. 
De  toute  fa~on,  dans  le  contexte d'augmentation  de  la consommation  au-
quel  nous  serons  confront~s dans  les  ann6es  qui  viennent,  il est  imp~­
ratif d'optimiser l'utilisations des  infrastructures. 
d.  Les  ~quipements terminaux  et  l'ONP  (Open  Network  Provision) 
Les  Utilisateurs  fran~ais sont  d~j~  habitu~s A la  libert~ sur les  ter-
minaux  et  les  modems.  Pour  nous,  un  tel  choix  ne  peut  d~pendre d'un 
seul  fournisseur,  fut-il  !'Administration. 
L'ONP,  proc~dure  commune  d'acc~s,  est  ~galement  essentielle.  Les 
Utilisateurs  doivent  !tre  associ~s A son  ~laboration,  ce  qui  implique 
leur  pr~sence dans  les  "groupes  de  fonctionnaires"  actuellement  char-
g~s de  la  r~flexion sur  le  sujet  (GAP  et  SOG-T). 
3.  LES  SERVICES  A VALEUR  AJOUTEE 
a.  Le  Livre vert  pr~voit  la  libert~ totale pour  les op4rateurs ext4rieurs 
aux Administrations. 
Nous  insistons  en  vue  d'obtenir  une  dimension  europ~enne de  leurs  ser-
vices,  ce  qui  est  le cas  ~videmment  d'op~rateurs extra-europ6ens. 
Les  Administrations  doivent  se  placer  en  situation  concurrentielle 
dans  les  m@mes  conditions  : 
* Statut  d'entreprise  avec  un  important  renforcement  de  la  fonction 
commerciale. 




* Accords  avec  les  op~rateurs  ext~rieurs  et  entre  elles,  en  vue 
d'acc~der  ~  la dimension  europ~enne des  services. 
Les  R~seaux  ~  Valeur  Ajout~e  europ~ens  doivent  acc~der  ~  terme  A une 
normalisation  europ~enne  unique  conforme  A  l'OSI.  En  effet,  si  une 
premi~re  ~tape des  R~seaux  ~  Valeur  Ajout~e sera  propre  A des  groupes 
d'entreprises,  l'~tape  ult~rieure  consistera  en  un  r~seau  unique 
(ensemble  de  r~seaux  interconnect~s aboutissant  A un  r~seau unique  g~­
n~ralis~) dont  la  dimension  sera  d'ailleurs alors  plus  qu'europ~enne. 
Cette  offre  europ~enne de  r~seaux  ~ valeur  ajout~e doit  @tre  organis~e 
de  facon  qu'il n'y ait  pas  de  distorsion dans  la  concurrence  entre  les 
offreurs  de  services,  notamment  les  Administrations  de  t~l~communica­
tions,  qui  ne  doivent  ni  ~tre  avantag~s  A  l'exc~s  par  leur  position 
dominante,  ni  affaiblis  A  l'exc~s  par  les  contraintes  de  services  pu-
blics  qui  sont  les  leurs. 
La  collaboration  avec  le  march~  pour  la  d~finition  des  normes 
d'~changes  doit  s'imposer  aux  Administrations  comme  A  toutes  les  en-
treprises  de  t~l~communications  priv~es.  Celles-ci  doivent  s'appuyer  A 
la  fois  sur  la  normalisation  mondiale  en  cours  de  d~finition (OSI  et 
EDIFACT). 
Une  fonction  de  certification  coordonn~e  au  niveau  europ~en  est  la 
condition  d'acc~s A cette normalisation.  Une  telle fonction  devra  @tre 
dot~e  de  l'autorit~ suffisante  pour  s'imposer,  le  moment  venu,  aupr~s 
de  tous  les  partenaires  concern~s en  Europe. 
L'accord  de  certification mutuelle  actuellement  pr~vu est  une  premi~re 
~tape,  A  condition  qu'il  se  place  dans  le  cadre  d'une  politique  de 
choix de  standards  coordonn~e au  niveau  europ~en. 
b.  L'Institut  Europ~en de  Normalisation 
11  r~pond aux  besoins  de  cet  ensemble  de  fonctions  qui  doit  @tre  pris 
en  compte  au  niveau  europ~en.  Le  march~  l'approuve  et  souhaite  lui 
voir  jouer  un  rOle  politique  et  technique  important,  ne  d~pendant  pas 
de  la  seule  CEPT.  La  pr~sence de  repr~sentants  des  Utilisateurs  dans 
son  Conseil  d'Administration est  indispensable. 
Le  vote  des  participants  au  Conseil  d'Administration de  l'Institut de-
vrait d'ailleurs  ~tre  pond~r~ en  fonction  de  leur  poids  sur  le march,, 
c'est-A-dire en  fonction  du  budget  T~l~coms qu'ils  repr~sentent. 
Il nous  apparatt  utile que  l'Institut puisse devenir  l  terme  comp~tent 
pour  d'autres  probl~mes que  les  t~l~communications. 
.  .. / ... 
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4.  CONCLUSION 
Les  Utilisateurs  confirment  leur  tr~s grand  int~rlt  pour  le Livre vert  : 
*  Au  niveau  de  la  d~marche  commune  qu'il  repr~sente,  car  il  traduit  une 
prise  de  conscience. 
*  Au  niveau  de  son  contenu. 
Le  CIGREF  exprime  quant  ~  lui  le besoin  d'une  autorit~ suffisamment  forte 
au  niveau  europ~en pour  r~gler le  d~veloppement des  t~l~communications en 
Europe.  Ce  d~veloppement  sans  autorit~  europ~enne serait  erratique,  on~­
reux  et  gravement  g~n~rateur de  pertes  de  parts  de  march~ pour  les  op~ra­
teurs  europ~ens. 
De  toute  facon,  l'absence  d'une  coordination  centrale  se  traduirait  par 
une  perte  de  comp~titivit~  des  acteurs  e!conomiques  europe!ens  dans  le 
contexte  de  1992. 
Les  fonctions  d'une  telle  autorite!  centrale  dont  la  d~finition  fait 
l'objet  du  d~bat  ouvert  par  le Livre  vert,  portent  sur  les  probl~mes de 
normalisation,  de  certification,  d'agre!ment,  de  principes  de  tarification 
communs. 
Cette  autorite!  devra  se  coordonner  avec  les  secteurs  correspondants  aux 
~chelons  nationaux.  Les  utilisateurs  du  marche!  percoivent  le  Livre  vert 
comme  le  premier  balbutiement  de  !'expression  d'une  politique  europ~enne 




II - COMMENTAIRE  DES  "POSITIONS  PROPOSEES"  PAR  LA  COMMUNAUTE 
DANS  LA  FIGURE  13 
Dans  leur  ensemble,  les  Utilisateurs  approuvent  pleinement  1 'objectif 
du  Livre  vert  et  l'esprit  des  propositions  r~sum~es dans  la  figure  13. 
En  particulier,  l'objectif  de  cr~er  un  environnement  europ~en ouvert  A 
la  concurrence  et  permettant  au  mieux  le  d~veloppement  des  nouvelles 
opportunit~s offertes  par  la  technologie  pour  rester au  niveau  concur-
rentiel  par  rapport  A nos  partenaires  am~ricains et  japonais. 
A)  Excluaivitl  des  droita  splciaux  des  Ad•iniatrationa  pour  lea 
infrastructures et  lea  services  de  baae 
No us  consta tons  dt!j~  1' «!tab li  ssement  d' une  concurrence  a  ce 
niveau  au  Japon  et  en  Angleterre  (Mercury).  Aux  USA,  il exiate 
la  possibi li  tt!  d' intervention  des  BOC  dans  d' aut res  secteura 
g~ographiques que  le  leur. 
Lea  grands  Utilisateurs  francais  recommandent  auasi  en  Europe 
la  pluralitt!  et  la  concurrence  dans  lea  services  de  base. 
Ils  souhaitent  que  Is  CCE  t!tablisse  lea  conditions  per•ettant 
l't!mergence  d'entreprises  de  tt!ltfco11111unications  publiques  ou 
privtfes  ~  capitaux  exclusivement  europt!ens,  de  dimension  mon-
diale. 




B)  Excluaivit•  pour  un  no•bre  li•it' de  Services  de  baae 
L'exclusivit~  du  service  vocal  pour  lea  Administrations  ne  pa-
ra1t  pas  opportune,  meme  seulement  ~  court  terme.  En  effet, 
1' autorisation  de  revente  du  trafic  ne  peut  pas  se  limiter 
seulement  au  trafic  Donn~es  mais  doit  s'dtendre  aussi  au  tra-
fic  vocal.  •_es  rdseaux  privds,  d'ores  et  dttj•  autorisds,  ne 
pourront  se  voir  interdire  le  trafic  vocal  sous  paine  de  sous-
optimisation  de  !'utilisation  des  infrastructures  correspon-
dantes. 
Ceci  d'autant  plus  que  le  RNIS  se  ddveloppera  dans  lea  toutes 
prochaines  anndes  soit  dans  le  cadre  de  r~seaux  publics,  soit 
dans  le  cadre  de  rdseaux  privds,  et qu'il  est  structurellement 
construit  pour  mixer  les  deux  types  de  trafic. 
D'ailleurs,  le  Livre  vert  a  bien  prdvu  le  caract~re provisoire 
du  maintien  du  monopole  des  Administrations  sur  le  trafic 
vocal.  Ce  monopole  pourra  done  etre  remis  en  cause  grAce  ~  la 
procddure  pt!riodique  de  suivi  proposde  par  le  Livre  vert. 
Le  CIGREr  pense  que  les  offres  de  services  de  base  et  de  ser-
vices  ~  valeur  ajout~e,  meme  si  elles  sont  faites  par  une  meme 
entreprise  de  tdldcommunications,  devront  etre  bien  sdpar~es 
de  facon  ~  ce  que  le  profit  sur  lea  una  ne  permette  pas  un 
dumping  sur  les  autres. 
C)  Offre  libra  dea  autres services 
Les  grands  Utilisateurs  francais 
vues  de  la  Communautd  sur  le  fait 
ajoutde  doivent  etre  enti~rement 
faces  du  territoire  europden. 
partagent  pleinement  lea 
que  lea  services  a  valeur 
libres  sur  toutes  les  sur-
t..a  condition  de  cette  libertd  est  l'unicit~  de  la  normali-
sation,  notamment  pour  le  RNIS  (cf.  D)). 
Le  march~  est  aujourd'hui  domin~  par  lea  entreprises  dtrang6-
res  a  l'Europe.  1.es  grands  utilisateurs  fran<:ais  souhaitent 
que  la  Communautd  prenne  lea  mesures  susceptible&  de  susciter 
le  ddveloppement  d'entreprises  ~  capitaux  europdens  ~galement 
dans  le  domaine  des  services  ~  valeur  ajoutde. 
. ..  I ... 
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~a  normalisation  unique  applicable  •  !'Europe,  qui  doit 
d'ailleurs  etre  la  norme  internationale,  est  une  demande  ea-
sentielle  du  marchd. 
Cependant,  les  services  actuellement  exiatants  qui  ne  seraient 
pas  conformes  •  cette  norme,  doivent  pouvoir  etre  normalement 
amortis,  majs  ils devront  etre  contrainta  •  terme  de  s'aligner 
sur  la  normalisation  unique. 
Si  des  divergences  existent  aujourd'hui  entre  lea 
interprdtations  des  diffdrentes  Administrations  au  des  diffd-
rents  opdrateura  potentials,  ellea doivent  diapara1tre  a  terme 
notamment  par  lea  soins  de  l'lnstitut  de  nor•aliaation  des 
Tt!ltfcom-municationa  qui  doit  jouer  le  role  de  guide  vera  un 
standard  unique. 
La  certification  de  cette  normalisation  europ~enne unique  avec 
mandat  d'attribuer cette  fonction  •  un  certain  nombre  de  labo-
ratoires officials,  est  aussi  une  condition  ndceasaire  de  cet-
te  convergence  de  la  normalisation. 
E)  Open  Network  Provision 
Une  vision  unifit!e  de  mise  en  place  progressive  est  souhaitde 
par  lea  Utilisateurs,  non  seulement  en  ce  qui  concerne  lea 
normes  (cf.  ci-dessus)  maia  aussi  en  ce  qui  concerne  lea  prin-
cipes  et  lea  niveaux  de  la  tarification  et  lea  conditions 
d'acc&s  • 
L'ONP  doit  etre  prdparde  dans  le  cadre  du  SOC-T,  maia  celui-
ci  devrait  etre  ouvert  dgalement  •  toutea  lea  entreprises  de 
ttfltfcom11unications  privdes  et  publiques  et  aux  utiliaateurs 
di recte11ent  et  priori tairement  concernlfa  par  1~  probltme  au 
niveau  applicatif,  et  co11pte-tenu  de  leur  reaponsabilitd  en  ce 
qui  concerne  le  syst&me  de  tdldco11munications  interne  a  leurs 
Etablissements. 




f)  Libert•  dee  •quipe•enta  ter•inaux 
La  libertd  des  dquipements  terminaux  est  dctj•  acquise  en 
france  dans  le  cadre  de  la  procddure  d'agrc!Ment.  Nous  souhai-
tons  que  cette  libertd  s'dtende  •  !'ensemble  de  !'Europe. 
Une  fonction  d'agrc!ment  europt!enne  doit  etre  mise  en  place, 
par  example  par  l'intermt!diaire  de  l'lnstitut europden  de  nor-
malisation. 
G)  La  st!paration  des  fonctions  rdglementaire  et  d'exploitation 
appara1t  aux  Utilisateurs  comme  une  ndcessitd  fondamentale. 
~es  fonctions  rt!glementaires  sont  actuellement  nationales.  11 
nous  para1t  nt!cessaire  de  voir  appara1tre  une  fonction  rt!gle-
mentaire  europdenne  pourvue  d'une  autoritd  suffisante. 
H)  Condition  •gale  de  concurrence  entre  intervenanta  et  lutte 
contre  lea  abus  de  position  do•inante 
Une  telle  condition  de  fonctionnement  du  marchd  des  Tt!ldcora-
munications  europt!ennes  appara1t  essentielle.  Elle  rejoint 
la  position  G)  de  st!paration  dea  fonctions  rc!gleraentairea  et 
d'exploitation. 
Au  moment  ob  les  tt!lt!communications  apparaissent  comma  un  t!lt!-
ment  majeur  de  la  compt!titivitt!  des  entreprises,  lea 
Utilisateurs  souhaitent  que  les  tarifs  se  rapprochent  de  la 
vt!ritt!  des  coOts. 
Le  devoir  national  de  Service  public  que  doivent  satiafaire 
les  Adrainistrationa  n•a  aucune  raison  d•etre  finance!  au  moyen 
d'une  pt!rc!quation  exercc!e  sur  lea  services  de  transport,  et 
devrait,  •  notre  sene,  etre  plutot  financ•  par  l'i•pOt  • 
. . . I ... 
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I)  Le  suivi  des  conditions  permettant  d'thiter  l'abus  de  posi-
tion  do11inante  est  essentiel,  soit  par  le  11toyen  des  prix, 
soit  par  celui  des  standards  (cf.  ci-deasus). 
Nous  approuvons  pleinement  la  recherche  d'une  position  cohf!-
rente  commune  des  Hembree  de  la  Communautd  europf!enne  vis-&-
vis  des  partenaires  extf!rieurs.  Cette  position  doit  etre 
f!tablie  dans  le  cadre  de  la  Communautf!,  chargde  de  reprdsen-
ter  des  intf!rets  communs  dans  le  cadre  de  ndgociations  inter-
nationales. 
En  ce  qui  concerne  les  choix  de 
pourrait  etre  dtablie  en  liaison 
de  Normalisation. 
standards,  cette 
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- A N N E X E -
L'EVOLUTION  DE  LA  REGLEMENTATION  DES  TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
- LE  POINT  DE  VUE  DES  GRANDES  ENTREPRISES  FRANCAISES  -
1.  LES  GRANDES  ENTREPRISES  FRANCAISES  FACE  AU  PR.OBLEME  DES  TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS 
*  Le  CIGREF  est  une  structure  associative  qui  regroupe  une  soixan-
taine de  grandes  entreprises  dans  le domaine  des  nouvelles  techno-
logies  de  !'information.  Son  rOle  est  de  traiter,  par  une 
concertation  inter-entreprises  adapt~e,  les  probl~mes  communs  aux 
grandes  organisations  - ind~pendamment  du  secteur  ~conomique au-
quel  elles appartiennent. 
Les  Administrations  n 'en  sont  pas  membres  puisqu' e lles  sont  ses 
interlocuteurs,  mais  des  relations  ~troites existent. 
Le  CIGREF  regroupe  14  banques,  9  compagnie&  d'assurances,  4  socif-
t'• de  transport,  19  groupes  industriels,  etc.  parmi  lea  plus  im-
portant&  de  France. 
11  reprfsente  40  %  du  pare  informatique  install'  en  France,  et 
30  % environ  de  la  facture  Tfl4communications  des  entreprises  au-
pras  de  la D.G.T. 





* Les  grandee entreprises membres  de  !'association  : 
Le  budget  T~l~communications moyen  est  de  150  l  200  HF.par entre-
prise  ;  les  plus  importants  atteignent  400  MF. 
Ces  entreprises  sont  toutes  actuellement  confront~es  l  une  muta-
tion essentielle et difficile qui  se  traduit  : 
•  Par  une  remise  en  cause  en  profondeur  de  leur  syst~me 
d'information,  et  des  outils  qui  le  supportent  - remise  en  cau-
se  d~bouchant sur des  ~volutions profondes  de  m~thodes de  fonc-
tionnement,  de  structure,  voire  de  comportement  des  hommes • 
•  Par  une  ouverture  essentielle  de  leurs  relations  internationa-
les  dont  l'~ch~ance  de  1992,  concernant  la  d~r~gulation  des 
services  e~ Europe,  sera  une  ~tape majeure  ;  · 
•  Par  une  croissance  pr~visionnelle  tr~s  forte  de  leurs  d~penses 
en  t~l~communications d'environ  20%  par an  en  moyenne. 
La  partie  principale  de  cette  croissance  est  concentr~e  dans 
les  r~seaux de  donn~es. La  mutation en cours  dans  ces entrepri-
ses est celle de  l'~conomie  fran~aise. Les  PHE  subissent  lam~­
me  mutation  et  doivent  pouvoir  !tre en  relations  automatis~es 
avec  les  grandes  entreprises  donneuses  a'ordres,  comme  le  sont 
d~sormais leurs  concurrents  ~trangers. 
2.  LES  PRINCIPES  QUI  NOUS  GUIDENT 
L'appr~ciation du  CIGREF  sur  les  mesures  susceptible&  d'@tre  prises 
dans  le  cadre  de  la  d~r~glementation  des  T~l4communications, 
s'appuie  sur  les deux  principes  suivants  : 
* Les  Entreprises  du  CIGREF,  soucieuses  de  leur  comp4titivit4 
internationale,  ont  besoin  de  disposer  de  moyens  de  t~l4communi­
cations  performants  l  des  prix  concurrentiels.  Elles  veulent  se 
trouver  sur  ce  point  en  bonne  position  technique  et  financitre 
vis-l-vis de  leurs concurrentes  des  autres  pays. 
* Les  Entreprises  du  CIGREF  se  sont  clairement  prononc•e•  pour  la 
libert~ d'assemblage  de  leurs  mat~riels  informatiques.  La  norma-
lisation  en  mati~re  de  t~l~communications est  l'un des  ~14ments 
fondamentaux- m@me  s'il n'est pas  le  seul - n4cessaires  pour at-
teindre  cet objectif. 




3.  CE  QUE  NOUS  SOUHAITONS 
* Que  les  recettes  des  t~l~communications ne  soient  pas  (ou  plus)  un 
~l~ment modulable  du  budget  de  l'Etat. 
Les  entreprises  doivent  pouvoir  baser  leurs  plans  d'~volution des 
syst~mes  d' information  sur  des  hypoth~ses  r~a  l i stes  d '~volut  ion 
des  prix,  conformes  aux  hypoth~ses  d'~volution  des  coOts  de 
revient  et  de  l'inflation.  Elles  doivent  pouvoir  compter  sur  des 
engagements  l  long  terme  des  op~rateurs  en  mati~re  de  tarifica-
tion. 
Dans  ce  sens,  1 'augment at ion  de  25  %  du  prix  des  t~l~communica­
tions  au  cours  de  l'~t~  1985  s'est  traduit  par  un  choc  ~conomique 
sur  les  entreprises  qui  a  remis  en  cause  !'ensemble  de  leur plani-
fication dans  le  domaine  T~l4communications. 
* Que  les  prix des  prestations  de  t~l~communications soient  fonction 
des  prix  de  revient  rt!els,  et  qu'il  y  ait  une  transparence  des 
coOts  correspondants. 
Un  mfme  service  doit  @tre  propos~ par  le  m~me  fournisseur  au  m~me 
prix,  quel  que  soit  le  client  ;  les  grands  utilisateurs  doivent 
cependant  b~n~ficier de  conditions  tarifaires de  groupe,  analogues 
l  celles  dont  ils  b~n~ficient  aupr~s  de  tous  leurs  autres 
fournisseurs. 
Notre  souhait  est  que  la  compensation  financi~re entre  le  service 
public  du  t~l~phone et  le  transport  de  donn~es l  grandes  distances 
disparaisse  l  terme. 
* Que  le coat  des  t~l~communications ne  soit  pas  plus  ~lev4 pour  les 
entreprises  fran~aises qu'il  ne  l'est  pour  les  entreprises  am4ri-
caines  ou  japonaises. 
* Que  le  respect  de  la  normalisation  international•  et  europt1enne 
progresse  fermement  mais  intelligemment  chez  tous  les acteurs  dans 
le  domaine  des  t~l~communications en  Europe. 
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Une  normalisation  unifi~e et  au  niveau  europ~en est  la  condition 
de  la  mise  en  place  de  r~seaux de  dimension  europ~enne,  dans  la-
quelle  interviendront  des  fournisseurs  multiples.  · 
Le  caract~re obligatoire  l  terme  de  la  normalisation  ISO  dans  le 
r~seau A valeur  ajout~e  fran~ais et  europ~en nous  para1t  done  n~­
cessaire.  Par  contre,  ce  r~sultat  ne  sera  pas  atteint  rapidement. 
En  cons~quence,  il conviendra,  A court  terme,  que  tout  fournisseur 
de  r~seaux A valeur  ajout~e puisse  proposer  une  offre  conforme  au 
standard  international  permettant  la  possibilit~ pour  le client  de 
fonctionner  imm~diatement  d'apr~s  le  standard  ISO. 
Un  syst~me  d'incitation  de  nature  financi!re  ou  fiscale  pourra 
~tre de  nature  A  acc~l~rer ce  processus  de  normalisation. 
* Que  les  obligations  de  service  public,  dont  les  entreprises  soot 
conscientes  soient  clairement  d~finies et  impos~es aux  op6rateurs 
de  transport.  Il  appartient  A  la  puissance  publique  de  fixer  les 
r!gles  dans  ce  domaine. 
*Que  soit  garanti  le  cOt~  strat~gique,  pour  la  nation,  de  l'outil 
T4!1E!communication,  et  que  les  conditions  de  sa  p~rennit~  soient 
rE!unies. 
4.  COMMENT  Y PARVENIR 
Au  niveau  des  modalit4!s,  les  .entreprises  clientes  des 
T~lE!communications  ne  peuvent  que  faire  des  propositions.  Il  nous 
semble  que  les orientations  suivantes contribueraient  l  6tablir et  A 
consolider une  situation saine. 
*  Le  d6veloppement  d'une  concurrence  E!quilibr6e  nous  para1t  induire 
une  s6paration  des  fonctions  de  transport  et  de  services  l  valeur 
ajout4e,  qui  devront  ltre fournis  par des  op6rateurs diff4rents. 
* Les  services  de  t4!14communications,  qu'ils  soient  de  transport  ou 
l  valeur ajout4e,  doivent  @tre  propos6s  par des  entreprises et  non 
par  des  administrations. 
.  .. / ... 
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* Les  entreprises  correspondantes  doivent  ltre clairement  plac~es en 
situation  concurrentielle,  done  en  particulier  dans  une  situation 
fiscale de droit commun. 
La  mise  en  place  d'une  T.V.A.  sur  les  t~l~communications nous  pa-
ra1t  done  opportune  pour  deux  raisons  :  elle  concourre  l  placer 
l'op~rateur dominant  dans  une  position d'entreprise  agissant  dans 
un  cadre  concurrentiel.  Elle  diminue  la  charge  des  Entreprises 
soumises  l  la T.V.A •• 
4.1 Commen·taire  du  projet  de  syst~me  de  double  tarification des  liai-
sons  spfcialisfes 
Ce  projet,  r~cemment  conmuniqu~,  traduit  une  simplification  des 
princ  ipes  retenus  par  rapport  l  ceux  t!voqufs  lors  des  rfunions 
d'usagers  de  septembre  et d'octobre  1986. 
Cependant,  ce  syst~me nous  semble  prt!judiciable  au  bon  fonctionne-
ment  de  l'•conomie  pour  des  raisons  de  principe  et  des  raisons  de 
modalit•s. 
* Raison  de  principe  principe  de  non  discrimination 
Un  fournisseur  ne  peut  mettre  un  mime  produit  l  la disposition de 
ses  clients  l  des  prix  diff•rents,  sous  peine  de  fausser  arbi-
trairement  le  bon  fonctionnement  du  marchf. 
* Au  niveau des modalitfs 
•  Un  client  final  peut  ltre contraint  de  prendre  personnellement 
le  risque  de  dfvelopper  un  rfseau,  malgrf  son dfsir fventuel  de 
sous-traiter a un  fournisseur  cet effort et  ce  risque  (qui  peu-
vent  dfpasser  ses moyens  et  ses  objectifs d'action personnels). 
En  d'autres  termes,  la double  facturation  prive  lea entreprises 
de  leur  libertf de  choix  quant  l  la  meilleure  manitre  de  trai-
ter  leurs  probl~mes de  rfseaux. 
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Un  tel  syst~me de  tarification  sera  beaucoup  moins  pr~judicia­
ble  aux  grands  op~rateurs  ~trangers,  qui  peuvent  effectuer  une 
pt!rt!quation  des  recettes  au  niveau  de  1 'ensemble  des  march4s 
mondiaux  sur  lesquels  ils  op~rent,  qu'il  ne  le  sera  aux  op~ra­
teurs  fran~ais  moins  capables  de  faire  une  telle  pt!r4quation, 
du  fait  d'une  couverture  mondiale  moins  dt!velopp4e.  Ce  syst~me 
conduit  done  ~  terme  ~  constituer  en  France  un  oligopole  de 
quelques  grands  opt!rateurs  ~trangers,  apr~s  ~limination  des 
opt!rateurs  fran~ais,  ce  qui  est contraire au  but  recherch•. 
4.2  La  nouvelle  r4!glementation  concernant  la  fonction  de  transport  de 
l'information 
En  raison 
•  du  poids  des  investissements, 
•  des  obligations  du  service  public, 
•  de  la  nature  strat~gique  pour  la  Nation  de  1 'outil  qu'est  le 
r~seau de  transport, 
il apparatt  n~cessaire que  les  op~rateurs dans  ce  domaine  fassent 
l'objet d'un  agr~ment. 
Cet  agr~ment doit !tre assorti  de  la  d~finition de  r4gles permet-
tant  : 
•  d'une  part  les  interfonctionnements  corrects des  difft!rents  r4-
seaux mis  en  place,  en  particulier au  niveau europ4en, 
•  d'autre part  aux  intt!r!ts  strat~giques de  la  nation  d'~tre res-
pect~s  :  cahier des  charges,  limitation des  intt!r~ts  ~trangers, 
etc. 
La  pr~sence  d'un  oligopole  de  fournisseurs  (au  m1n1mum  duopole) 
nous  paratt  indispensable  l  la garantie d'un coat minimum  du  ser-
vice  pour  1'4conomie. 
De  mime,  la  prt!sence  de  plusieurs  investisseurs  nous  paratt  la 
meilleure  garantie  du  maintien et  du  d4!veloppement  d'une  infraa-
t ructure  adapt~e ·aux  besoins  de  1 't!conomie. 
Enfin,  les  grandes  entreprises  souhaitent disposer d'une offre de 
dimension  europt!enne,  voire mondiale  de  la  part des  opdrateura de 
transport.  Les  dispositions  de  la  loi  doivent  d~nc  favoriser  le 
d~veloppement de  transporteurs  europt!ena. 
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Sans  cette  dimension  europ~enne,  on  assisterait  l  un  d~tourne­
ment  de  trafic  au  b4n4fice  des  grands  r4seaux  mondiaux  d4jl 
existants  ou  en  train  de  se  mettre  en  place.  En  effet,  une  sim-
ple  liaison  large  bande  permettrait  de  relier  les  si~ges sociaux 
des  grandes  entreprises  fran~aises aux  cates  des  grands  r4seaux 
mondiaux  plac~es dans  les autres  pays  europ~ens. 
11  s'instaurerait  alors,  comme  autrefois  en  informatique,  une 
comp~tition  entre  pays  europ~ena,  au  b4n4fice  exclusif  des 
grands  op4rateurs  mondiaux,  ce  qui  concr4t iserait  1'4chec  de 
toute  strat4gie europ4enne  en  la  mati~re. 
Tous  les  pays  europ4ens  ne  sont  peut-@tre  pas  prats  l  adopter 
aujourd'hui  un  tel  sc4nario.  Il  leur  serait  plus  difficile  de 
s'y opposer s'il  ~tait clairement  inscrit,  sous  r~serve de  r4ci-
procit4,  dans  la nouvelle  politique  fran~aise. 
4.3 Lea  services  l  valeur  ajout~e correspondent  au  contraire  l  une  ac-
tivit4  ~conomique  dans  laquelle  les  investissements  sont  propor-
tionnellement  plus  14gers  et  1' innovation  est  dominance.  Il  faut 
laisser  toutes  les  opportunit4s  de  d4veloppement  du  march4  se  don-
ner  libre  cours.  On  doit  done  dans  ce  secteur  avoir  une  activit• 
enti~rement  lib~rale. 
4.4 
A  notre  avis,  cette  constatation  justifie  l  nouveau  le  rappel  du 
principe  de  non  discrimination  d4jl  ~voqu~,  sous  peine  de  fausser 
1~  concurrence. 
Le  syst~me de  double  facturation  des  liaisons  sp~cialis~es en  fonc-
tion  de  leur utilisation  par  des  entreprises  ou  par  des  op4rateurs 
sp4cialis4s  dans  lea  services  l  valeur  ajout~e,  est  en  contradic-
tion avec  ce  principe de  non  discrimination. 
L'existence  souhait4e d'une  offr~ europienne  concurrentielle en ma-
ti~re de  r~seaux de  transport  implique  la mise  en place d'une poli-
tique  co.aune  en  ..  ti•r•  de  nor.alisatioo,  dotie  des  moyens 
correspondants  : 
•  Moyens  de  d4finition des  normes  ;  c'est  notamment  le dispositif 
mi s  en  place  dans  le  cadre  du  CEN/CENELEC,  en  liaison  avec: 
l'ISO. 
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•  Hoyens  de  certification,  avec  la  d~signation de  laboratoires  eu-
rop~ens  agr~~s  A  fournir  un  label  de  conformit~  pour  les  pro-
duits et  solutions  test~s. 
Par  exemple,  une  solution  aux  r~cents  conflits  concernant  la 
normalisation  du  vid~otex,  voire  du  t~l~tex,  si  pr~judiciables 
aux  entreprises  r~side  peut-C!tre  dans  le  caractare  unique  et 
obligatoire de  cette structure de  certification. 
5.  En  conclusion,  les  grandes  entreprises  fran~aises membres  du  CIGREF 
rappellent  leur  int~rC!t  pour  l'important  projet  concernant 
l'6volution de  la  r~glementation des  T6l~communications actuellement 
en  cours  de  pr~paration. 
Elles  sont  particuli~rement  favorables  A la  possibilit~ de  b~n~fi­
cier  dans  l'avenir d'une  offre  concurrentielle  tant  dans  le  domaine 
du  transport  que  dans  le  domaine  des  services  l  valeur  ajout~e. 
Les  principes  qui  guideront  cette  ~volution : 
•  v6rit6 des  prix, 
•  transparence  des  coats, 
•  concurrence  loyale, 
leur paraissent  particuli~rement essentiels. 
Elles  sont  favorables  A la mise  en  place d'un  ag~ment pour  les  op~­
rateurs  de  transport,  par  contre  une  totale  libert6  dans  le  domaine 
des  services  l  valeur  ajout~e leur  para1t  n~cessaire. 
Enfin,  la  loi en  cours  de  pr~paration doit  rester ouverte,  de  mani•-
re  l  s'adapter  l  toutes  les  6volutions  technologiques  ou  des  servi-
ces,  et  permettre  aux  entreprises  de  b~n~ficier dans  les  meilleures 
conditions  des  progr•s  offerts.  A titre d'exemple,  le  d~veloppement 
du  R~seau Num~rique l  Int~gration de  Service  (RNIS)  qui  m~lange voix 
et  donn~es,  ne  permettra  pas  le  maintien  d'une  s~paration r4glemen-
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Erste  Anmerkungen  zum  GrUnbuch  der  EG-Kommission 
"Gber  die  Entwicklung des  gemeinsamen  Marktes  fur 
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I.  Grundsatzliche  Bemerkungen 
Der  EWG-Vertrag  fordert eine gemeinsame  Pol~~~~~-----------­
dem  Gebiet des  Personen- und  Guterverkehrs  (Artikel 
74  EWGV);  der Post- und  Fernmeldeverkehr findet  im 
Vertrag dagegen  keine  Erwahnung.  Auch  die Einheitliche 
Europaische Akte,  di~ der  Gemeinschaft ausdrucklich 
eine ganze  Reihe  neuer Aufgabenfelder  zugewiesen 
hat,  spricht nicht davon,  daB  dazu  auch die Entwicklung 
einer gemeinsamen Telekommunikationspolitik  geho~en 
sollte.  Wer  daraus die  Frage ableiten  m5chte,  ob 
es  fur  eine gemeinsame  Politik auf  diesem Gebiet 
und derart,  wie  sie von  der  Kommission mit dem  Grunbuch 
initiiert wird,  uberhaupt eine Notwendigkeit gibt, 
wird  aber  anerkennen  mus~en:  Eben  diese  Notwendigkeit 
umfassend  und  sachlich dargelegt  zu  haben,  ist die 
wichtigste Leistung,  die die  Kommission  mit  ihrem 
Grunbuch  zunachst einmal erbracht hat. 
Unabhangig  davon,  ob sich die Gemeinschaft  urn  die 
Gestaltung des  ordnungspolitischen  Rahmens  fur die 
Markte  der  Telekommunikation  kGmmert  oder nicht, 
wurde  aber  auch gelten,  daB  kein Mitgliedstaat sein 
eigenes  Fernmeldewesen  heute  noch  neu  organisieren 
kann,  ohne  darauf  zu  achten,  was  in den  anderen  Landern 
vor  sich  g~ht.  So  wie  die Mitgliedstaaten  uberdies 
verpflichtet sind,  alle MaBnahmen  zu  unterlassen, 
"wB1che  die  Verwirklichung  der  Ziele  d~s Vertrages 
gef~hrden k6nnten"  (Artikel  5  EWGV),  milssen  sich 
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die Organe der  Gemeinschaft  und  an erster Stelle 
die Kommission  verpflichtet fuhlen,  fQr  die  Probleme 
gemeinschaftliche  Losungen  zu  entwickeln,  ~die sich 
im  Fernmeldeverkehr  uberall  im  Grunde  in~gleicher 
Weise.stellen. 
Zu  einem quten Teil sind diese  Pr.obleme ;durc;h  den 
Vorgang_bedinq~, der  im  Grunbuch  kurz,~r·t~effend 
mit der Feststellung beschrieben wird,  daB  nunmehr 
auch aus  Dienstleistungen der  Telekomm:~nilcation flandels- _ ..  ') 
guter.werden oder  schon  geworden  sind.  D~s zieht 
zwangslaufig nach sich,  daB  die  im  Fernaeldeverkehr 
bestehenden nationalen Dienstleistungamonopole auch 
im  Lichte des  im  EWG-Vertrag  verankerten Prinzips 
der Dienstleistungsfreiheit  zu  uberprufen sind,  so 
wie diese Dienstleistungen ebenso  zwa~qsliufig auch 
zum  Objekt der gemeinschaftlichen und  der internationalen 
Handelspolitik werden.  Auch  deshalb wird die Entwicklung 
einer gemeinsamen  Telekommunikationspolitik  zu einer 
Aufgabe  der Gemeinschaft,  der sie sich nicht mehr 
entziehen kann. 
Dazukommen  ~ie neuen  grundlegenden politischen Ziele 
der  Gemeinschaft,  die ihr durch  Beschlusse des  Europa-
ischen Rates  oder  eben durch die Einheitliche Europaische 
Akte  vorgegeben  wurden  und  die in  jedem  Fall auch 
das  offentliche Fernmeldewesen  der Mitgliedstaaten 
betreffen: 
- die Vollendung des  Binnenmarktes  his  1992, 
- die  Schaffung  eines  gemeinsamen  Informationsmarktes, 
die Verwirklichung eines  gemeinsamen  Marktes  im 
audio-visuellen Bereich  und 
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- die  "Forschungs- und  Entwicklungsgemeinschaft", 
~ls welche  sich oie  EWG  auch  in  wachsendem  MaBe 
verstehen will  und  verstehen  muB. 
Diese  Zielsetzungen werden  von der Wirtschaft der 
Bundesrepublik wie  von  der  Bundesregierung unterstUtzt. 
Es  widersprache den  eigenen  Interessen,  dies nicht 
zu  tun.  Vor  diesem Hintergrund  aber  muB  gesehen werden, 
was  eine gemeinsame  Telekommunikationspolitik bedeuten 
kann  und  bewirken  soll. 
. 
Die  Rolle des  Fernmeldewesens  und der Fernmeldepolitik 
ist im  Hinblick auf  die genannten  Ziele nicht anders 
zu  beurteilen als die  Rolle der  gemeinsamen Verkehrspoli-
tik.  So  wie ein liberaler gemeinsamer Markt des  Verkehrs 
notwendiger  Unterbau  fur  den  Binnenmarkt der guterprodu-
zierenden  und  -vertreibenden Wirtschaftszweige ist, 
so  muB  ein liberaler gemeinsamer  Markt  fur Dienstleistun-
gen  der  Telekommunikation als konstituierendes  Element 
des  Binnenmarktes aller Wirtschaftsbereiche,  ganz 
besonders aber der Dienstleistungswirtschaft angesehen 
werden. 
SchlieBlich  - und  auch das  wird mit dem  Grunbuch 
in erfreulicher Deutlichkeit aufgezeigt  - muB  man 
sich des  Umstands  bewuBt  werden,  daB  es  fur die Mitglied-
staaten  und  auch  fur  ihre Fernmeldeverwaltungen  Rechts-
pflichten aus  dern  EWG-Vertrag  gibt,  in deren  Geltungsbe-
reich die  Telekommunikation  gewissermaBen  mehr  und 
mehr  "hineinwachst  ''.  Dazukornmt  eine nach  und  nach 
"einschL3.gig"  werdende  Rechtsprechung des  Europaischen 
Gerichtshofes.  Folgende  Aspekte  erscheinen dabei 
als  besonders  wichtig,  weil  rechtsbedeutsam: 
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Soweit  sie nicht  Hoheitsaufgaben  wahrnehmen,  sind 
auch  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  Unternehmen  im  Sinne 
der  Wettbewerbsbestimrnungen  des  EWG-Vertrag·es.  Das 
bedeutet,  daB  sie sich nicht mehr  als letete Instanz 
hinsichtlich der  Frage betrachten kaanen,  ·wo  oder 
wieweit  von  ihnen  Monopolrechte  zu  beanspr·uchen 
sind. 
Als  eines der  grundlegenden  Ziele des Vertrages 
richtet sich die Dienstleistungsfreiheit auf die 
Schaffung eines  gemeinsamen  Marktes  fur  Dienstleistun-
gen.  Das  bezieht auch  Dienstleistunqen des  Fernmelde-
verkehrs mit ein,  nachdern  sie,  wie  schon gesagt, 
zu  Handelsgutern  geworden  sind . 
• 
- Entscheidungen des  Europaischen Gerichtshofes  schaffen 
unmittelbar geltendes  Recht.  Dies stellt alle Mitglied-
staaten und  besonders  ihre  Fernmeldeverwaltungen 
vor die Frage,  ob sie einen  gerneinsamen  Markt  fur 
die  Telekomrnunikation politisch und  konstruktiv 
entwickeln wollen oder  hinnehmen  mochten,  daB  ein 
solcher Markt  durch Entscheidungen des  Europiischen 
Gerichtshofes  geschaffen wird. 
All dies  laBt erkennen,  daB  das  Grunbuch nicht nur 
als  eine mit  FleiB  und  Sachverstand  verfaBte  Bestandsauf-
nahme  der  zahlreichen politischen,  wirtschaftlichen, 
technischen  und  rechtlichen  Aspekte  der  Telekommunikation 
gelesen  werden  sollte.  Es  sollte vor  allem  auch als 
Absichtserklarung der  Kommission  verstanden  werden, 
von  jetzt an  mit  der  systematischen  Entwicklung  eines 
gerneinsamen  Marktes  fur  Dienstleistungen  und  technisches 
- c;  -
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Gerat  der  Telekommunikation  zu  beginnen.  Diese  Absicht 
sollte auch die volle  Unterstiltzung des  Rates  haben. 
II.  Zum  Kapitel  X "Vorschlag  fUr  eine  Losung" 
zu  X,l  "Voraussetzunq  fUr  ein qemeinsames  Vorgehen" 
Wenn  es  beim  zweiten  Spiegelstrich  (S.  177)  heiBt: 
"Ordnungspolitische Veranderungen  im  Telekommunikations-
bereich mussen  die  Uberlegungen aller Beteiligten 
miteinbeziehen,  insbesondere der privaten und  geschaft-
lichen Nutzer,  der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen,  der  Beschaf-
tigten der Verwaltungen,  der Mitbewerber  und  der 
Telekommunikations- und  Datenverarbeitungsindustrie.", 
so ist darauf  hinzuweisen,  daB  eine solche Einbeziehung 
"aller Beteiligten"  bis  jetzt wohl  noch nicht gegeben 
ist, also noch organisiert werden  muBte.  Vor  allem 
kame  es  auf die Einbeziehung der  Benutzer  und  der 
bereits aktiven oder  potentiellen Anbieter  von  Dienst-
leistungen,  also kilnftiger  Konkurrenten der  Fernmeldever-
waltungen  an. 
Zum  vierten Spiegelstrich: 
"Es  besteht Einverstindnis  darGber,  daB  die  Rolle 
der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  bei der  Bereitstellung 
der  Netzinfrastruktur  im  wesentlichen sichergestellt 
sein muB,  damit  sie ihren offentlichen Dienstleistungs-
auftrag erfUllen konnen.", 
wird  bemerkt,  daB  das  hier  festgestellte  "Einverstandnis" 
wohl  in erster Linie auf  einer  Anerkennung  historischer 
Entwicklungen  und  damit  verknupfter  politischer Realitaten 
beruht,  aber  nicht  das  Ergebnis  einer  fundierten 
Analyse  der  Probleme  von  Monopol  und  Wettbewerb  auf 
der  Netzebene  ist.  Sich auf  einen  "offentlichen  Dienst-
leist.ungsauftrag"  der  Fernmeldeverwaltunge!1  zu  beziehen, 
',  ~  I  • 
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ohne  Inhalt  und  Reichweite dieses Auftraqes  naher 
zu  bestimmen,  genugt  zur  Rechtfertigunq des  Netzmonopols 
nicht.  Gerade  weil  man  in den  USA  und  in Japan  schon 
weiter  gegangen  ist,  sollte sich die Gemeinseliaft 
um  eine  Klarung der  Aufgaben  und  der Verpflichtungen 
bemuhen,  die den  nationalen Netzmonopolen  aus  europaischer 
Sicht  zuku.nftig  zu  stellen sind,  urn  sie poli  tisch 
und  auch rechtlich weiter  legitimieren  zu  konnen. 
Auch  beim funften  Spiegelstrich: 
"Eine stabile natiirliche Grenzlinie  zwischen  einem 
"reservierten"  Dienstesektor und  einem dem  Wettbewerb 
geoffneten Dienstesektor  {der  insbesondere die Mehrwert-
dienste einschlieBen sollte) ist nicht moglich. 
Aufgrund  der  technologischen Entwicklung  •••  kann 
jede Definition  {und  Reservierung)  eines Basis-
oder Grunddienstes  nur  zeitweilig sein und  sollte 
periodisch uberpriift werden,  wenn  nicht die Gesamtent-
wicklung der  Telekommunikationsdienste behindert 
·werden  soll.  Es  herrscht  jedoch in der  Praxis  Einmutiq-
keit  zwischen  den  Mitgliedstaaten dardber,  daB  der 
herkommliche  Fernsprechdienst ein Basisdienst ist  ••• ", 
handelt  es  sich  urn  eine vorschnell gezogene  "politische" 
Folgerung.  Wahrend  auf der einen Seite betont wird, 
daB  es  keine  sinnvolle  und  auf  Dauer  angelegte Unte.rschei-
dung  zwischen Basisdiensten  und  Mehrwertdiensten 
gibt und  dementsprechend  auch nicht versucht wird, 
eine EG-einheitliche Definition aufzustellen,  werden 
beide Begriffe  von  der  Komrnission  gleichwohl  benutzt 
und  obendrein  konstatiert,  daB  der  Fernsprechdienst 
ein  "Basisdienst"  sei.  Darnit  wird  der  SchluB  verbunden, 
daB  dieser  Dienst  irn  Monopol  verbleiben musse  oder 
solle.  Ein  solcher  SchluB  kann  allenfalls gezogen 
werden,  wenn  klargernacht wird,  welche  Urnstande  oder 
Zielsetzungen  den  Dienst  zum  Basisdienst rnachen  und 
inwiefern diese  den  AusschluB  von  Wettbewerb  zwingend 
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verlangen. 
Wie  im  Kapitel  VI  ''Ordnungspolitischer  Rahmen",  so 
bleibt auch  hier die unterstellte Notwendigkeit, 
am  Ooppelmonopol  fUr  Netze  und  Fernsprechdienste 
festzuhalten,  unerklart. 
zu  X,3  "Vorgeschlagene  Positionen auf  Gemeinschaftsebene" 
Mit  dem  Satz: 
"Die  Vorschl~ge konzentrieren sich auf  solche  Problem-
kreise,  die auf  Gemeinschaftsebene  fur alle Mitglied-
staaten gel8st werden  mUssen.", 
stellt die Kommission  ein Prinzip auf,  dem  generell 
zugestimmt werden  muB:  Keine  EG-Losung  fur  Fragen, 
die ohne weiteres  und  ohne  Schaden  auch  auf nationaler 
Ebene  geregelt werden  konnen!  In  zwei  Fallen fragt 
es  sich aber,  ob die Kommission  den Mitgliedstaaten 
nicht Entscheidungen  UberlaBt,  die eher  Gegenstand 
der  gemeinsamen  Politik sein sollten,  wenn  ein gemein-
samer  Markt  fur  Telekomrnunikation  entstehen sell: 
- Unbeschadet  des  Votums,  am  Netzmonopol  festzuhalten, 
soll es  einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten moglich sein, 
"liberalere Systeme"  zu  wahlen,  also konkurrierende 
Netze  zuzulassen. 
- Ebenso  sol! es  Sache  der  Mitgliedstaaten bleiben, 
wie  und  mit  welchen  Mitteln der  Wettbewerb  zwischen 
W§hl- und  Festverbindungen  reguliert wird,  urn  die 
Ertrage  aus  den  nationalen  Fernsprechmonopolen 
~'J  sichern. 
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Die  erste Position,  die moglicherweise mit  Rucksicht 
auf  GroBbritannien  eingenommen  werden  muB,  bedeutet, 
daB  die  EG  de  facto  gar  nicht  fur  die Beibehaltung 
der  Netzmonopole eintritt,  sondern  Monopol  urtd  Wettbewerb 
im  Netzbereich als Optionen  behandelt.  Das  wird  von 
Unternehmen,  die in anderen  Landern  bereits als konkurrie-
rende  Netzbetreiber tatig sind,  zweifellos mit  Interesse 
vermerkt  werden.  Auch  hier macht  sich bemerkbar, 
daB  eine  uberzeugende  Begrfindung  fur  das  Netzmonopol, 
die aus  einer klaren Darstellung der Aufgaben abgeleitet 
werden  muBte,  die Netzbetreibern  im  Rahmen  der Politik 
der Gemeinschaft  zu  stellen waren,  fehlt.  Es  fehlt 
damit  auch das  uberzeugende  Gegenmodell,  das  man 
etwa  den  USA  entgegenhalten konnte,  wenn  von dort 
auch die  Schaffung eines  Marktes  fur Netztrigerleistungen 
verlangt wurde. 
Zur  Problematik Wahlverbindungen/Festverbindungen 
heiBt es  (auf  S.  185  f),  sowohl  Verbotsregelungen 
zum  AusschluB  des  Wiederverkaufs  von  Sprachdiensten 
als auch deren  Unterbindung durch eine nutzungszeitab-
hangige Tarifierung  "miiBten  in der  Gemeinschaft akzeptiert 
werden".  Das  hieBe  aber,  daB  in einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten  .J) 
Nutzungen  von  Mietleitungen verboten blieben,  die 
in anderen  immerhin  zulassig waren.  Das  ist vom  Stand-
punkt der  Gemeinschaft  so  wenig  zu  akzeptieren,  wie 
es  von  Dienstleistungsanbietern  und  Nutzern akzeptiert 
werden  kann.  Wenn  die  Kornrnission  in der  "Akzeptanz 
klarer Verpflichtungen durch die  Fernmeldeverwaltungen 
bezilglich des  Ar1schlusses  und  des  Netzzugangs  ffir 
Anbieter  grenzfibergrelfender  Dienste"  eine der  "wesent-
lichen Anderungen"  sieht,  die  auf  Gemeinschaftsebene 
durch  eine  gemeinsarne  Politik herbeigefilhrt werden 
milssen  (S.  185  eben),  so  mu6  hinzugefugt werden, 
l.  da~ sich die  nationalen  Netze  nicht  nur  fur  die 
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Anbieter  von  zwischenstaatlichen Telekommunikations-
diensten,  sondern  generell offnen  mussen,  wenn 
ein echter Binnenmarkt  auf  diesem Gebiet entstehen 
soll,  und 
2.  daB  die  Fernmeldeverwaltungen ebenso durch Gemeinschafts-
recht verpflichtet werden  mussen,  Festverbindunqen 
uberall  zu  Bedingungen  zu  uberlassen,  die eine 
markt- und  wettbewerbsgemaBe  Nutzung  ermoglichen. 
Die  Kommission halt,  was  den  zweiten  Punkt betrifft, 
Beschrankungen  jedoch fur gerechtfertigt,  sofern 
sie  "auf ein legitimes  Niveau  des  Schutzes  der  finan-
ziellen Lebensf&higkeit  (der  Netzbetreiber)  begrenzt" 
bleiben.  Das  klingt einleuchtend,  macht  aber ein 
weiteres Mal  darauf  aufmerksam,  wie  unscharf die 
Begriffe sind,  mit denen  Netz- oder  Fernsprechmonopol 
jew~ils verteidigt werden.  "Finanzielle Lebensfihigkeit" 
ist jedenfalls etwas  anderes als die an  anderer Stelle 
vorgebrachte  "Sicherung der  Investitionskraft",  d.h. 
der  Finanzierung  von  Investitionen,  deren Art und 
Umfang  womoglich  vorrangig politisch vorgegeben wurde. 
Weil die Antwort  auf  die  Frage,  was  eigentlich  jeweils 
mit  Hilfe einer  am  Fernsprechtarif orientierten nutzungszeit-
abhangigen  Tarifierung geschutzt werden  soll,  nicht 
zuletzt durch politische Vorgaben  bestimmt wird, 
geht die  Vermutung  der  Kommission,  die Gebuhrenpolitik 
der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  bei  Festverbindungen  lasse 
sich durch eine wettbewerbsrechtliche MiBbrauchsaufsicht 
..  unter  Kontrolle  halten,  am  Kern  des  Problems  vorbei. 
Unter  den  anzusteuernden  "wesentlichen Anderungen" 
wi~d nicht erwahnt,  daB  sich die  Gemeinschaft  umgehend 
- lo  -
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auf  das  Prinzip einigen sollte,  daB  in  jedem Fall 
alle Dienste der nicht-sprachlichen  Kommunikation 
in  den  Wettbewerb  geh5ren.  Es  genfigt  nicht,  daran 
zu  erinnern,  daB  bei  der  Festlegung  "reservierter" 
Dienste restriktiv verfahren werden  sollte.  Zu  fordern 
ist vielmehr eine klare wettbewerbsorientierte Grundsatz-
entscheidung auf  Gemeinschaftsebene.  Statt im  Netzbereich 
den Mitgliedstaaten die  Wahl  zwischen Monopol  und 
Wettbewerb  zu  lassen,  muB  diese Option  an erster 
Stelle in bezug auf  den  Fernsprechdienst offengehalten 
werden. 
Zu  X,4.2  "Einleitung neuer Aktionslinien" 
Zur  Aktionslinie  I: 
Fur  ein  "Europaisches  Institut fUr  Telekommunikations-
normen"  mag  es  einen  Bedarf  geben.  Wenn  sich ein 
solches  Institut allerdings  zum  Instrument einer 
falsch verstandenen europaischen  Industriepolitik 
entwickeln kann,  das  statt auf  nationaler auf  EG-
Ebene nichttarifare Handelshemrnnisse  "schopft",  sollte 
man  eine derartige Einrichtung nicht ins  Leben  rufen. 
Zur  Aktionslinie  II: 
Das  Prinzip des  offenen  Netzzugangs  muB  aus  gesamtwirt-
schaftlichen Grunden  wie  aus  der  speziellen Sicht 
der  Dienstleistungsanbieter  und  Nutzer  entschieden 
unterstlitzt werden.  Es  sollte umgehend  und  konsequent 
in  Richtung einer  praxisnahen  und  rnarktwirksamen 
Realisierung ausgearbeitet werden.  ONP  schafft die 
Voraussetzungen  dafUr,  trotz  Netzrnonopol  "flachendeckend~" 
Wettbewerbsmirkte  filr  alle Dienstleistungen der  Telekom-
munikation  zu  verwirklichen.  ONP  ist insofern  u.E. 
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auch  das  einzige  Gegenmodell  zum  Netzwettbewerb, 
das  uberzeugen  kann  und  auf  das  sich die Gemeinschaft 
auch  in ihrem  fernmeldepolitischen  Dialog mit den 
USA  wird  stutzen mUssen. 
Zur  Aktionslinie III: 
Der  Vorschlag,  gemeinsame  Dienste  zu  entwickeln, 
die  "europaweit fl!chendeckend"  verfugbar sind,  bezieht 
sich auf  herko~~liche Fernmeldedienste,  auf Mehrwertdienste 
unbestimmten Charakters  und  auf  Informationsdienste. 
Dies  zeigt,  daB  auch der Dienstbegriff sehr unterschied-
liche Tatbestande abdeckt.  Unklar bleibt hier aber 
vor allem,  was  mit  "europaweit  flachendeckender" 
Verfugbarkeit gemeint ist:  nur die schlichte Moglichkeit, 
einen  bestimmten  Dienst uberall  zu  nutzen,  oder aber 
seine  Nutzung  zu  einem EG-Einheitstarif? 
Etwaige  Bestrebungen,  die nationalen Versorgungsphilo-
sophien durch eine  "europiische Gemeinwirtschaftlichkeit" 
zu  ersetzen oder  auch  zu  uberhohen,  mussen  rechtzeitig 
zuruckgewiesen  werden.  Der  Beitrag,  den die Telekommuni-
kation  "auf dem  Wege  zu  einer dynamischen europaischen 
Volkswirtschaft"  - siehe den Obertitel des  Grunbuchs!  -
zu  leisten hat,  verlangt eine  konsequente  Entscheidung 
fur  den  europaweiten Wettbewerb.  In  diesem Wettbewerb 
mussen alle Anbieter einschlieBlich der  Fernmeldeverwal-
tungen  angebots- und  preispolitisch konsequent marktorien-
tiert arbeiten  konnen. 
Auch  unter  dem  Aspekt der  "europaweiten"  Verfllgbarkeit 
sind die wesentlichen  Forderungen  zunachst  von  der 
auf  EG-Ebene  zu  koordinierenden  Ir.frastrukturpolitik 
zu  erflillen  und  an  die  Tr~ger der  nationalen  ~etzmonopole 
zu  richten. 
•  <  .· 
- 12. _-. 
133 - 12  -
Zur  Aktionslinie  V: 
Vor  allem  fur  die  Uruguay-Runde  des  GATT  sowie  fur 
den  weiteren  handels- und  fernmeldepolitischen  Dialog 
mit  den  USA  und  mit  Japan  muB  die  EG  eine  gemeinsame 
Politik entwickeln.  Dafur ist ein eigenes,  und  zwar 
klares  und  liberales Konzept  fur  den  eigenen Markt 
eine  unabdingbare Voraussetzung.  Es  muB  der Situation 
und  weiteren Entwicklung in den  USA  unter wettbewerbs-
und  handelspolitischen Gesichtspunkten ebenburtig 
sein,  ohne die  US-amerikanischen  Ent~icklungen einfach 
zu  kopieren.  Es  hieBe,  zweite oder  gar dritte Schritte 
vor  dem  ersten  zu  tun,  wenn  man  in der Gemeinschaft 
alle·uberkomrnenen Aufgabenteilungen,  so vor allem 
die  zwischen  fernmeldetechnischer  Industrie auf  der 
einen Seite und  staatlichen Fernmeldeverwaltungen 
auf der anderen Seite uberspringen wollte,  um  auch 
in Europa  moglichst viele Telekommunikationsunternehmen 
nach  dem  Muster  von  AT  & T  oder  auch  NTT  entstehen 
zu  lassen.  Die  in der  Telekommunikation  zu aktivierende 
Wettbewerbsdynamik  muB  an erster Stelle im  Interesse 
der  europaischen Anwender  entfaltet werden,  nicht 
aber,  urn  Unternehmen,  die unter  ganz  anderen historischen 
Voraussetzungen  auf  dem  Feld der  Telekommunikation  .~) 
groB  geworden  sind,  in Europa  die gleichen Entwicklungs-
chancen  zu  bieten,  wie  sie sie von  ihren Heimatlandern 
her  kennen. 
Fraglich ist allerdings,  ob die  Gemeinschaft  in die 
entsprechenden Verhandlungen  mit  einem  uberzeugenden 
Konzept  eintritt,  wenn  sie  am  Fernsprechmonopol  festhalt 
und  ihren Mitgliedstaaten dar0ber  hinaus  freistellt, 
wie  sie die  Nutzung  von  Festverbindungen  behandeln 
wollen.  Eine  glaubwurdige  Rolle  wird  die Gemeinschaft 
bei  den  Verhandlungen  uber  die  Liberalisierung der 
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Uicnstleistungcn  nur  spie1en  k6nnen,  wenn  sie,  gcstlitzt 
auf  das  ONP-Prinzip,  ihren eigenen  Markt  fur  Dienst-
leistungen der  Telekon~unikation konsequent  wettbewerbs-
orientiert gestaltet und  auch  Dienstleistungsanbietern 
aus  Drittlandern offnet. 
lo.  September  1987 
•. 
135 ) 
Zum  Grllnbuch  der  EG-Kommission  "Dber  die  Entwicklung 
des  gemeinsamen  Marktes  fur  Telekon~unikationsdienstlei­
stungen  und  Teleko!!'.mur.ikationsgerate" 
Anmerkungen  zu  Kapitel  VI:  "Konzept eines ordnungspoli-
tischen  Rahmens,  zu 
I. 
dem  hin sich die gegenwar-
tigen Entwicklungstenden-
zen  entwickeln k5nnten" 
An  den  Anfang  des  Kapitels stellt die  Kommission 
einen Uberblick  uber die derzeitigen Verhaltnisse 
in den  Mitgliedstaaten,  aus  dem  sich ergibt,  daB 
diese  - etwa  in bezug auf  den  Verbund  oder die 
Selbstandigkeit von  Post- und  Fernmeldewesen oder 
hinsichtlich der  Trennung hoheitlicher  und  betrieb-
licher Aufgaben  im  Fernmeldeverkehr  - sehr unterschied-
lich sind,  daB  aber  Gberall  eine  Neuordnung disku-
tiert wird oder  schon  im  Gange  ist und  daB  insofern 
"gewisse  konvergierende  Tendenzen  in Richtung 
auf  folgende  Zi~lc zu  erkennen"  seien: 
..  - Offnung der  Endgeratemarkte  fur  den Wettbewerb, 
- Entstehung eines wettbewerbsorientierten 
Markts  fur.  Mehrwertdienste, 
- Trennung  zwischen  hoheitlicher  und  betrieb-
licher  Funktion, 
- Beibehaltung der  gesetzlichen  Monopole 
(bzw.  Duopolei  fur  die  Bereitstellung 
der  Netzinfrastruktur  und  einer  begrenzten 
Anzahl  von  Grund~i~nsten, 
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- starkere Ausrichtung  der  Gebuhren  fur 
diese  Dienste  an  den  tatsachlichen Kosten." 
(S.  59) 
Dies  ist ohne  Zweifel  richtig  und  auch  nicht erstaun-
lich,  weil  man  uberall mit  den  gleichen Konsequenzen 
der  informations- und  kommunikationstechnischen 
Entwicklungen einerseits  und  der  Entwicklung, 
welche die  Kommuni~ationsbedlirfnisse im nationalen 
und  internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehr  nehmen, 
andererseits konfrontiert ist. 
Die  Kommission  zieht daraus  den  SchluB,  daB  die 
Gemeinschaft  dadurch die  "Chance"  erhalte,  "einen 
gemeinsamen  ordnungspolitischen Rahmen  zu  schaffen, 
aus  dem  heraus  sich rasch ein gemeinsamer  Telekommuni-
kationsmarkt  entwickeln  kann."  (S.  6o) 
Dem  ist grundsatzlich  zuzustirnmen.  Zu  fragen  ware 
allenfalls,  ob  es statt "Chance"  nicht  schon  "Notwen-
digkeit"  heiBen  muBte. 
Die  Kommission  geht aber  auch weiter  und erklart: 
"Die  Gemeinschaft  hat die Pflicht,  daffir  zu  sorgen, 
daB  wahrend  dieses  Neuordnungsprozesses  zwischen 
den  Mitgliedstaaten keine  neuen  Hindernisse  fur 
den  Handel  mit  Gutern  und  Dienstleistungen errichtet 
und  die  bestehenden  Hindernisse  abgebaut  werden. 
Sie sollte die derzeitigen Veranderungen  als 
eine  Gelegenheit  nutzen,  die  Entwicklung eines 
einzigen gemeinschaftsweiten  Markts  fur  Telekommuni-
kationsausrlistung  und  -dienste voranzutreiben." 
( S.  6o) 
Auch  an  dieser  Verpflichtung  ist nicht  zu  zweifelno 
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Sic  bestcht  im  Grunde  fur  die Mitgliedstaatcn 
ebenso  wie  fur  die  Organe  der  Gemeinschaft.  Um 
das  zu  erkennen,  genilgt  es,  sich  zu  vergegenw§rtigen, 
in welchem  MaBe  nationale  Fernmeldeverwaltungen 
durch  Investitionsentscheidungen,  durch  Zulassungs-
verfahren oder  -praktiken  usw.  "Politik gegen 
die Gemeinschaft"  betreiben konnen.  Damit wird 
aber  schon  gegen  Art.  5  EWGV  verstoBen,  der die 
Mitgliedstaaten verpflichtet,  "alle MaBnahmen 
zu  unterlassen,  welche die Verwirklichung der 
Ziele des Vertrages  gefahrden  konnten".  Zu  diesen 
Zielen gehort seit dem  Inkrafttreten der Einheitlichen 
Europaischen Akte  auch die  Schaffung des  EG-Binnen-
marktes bis  1992. 
-
Der  "gemeinsame  Telekommunikationsmarkt"  als Ziel 
einer neuen  Gemeinschaftspolitik ist ein Teil 
dieses Binnenmarktkonzepts,  hat seinerseits aber 
mehrere Aspekte.  Die  Kommission  stellt fur die 
von  ihr angestrebte  "gemeinsame  Telekommunikationspo-
litik"  folgende  Ziele,  die sie die  "wichtigsten" 
nennt,  auf: 
"  - die  Schaffung  eines  gemeinsamen Markts 
fur  Telekommunikationsendgerate, 
- die  Schaffung  eines  gemeinsamen  Markts 
fur  Telekorr~unikationsdienste, 
die  Schaffung  eines  gemeinsamen  Markts 
filr  Netzeinrichtungen,  die  Bestandteil 
der ·relekommunikationsinfrastruktur sind." 
(S.  58) 
Dem  folgt  auch  der  weitere  Aufbau  des  Kapitels 
VI.  Es  ist aber  zu  bcachtcn,  daa  es  bei  den  Diensten 
- 4  -
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urn  Ziele  und  auch  Probleme  geht,  die eine andere 
Qualitat  haben  als  jene  Ziele  und  Probleme,  die 
mit  der Verwirklichung eines  gemeinsamen  Marktes 
fi1r  Telekouununikationstechni.k  verbunden  sind. 
Bei  den  Diensten  kommt  zusatzlich  zu  den wettbewerbs-
und  den  handelspolitischen  Bestinuuungen des  EWG-
Vertrages,  die auch  fur die  Markte  der  Telekommu-
nikationstechnik  bedeutsam sind,  die  Forderung 
des  Vertrages  nach Verwirklichung der Dienst-
leistungsfreiheit hinzu,  die sich als die Verpflichtung 
zur  Schaffung eines  gemeinsamen  Marktes  fur  Dienstleistungen 
jeglicher Art,  also auch  des  Fernmeldeverkehrs 
interpretieren laBt. 
Allein dies rechtfertigt bereits,  der Entwicklung 
einer gemeinsamen  Politik in  bezug  auf die Ordnung 
der Markte  fur  Telekommunikationsdienste ein besonderes 
Gewicht  beizumessen.  Daruber  hinaus  bedarf es 
auch  - was  die  Kommission  in diesem  Sinne nicht 
zum  Ausdruck  bringt  - einer  gemeinsamen  Infrastrukturpolitik, 
ohne die  gemeinsame  Markte  fur  Telekommunikationstechnik 
und  -dienste Stuckwerk  bleiben durften. 
II.  Gemeinsamer  Markt  fur  Fernmeldetechnik 
Den  ''gemeinsamen  Endgeratemarkt"  sieht die Kommis-
slon heraufziehen,  weil  in allen Mitgliedstaaten 
bereits eine Tendenz-bestehe,  auch die nationalen 
Markte  "allrnahlich  vollkornrnen  fi.ir  den  Wettbewerb 
zu  offnen".  Je  rnehr  sich in  Zukunft  ISDN-fahige 
und  multifunktionalc  Endgcr5tc  durchsctztcn,  desto 
mehr  werde  die  Freigabe  des  Marktes  fi.ir  den  Wettbewerb 
chnehin  "unausweichlich". 
Die  Kornrnission  befi.irwortet  ein  gemeinsames  und 
"synchrones"  Vorgehen  zur  Offnung  des  Endgeratesek-
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tors  fUr  den  Wettbewerb  und  verweist einmal auf 
die  Bestimmungen  des  EWG-Vertrages  uber  den  freien 
Warenverkehr  und  den  Abbau  staatlicher Handelsmonopole, 
zum  anderen  auf  einige bereits getroffene Entschei-
dungen  im  Bereich der  Normung  und  der  gegenseitigen 
Anerkennung  von  Allgemeinzulassungen,  die  zu  den 
notwendigen  Schritten bei der  Errichtung eines 
gemeinsamen  Marktes  fur  Endgerite geh6ren. 
Sie spricht sich dann weiter dafur aus, 
- die Fernmeldeverwaltungen  am  Wettbewerb  auf 
dem  Endgeratemarkt der  Gemeinschaft  teilnehmen 
zu  lassen, 
den  Ubergang  zu  diesem \gemeinschaftsweiten 
wettbewerbsorientierten ~Endgeratemarkt erheblich 
zu  beschleunigen."  (S.  62). 
Die  erste Empfehlung  entspricht der  Grundhaltung, 
die sich  zur  staatlichen Marktbeteiligung auch 
in der  bundesrepublikanischen Diskussion herausge-
bildet hat.  Auf  Gemeinschaftsebene  kommt  aber 
eine neue  Dimension  hinzu,  die sich in die Frage 
kleiden  laBt:  Wieweit  treffen die nationalen Fernmel-
deverwaltungen als Anbieter  von  Endgeraten auf 
einem  gemeinsamen  Markt  eigentlich unter gleichen 
Wettbewerbsbedingungen  aufeinander? 
Das  wird  im  Grunbuch  nicht  behandelt.  Die  Komrnission 
ist darum  z~ fragen,  ob  sie  sich auch  aufgerufen 
ftihlt,  neben der  dffnung  der  M~rkte einc  Kl~rung 
der  Wettbewerbsvoraussetzungen  zu  betreiben. 
Der  Beschleunig~ng der  Ma~kt6£fnu~q wird  man  zustimmen 
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konnen,  wenn  sichergestellt ist,  daB  sie nicht 
nur  formal  erfolgt,  sondern  tatsachlich in allen 
Mitgliedstaaten  zur  effektiven Offnung 
fuhrt,  nicht  zuletzt  jener Teilrnarkte, 








Zurn."gerneinsamen  Markt  fUr  Netzeinrichtungen  und 
Gerite,  die Bestandteil der  Infrastruktur sind" 
oder  kurz:  fur  Netztechnik rechnet die Kommission 
das vielzitierte Beispiel vor,  daB  sich die Entwick-
lung eines  neuen offentlichen  und  digitalen Vermitt-
lungssystems  nur  noch rentieren konne,  wenn  es 
einen Anteil  am  Weltmarkt  von  mindestens  8  v.H. 
erringe.  Keiner  der  nationalen Markte  in der  Gemein-
schaft habe  aber  einen  groBeren Anteil als  6  v.H. 
Diese  Lucke  verlange 1.  die grenzuberschreitende 
Zusamrnenarbeit  in der  europaischen  Fernmelde-
industrie  und  2.  "liege es  nun  an  den  Fernmeldever-
waltungen,  bei  der  Vergabe  von  offentlichen Liefer-
auftragen nicht mehr  nur  inlandische Angebote 
(zu)  berucksichtigen,  sondern  zu  Ausschreibungsver-
fahren auf  europaischer  Ebene  uberzugehen."  (S. 
92) 
Die  Darstellung der  Problerne  wie  die vorgeschlagene 
"Losung"  sind  zu  eipfach,  schon deshalb,  weil 
die  Voraussetzung  nicht  stirnrnt,  daB  derartige 
Entwicklungsarbeiten  von  den  betreffenden Unterneh-
men  nur  aus  eigener  Initiative,  auf  eigenes  Risiko 
und  ohne  P.bstiffilllung  mit  den  Infrastrukturplanungen 
ihrer nationalen  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  in Angriff 
genommen  wlirden.  Es  kann  gerade  dieses  abgestirnmte 
Vorgehen  sein,  dan  zu  einem  uberdimensionierten 
Entwicklungsaufwand  und  zur  Schaffung  von  Systernen 
flihrt,  fur  die  es  keinen  ausreichenden  Markt  gibt, 
..  ,, 
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und  zwar  auch  nicht  auf  Gemeinschaftsebene.  Es 
fragt  sich,  ob  das  Problem nicht eher darin wurzelt, 
daB  schon die nationale Politik zur Weiterentwicklung 
der  Netze  hzu  engh  ist, weil auf  das  Territorium 
beschrankt,  fur  das  die nationalen  Fernmeldeverwal-
tungen  jeweils  zcst&ndig  sind. 
Anders  gefragt:  Bedarf  es  nicht einer gemeinsamen 
Politik  zum  Ausbau  und  zur  Modernisierung der 
bestehenden  Netze  sowie erst recht zur Einfuhrung 
neuer  Netze,  wenn  man  einen gemeinsamen  Markt 
fUr  Netztechnik  schaffen will,  der die Entwicklungs-
risiken  fUr  die  fernmeldetechnische  Industrie 
in Europa  kalkulierbar halt? 
zu  einer  gemeinsamen  Infrastrukturpolitik gibt 
es Ansatze.  Der  wichtigste ist vermutlich die 
auf  Gemeinschaftsebene getroffene Entscheidung 
zur  Einfuhrung  des  ISDN.  Eine  gemeinsame  Infrastruk-
turpolitik auf  dem  Gebiet der  Telekommunikation 
wird  aber  vermutlich  noch  systematischer entwickelt 
werden  mussen.  Sonst wiederholt sich hier,  was 
im  Verkehr,  und  zwar  im  Schienenverkehr soeben 
vorexerziert wird,  wo  einzelne Mitgliedstaaten 
Schnellbahnstrecken  bauen  und  fur diese moderne 
Zuge  entwickelt werden,  die  nur  auf  dem  jeweils 
nationalcn  Netz  einzusetzen sind. 
III.  Gemeinsarner  Markt  fur  Telekommunikationsdienste 
Anknupfend  an  die  Darstellung der  informations-
und  kommunikationstechnischen  Entwicklung in Kapitel 
IV  und  der wirtschaftlichen Aspekte  in Kapitel 
V des  Grilnbuches  stellt die  Komrnission  hier eingangs 
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Oit.'  KL'mmi  s~;ion  t:rw~ihnt,  d~B die  Diskussion 
in  den  Iv1itgliedstaaten  bis  jetzt noch  stark  von 
den  Begriffen Grunddienste  versus  Mehrwertdienste 
bestimmt  wird,  daB  es  aber  nirgends  und  schon 
gar  nicht  auf  Gemeinschaftsebene  eine klare,  von 
allen akzeptierte Definition gibt  {siehe dazu 
auch  die  Ausflihrungen  in Kapitel  V  des  GrUnbuchs). 
Weil  "sich die  Grenzen  zwischen  Mehrwertdiensten 
und  Grunddiensten  zusehends  verwischen,  und  eine 
dauerhafte  naturliche  Unterscheidungsmoglichkeit 
nicht  gegeben  ist",  formuliert  sie ihre eigene 
Ansicht  schlieBlich wie  folgt: 
"In  Zukunft  wird  nur  noch die Einteilung der Dienste 
in  solche,  die vorlaufig noch  den  Fernmeldeverwal- . 
tungen  vorbehalten  bleiben k6nnen  ("reservierte 
Dienste"),  und  solche,  die Gegenstand eines offenen 
Wettbewerbs  sind  ("Wettbewerbsdienste"),  die 
relevante  Unterscheidung darstellen."  {S.  65) 
Dem  fuqt  sie wenig_spater  hinzu,  daB  schon  heute 
nur  noch  der  Fernsprechdienst als  "reservierter 
Diens~"  in  Betracht  zu  ziehen  sei.  Der  Telexdienst, 
dt::r  andere 
11klassi.sche"  Monopoldienst,  verschm6lze 
'' rapide"  mit  andcren  Text- und  Datendiensten. 
AuBerdem  wird  auf  das  Urteil  des  Europaischen 
Gerichtshofes  VGm  2u.3.85  gegcn  British Telecom 
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ausdrucklich anerkannt  worden  sci. 
Besonderes  Interess~ verdjP.nt  in diesem  Zusammenhang 
der Abschnitt  lV.  1.2 auf  s.  64,  in welchem die 
Kommission  fiir  eine  "enge  Auslegung des Prinzips 
der  Gewahrung  ausschlieBlicher Rechte",  d.h.  von 
Monopolrechten  bei  Diensten eintritt,  und  zwar 
nicht  aus  technischen oder wirtschaftspolitischen, 
sondern  aus  juristischen Grunden.  Dies wird aus 
den  Wettbewerbsbestimmungen des  EWG-Vertrages 
abgeleitet,  an erster Stelle aus Art.  9o Abs.l 
und  2  EWGV.  Denn  danach gelten die Wettbewerbsbe-
stimmungen des Vertrages  auch  fur  Unternehmen, 
die  "mit Dienstleistungen von  allgemeinem wirtschaft-
lichen  Interesse betraut sind",  ein Fall,  der 
auf  die Fernmeldeverwaltungen  zutrifft, die vom 
Wettbewerbsrecht  im  ubrigen  auch als Unternehmen 
angesehen  werden.  zuruckstehen  mUssen  die Wettbewerbs-
bestimmungen  nur  dann,  wenn  ihre Anwendung  .. die 
Erffillung der  (jenen  Unternehmen)  ubertragenen 
besonderen Aufgaben  rechtlich oder tatsachlich 
verhindern"  wurde. 
Was  hier mit dem  Blick auf  das  vom  EWG-Vertrag 
gesetzte Wettbewerbsrccht erklart wird,  laBt sich 
im  ubrigen  ebenso  bezuglich des  Prinzips der  Dienst-
leistungsfreiheit  (~rt.  59  EWG~)  feststellen. 
Auch  diese darf  nur  eingcschr~nkt werden,  wenn 
es  durch  ubergcordnete  Al~gemeininteressen gerecht-
fertigt werden  kann.  Auch  dies  ist durch die Recht-
sprechung  des  EuGH  erbartet. 
Wesentlich  sind  die  F'olgerungen,  die die  Kommission 
daraus  zieht,  namlich: 
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- Die  Grilnde  fur  die Aufrechterhaltung eines 
Dienstmonopols  miissen  sorgfaltig gegen die 
Einschrankungen  abgewogen  werden,  die anderen, 
den  Benutzern oder Anbietern  von  Dienstleistungen, 
auferlegt werden. 
- Der  Begriff des  Dienstleistungsmonopols ist 
grundsatzlich eng auszulegen. 
- Die  "technologisch bedingte  fortschreitende 
Dienstintegration"  macht  es erforderlich,  bestehen- ~ ' 
de  Dienstleistungsmonopole  regelmaBig  zu  iiberprilfen. 
Als  Ergebnis der eigenen  Uberprufung ist die Kommis-
sion,  wie  erwahnt,  zum  Fernsprechmonopol gelangt. 
In der  Zusammenfassung  des  Abschnitts  (S.  66) 
druckt sie sich aber  trotzdem vorsichtig aus, 
indem sie schreibt: 
"Soweit  sich ein Dienstleistungsmonopol derzeit 
-mit der  Notwendigkeit  rechtfertigen liBt,  die 
finanzielle Lebensfahigkeit der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen 
abzusichern,  durfte der einzige Dienst,  der dafilr 
in Frage  kommt,  der  Fernsprechdienst  (Sprachilbertra-
gung)  sein." 
Ob  hier auch ein  juristisch begrundeter  Zweifel 
anklingt  - sind  Fernmeldemonopole als  Finanzmonopole 
zu  legitimieren?  - bleibt offen. 
Festzuhalten ist dies: 
1.  Die  Unterscheidung  zwischen  Grunddiensten 
und  Mehrwertdiensten  beruht  auf  politischen 
Gesichtspunkten,  die der  Zuordnung  der  Dienste 
zum  Monopol  oder  zum  Wettbewerbsbereich dienen 
,- .. 
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~;ollcn. 
2.  Diese  lJnterscheidung ist in  jedem Fall instabil. 
Sie wird  durch die  technische  Entwicklung 
uberholt  und  ist nicht  eo  ipso mit dem  Gemein-
schaftsrecht vereinbar. 
Im  folgenden  Abschnitt  4.2  "Auf  dem  Weg  zu  einem 
wettbewerbsorientierten gemeinsamen  Markt"  greift 
die Kommission  auf,  daB  Telekommunikationsdienste 
durch den  Gang  der Technik  "handelsf!hig"  geworden 
sind,  daB  sie infolgedessen auch  von  einem Anbieter 
im  Mitgliedstaat A)  Kunden  in den  ubrigen Mitglied-
Qtaaten  B,  c,  ...  angeboten werden  konnen,  womit 
fUr  Telekommunikationsdienste der Fall des Art. 
59  EWGV  eintritt, der generell die Aufhebung der 
Beschrankungen des  freien Dienstleistungsverkehrs 
uber die Grenzen  hinweg  vorsieht.  Auch  in diesem 
·Fall gilt,  daB  Ausnahmeregelungen moglich,  aber 
restriktiv zu  handhaben  sind.  Darauf,  so die  Kommis-
sion,  werde  im  Konfliktfall auch der Europaische 
Gerichtshof  bestehen.  Diese  Warnung  ist berechtigt. 
Die Dienst-leistungsfreiheit gehort neben der 
Freizugigkeit der Guter  und  Personen,  der Arbeitnehmer 
und  des  Kapitals  sowie  zusarnmen  mit der  Niederlassungs-
freiheit  zu  den  konstituierenden  Prinzipien der 
EWG. 
Die  Kommission  macht  darauf  aufmerksam,  daB  sich 
die  Konfliktf~lle begrenzen  lieBen,  wenn  die Mitglied-
staaten 
- "bezilglich der  Dienste,  die  Gegenstand  von 
Monopolrechten  sein  k6nncn,  von  vergleichbaren 
-·_  12  -
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Dcfinitionen  ausgingen,  und  wenn 
die vorbehaltenen  Dienste  restriktiv definiert" 
wiirden.  (S.  68) 
Nicht hier,  aber  an  spaterer Stelle schlagt die 
Kommission  vor,  nur  noch  an  einem Monopoldienst 
festzuhalten,  am  Fernsprechdienst.  Was ··mit  einer 
solchen Entscheidung noch nicht entschieden ware, 
ist aber die Frage,  wie  frei die "itgliedstaaten 
hinsichtlich der  Bestimmung  der mit dem  Fernsprechmo- ~ 1 
nopol  auf nationaler Ebene  zu  verfolgenden  Ziele 
und  hinsichtlich seiner praktischen Handhabung 
sein sollen.  Hier werden die  "GrQnde"  fUr  das 
Monopol  berQhrt,  deren  Abwagung  gegen die beizubehal-
tenden  Einschrankungen die Kommission·mit Recht 
verlangt.  Kann  es den Mitgliedstaaten  Qberlass~n 
bleiben,  sich diese Grunde  jeweils nach eigenem 
Gusto  zurecht  zu  legen? 
Ein  gemeinsamer  Markt  fur  Telekommunikationsdienste, 
der sich auf der  Basis nationaler Gebietsmonopole, 
namlich der  Netzmonopole  der nationalen Fernmeldever-
waltungen entfalten sol!,  hat  von  vornherein mit 
Schwierigkeiten  zu  rechnen.  Weil  das  so ist, fordert 
die  Kommission,  daB  "sich die Gemeinschaft  auf 
gemeinsame  Grundsatze  bezuglich der allgemeinen 
Bedingungen  fur  die-Bereitstellung der Netzinfrastruk-
tur fur  Benutzer  und  Anbieter  von  wettbewerbsbestimm-
ten  Diensten,  insbesondere  im  grenziiberschreitenden 
Fernmeldeverkehr,  einigen"  miissen.  (S.  69)  Sie 
schl3gt die Bereitstellung einer  "offenen Netzinfra-
struktur  (open  network  provision ONP)"  vor,  wozu 
durch EG-Richtlinie die  technischen Schnittstellen, 
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GebGhrcngrundsfit7e  und  etwnige  Nutzungsbeschr~nkungen 
naher  bestimmt  Werden  sollten. 
Die  Kommission  nimmt  damit  den  Gedanken  auf,  daB 
Fernmeldenetze  heute als  "3ffentliche Verkehrswege" 
betrieben werden  konnen  und  daB  die Betreiber 
der  Netze,  also die staatlichen Fernmeldeverwaltungen, · 
die groBten Weiterverkaufer  von  Fernmeldediensten 
sind.  Mit  dem  ONP-Prinzip wird  auch anerkannt, 
daB  es nicht notwendig ist,  konkurrierende  Infrastruk-
turen  zu  schaffen,  nur  um  einen wettbewerbsorientier-
ten  Dienstleistungsmarkt  zu  verwirklichen.  Unklar 
bleibt,  weshalb das  Fernsprechmonopol erhalten 
bleiben sollte,  wenn  das  Fernsprechnetz als  "offenes 
Netz"  zur  Verfilgung  stfinde,  und  jeder Dienstleistungs-
anbieter,  der dieses nutzt,  nach gleichen Gebuhren-
grundsatzen  zur  Finanzierung der Aufgaben  herangezo-
gen wurde,  die der  Netztrager  zu erfullen hat. 
Weil  das  ONP-Prinzip technisch realisierbar geworden 
ist, stellt sich uberdies die  Frage,  welche  recht-
lichen Folgen es  hatte,  wenn  die nationalen  Netze 
nicht fur  andere  Dienstleistungsanbieter geoffnet 
wurden . 
Im  Abschnitt  4.3  (S.  7o)  wendet  sich die  Kommission 
den  Fernmeldevcrwaltungen  und  ihren Aufgaben  naher 
zu,  weil  "die Entstehung eincs wettbewerbsorientier-
ten  Dienstleistungssektors  und  die  Notwendigkeit, 
die  FernmeldcretzP  auch  and~rcn Anbietern  von 
Diensten  zu  fairen  Bcjingungcn  zuginglich  zu  machen, 
... die  kllnftige T§tigkeit der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen 
nachhaltlg  beeinflusse!1"  werde.  Die  Korrunission 
h~lt es  ffir  wichtig,  daB  die  Verwaltungen  auf 
. ; 
:·!  -· 
··:.; ••  .J ...  -· 
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diesem wettbewerbsorientierten  gemeinsamen  Markt 
"eine starke Stellung"  einnehmen. 
Indessen  fordert  sie 
- den  schrittweisen Abbau  noch  vorhandener Monopol-
rechte bei  bestimmten  Endgeraten  (S.  73), 
- und  die Trennung der  von  den  F·ernmeldeverwaltungen 
wahrgenommenen  hoheitlichen und  betrieblichen 
Funktionen.  (S.  74) 
Letzteres sei eine wesentliche Voraussetzung fur 
eine wirksame  Anwendung  der Wettbewerbsregeln 
auf die Anbieter  von  Telekommunikationsdiensten. 
Als die eigentliche Aufgabe  der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen 
werden damit die Bereitstellung und  der Betrieb 
der  Fernmeldeinfrastruktur angesprochen.  Abgesehen 
von  GrcBbritannien ist dies  noch in allen Mitgliedstaaten 
Monopolen  vorbehalten,  und  die Kommission sieht 
auch keine  Grunde,  dies prinzipiell in Frage  zu 
stellen.  Sie verweist  zwar  ein weiteres Mal  auf 
das  Wettbewerbsrecht des  Vertrages  und  meint, 
auch  in bezug  auf  den  Betrieb von  Fernm~ldenetzen 
miiBten  AusschlieBlichkei  tsrechte rest"rllkti  v  4khandhabt 
werden.  "Neu  entwickelte Techniken  in  Nachba:;l~reichen, 
etwa  des  Satellitenfunks,  des  Mobilfunks  und  di~ 
'  '  :·~ t• 
Kabelfernsehens,  erfordern eine spezielle Betrachtung." 
(S.  73)  Im  ubrigen  zieht sie  jedoch  vor  allern 
.  ·I•  ., 
aus  einem Vergleich mit  den  USA  den  SchluB,  d~~ 
regionale  bzw.  nationale  Netzmonopol~ irt  Eurb~a 
- is -
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weitcr  bestehen werdcn: 
"Angesichts  der geringeren  Dimension  der  einz~lnen 
Lander  in Europa,  der  Zielsetzungen des offentlichen 
Diensteversorgungsauftrages,  der  aus wirtschaftlichen 
Grunden  erforderlichen economies  of  scale und 
des  notwendigen  Kompromisses  zwischen  mehr  Flexibi-
litat durch Wettbewerb auf  der einen Seite und 
hoheren Transaktionskosten als mogliche  Folge 
des  Nebeneinanders  mehrerer  Netze  auf  der  anderen 
Scite,  ist mit  einer gleichgerichteten Entwicklung 
in den Mitgliedstaaten in Richtung  auf die Beibehal-
tung des  Prinzips der alleinigen Zustandigkeit 
einer einzigen  Fernmeldeverwaltung ••• fur die 
Bereitstellung der Netzinfrastruktur  zu  rechnen." 
(S.  72) 
Das  ist allerdings eine Feststellung,  die sich 
einfach auf  die gegebenen  Haltu~gen der Mitgliedstaaten 
stutzt,  ohne weiter  zu  untersuchen,  wie  fest begrun-
det diese sind.  Der  Satz:  "Keine  einzige Fernmelde-
verwaltung  in der  Gerneinschaft ist groBer als 
irgendeine der  7  regionalen Holdinggesellschaften 
in den  USA,  die  nach wie  vor  ein Monopol  auf  den 
Betrieb ihrer  jeweiligen Netzinfrastruktur haben." 
trifft zwar  zu,  beantwortet aber  nicht die Frage, 
wieso  ffir  die Gerneinschaft  nicht tauglich sein 
sollte,  was  im  US-Fernverkehr  praktiziert wird, 
namlich  Netzwettbewerb.  Dieser  Punkt wird nicht 
er6rtert.  Verlangt  wird  etwas  anderes:  daB  die 
nationalen  Netzrnonopole  in der  Gemeinschaft  klare 
Verpflichtungen  bezilglich  des  Anschlusses  und 
des  Netzzuganges  fur  Dienste akzeptieren,  die 
die Grenzen  der  Monopolnetze  ilberschreiten.  Ein 
wei teres  Mal  ist dami  t  das  ONP·-Prinzip  angesprochen. 
Zur  Frage  "Monopnl  oder  Wettbewerb  auf  der  Netzebene?" 
16  -
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hiitt.e  man  sich  l~inP dUsfilhrlichcre  Behandlung 
der  Problematik  gewunscht.  Grunde  fur die Beibehal-
tung der  nationalen  Netzmonopole  werden eiqentlich 
nicht genannt.  Wenn  es  heiBt: 
"Gleich,  welches  organisatorische Prinzip die 
Mitgliedstaaten fur  den  Betrieb ihrer Netzinfrastruk-
tur durch  ihre Fernmeldeverwaltunqen wahlen  -
kurzfristig und  langfristig sollte auf  jeden 
Fall die Integritat der  Netzinfrastruktur qewahrt 
bleiben. 
Die Mitqliedstaaten sollten sicherstellen,  daB 
die  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  leistungsstarke nationale, 
gemeinschaftsweite  und  weltweite  Kommunikationsdienste 
gew&hrleisten."  (S.  73), 
so  Werden  Zielsetzungen angefuhrt,  die uber ein 
Monopol  verfolgt werden  konnen,  dieses aber nicht 
unbedingt  voraussetzen.  Erst mit dem  Satz auf 
s.  75: 
"Alle Mitgliedstaaten scheinen  sich darin e1n1g 
zu  sein,  daB  die finanzielle Lebensfahigkeit 
der  Fe:rnmeldeverwaltungen gesichert werden  muB." 
und  der  Fortsetzung: 
"Die  groBte  und  unter  den  gegebenen  Umstanden 
einzig wirkliche Gefahr  besteht darin,  daB  den 
offentlichen Vermittlungsnetzen moglicherweise 
die  Einnahmen  aus  den  Sprachdiensten verlorengehen, 
die  zur  Zeit  85  - 9o  % der  Gesamteinnahmen  aus 
dem  Fernmeldeverkebr  ausmachen." 
ko~~t man  zum  springenden  Punkt.  Die  apostrophierte 
Gefahr ist naturlich die des  cream  skimming,  die 
ihrerseits die  Konsequenz  der Verpflichtung des 
staatlichen Anbieters  ist,  "Grunddienste universell", 
d.h.  flachendeckend  und  zu  Einheitsgebuhren anzubie-
- 17  -
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ten. 
Die  Komrnission  diskutiert die  in den  Mitgliedsta~ten 
erwogenen  oder  angewandten  L6sungen dieses  Problems, 
vom  strikten Verbot  des  bloBen  Wiederverkaufs 
der  Sprachkapazitat  von  Mietleitungen bis  zur 
nutzungszeitabhingigen Tarifierung.  Weder  den 
einen  noch  den  anderen Ansatz  findet  sie befriedi-
gend.  Sie gibt auch  keine eigene  Empfehlung ab, 
sondern  schreibt: 
"Die  Frage,  ob  sie fUr  Mietleitungen nutzungsabhingige 
oder einheitliche oder  nach  einem gemischten 
Tarif berechnete  GebUhren  erheben,  ist im wesent-
lichen von  den  einzelnen Fernmeldeverwaltungen 
selbst  zu  beantworten ...  "  (S.  77) 
Hinsichtlich der  Behandlung  von  Mietleitungen 
bliebe es  dann  bei  nationalen Regelungen,  aber 
auch  beim  "Wettbewerb der  nationalen  Fernmeldeord-
nungen",  der  sich in einigen Fillen durchaus  schon 
als standortrelevant erwiesen hat. 
Ubergeordnetes  Ziel dieser  Uberlegungen ist, die 
"finanzielle Lebensfahigkeit"  der  Fernmeldeverwal-
tungen  zu  sichern.  Schon  im  Kapitel  V  "Wirtschaft-
lichE:"!  Aspekte"  heiBt  es,  wenn  das  Telekonununikations-
system der  Zukunft_ die wirtschaftlichen Vorteile 
der  modernen  informatioP.s- und  konununikationstech-
nischen  Entwicklung  nutzb~r machen  solle,  mtisse 
cs  "zw~i  :t  •• T.  wider:spri.ichl iche  Bedingungen"  erfullen: 
"  Im  Interesse  sowohl  der  Industrie als 
auch  der  1\nbir.tcr  von  Dieastleistungen 
rnui3  dt',;m  frr::.ien  Spiel  der  Marktkrafte, 
dcm  ~·Jet tbev;erb  ·....~n.d  der  Innovation  in  der· 
G8mc i nscha f t  mehr  f{u urn  gegeb~:!n  werden. 
- 1.8_  -~ 
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- Glcichzeitig mu3  di~ finanzielle  Lebens-
fahigkeit  der  Betreiber der  Netzinfrastruktur 
sichergestellt werden,  wenn  diese die 
enormen  Investitionsvorhaben,  die  zur 
Schaffung der  Infrastruktur  fUr  die  Informa-
tionswirtscha!t von  morgen  notwendig  sind, 
in Angriff  nehmen  sollen."  (S.  "48) 
Wie  sehr diese  Unterstellung,  daB  ein Widerspruch 
zwischen  Wettbewerb  und  Existenz- oder  Investitions-
fahigkeit der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen bestehe,  berech-
tigt ist,  hangt allerdings nicht nur davon  ab, 
in welcher Breite Wettbewerb  zugelassen wird. 
Eine nicht minder  groBe  Rolle  spielt,  was  man 
unter  "finanzieller Lebensfahigkeit"  der  Fernmelde-
verwaltungen versteht.  Geht  es  dabei wirklich 
nur  darum,  daB  sich diese wirtschaftlich selbst 
traqcn  k6nnon,  untnr  RinschluB  dar  hufg~bc,  Ncuinvcsti-
tionen  solide  zu  finanzieren?  Oder  geht es  um 
die  Finanzierung  von  Zielsetzungen,  die mehr  oder 
weniger  schon  jenseits des  eigentlichen Auftrages 
einer Fernmeldeverwaltung  liegen? 
Die  Kommission  geht auf diese  Problematik nicht 
ein,  obwohl  auch ihr bekannt  sein muB,  welche 
Rolle sie Bpielt.  Die  "finanzielle  Lebensf~higkeit" 
einer Fernmeldeverwpltung wird  jedenfalls von 
vielen Seiten  her  strapazlert,  wenn  nicht gar 
in  Frage gestellt,  unter  Umstanden  sogar durch 
eine  uberzogene  und  zu  wenig  marktgerichtete  Investi-
tionspolitik  im  Infrastrukturbereich.  Darum  kann 
eine  sachgerechte  Antwort  auf  die  Frage,  wie Mitlei-
tungen  gebuhrenpolitisch behandelt werden  mussen, 
- 19  -
15tl 





- 19  -
nuch  nicht  unabhangig  von  der  anderen  Frage  gegeben 
werdcn,  welchcn  Ziclen die Gebilhrenpolitik  bei 
den  W3hlverbi~dungPn, d.h.  beim Telefon eigentlich 
unterworfen ist. 
Was  die richtige Oarstellung des  Problems  betrifft, 
urn  das  es  hier geht,  so ware  zu  sagen: 
Es  gibt keinen prinzipiellen Widerspruch  zwischen 
dern  Ziel,  Wettbewerb  zu  ermoglichen,  und  der Absicht, 
Fernmeldeverwaltungen finanziell  unabhangig arbeiten 
zu  lassen.  Es  gibt aber  sehr wohl  einen Widerspruch 
zwischen dieser  zweiten  Zielsetzung und einer 
Beanspruchung der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen durch 
die Politik,  die  keine  Rucksicht darauf  nimmt, 
daB  sich auch  ein offentliches Unternehmen,  wie 
es  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  sind,  im  Wettbewerb befin-
den  kann. 
Unter der  Oberschrift 
11Transparenz  und  Quersubventio-
nierung"  stellt die  Kommission  noch  einrnal  fest, 
da~ sich alle Mitgliedstaaten daruber einig seien, 
daB  die Fernmeldeverwaltungen  "am  Wettbewerb auf 
dem  neu  entstehenden Markt  fur  Dienste  und  Endgerate" 
beteiligt sein sollen.  Es  musse  aber  sorgfaltig 
darauf  geachtet werden,  daB  daraus  keine Wettbewerbs-
verzerrungen  zu  Lasten  der  anderen  Konkurrenten 
erwiichsen.  "Di.e  Untern12hmenspolitik  der  Fernmeldever-
waltung~n muB  transpar0nt  sein,  insbesondere was 
die  Quersubventionierung  zwischen  Tatigkeiten, 
auf  die sie cin  MonopoJ  haben,  wettbewerbsbestimmten 
Diensten  und  'l'atigkei  ten  im  Endgeratesektor betrifft." 
(S.  78) 
Damit  wird  eir~e- QuersubvPntionierung  vom  r~onopol-
- 2o  -
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zum  Wettbewerbsbereich grundsatzliqh  jedoch als 
zulassig anerkannt.  Die  Erklarung dafUr ist, daB 
eine kritische Beurteilung des  Vorgangs  unter 
wettbe~erbsrechtlichen Gesichtspunkten erfolgt, 
fur die es  keine  Rolle spielt,  wo  die  Subventionen 
herk9mmen,  wohl  aber,  was  mit  ihnen  bezweckt wird. 
Ist der  zw.eck,  andere Anbieter  aus  dem  Markt  zu 
verdrangen,  so ist das  wettbewerbswidrig,  gleichgul-
tig,  ob dabei  Mittel eingesetzt werden,  die  im 
Monopql  oder  "nur"  aufgrund einer marktbeherrschen-
den  Stellung im Wettbewerb erwirtschaftet werden. 
Unter der Verpflichtung,  wettbewerbswidr;ge  Praktiken 
der Preispolitik  zu  unterlassen,  stehe~ d~e privaten 
Anbieter genauso wie die  Fernmeldeverw•+tu~qen~ 
Quersubventionierung  im  Haushalt der  F~rnmeldeverwal­
tungen ist trotzdem kein  Scheinproblem:  dO$  sient 
wohl  auch die Kommission  so,  denn  sie beharrt 
auf  "Transparenz"  der  Haushaltsgebarung  und  Rechnungs-
legung auf seiten der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen.  Allein 
die GroBenordnung  der  Finanzmittel,  uber welche 
diese verfugen  konnen,  sollte schon  genugen,  urn 
an die Fernmeldeverwaltungen,  soweit es  um  internen 
Verlustau~gleich geht,  strengere MaBstabe  anzulegen 
als an  private  Unternehmen.  Dazu  kornmt,  daB  Fernmel-
deverwaltungen nicht konkursfahig  sind,  den  Staats-
haushalt  im  Rucken  haben  und  eben  auch  uber ein 
geschutztes Gebietsmonopol  verfugen.  Ob  die  im 
Text  erwahnte  EG-Richtlinie  So/723/EWG,  der  zufolge 
die  finanziellen  Beziehungen  zwischen  den  Regierungen 
der Mitgliedstaaten  und  ihren offentlichen Unterneh-
men  "transparent"  sein sollen,  unter diesen  Umstanden 
fur  die  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  genug  leistet,  ware 
noch  zu  prufen. 
- 21  -
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Die  Ankundigung  der  Kommission,  daB  der  demnachst 
erscheinende  Vorschlag  der  18.  Mehrwertsteuerricht-
linie die  verbindliche  Einbeziehung  des  Fernmeldewe-
sens  in die Mehrwertbesteuerung ab 1.1.199o vorsehen 
wird,  ist zu  begruBen.  (S.  So) 
Im  Abschnitt  4.3.5  "Gebilhrengrundsltze"  wird darauf 
aufmerksam gemacht,  daB  es  zwischen  den  nationalen 
Fernmeldegebiihren  und  ebenso  zwischen den  Gebiihren 
fur  nationale  und  internationale Verkehre  Differenzen 
gibt,  die sich sachlich nicht erklaren  lassen, 
mit Blick auf  den  gemeinsamen  Markt  fur  Telekommuni-
kationsdienste also auch nicht  zu  tolerieren waren. 
Die  Kommission  wiinscht  auch hier einen  "grundsatzlichen 
Konsens",  der  nach ihrer Meinung  folgende  Punkte 
beinhalten konnte: 
- die  Forderung,  daB  sich die  Fernmeldegebiih-
ren  "an  der  allgemeinen Kostenentwicklung orientieren" 
sollten; 
- das  Ziel,  im  innergemeinschaftlichen Verkehr 
schrittweise den  Weg  zu  einer  "europaischen 
Gebfihrenzone  zu  ebnen"; 
- die Aufstellung allgemeiner  Grundsatze  fur 
die  Gebuhrenord~lng, die  fur  Nutzer  und  Anbieter 
von  Wettbewerbsdiensten  im  Rahmen  der  Bereitstel-
lung  eines  offenen  Netzes  zu  gelten hitten, 
hiermit  verbunden  eine  "Einigung  fiber  allgemeine 
Grunds~tze flir  die Bereitstellung  von  Mietleitungen." 
(S.  83) 
Ge~erell  all~rdings wirrl  a~~r~~nnt: 
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"Die  Festsetzung der  GebUhren  ist ein wesentlicher 
Bestandteil der  allgemeinen  Unternehmensstrategie 
der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen." 
Orientierung an der  "allgemeinen Kostenentwicklung" 
soll offenbar  auch  und  vor allem Ausrichtung an 
den  tatsachlichen Kostenstrukturen bedeuten.  Denn 
die  Kommission  meint  in diesem  Zusammenhang,  es 
miisse  "ein gerechter KompromiB  zwischen der  Notwendig-
keit,  die Gebuhren  an  den  Kosten auszurichten, 
und  dem  Ziel,  eine universelle Dienstleistung 
- fur  jedermann  zu  mehr  oder weniger gleichen 
Bedingungen  - zu  erbringen,  gefunden werden." 
(S.  83)  Sie  laBt aber  im  unklaren,  was  sie unter 
einem derartigen  KompromiB  verstanden wissen mochte. 
Auch  hier fehlt der  Hinweis,  daB  es gerade  beim 
Fernsprechtarif  nicht nur  an  der  "Universalitit" 
des  Dienstes  liegt,  wenn  die Gebiihren mit den 
Kosten  wenig  zu  tun  haben  und  zum  "Rosinenpicken" 
geradezu auffordern.  Darum  sollte das  Konzept 
der  "universellen"  Dienstleistung,  die nicht nur 
flachendeckend,  sondern  obendrein  zu  einem marktver-
falschenden Einheitstarif angeboten werden  muB, 
grundsatzlich erst ~inmal in Frage gestellt werden. 
Es  kann  auch die  Kombination  "Flachendeckung  ja: 
Tarifeinheit nein"  geben. 
Vor  dieser  Frage  landet  man  ebenso,  wenn  eine 
Gebuhrenordnung  fur  ein offenes  Netz  geschaffen 
werden  soll.  Die  Kommission  spielt nur mit  einem 
Satz  auf  die Moglichkeit  oder  Notwendigkeit  an, 
--2)  .. -
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die  Gebtihren  des  Netzbetreibers  zu  "entbUndeln", 
d.h.  nach  "Trigerdienst-"  und  "Mehrwert-Komponenten" 
zu  differenzi~ren.  Dieses  Konzept  sollte in der 
Tat  ~inmal konsequent  ausgearbeitet werden. 
Im  Abschnitt  4.4  werden  "angrenzende  Infrastrukturen 
und  Dienste"  behandelt,  womit  gemeint ·sind: 
- Satelliten, 
- Mobilfunk, 
- Kabelfernsehnetze  (S.  84ff). 
Der  Begriff  "angrenzende  Infrastrukturen" ist 
wenig erhellend,  weil er nicht  zu  erkennen gibt, 
ob  es  sich  um  Netze  handelt,  die mit  ihren Leistungen 
die bestehende  Infrastruktur  lediglich erganzen 
oder dieser Konkurrenz  bereiten.  In der  Praxis 
ist beides  gegeben,  und  die  technischen Entwicklungen 
wie die  heute  schon  zu  verzeichnenden ordnungspoli-
tischen Tendenzen,  auf  welche die Kommission  verweist, 
lassen erwarten,  daB  sich gerade die Konkurrenzbe-
ziehungen weiter  verscharfen.  Damit  rechnet die 
Komrnission  auch  bei  den  KTV-·Netzen. 
Grunds§tzlich wird  auch  in  bezug  auf  den  Betrieb 
"angrenzender  Infrastrukturen"  daran  erinnert, 
''dafi  ausschlief3liche  Rechte  bezuglich der  Be rei  tstel-
lung  der  Fernmeldeinfrastruktur restriktiv  zu 
definieren"  sind  (S.  87,  zur  Satellitenkommunikation). 
11Die  Tatsache,  da£3  die Bereitstellung der  zentralen 
Netzinfrastruktur  eincm  einzigen  Betreiber  vorbeha1-
- 24  -
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ten ist, darf  der  Nutzung  neuer  technischer M6qlich-
keiten durch  private  Systeme  nicht  im  Weqe  stehen" 
(S.  89,  zur  Mobilfunkkommunikation.  Denn  "den 
Nutzern  sollte Gelegenheit  gegeben  werden,  die 
Vorteile des  technischen  Fortschritts in vollem 
Umfang  auszusch5pfen." 
Auf  der  anderen  Seite betont die  Kommission die 
Notwendigkeit,  auch dann  die Kompatibilitat der 
Systeme  sicherzustellen.  DaB  sich in der Gemeinschaft 
5  verschiedene  und  nicht-kompatible Mobilfunksysteme 
entwickelt haben,  zitiert sie ausdrucklich als 
ein  "drastisches Beispiel  im negativen Sinne". 
Sie verweist  auf  ihre Vorschlage  fur  eine koordinierte 
Einfuhrung eines  europaweiten 5ffentlichen digitalen 
Mobilfunkdienstes,  die ein weiterer Ansatz  fur 
eine  gerneinsame  Politik auf  dem  Gebiet der Infrastruk-
tur waren. 
Bei  der  Satellitenkomrnunikation wird  aus der  tech-
nischen  Entwicklung gefolgert,  daB  sie  "zwanqslaufig 
eine  Oberprufung der ordnungspolitischen Auflagen 
(d.h.  der Monopolrechte  der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen) 
fur die Bereitstellung sowohl  des  Raumsegments 
als  auch des  Bodensegments erforderlich machen" 
wird  (S.  87).  Auch  in Europa  gehe die Tendenz 
bereits  "erkennbar  ~ahin,  daB  Satellitenantennensysterne 
(Bodenstationen)  auch  von  privater Seite angeboten 
und  betrieben werden  dlirfen,  insbesondere  solche, 
die nur  fur  "down  links"  (Empfang)  ausgerichtet" 
seien  (S.  86).  Der  Betrieb  von  Empfangsantennen 
mit  sehr  kleinem  Durchmesser,  sag.  VSAT,  sollte 
"in  ~hnlicher Weise"  wie  der  Betrieb  von  Fernmelde-
endger~ten geregelt werden.  Die  Beschrankungen· 
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fUr 
11Aufwtirtsverbindungen"  und  fUr  bidirektionelle 
Satellitenkommunikation miiBten  "von  Fall  zu  Fall 
gepruft werden".  Das  befurwortende  Votum  fur die 
Zulassung  konkurrierender  Anbieter  von  Satelliten-
diensten wird  jedoch an  folgende  Bedingungen  geknupft: 
- Es  durfen  keine  Interferenzen  zu  anderen Satelli-
ten- oder  Funksystemen auftreten. 
- "Die  Grundlage  und  die finanzielle  Lebensfahig-
keit des  Betreibers der  allgemeinen Fernmeldenetz-
infrastruktur durfen nicht gefahrdet werden." 
(S.  87) 
Damit ist auch hier hinsichtlich der  "angrenzenden 
Infrastrukturen"  das  eigentliche Problem allen 
Wettbewerbs  auf der  Netzebene  angesprochen:  Welche 
Finanzierungsaufgaben sind den  Netzbetreibern 
zu  stellen,  und  wie  soll  - wenn  die Netztechnik 
selbst Wettbewerb moglich macht  - die finanzielle 
Stabilitat der  Netzbetreiber gesichert werden: 
durch  konsequente  Monopolisierung aller Aufgaben, 
die  sich  im  Bereich der  Infrastruktur stellen, 
oder  durch  Koordinierung  des  Wettbewerbs,  wenn 
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We  accept the continued exclusive provision·Of special 
rights for  the  telecommunication administrations.  A 
natural monopoly  for  the network-infrastructure,  and  the 
direct transmission of signals between passive 
interfaces at the user location,  form  a  good starting 
position for  these special rights.  In our opinion 
services and apparatus outside the basic  •machine•  that 
performs  the direct transportation of signals should be 
free in the long run,  as proposed for the Netherlands. 
"Basic"  seryices 
We  understand your ·view  on the continued exclusive 
provision of some  basic services (voice phone)  by 
telecom administrations but wish to draw your attention 
on  the elegant construction in a  recently proposed 
alteration of the telecom law in this country;  this bill 
avoids the cumbersome definition of "basic services• by 
stating the obligation for  the teleoom administration to 
perform certain well-defined services.  T.hese  services 
need not be offered under  a  monopoly. 
We  strongly recommend  to include,  e.g. under this point 
B,  an Be-position on the freedom  for users regarding the 
possibility to choose  from  a  menu  of services, via 
leased or switched lines,  without any mandatory 
assigning of services for  any  type of in£ormation. 
Com~etitive services 
We  agree  on your view  that at least all services that 
have value-added quality should be free.  In our view, 
however,  (as remarked already under  •B•) all services 
offering more  than the direct transporteaion of signals 
can be free  (with PTT  as competitor). 
We  recommend  to include a  position on  the equal access 
conditions for all service providers (including PTT), 
and as to  the timely provision of all information on 
proposed changes in the infrastructure to all parties 
concerned. 
D.  Stanaard1zation 
We  agree on your position on  standardization.  Standards 
must  be functional.  We  wish,  however,  to emphasize. that 
standardization is most  of all a  question of timely 
action:  effective competition between services in an 
innovative and de-restrictive climate must  never be 
inhibited by  a  standardization-eager special institute. 
Nevertheless,  we  strongly support the idea to create a 
European standardization institute in this field;  The 
concept should be further developed under  the aegis of 
the EC,  and be  managed  under  EC-supervision by 
professionals  from  parties involved among  which CEPT. 
Flexibility and  extremely good  contacts with the market 
are of paramount  importance  for  succes. 




Clear definitions of general requirements  for access to 
and use  of  the network are necessary.  These  requirements 
should,  in our view,  not include specs related to 
general equipment  performance or functionalities.  A 
limitation to avoidance  of personal injury,  damage  to 
the network,  interference with billing or 
characteristics of other network-users apparatus seems 
necessary. 
Discussions  on  open network provision (ONP),  as 
described,  are necessary,  but have to take into account 
the fact that any service provider should get access to 
the network  on  a  basis that is functionally equivalent 
to the  one by which a  PTT  realizes  s~ch access for a 
competitive service. 
Good  interconnect and access obligatioDS for  transborder 
services are vital for the realization of a  large 
European market.  In practice,  however,  such obligations 
are not  enough,  because in many  instances the 
operational discussions between the national PTT's  on 
the factual interconnection are sub-standard;  when  a 
company  asks for  such a  connection,  in many  oases 
detailed information on the exact nature of the value-
added service in question is requested.  and ad hoo 
interconnect-solutions are then created. 
Terminals 
We  share your view that terminal equipment.  within and 
between Member  States must be provided on a  competitive 
basis,  subject to type approval.  We  see no  need to 
exclude the first telephone. 
The  physical boundary of the infrastructure should be 
the clearly defined passive termination of the link from 
the network  on the location of the user. 
Type-approval has to take place in recognized· 
laboratories;  we  strongly recommend  to include a 
position on  the positive effects of sel£rcertifioation 
in this respect  . 
We  do  not agree-with your  opinion tha.t  •receive only  .. 
earth stations are terminals,  since there are normally 
not connected directly to the infrastructure.  The 
uplinking-apparatus as such can in our view also not be 
part of the infrastructure,  since the latter ends 
passively,  i.e.  just above  the transmitter.  Private 
operation will thus  only be limited by the conditions 
linked to the right to  transmit  a.  radio signal.  .  · 
G.  Player/referee  . 
Full separation of regulatory and operational activities 
of the  PTT  needs  several safeguards.  An  inclusion in the 
EC-posi  tion of points related to consultation in the.: 
drafting process  of  new  regulation,  appeals,  and contro1 
of  the basic principles of cost-based tariffs could  ~e 
usefull. 
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H.  Reyiew  PTT's 
I. 
We  suggest that the  EC.  in reviewing  the activities of 
PTT's concentrates on the boundary between commercial 
activities and the utility-functions.  Cross-
subsidization ought especially to be avoided between 
utility and  commercial  functions;  we  advise you  to 
refrain from  using  the concept of cross-subsidy while 
speaking of normal business start-ups by  the commercial 
part of  a.  PTT. 
Your  review could comprize e.g:  adequ~te accounting 
procedures  to separate costs and  revenues between 
monopoly  and competitive activities,  the non-
discriminatory access to basic transmission functions 
under  the same  tariffs for al providers of competitive 
services  (including PTT),  up-to-date information 
concerning technique,  interface and customer-connection. 
Clear regulation in the several member  countries is 
necessary. 
Review  commercial 
We  agree  on your view  to  review all providers in order 
to avoid the abuse of dominant positions.  Special 
constraints in the competitive market  should be avoided. 
J.  Common  Policy 
Extra: 
Extra: 
We  would welcome  a  good and clear policy regarding 
arrangements with third countries and the built up  of a 
consistent community  position for the GATT  negotiations. 
In this respect we  draw your attention to the already 
large installed base of telecom-apparatus,  and to the 
need,  both from  the points of view  of users and 
providers of value-added services,  to operate in a  large 
transparant market. 
Tariffs 
We  are somewhat disappointed that the principle of cost-
based tariffs.  which is advocated in the full text of 
the green paper,  did not lead yet to a  c~ear-cut 
position in figure  13.  In our view,  the tariff structure 
for  each transmission service of a  PTT  should be 
consistent with the network-facilities used,  and be 
based on the costs of the service provided.  Differences 
per country will continue to exist of course,  but a 
system of  "charge what  the market can bear• is utterly 
out of place in a  monopolistic environment.  Improvements 
in cost/performance achieved by advances in technology 
should be built in in the tariffs.  A  clear split-up of 
the telecommunications bill in a  transport part and a 
(value added)  service part would  be very usefull. 
Liability 
until now,  almost every  PTT  has rejected even the most 
basic principles of liability.  In view  of  the very 
strong dependence  on good  telecom-provisions for  a  fast 
growing  number  of companies,  the normal business-
principles of liability and  third party risks must 
become  good  practise for  the  te~ecom-administrations  .. 
The  :o.~nqnuni  ty sb:Ould  take a  position as to the ·,'  I 
limit&~ons of this liability in the member  ·countries. 
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GREEN  PAPER ON 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
STATEMENT OF  INTEREST 
DIGITAL EQUIPMENT 
Digital  is  the world's largest manufacturer of networked  computers and  computer-
based  equipment.  Its  products  include  a  wide  range  of  hardware  and  software 
systems that are often heavily integrated with telecommunications. Digital also Is an 
acknowledged  industry leader in  applying  computer-based  technology to  produce 
advances in  the efficiency and capabilities of telecommunications networks. 
As  a major competitor in the unregulated equipment marketplace, Digital has been 
and is an  active global participant In  past Commission,  PTT,  FCC and other delib-
erations concerning the  role of telecommunications regulation & standards in  con-
nection  with  network  facilities,  customer  premises  equipment  and  enhanced 
services  (VANS  and  VAS).  In  these  discussions  Digital  has  been  a  staunch  sup-
porter of pro-competitive and deregulatory policies. In particular, Digital consistently 
has maintained that the computer, data processing and telecommunications equip-
ment  marketplaces  should  be  allowed  to develop  free  frorr~  regu~atory intrusions, 
whilst maintaining national and  regiona.l  social goals. 
Digital also approaches the Green Paper from the standpoint of a manufacturer and 
supplier with global operations.  As  a multinational corporation,  its computer  equip~ 
ment and  services are marketed on  a global basis.  In  all developments of its pr·od-
ucts  and  services,  Digital  views  itself as  competing  in  a world-wide  marketplace. 
Accordingly, any new regulatory requirements impacting that marketplace are of ob-
vious  and  direct importance and  concern . 
1  t  .. ...  ~ 
;)  ~ DIGITAL'S PHILOSOPHY & OVERVIEW 
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Digital  Equipment  defines  its  miSSIOn  as  the  production  of  quality  information 
sys\ef)JS,  products  and  services;  information  systems  are  defined as  "the way  In 
which  a company acquires,  shares,  integrates and uses data to fulfill its mission, 
optimize its productivity and competitiveness, and plan its evolution". 
To  become  more  productive,  organizations  must have  a.  consistent philosophy of 
organization  which  empowers  their  employees  to  fulfill  the  company's  mission. 
Below is Digital's visioo. of the ideal philosophy to achieve productivity and achieve 
high  employee  morale  through  the  positive  devetopment  of  ethical,  aut.onomous 
individuals. 
We  believe  in  the  dignity of the  individual,  the  increase  In  his  productivity which 
comes  from  associating freely with  others  in  his  orga.ni~ation while accessing the 
information required  by  hi.s  job, and his obligation to provide information to others 
as he receives it. We  beli~ve in the Fundamental Human Right to the "Free flow of 
Information" (Green Paper, p.  139) and its major significance tor the development of 
welfare and economic growth (along with the free flow of persons, goods, services 
and  capitals). We  want to hetp to increase the  effectiveness of,  interpersonal com-
munication. 
These beliefs lead to the peer-to-peer style of networking we produce, as well as to 
the management style we use. Computer mediated information (mall, notes files, ...  ) 
is an  appropriate implementation of this style.  lnteresti·ngly, this style is applicable 
also to  computers interfacing with  machines  : on  the shop ftoor we could  use the 
slogan "liberate the robots" to identify the power which we can add to the manufac-
turing process when  the parts of the process are appropriately connected. 
We  look forward  to  the  evolution  of the  business.  world to the·  "one corporation" 
concept,  in  which  the information flow  between  departments of two different com-
panies  is as  easy  as  that between  equivalent departments ln the same company. 
This interaction would make clear that the  pr~mary long-term added value of a com-
pany  is  the  processes which  it has;  if  those  processes are  not clearly superior to 
those  available  externally,  then  the  company  should  serious.ly  consider  using the 
external  processes  instead  of  its  internal  ones.  This style  of  management would 
quickly lead  to the distribution of  processes to  the place where they can  be  done 
best, just as distributed computing moves. the computation to the place where it can 
be done best. Examples are just-in-time manufacturing which moves your inventory 
outside your company  or  external  manufacturing  which  moves  the  whole  process 
outside. 
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The final stage of our relationship to other companies occurs when we take the risk 
of  agreeing to  do  new things together as  partners.  Previous to  this stage,  we  sell 
products,  services,  architectures and  then  processes  which  we  already have.  The 
partnership commitment is to  make things which both parties agree are necessary, 
but which were not previously part of the repertoire of either company. 
We recognize that a major part of our perceived added-value lies in what we call the 
Digital Computing Environment (DCE), which allows high productivity in applications 
development, flexible restructuring of information flows to adapt to organization and 
mission  changes,  and  enhanced  capability for  effective  information  management 
and exchange. We  are therefore developing programs to  make the  use of the DCE 




IMPORT·ANC.E ··O'F  TME ACOMI\Itf.NICATI;ON'S 
t"N·FR-ASTRU:CTU:RE 
In  light of the above,  we  are convinced that the .provision  of un'ifi&d pan-turopean 
communications  infrastructure  is  of  paramount  importance  fOr  the  Ctitieal 
development of the European business communtty, at :all levels. Such capability <5f· 
fared within a more harmonized tarifflcation Env!ronment and With  wide geographic 
coverage  will  have  a very .significant stimulating effect on  the telecommunications 
and  information  technology  markets  and,  even  more  Important,  o·n  the  total ·eco-
nomic development of our continent and its competitiveness vis-a-vis the U.S.A. and 
Japan. 
1
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ROLE  OF THE PTTS 
We  believe that the PTI administration  (plus other carriers), whether re-regulation 
takes place or not, are In the best position to bring the benefits of full communica-
tion capability economically to the largest possible community of users because  o~ 
their historical position and geographic coverage. 
We are also of the opinion that PTT administrations and the European Commission 
must play an  important role in the promotion  of the non-proprietary standards that 
are indispensable to full open Information exchange and to ensure fair competition. 
While we  do not exclude the possibility to  provide partial infrastructure if no other 
satisfactory solution is available, if It is more appropriate for our customers, our pre-
ferred  competitive alternative, given the above conceptual framework, would be 1o 
see these services offered by both the PTT administrations (and where re-regulation 
allows, other carriers) and other service providers, coordinated at a European level. 
It  is  therefore  our  Intention  to  support  the  effort  of the  PTTs  and  the  European 
Commission, and to cooperate fully with them. We will be happy to explore with all 
parties ways  where  our capabilities (architecture,  products and  services)  could  be 
beneficial. 
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i  I MARKETS 
We belteve that virtually all businesses are potential users of advanced communica-
tions services (national, pan-European and global), should these become affordable. 
The current usage of Teletef-based services in France is a good iUustration of this. 
Because  of  the  rapid  pace  at  which  technology  is  evolving  (and  interpenetrating 
both  the telecoms and  computer industries),  and  accelerating rather than  slowing 
down,  this market could  be  split in two parts. 
The  first  part  is  constituted  of  those  large  organizations  which  can  afford  the  in-
frastructure  and  the  staff  to  build  corporate  networks and  services that can  track 
and therefore take advantage of leading edge technology progress and optimal tarif-
fication. It can be expected that they will use the Public Infrastructures for satisfying 
their complementary needs  - in  particular for  inter-company communications - and 
continue to use their own  networks for most intra-company information exchange. In 
the latter case, they will probably seek support from their usual suppliers. 
The  other  part  of  the  market  is  simply  "all others",  i.e.  those  enterprises  which 
cannot or do not want to  dedicate significant resources to  a network infrastructure 
although their businesses rely strongly on  easy,  timely and cost-effective communi-
cations with customers, suppliers and trade partners. 
This second  part of the market, certainly the  largest,  is clearly the primary one for 
open advanced communications services on optimal tarlffication, as well as the seg-
ment where a pan-European unified approach would bring a maximum contribution 
to  the  development  of  the  European  economy.  This  is  the  critical  rote  of  the 
Telecommunications  Administrations,  operating  on  a competitive  basis  with  other 
suppliers, because of their (possible)  economies of scale and  delivery coverage . 
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J Di{Jii'~l welcomes the bold initiative the European Commis.s;on has taken in publish-
in9 ii'e  Green  Paper.  We  welcome tho  trend  irnpliclt  lr'i  its  publication  (vis  open 
de1  ...... ~~ ar d discussion of critical issues  reiatE~d to the future development of econo-
mit~  .. rnarkets  and  technology),  and  the  soecific  trenas  outlined  within  the  :;,~b· 
s'l.: ·.  3  .:;.f  the'  G··ef,;l Pa,:.tsr.  vis  : 
a}  ·r;,t::1  €(\(!-,;lic;fl'ar~oynnion of the nGfK  ;o,  inc;ree.~ad ...  ~c,nlpeUt!··en~s.; :r,  u1~ u~le­
l~lin!ITJuni-..!atior.s equipment dom:li  11. 
b)  T~~~ ot;>licit recognition  of the  increa·~lng  lilter~lnkage· between  ta!~v~r.:  ...... ;·;;. 
caticr;s  lnfrae~:uctures (both  r.eguiaH3c.  .t·.;,d  ncn  ..  H;;yuiateo),  ti·~~  comp~~;:~~,~: ht· 
dustry and  Ar.onon1ic  development (both  suprliars and  uat.us). 
c)  -~  ;-,~  re~.og.1  ~\~vn cf the need for par. -Euro)Jear ,not just EEC)  simpiificat~cro and 
n":t• monizatioo of homologation procedt.:rss. 
d)  ;  ;l~xplir:Jt recognition of the  nee~ h~~· (l'0'.l ·cal)  separation of re(lulation from 
r. :.J:)ra tk;ns. 
(;_:  '11e  i~·nplicit  recognition  of the  nee-1  (partially through  d.  at:ove;  for  a  cJeur 
~e~Jal basis for com  petition  betwee  :1  p  ~·:·,ate i  ntJ us  ~ries and  stat~g  con~~rnf!i. 
f)  ...  ,:;  ;mplicit rscognition that for  real  f.::,~vt·Jiopnlent  o¥  the Eu1 opean  econo;ny 
~nd sc.cial .  ·structure  more  than  mari<·?!  !orcas are  :nvolvo~,  ~'.!id  that  ~o:11e 
<Jogree of social-goals oriented (not j•Js: 711arket··goa!s orlentGd) managame:-l·;  4.:-; 
,  ..  ,.t_)~:,acaar 1  lrj  the  ''collislon't  <li  tne  t~,:ecornmu  ..  H::ttlo~1  :.~nd  c:;npu~):'!lc; 
•••viJ.Str:e£. 
g)  'he  ongoing  recognition  that  t=::ln·E:r.:~·cpean,  me,tHndus. ry  multi  .. vt>ndor 
~vi:c;b~Jrations are necessary to  ac~1eve regional, end  ~o some  exteni:  gk~rs.i. 
_  :.::;~ 111r.::ance  through  the  development  1.nd  easy  implt)mantat;on  ttl  new 
"~,.;~ tr.oioqi~s. --
Our major concerns, both from a philosophical view point and because of the rate of 
change we see in both technology and user requirements to effectively compete, are 
that the Green Paper does not address (either in the current discussion process or 
explicitly within Its substance) the following critical issues : 
1.  It Is  our view, as outlined above, that Information Technology, particularly the 
"access to"  aspect which  is above all  the  Telecommunications Sector,  is  in 
the process of becoming one of the fundamental ENABLING mechanisms for 
the development of modern society in both the economic and social fields. We 
suspect that the major feedback on  the Green  Paper will be from technically 
and/or commercially interested parties (PTTs, Suppliers, Pressure Groups and 
some large users). Given the fundamental  social shaping force of these joint 
technologies, we believe the common interest lies in broadening the debate to 
include other social and trade entities. (This concern is lliustrated by the proc-
ess we have observed in the PC-WATTC process where the micro technical/ 
economic Interests of the PTTs are becoming "de facto" government positions 
since  the  issues  have  been  "sold"  (by  some  PTTs)  as  a  purely  technical 
matter, thereby avoiding interdepartmental discussions of the real social/legal 
issues  and  ~he  consequent  development  of  ·full  social  and  economic 
positioning). 
Given the fundamental enabling role of this particular sector of the economy. 
debate relating only to "internal players" and their interests is at least distort~ 
ing and  at most dangerous,  since the total  regi~nal economy and  its global 
competitiveness (and hence the welfare of the population at large) Is at stake 
(the Green Paper p.  152 2nd  para emphasises this point). 
2.  a)  In  many contexts the Green Paper makes reference to the significance of 
the new technologies in  enabling or "pump-priming"  roles,  and to  their 
impact  on  social  factors  and  the  nature  of  work.  However,  it  then 
describes  necessary  developments,  which  are  legitimate  and  valid  in 
themselves  but  which  relate  only  to  the  specific  development  of 
technologies and economies in the Telecommunications Industry. It Is our 
view that this perspective  is  self-limited and  leads Inevitably to  analytic 
avoidance of  one  of the key  issues  : "How to  stimulate beneficially and 
how to manage the changes this industry will bring ?". Taking this wider 
perspective  would,  we  submit,  immediately  alter  the  perspectives  on 
Tariffing,  Regulations  and  the  internal  dynamics  of  the 
Telecommunications  Industry.  It  is  the  Interaction  of  the 
Telecommunications Industry with the total economy which, we argue,  is 
9 the  correct  (or  ~he rnort:J  intaresHr:g)  base  for  modeling  tariff  and  a·egu-
latory  alternatives.  in  this  we  concur  with  the  principles  in  C.C.  Van 
Weizsaecker's paper,  "The economics of VANS''. Other have also made 
substantial arguments  pointing to  the  rapid commodltlsation  (and  hence 
widespread  diffusion)  of  information  technology  made  possible  where 
(electronic)  distribution  is  unencumbered  by  adverse  regulation  or  spe-
cific industry - protecting tarlffication  principles  ..  In  particular the  value-
based tariffs used  by many PTTs  as against cost-based tariffs. The con-
trasts between  IT developments where cost-based leased lines are avail-
able against these  where value-based charging  is In  place are dramatic 
and conclusive. Bringing this perspective togeth•r wlth the economies of 
scale  arguments  in  Weizsaecker  and  the  principle  of  Free  Flow  of 
lnformatic;>n,  the  following points emerge : 
Cost-related  tariffication  would  become  a  major  pump-priming 
stimulant. 
Existing regulatory barriers (interconnect and sharing or resale of ca-
pacity restrictions) would  no  longer be valid arguments. 
(In  the  longer term)  Reconsideration  of competition would  be  neces-
sary in  all telecommunications domains where economy of scale can 
no  longer be  considered a factor. 
(To  ensqre; a  high  quality  information  flow)  Network  Infrastructure 
providers  must  commit  to  agreed  performance  criteria  (as  against 
standards),  preferably  pan-European,  with  appropriate  penalties  In 
case  of  non-observance.  All  of  this  must  be  published,  In  order  to 
convey to  ttie user the right operational expectations .and  thereby the 
choice  of  the  appropriate  solution.  (e.g.  Expectations  and  business 
needs  of  users  for  international  public  packet  switching  are  much 
higher with  respect to  throughput and  reliability than that which Is  in 
.  practice available today.)' 
A wider choice of services,  free competition in the equipment sector, 
and  possibly some  competition  in  the  infrastructure domain,  will  all 
n1ake  the  ieiacommunications  business  increasingly  complex.  This 
complexity  will  require  an  ever  increasing  number  of  professionals 
(marketers, engineers and  managers). This will not only be within the 
telecommunication  manufacturing  industries  and  telecommunication 
10 ·-
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services providers, but also within the network infrastructure and, last 
but not least,  in  the  user  community  Itself.  The  Commission  should 
initiate warning  signals  that  without appropriate actions  being  taken 
now at many levels Europe will be confronted with dramatic shortages 
of such  professionals. 
11 COMMENTS ON  THE  PROPOSED POSITIONS OF 
THE  GREEN  PAPER 
In  the interests of brevity we  will  restrict our comments to the ten positions outlined 
in  figure  13 of the  Green  Paper. 
a.  Digital accepts the implication that the continued exclusive provision and op-
eration  of the  network  infrastructure  is  the  province  of the telecommunica-
tions administrations (subject to  the caveats  in  b). 
We  believe,  however,  that  a gradual  structured  opening  of the  network in· 
frastructure would stimulate further innovation and a greater level of services 
to  help fulfill user needs. To this end, we  believe that the Ommediate)  ability 
for  users  to  utilise competitively supplied  private  microwave  links and  two-
way satellite communications would  be  a key development SPUR.· 
Where  additional  competitive  infrastructures  are  allowed,  which  we  would 
encourage, they should  be  subject to the same  regulatory Of  not utility) con-
ditions and  treated as  part of the overall  infrastructure. 
b.  We  agree that where services are to  be  provided on  an  exclusive basis this 
provision  must  be  construed  as  narrowly  as  is  necessary  to  ensure  that 
public service goals are met.  We  agree that these circumstances should  be 
reviewed  on  a continuous  and  regular  basis,  to  take  Into account not only 
technical developments but also market development and social needs. 
We  would urge caution, however, with the blanket use of openness. It is our 
belief that the provision of some new services may need Initial monopoly pro-
vision, particularly for their development and take up in the lower end of the 
market (for reasons  of  scale and  user economies). The Telecommunications 
Administrations may be  the  most appropriate vehicle. Coupled with this ap-
proach, however, must be a well defined transition timescale and  process to 
ensure investment protection during the subsequent opening to competition. 
12 
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c.  We  agree that the  provision of all  other services, except those defined in  b. 
and  subject to  the  stated  caveats,  should  be  unrestricted. We  also  believe 
that the Telecommunications Administrations should  be  encouraged to  offer 
similar  but  competitively  based  services.  The  role  of  the  Independent 
Regulatory Authority as  proposed is critical in ensuring that no unfair or mo-
nopoly  positions  are  implemented  by  the  Telecommunications 
Administrations.  Equally  we  believe  that  the  European  Commission  has  a 
critical role, both with regard to the Telecommunications Administrations and 
to  other  services  providers,  in  ensuring  compliance  with  EEC  commercial 
policies  and  competition  rules.  It  is  further  important  that access  by  other 
service providers to the network infrastructure is adequately defined and en-
sured  by the regulatory bodies and guaranteed on  a pan-European basis by 
the EEC,  via the appropriate instruments. 
d.  We  support  the  Commission's  goal  of  the  provision  of  pan-European  (and 
indeed global) interoperability via standards. We believe, however, that stan-
dards are  best achieved by  independent but formally constituted bodies in-
volving  all  concerned  parties,  particularly  users._  Given  this,  the 
Telecommunications Administrations,  should  be  no  more than  a participant 
in  such  bodies. If they are  the determining or setting agency this would  be 
effectively an  extension of monopoly condition. This Is  not acceptable, given 
that we  would also encourage Administrations to  participate in  the competi-
tive services areas. 
e. 
We  would  further encourage the  Commission  and  the  Administrations (and 
other service providers) to  move towards contract-based performance speci  .. 
fications (external to standards), in order to ensure user expectations of such 
services can  be  met. 
As  previously stated,  we  believe that clear,  unambiguous and  fair intercon-
nect  and  access  standards,  together with  user obligations for  utilization  of 
the infrastructure (both  national and transnational), are critical  . 
We fully support the aim of the Commission for a directive on  Open Network 
Provision,  provided that the conditions are  non-restrictive and  apply equally 
to  all  service  providers,  including the  Telecommunications  Administrations. 
We  believe, however, that all interested  parties should be allowed to partici-
pate  in  the discussion leading to  such  a directive. 
f.  We  support and  agree. 
13 g.  We  strongly agree  with  the  separation  of  regulatory and  operational entitles 
and  powers.  We  believe that this  is  essential at national level  In  order to re-
flect different national  conditions  and  social  goals.  However,  there  also  re· 
mains  a  need  for  coordination  at  an  European  level.  We  believe  that  the 
Commission would  be well advised to give early consideration to  a review of 
the  methods available to  achieve such  coordination. This Is  not to argue for 
an  equivalent of the  U.S.  Federal  Communications Commission for Europe, 
but possibly for a rationalization of the existing Inter-Institutional links. 
h&i.  We  agree and  support subject to  previous caveats. 
j.  We  believe  that  this  is  a  critical  activity  which  should,  however  (and  as 
previous comments  have  indicated),  be  extended to  ensure participation  of 
entities other than  just the Telecommunications Administrations. 
Digital Equipment- December  1987 
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Nederlandse vereniging van Bedrijfstelecommunicatie Grootgebruikers  - NVBTG 
(Dutch  Business  Telecommuni~ations Users Association) 
f 
NVBTC's  view of the "Green paper"  of the EC 
The  NVBTG  compliments  the commission on  the report that has been 
published and  concludes in general that it is a  good step forward to a 
uniform European  telecommunications policy. 
However,  we  wish to  ~~hasize that this can only materialize with the 
serious support and co-operation of all member-states,  because a 
noncommittal attitude will produce a  strong contrary effect. 
NVBTG  has  found that there are some  inconsistencies and omissions in 
the report.  These will be dealt with in our comment  point by point. 
In general,  we  as a  user  cons~der two  main  points of extreme importance, 
viz: 
1.  The  Telecommunications Administrations  (TAs),  which will be granted 
a  consession,  will confine themselves  to the transport of information 
in the most restricted sense. 
2.  A clear and obvious,  transparent uniform tariff structure, above 
all for international communication. 
In this connection NVBTG  holds the view,  that the tariffs for all basic 
services should be based on  the actual costs plus a  reasonable return 
on  investments. 
It appears that there is an utterly untransparent tariff structure, in 
particular for international communication. 
This applies both to basic services and  leased circuits.-On this point 
a  uniform European tariff would have our preference. 
Onl1 if there is a  demonstrable necessity to introduce differentiation 
in tariffs per country can such differentiation be tolerated, provided 
it will be transparent and verifiable for the user. 
In any  case neither the direction of a  circuit nor the ~ting  may 
lead to different tariffs. 
The  EC  should continue doing its utmost to came  to a  uniform tariff 
structure in Europe. 
The  fact that there are sometimes considerable differences in tariffs 
in the various member-states  leads to a  disturbance of business  .. ·  ;._  ... _ 
activities.  ·  · ·  · :.  \  .. <·· 
Comment  on  the various positions 
A.  Monopoly 
We  accept the existence of an exclusive right for the TAs  to offer the 
basic services to the network infrastructure. 
It should be noted that it is then also important to define most  sharply 
what  the limits between "basic services"  and  "value added  services" 
actually are.  In this respect we  are not  in agreement with the 
differentiation referred to in the report,  being "limited,. and "partial" 
release of  servi~es (cf also page  14  and  15). 
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There  should be  no  subdivision in gradations;  the service is either 
"basic service" or "value added service".  In  the latter cue it clearly 
falls outside  the concession area. 
This  concerns both wired and wireless circuits.  We  would observe in 
this respect that Receive Only  Earth Stations  (ROES)  for satellite 
reception  in the right sense of the word  and  without connection to the 
public network,  should fall outside the monopoly,  in fact, more 
strongly,  we  also regard type approval for such ROES  aa irrelevant. 
Besides,  the service "voice only" will in the long term ba debatable 
at a  complete digitisation of the networks. 
B.  Basic services 
We  agree that basic services  form  the exclusive right of the Tis 
(concession area).  However,  i~ should be determined most precisely 
what  in this case should be  regarded as basic service.  This likewise 
calls for  a  clear definition of the network access,  both technically and 
functionally. 
We  support the view that only the basic service "voice" should fall 
under  the exclusive right of the TAs. 
It should be clearly defined that voice networks within the user's 
private field should fall outside the basic service (e.g. the voice 
part of a  PABX  and private PABX  networks). 
Every other service, using  the transport function of the infrastructure 
.should therefore be regarded as a  competitive service outside the 
monopoly. 
C.  Value  added  services 
We  agree to your view that every service,  containing characteristic 
features of added value,  should fall outside the concession area.  These 
services can be offered by both TAs  and private suppliers. 
The  access  standard for use of the infrastructure should be absolutely 
uniform for both private suppliers and TAs  and all parties should be 
treated on an  equal basis with respect to the availabiliir of the 
service. 
Regarding this matter,  we  wish to observe that "packet switched" data 
networks,  as offered now  by several TAs  should be seen as "Value Added 
Network  Services"  and should therefore be offered in competition. 
D.  Standardization 
We  agree to your proposal regarding standardization. 
We  wish to emphasize though,  that standardization should also be bound 
to a  time  schedule. 
Besides,  the will to standardization may  not lead to the elimination.of 
competition nor may  it slow  down  the  innovative process. 
Standardization,  although often initiated by  the TAB  and industry and 
often also used  as  a  competition weapon,  should be co-established by 
an active input of the users,  for they are the ones that should be 
able  to work  with the final result of standardization.  ,, 
We  wish to observe,  that in the past standardization in telecOJDIIWlicatiens 
systems or recommendations  from  several standardization bodies was  oftert 
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accompanied  by  too great a  number  of options in the standard. 
If standardization is really to be effective,  the number  of options 
should be minimal. 
Needless  to say that standardization of course is a  completely European 
or worldwide affair that affects every member-state. 
For TAs  and  possible suppliers standardization should be made 
compulsory.  An  independent  - possibly European  - authority should be 
set up  which  observes and monitors the right interpretation of the 
standards. 
E.  A~cess standards 
It is of evident importance that there should came  clear definitions 
for access to the network,  whereby  one  should confine oneself to the 
interface specifications, botp functionally and technically.  We 
emphasize that the internal functionality of the terminal equipment, 
its specifications and performance,  insofar they do  not fullfil this 
interface function,  should absolutely fall outside the access standards. 
The  most  important characteristic feature for the access standard,  in 
our view,  is that the functionality and integrity of the network is not 
affected by same  terminal equipment. 
We  hold the view that within the EC  efforts should be made  to come  to 
uniform access standards for comparable services that are applicable 
in each  individual country.  Operations  should be in line with the 
market,  in other words,  both private suppliers and  TAB  have  equal 
ch~,ces in the access to the network and completely equal conditions. 
F.  Terminals 
We  agree  that there should be a  type approval for terminal equipment 
provided that this will be carried out by  an  independant authority. 
Type  approval for ROES  is, in our opinion,  completely superfluous, 
unless  a  ROES  is connected to the public infrastructure; in that case 
the conditions as mentioned under E should apply,  restricted to the 
interface specification. 
G.  Player and Referee 
There  should be a  clear separation between  the regulatory and executive 
authorities.  The  report of the commission is not clear; they merely  . 
make  mention of a  separation.  We  want  to emphasize that this separation·  ..  -~. 
should be complete and  that the regulatory authorities should be  . ··  :. 
completely independent and have  no  single functional relation with the 
TAs. 
We  feel that a  control body  should be  set up  which  could act with 
authority and  prevent a  possible fusion of  interests~ This authority, 
acting absolutely impartially,  can be set up  either on  a  local level 
or on  a  European  level. 
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Care  should be  taken that a  clear and strict division is maintained 
between  the  co~rcial and  the concession activities of the TAs.  With 
regard to the coDmlercial  function it should be  noted that every 
entrepreneur,  say at the  introdu~tion of new  products,  is free to allow 
a  kind of cross subsidizing within the scope of his corporate 
activities. 
We  want to state clearly that this kind of cross subsidizing is quite 
different from  the feared cross subsidizing between public utility 
function and  commercial  function.  This  latter fora is coaplet•lY 
inadmissible. 
I. Monitoring on  commercial activities 
No  comments. 
J.  Commercial  activities of the community. 
We  do  not see any  reason why  for the telecommunications market an 
exception would  have  to be made.  In other words,  the telecommunications 
market within the Community  should behave  completely in accordance 
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INTRODUCTION 
The  European  Computing  Services Association warmly  welcomes 
the publication of  the consultative document  on  the 
development of  telecommunications within the  Common  Market 
as  a  demonstration of  the Commission's  commitment  to change 
in this most  important aspect of  the  European  economy. 
On  several occasions  in the past ECSA  has  emphasised  to  the 
Commission  that the telecommunication  networks  in Europe 
provide the vital highways  of  the  new  information  society. 
It is essential for  the development  of  information 
technology  throughout  Europe that these data 
communication  channels  should be  fast,  low  cost and 
unrestricted.  In a  paper published  in 1985  on  "Freedom for 
European Value  Added  Network  Services",  ECSA  called for  the 
liberalisation and harmonisation of  the  telecommunications 
network  and the  need  to be  freed  of  any  current restrictions 
imposed  solely in the interests of  the  national  PTTs  or 
"Telecommunications _Administrations". as  they are referred to 
in the  Green  Paper. 
ECSA  is therefore encouraged  by  the Commission's  initiative 
in proposing ways  to promote  the development  of  new  services 
by  setting them  in a  more  competitive  framework.  Although 
these proposals  do  not at the present  time  go  as  far as  ECSA 
would  wish  in the liberalisation of  telecommunications,  ECSA 
offers its support  for all these proposals  and  would  wish  to 
hasten  the transition process. 
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THE  SCOPE  OF  ECSA'S  INTEREST 
ECSA  represents  the interests of  17  national  trade 
associations for  c~mputing services with a  total membership 
'·  -~~-·  ·•,..  .::~·- '·1.  '·~;,  -:~ ..•  _..:.'~~:;,  :;·  ·, 
of  over '1300  coiBPanies·~  ..  ·~ ·The  t:.otal  turnover··of  the computing 
services  industry  in western  Europe  in 1986  was  $23.5 
billion and  the  industry continues to expand at an  annual 
rate of  around  20%.  About  22%  of  the  revenue  of  ECSA 
members  is accounted  for  by  remote  problem  solving,  remote 
auto-transactions,  database services,  electronic data 
interchange  and  value  added  network  services.  All  of  these 
services rely on  the availability of  a  cost-effective data· 
communication  networ~~ it is the absence of  such  a  system on 
a  pan-European  basis that has  retarded the  gro~th of 
computerised  network  services in the continent of  Europe 
compared with  their development  ~n the continent of  North 
America.  It is significant that at the present time almost 
all of  the computing  service companies  poised  to take 
advantage  of  a  harmonised  European  data  communications 
network are multi-national  companies with  headquarters  in 
the  USA. 
Because  of  the  specialised interests of  computing  services 
companies,  ECSA  is commenting  only  on  those main  proposals 
in  the  Green  Paper  which  affect  the· supply  of  computing 
services.  Where  the  Green  Paper  contains  other major 
proposals  in which  ECSA  members  are concerned  only  as 
telecommunications  users,  then  ECSA  supports  the  comments  of 
the  European  Telecommunications  User  Associations  submitted 
on  25.11.87. 
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LIBERALISATION  OF  ATTACHMENT 
ECSA  fuliy supports  the  proposed  liberalisation of  the 
market  for  ter:minal  equipment  and  recommends  that this be 
carried out as quickly as possible rather than  phased in 
slowly as  indicated in the Green  Paper.  There  should  be  no 
exceptions to the freedom  of  attachment which  should  be 
extended  to all equipment,  including the subscriber•s.first 
telephone set. 
OPENING  OF  THE  NETWORK  SERVICES  MARKET  TO  COMPETITION 
ECSA  advocates  the  freedom  for all network  services to 
operate throughout  Europe  and  make  unrestricted use  of  the 
networks  across  Europe  in order  to strengthen the 
competitiveness  and  efficiency of  the whole  European 
economy.  ECSA's  main  proposals  on  value added  network 
services are  embodied  in  the attached Briefing  Note  on  Value 
Added  Network  Services dated  January  1985. 
ECSA  does  not accept that for  the  time  being certain basic 
services  should  be  reserved  for  exclusive provision  by  the 
Telecommunications  Administrations .. of  some  member  states. 
Indeed  a  strong  case is to  be  made  for  excluding  the 
Telecommunications Administrations  from  participating in  the 
provision of other services  because of  potential conflicts 
of  interest and unfair marketing  advantages  •. 
-~·.- CK4AOX TRANSBORDER  OPERATIONS 
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ECSA  supports  the  right of  its member  companies  and other 
operators  to supply  telecommunications  services across  the 
national boundaries within  the Community  without 
discrimination or protectionist barriers.  The  harmonisation 
of  telecommunication tariffs is particularly important in 
this respect. 
TARIFF  PRINCIPLES 
Inequalities in  telecommunication tariffs are one  of  the 
main  obstacles  to the establishment of  pan-European  network 
services.  The  Commission  should work  energetically 
towards  the  removal  of  the gross  anomalies  that currently 
exist in many  nations whose  telecommunications 
administrations protect or unduly exploit their 
telecommunications'monopoly. 
The  tariff principles referred to  in  Section 4.3.5  of  the 
Green  Paper have  been  identified  by  ECSA  as  one  of  the main 
practical obstacles to transborder dataflow throughout 
Europe.  The  bi-lateral agreements  lead to anomalous  charges 
for  netwo~k services which  make  it>impossible to operate in 
a  competitive or businesslike manner.  The  position is 
especially difficult in the  case of  leased-lines where 
current charges  both  at the  national  and  the  community  level 
show  wide  and  unexplained divergencies  as  confirmed  by  the 
Green  Paper.  These  disparities in charges  must  be  removed 
to  the  speediest possible  timescale. 
CK4ADX  188. European Computing 
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ECSA  is very  strongly  opposed  to  the  concept  that 
telecommunication tariffs for  tale-services  should  be  in  any 
way  dependent  of  the nature of  the tele-service. 
On  a  national level,  ECSA  agrees that the setting of  tariffs 
is a  major  component  of  a  Telecommunications 
Administration's overall  commercial  strategy;  but  afiQ  the 
abuse  of  dominant  positions must  be halted.  Increasing 
pressure must  be  exerted for  local tariffs to follow true 
basic cost trends.  As  the cost of  provision of  long 
distance traffic has  fallen much  more  than the cost of 
provision of  local traffic,  tariffs should  become  less 
distant-dependent. 
CONTINUATION  OF  MONOPOLY 
ECSA  is opposed  to the continuation of  the monopoly  rights 
for  the provision of  the basic  telecommunications  network 
but  recognises that a  limited  number  of  public and  private 
carriers should continue to have  exclusive or special rights 
regarding  the provision and  operation of  the  network 
infrastructure. 
ECSA  also recognises  the  role of  Telecommunications 
Administrations  in the establishment of  future generations 
of  infrastructures.  However,  with  the advances  in satilite 
and  optical  communications,  along with  the  convergence  of 
telecommunications  with  other technologies,  undue  power 





Administrations which  may  inhibit the  rapid  expansion of 
important  new  services made  possible by  high  technology. 
One  of  the main  conditions which  must  be  imposed  to prevent 
the abuse  of  monopoly  power  and  dominant market  position is 
the  separation of  the accounting  functions  for  the different 
facilities and  services  supplied  by  the  Telecommunications 
Administrations  to prevent unfair competition  from 
artificially low prices or cross-subsidies. 
SEPARATION  OF  THE  REGULATORY  FUNCTION 
ECSA  is adamant  that the regulatory function  currently 
carried out  by  the  telecommunications  administrations  in 
many  of  the nations  in the  EEC  must  be  separated completely 
and  absolutely  from  the operational functions  of  public or 
private undertakings. 
No  mention  is made  in  the  Green  Paper  of  whether  the 
Commission would  seek  to establish a  separate 
European  community  telecommunications  regulatory agency,  but 
ECSA  would  strongly·support this move. 
At  the  present  time,  the major  problem areas within  European 
telecommunications  are  being  ignored  because  they  concern  a 
harmonisation  of  tariff structures and  the definitions  of 
the  basic  and  enhanced  services.  Only  a  European  Community 
telecommunications  regulatory agency  is capable of  forcing 
through  a  tariff  policy against  the opposition of  many  of 






understandably  interested in preserving  their massive 
investment  in  the basic  infrastructure. 
STANDARDISATION 
ECSA  supports  the adoption  of  international standards where 
these are available and  the creation of  European  standards 
where  this is not the case.  The  preparation of  the 
standards and  technical  specifications necessary to open  up 
a  competitive market  environment  for  information  technology 
services must  be  supported  by  the  Commission.  And  ECSA  would 
support  the creation of  a  European  Standards Institute for 
this purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
In presenting the above  comments  on  the  Green  Paper,  ECSA 
has  had  to await  the ratification of  these  views  by  the  17 
member  associations which  it embraces.  The  length  of  time 
taken  between meetings  of  international  bodies  organised  on 
a  voluntary,  self-funded basis means  it is not  possible  to 
respond  more  quickly with  an  agreed  consensus  position on 
major  strategic issues  such  as  those  ~overed by 
the  Green  Paper. 
ECSA  congratulates  the  Commission  on  its initiative in 
producing  the Green  Paper  which  is certainly the most 
important consultative document  to emerge  from  the 
Commission  for  several  years  as  far as  ECSA  is concerned. 
ECSA  welcomes  the call for  a  radical  restructuring  of  the 
European  marketplace  and  common  approaches  between 
CKAADX 
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Governments  in  key  policy areas  of  telecommunications.  ECSA 
looks  forward  to working  with  the  Commission  to 
ensure  that the proposals  contained  in the Green 
Paper are  implemented  in order  to  promote  a  greater degree 
of  competitiveness  throughout  the  telecommunications 
equipment  and  services market  across  Europe. 
CK4ADX-
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ECTEL  RESPONSE 
CEC  GREEN  PAPER  ON  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE 
COMMON  MARKET  FOR  TELECOMMUNICATION  SERVICES 
AND  EQUIPMENT  (COM(87)290  FINAL)· 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  ECTEL  welcomes  the  opportunity  to  comment  upon  the 
Consultative  Green  Paper  (COM(87)290  Final)  which was  published 
by  the commission of  the European Communities  (CEC)  on  30  June 
1987. 
2.  Through its member Associations,  ECTEL  draws  together  the 
views  of  a  broad  spectrum  of  companies  compr1s1ng  the 
Telecommunications  and  Information Technology sectors of European 
Industry.  In  addition  to  their  R&D  and  manufacturing 
activities,  these enterprises have  longstanding  professional and 
commercial  relationships  with the  PTTs  and User  Groups  both  in 
Europe  and worldwide.  It is against this background that ECTEL 
welcomes  the initiatives being taken by the  CEC  to  strengthen 
European  telecommunications  and  to  promote  fair  and  open 
competition  in  this  rapidly  developing  area  which  offers 
substa~tial possibilities for industrial and market growth within 
the  Community. 
3.  Bearing  in  mind  increasing  convergence  in  the 
Telecommunciations  and  Information Technology  fields  and  the 
~echnological  advances  being made  to satisfy  increasing  user 
demand  for  new  and  improved  services,  the  European 
Telecom~unications  Administrations  (TAs)  will  undoubtedly  be 
required  to  play  a  major role in creating  the  infrastructure 
environment  within  which  the  necessary  coherent  European 
telecommunicationE  regime  can be developed.  In this context, 
ECTEL  generally  supports  the  proposals which  have  been  put 
forward  by  the Commission  in the Consultative  document.  These 
are  perceived  to  provide  a  sound basis  upon which  to  develop 
European  ISDN  and  IBC  regimes,  which  will  significantly 
strengthen the  Community market  and industrial base. 
4.  Much  detailed work  needs  to be  undertaken in order to refine 
the  proposals  which  have  been  made  and  to  effect  their 
implementation. 
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5.  The 




comments  contained  in this  section of  the  paper are of 
nature  and  have  been  referenced  to  the  proposed 
Positions  set out at Figure  13  of  the  Consultative 
Position  A  Acceptance  of  continued  exclusive 
provision  or  special  rights  for Telecommunications 
Administrations  (TAs)  in provision and operation of the 
the  network  infrastructure. 
(1)  ECTEL  accepts  that  TAs  should continue  to  be 
accorded special rights  regarding public  network 
infrastructure  provision  and  operation,  and 
recognises the  need to safeguard network integrity 
and  financial  viability.  It  is,  however, 
important  that  these  privileges  are 
counterbalanced  by the obligation to connect  and 
by the  following  network attributes: 
Availability and reliability 
Europe-wide compatibility 
Public network integrity 
Compliance  with  Europe-wide  common 
connectivity  and  access  protocols  for 
digitally presented circuits 
(2)  ECTEL  is  also  of  the  opinion  that,  as  a 
consequence  of  their special  rights,  the  TA's 
should  be  required to provide  the  supplementary 
bearer  services  (CCITT  Rec  !.211) within the  ISO 
Reference  levels 1,  2  and  3  in order to  provide 
the  desired functionality of the European  public 
network  infrastructure  which  may  o~herwise  be 
beyond  the  resources  of  small or  medium  sized 
users.  However  this is to be without prejudice to 
the  ECTEL  response  to Position E  below. 
(3)  Retention  of  these special rights should also  be 
accompanied  by  adequate  safeguards  to  ensure 
compliance  with  the  above  obligations  and  to 
prevent possible abuse  of dominant  power. 
(4)  Allowing  for  the  varying rates at which  individp~l 
Member  States  progress  towards  liberalisatibn, 




TAs  must  be  avoided.  It  will,  therefore,  be 
necessary  to limit their  influence in relation to 
both  the  setting of  standards  and  the  vertical 
integration of manufacture  and supply,  if industry 
is to participate upon  an equitable basis. 
(5)  In  the  context  of  two-way  satellite 
communications,  ECTEL  would  not  support 
proposals for  such  services  to be dealt with case 
by case.  This  would create uncertainty and could 
be  inconsistent  with the  Commission's  position 
vis-a-vis  the  physical  network  infrastructure. 
ECTEL  recommends  development of a  consistent  set 
of basic network infrastructure rules which should 
be  applied  Europe-wide  and  should  be  based 
upon  a  clear understanding  of  these  proposed 
infrastructures,  including those providing  cable 
and cellular mobile  radio services. 
b.  Position  B  _  Acceptance  of  continued  exclusive 
prov~sJ.on  2!:.  special rights for  the Telecommunications 




(1)  ECTEL  supports  the  CEC  conclusion that no  stable 
'natural'  boundary  is possible between  reserved 
and  competitive  services  and  that  exclusive 
provision by network operators must  be  rigorously 
justified  as  essential  to the  satisfaction  of 
universal service obligations. 
(2)  ECTEL  strongly recommends  that a  narrowly  defined 
common  set of  'reserved'  services and  a  harmonised 
schedule  for  their  introduction  should  be 
urgently  established  upon  a  coherent  European 
basis.  This  should  be  kept  under  continuous 
review particularly within the  ISDN  environment. 
Position  C 
services 
Unrestricted  provision  of  all  other 
In  the  area of competitives  services,  ECTEL 
the  requirement  for  TAs  to  compete  upon  an 
basis  with  all  other  service  providers, 







d.  Position  D  - Standards  for  network  infrastructure 
and  services 
(1)  ECTEL  agrees  that there  is a  need  to achieve  and 
further  develop  the  Community-wide 
interoperability of  publicly available competitive 
services  and  terminal equipment.  To  achieve this, 
harmonised  standards are required  for  accessing 
services  and  for  attachment  (to the  network)  of 
terminals  which can offer these  services.  This 
principle should be  applied to  both reserved  and 
publicly  available  competitive services  at  the 
m~nkmum  level needed  to guarantee satisfactory 
end-to-end  connection,  integrity of the  network 
for all users and safety. 
(2)  It  will also be  necessary to adopt Community-wide 
standards  for the network infrastructure  itself, 
insofar  as  this  is  necessary  to  support 
universality  of  the  services  and  terminal 
attachments  provided.  In the case of competitive 
services,  ECTEL  considers that all providers must 
be  obliged  to comply fully  with  defined  and 
agreed  network interfacing requirements.  ECTEL 
draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  over-
specification  in  general  and  of  services  and 
attachment  requirements  in  particular,  will 
unnecessarily  increase product costs and  inhibit 
innovation.  This  should  be  avoided. 
(3)  ECTEL  also considers  that proper account must be 
taken of the distinction between requirements  for 
existing  services  having an  historic  installed 
base  and  those  new  services and  terminal·s  (e.g. 
ISDN)  where  international harmonisation  may  be 
more  easily  achieved.  ECTEL  believes that  the 
limited  resources available for standards  making 
should be  concentrated in the latter area.  At the 
same  time existing  standards/specifications  for 
historical networks  should be placed in the public 
domain while  procurement continues. 
e.  Position  E  - Requirements  for  Provision of  Competitive 
Services and Directive on  Open  Network  Provision 
(1)  The  Green  Paper  proposes  that  unrestricted 
provision  of  'competitive'  services  - including 
'value-added'  services within and  between  Member 
States  should  be  allowed  by  any  service 
provider for discrete,  shared and  third party use. 
Assuming  that  'competitive'  services exclude only 
those  identified under  (A)  and  (B)  above,  EOTEL 
agrees  with  the  concepts  set  out in the  Green 
4  196 Paper.  It  is  also  convinced of  the  need  to 
establish consensus  in the  Open  Network  Provision 
(ONP)  context,  particularly  in  relation  to 
standardisation  and  tariffing.  It  is, 
nevertheless,  recognised that much  work  remains  to  be  done  in order  to define  the  necessary  basic 
service  elements  and  Open  Network  Provisions  and 
to  agree  the  regulatory framework  which is to  be 
adopted. 
(2)  The  needs  of  special  user  groups  wishing  to 
utilise  the infrastructure as  a  transport network 
(up  to OSI  layer  3)  for  individual  applications 
and  VAN  services should be  recognised.  Relevant 
guarantees concerning installation and maintenance 
must also be provided in such cases. 
(3)  A coherent numbering plan and customer to  network 
signalling  system are also required if  effective 
and economic  interoperability are to be  achieved. 
f.  Position  K =  Unrestricted provision of  ~  approved 
terminal eguipment 
(1)  ECTEL  supports  the open  competitive  provision, 
including installation and subsequent maintenance, 
of  terminal  equipment on a  Community-wide  basis 
and  believes that the first telephone  should  be 
included  within this regime as  soon as  possible. 
It will,  however,  be  necessary to  have  regard to 
the impact of these changes  upon  the manufacturers 
involved. 
(2)  ECTEL  also  emphasises that if  T~s are to  enter 
the market as  terminal equipment  suppliers,  fair 
competition  must  be guaranteed.  This  implies 
transparent commercial separation of monopoly  and 
competitive  activites  including accountancy  and 
cross  subsidisation of both finance  and  network 
specification-and customer information. 
g.  Position  ~ =  Separation of  regulatory and  operational 
TA  activities 
ECTEL  strongly  supports  the  need  to  separate  the 
regulatory  and  operational activities of  TAs.  These 
requirements  are considered fundamental  to  achievement 
of  the  Commission's  policy  objectives.  The  CEC 
should  also  review  the organisation needed  to ensure 
effective  oversight of  national  regulations.  This 
should  include  radio  frequency  spectrum  planning 
activities which  should  be  undertaken  upon  a  European 
basis,  possibly within a  CCIR  framework. 
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activities  of  TAs  and  private  proVIders  under 
appropriate  provisions of  the Treaty of ~ 
j  • 
(1)  ECTEL  agrees  that the  relevant provisions of  the 
Treaty  should  be  consistently  applied  to  both 
public  and  private  service  providers  and  to 
network operators.  Here it will also be necessary 
to address other matters  such as  VAT  issues.  The 
question of enforcement  needs  some  consideration. 
Mechanisms  must  be  established at Community level 
to  ensure  that  both  the  full  intent  of ·the 
policies  and  their timescales to  implementation 
are  satisfied by  all Member  Governments.  The 
functional  separation proposed in  (g)  above  will 
necessitate  institutional change by  some  Member 
States;  this should be undertaken  with a  view to 
safeguarding  competition  within a  European  and 
not  just in a  national context. 
(2)  Experience  has  shown  that it is not  practicable, 
for  example,  to  codify  precisely what  cross-
subsidisation  is  unfair.  Judgement  is, 
therefore,  needed  to  implement this policy  and 
this  can  only  be  exercised  by  the  separate 
regulatory  authorities  envisaged  by  the 
Commission.  An  essential feature of this  is the 
need  for financial separation of business  areas 
within TAs  and continuing  transparency,  at least 
to the regulatory authorities. 
Position  J  =Application of the  Community's 
commercial-policy 
common 
(1)  ECTEL  recognises  the need for  Europe to present a 
strong and coherent position during  international 
negotiations  and  believes that this can  bes~  be 
achieved  through  a  continuous  process  of 
consultation  and  negotiation.  This  will 
doubtless  be  facilitated  by  progressive 
implementation  of  the  proposed  Community 
telecommunications  policy.  It  should 
be  recognised,  particularly  during  periods  of 
transition,  that  development  of  a  coherent  open 
market  will  increase  vulnerability  of  the 
Community  to  import  penetration.  Appropriate 
safeguards  will,  therefore,  need  to be  provided 
while  arrangements  for  achieving  both  true 
reciprocity  and equality of opportunity are  being 
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negotiated with  non-Community Administrations  and 
this  should  be  addressed  upon  a  country  by 
country,  market  by market  and product by product 
basis. 
SPECIFIC  ITEMS  OF  ECTEL  INTEREST 
6.  Acceleration of Existing Action Lines 
ECTEL  strongly  commends  the  action  lines  proposed  in  the 
commission  Green  Paper,  together with promotion of  the  RACE 
Main  programme,  early  introduction  of  digital  mobile 
communications  and  the co-ordinated introduction of  ISDN.  It 
also  advocates rapid extension of Directive  86/361  to  include 
full  mutual  recognition  of  general  type  approval  of 
telecommunications  terminal  equipment.  In  this  context 
arrangements  should be  made  to ensure: 
a.  Strict  compliance 
requirements. 
by TAs  with all  relevant  approval 
b.  Europe-wide  harmonisation  of approval  procedures  in 
respect of subject matter and  time to implementation. 
7.  Initiation of  New  Action Lines =European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute  (ETSI) 
a.  ECTEL  wishes  to stress the  importance of  standards 
in  achieving  a  coherent  Europe-wide 
communications  infrastructure,  and  considei·s  it 
necessary  to  progress  urgently  towards  an 
arrangement  that  will  guarantee  equitable 
participation  by  the  TAs,  industry  and  user 
bodies  in standards making policy,  management  and 
technical issues. 
b.  In  respect of  the  network  infrastructure,  ECTEL 
recognises  the  leading  role  of  the  TA's  in 
defining  standards which will ensure  Europe-wide 
coherence.  Such  input  must,  however,  be 
complemented  at  all  levels  by  the  relevant 
industry  contribution  in  order  to  strengthen 
Europe's competitive position in world markets. 
c.  In the field of  telecommunciations  and  information 
technology  equipment  for  attachment  to  the 
network,  and  in the  provision of services,  ECTEL 
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industry  to take  the  leading role with  a  balanced 
contribution from  the TA's  and  user interests. 
d.  The  precise mechanisms  to achieve  these objectives 
need  further careful study and  consultation.  In 
the  meantime,  it  is  important  that  current 
standards work  is not delayed or impaired by the 
possibility of future changes. 
e.  Within  the  above  framework,  the  concept  of 
f. 
g. 
establishing  a  European  Telecommunications 
Standards Institute is supported. 
Accelerating  convergence  between 
Telecommunications,  Information Technology,  radio, 
broadcasting  and  other  information  transfer 
regimes  must  be  recognised.  In this context it is 
important to ensure that,  where appropriate,  the 
necessary  co-operation- and  working  linkf:i  aref 
esl:ablished  between 'ETSI.,  CEPT,  CEN.,  CS\IELEC  ar:"'  _ 
other relevant European  standardisation bodies,  In 
a  timely manner. 
Any  new  arrangements must ensure  that  standards 
for  equipment  and services do not  frustrate  or 
preclude  competition  and the achievement  of·  EC 
policy.  Care  must also be taken to ensure  that 
the  necessary  working  links  and  collaborative 
arrangements  are  de~eloped::  wl th the re  1  evant 
International  standardisation bodies (ISO,  IEC,  CCI  TT, 
CCIR,  etc.) 
B.  Conditions  for  Open  Network Provision 
a.  ECTEL  is  convinced  of  the  need  to  establish  a 
harmonised  European-wide  network  interfacing  regime, 
supported  by  agreed  conditions  of  use  and  tariff 
policies. 
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Directive  dealing  with  open  network  prov~s~on,  is 
definition of  the  network  boundary,  particularly in the 
context  of  digital technology.  If the  liberalised 
supply  of  terminal equipment  is to be  meaningful  it 
is  important  that this boundary should be defined  so 
that  the network  includes only the minimum  amount  of 
equipment  on  customer  premises.  This  equipment 
should,  however,  be sufficient to allow operators  to 
terminate  and  test their networks while at  the  same 
time protecting them  from all connected apparatus which 
complies  with  the  generally  applicable  electrical 
safety  requirements.  such  a  definition  will  make 
clear  the  distinction  between  terminal  equipment, 
installation  and maintenance  and network  equipment. 
All  current  and future  terminal  equipment  would  be 
subject  to minimum mandatory standards for attachment. 
Networks  not  governed by these  requirements  should 
then  be  the subject of an  appropriate  Directive  on 
interface  standards,  which  must  reflect  the  Open 
Network  Provision concept. 
c.  The  Commission  should urgently initiate a  study  of 
this  matter  with  the  full  co-operation  of  all 
interested  parties.  Its aim  should be  to develop an 
initial  definition of the Network  Termination  Point 
(NTP)  of  a  digital network  and  to agree the principles 
by  which future redefinition can evolve as  technology 
progresses. 
9.  Common  Development of Europe-Wide  Competitive Services 
a.  ECTEL  endorses  the 
services  (including 
competitive  basis 
need for  development  of  these 
value  added  services)  upon  a 
within  a  European  framework. 
b.  It  is,  however,  important  that  more  is  done  to 
identify  user  demand  for  new  developments  so  that 
there  is  commercial  and  technological  motivation  to 
make  speedier progress.  - Greater emphasis  should also 
be  placed upon  the development of  Europe-wide  services 
and  upon  the need  to encourage  not only the  TAs  but 
many entrepreneurs to provide  services which  are either 
being  requested  now  by  users or  for  which  information 
providers  and others foresee  opportunities  to  satisfy 
future-user  needs. 
4'  •..  ,.  ,,  • 
9  201 10.  Open  Markets 
a. 
b. 
Within  the  Community 
There  is  a  ris~  that,  with  liberalisation  being 
introduced at a  different pace in each member  country, 
equipment  suppliers  in the  more  liberalised  nations, 
(particularly  those  in which  basic and  value  added 
services  are provided on  a  competitive  basis)  will 
find  themselves disadvantaged.  This would occur  in 
cases where,  on  the one  hand,  competing operators chose 
their  suppliers  on  the basis  of  purely  commercial 
criteria,  while  Administrations  in  other  countries 
identified  national  or~g~n as  a  sourcing  criterion. 
As  the  Community  aims  to create an open  market  for 
equipment  and  services,  ECT·EL  considers  that  no 
supplier  within  the Community should be  denied  the 
opportunity to participate in the market for equipment, 
works  and services  including supply to TAs.  The 
Commission  should,  therefore,  ensure that this market 
is both open and fair. 
Worldwide 
The  very  act  of  creating an  open  competitive  and 
coherent  market makes  that market more  vulnerable  to 
import penetration,  especially during the transitional 
phase.  Although  there is no desire to press for the 
restriction  of  international  trade  agreements  to 
provide protection,  abuses of such  agreements  must 
be disallowed.  At  the  same  time,  the whole  Community 
should press vigorously for the removal of restrictions 
by  our  international competitors on access  to  their 
internal  markets.  Some  means  of achieving  concrete 
reciprocity,  country by country,  market by market  and 
product  by product  must,  therefore,  be  sought as  a 
counter-balance  to the opening of European markets  to 
external competition. 
11.  Alternative Infrastructure ~ Cable  and  Radio 
a.  ECTEL  believes  that the  Green  Paper is unclear as  to 
the  future  status  of  local  cable  systems  and  in 
relation  to responsibility for  their  infrastructure. 
Local  area  broadband  cable  systems  are  developing 
without  the  full  investment  required  to  satisfy 
telecommunications  system  needs.  This  can have  an 
adverse  effect upon  integration of  such  systems  as 
part  of  a  national  telecommunications  serviqe. 
Furthermore,  many  private radio  networks  already exist 
and  interconnection  of  these  with  national 
telecommunications  networks  must  be  considered. 
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": b.  To  enable  such systems  to be  integrated as part  of  a 
national  switched  network,  factors  such  as 
transmission performance  and  numbering  plans must  be 
considered.  The  impact  that such  systems  could have 
in  Europe  needs  further  study. 
c.  ECTEL  considers  that  when  drafting  any  proposed 
Directive  on Open  Network  Provision,  the  Commission 
should  recognise  the  need for  a  coherent approach  to 
both  availability  and  allocation  of  the  frequency 
spectrum.  A  broad study is also needed to take account 
of  the  requirements  for  trunk  radio  systems,  pan-
European cellular mobile  services,  paging and messaging 
services,  cordless  telephones,  universal  personal 
communicators,  radio  local area  networks,  satellite 
services and rural radio services. 
12.  ECTEL  endorses the  concepts  put forward  by the Commission 
in  relation  to  the  future  development  of  satellite 
communications,  relations  with  third party countries  and  the 
social impact of  the changes  being proposed. 
13.  CONCLUSIONS 
ECTEL  concludes that: 
a. 
b. 
Change  is 
regulatory 
Community, 
desirable and  inevitable and  that  greater 
coherence  is  required  throughout  the 
preferably  upon  a  Europe-wide  basis. 
Any  changes which are contemplated need to be carefully 
co-ordinated  since  their  purposes  and  effects  are 
interdependent;  for  example,  the  absence  of suitable 
standards at the right time  could be  a  major  impediment 
to progress in other  areas.  Also,  failure to  find 
effective  solutions  to  problems  in  the  area  of 
copyright/IPR,  fraud  and  security  will  inhibit  or 
retard  the  growth  of  services  and  diminish  their 
overall economic effect. 
c.  A  carefully  timed  implementation plan  needs  to  be 
developed  which will  take  account of  both the  further 
preparatory work  needed,  the  inter-dependencies  of the 
changes  to be  made  and  their effects upon  industry. 
d.  These  changes  need  to  be  introduced in a 
and  well  ordered  manner,  in  order 
destabilisation.  Such  a  situation would 
impede  the  proper  development  of  the 
11 
progressive 
to  avoid 
not  only 
proposed corrununity  telecommunications  regime,  but could  also 
threaten  the  survival  of  important  elements  of 
manufacturing industry which  have a  vital  contribution 
to make. 
e.  After  reviewing  the  responses  whi~h it has  received 
to  the  Green  Paper,  it is hoped  that  the  Commission 
will  develop  drafts of its  intended  submis-sions  to 
the  Council  and  a  timetable  for  their  phased 
implementation,  be·fore  proceedinq  with any 'executive 
action. 
f.  ECTEL  recognises  that  much  work  now  needs  to  be 
undertaken in order to develop the concepts set out  in 
the Green  Paper  and stands ready to contribUte fully to 






COMMENTS  OF  ECTUA  ON  THE  "GREEN  PAPER  ON  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF 
THE  COMMON  MARKET  FOR  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  SERVICES  AND  EQUIP  .. 
MENT"  (COM(87)  290  final} 
ECTUA  enthusiastically welcomes  the Green  Paper as  a  sign of the 
Commission's  interest in the  fostering of  telecommunications  in-
sofar  as  it  is  indispensable  to  the  dynamics  of  the  European 
economy. 
ECTUA  is pleased to have  been invited to present the  op1n1ons  of 
European users on  the  propositions  made  by  the  Commission,  and 
wants  to  clearly  express  its  support  to  the  Commission  in its 
objectives. 
ECTUA's  opinions are set forth in the  documents:  ECTUA  Position 
on European Telecommunications Policy (final 16/8/1987,  see annex 
1),  ECTUA  Point  of View  on the Development in Europe of an  Open 
Network Provision Concept  (final  9/9/1987,  see  annex  2),  ECTUA 
Point  of  View  on  a  European Telecommunications  Standards  Insti-
tute  (final 25/11/1987,  see  annex  3),  and  in  comments  submitted 
by individual member  associations. 
Firstly,  ECTUA  insists  on  the  need  for  a  European telecommuni-
cations strategy that matches  the needs  and  interests  of  users. 
This condition must be  met so that the entire economy  can benefit 
from the potential evolution of networks and services.  Therefore 
user participation is needed in developing the strategy to  lead, 
in  particular,  to  the  cost-orientation  and  harmonisation  of 
telecommunications tariffs,  and to the harmonization of telecom-
munications  regulations  in  Europe.  Then,  users  will  have  the 
greatest  possible  choice  and  flexibility  in  determining . and 
maximising their own strategies in the utilisation of Information 
Technology. 
It  ~-s  in  this  spirit  that  ECTUA  wholeheartedly  supports  the 
opening up of the market to free competition where  no participant 
can  abuse  its  dominant  position.  For  the  same  reasons,  ECTUA 
extols the  separation of telecommunications  regulation  from  the 
operations. 
Secon~  ECTUA  would  like to draw  the Commission's  attention to 
the  need  to  organise  European  representation  in  international 
fora in such  a  way  that all parties concerned are fairly repres-
ented.  Users have particularly in mind to be  represented at the 
ITU  (CCITT,  WATTC)  and at  ISO. 
Finally,  ECTUA  recognizes  the need  to  improve  the  infrastructure 
and  promote  new  services.  With  this  objective  in  mind,  ECTUA 
asks  that  regulations  that currently inhibit utilisation of the 
infrastructure be  removed without delay.  It is only  under  such 
conditions  that  new  services will develop  rapidly  and bring ad-
ditional  revenues  to  the  infrastructure providers. 
--- 20_5_ 25-11-1987 
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COMMENTS  ON  THE  COMMISSION'S  PROPOSED  POSITIONS  (Figure  13) 
A-B)  Principle of exclusive  prov~sion or special  rights  regarding 
the provision  and operation of  the  network  infrastructure and 
..  ~ha provision of a  limited  number of basic  services  : 
Users believe that no  sector should be  reserved definitively 
and that exclusivity  or  special  rights  should  be  accepted 
only  as  exceptions  when  they can be  justified on the basis 
of superior efficiency.  These should be subject to periodic 
review by  an  independent  regulatory body.  The  general  rule 
should be  free  competition. 
Users  are  also of  the  opinion  that  the  infrastructure  and 
basic  switched  voice  telephone  services,  where exclusivity 
and  special  rights  would  be  applied,  should  be  precisely 
limited  in  order  to  avoid uncontrolled extension.  Value-
added  services in the area of voice  storage  or  processing, 
for  example,  should not be  an exception to the rule of com-
petition. 
Exclusivity and  special rights should be matched with obli-
gations  and  responsibilities  for  the provider with respect 
to  timely  delivery  and  maintenance,  multiple  intercon-
nections,  and  the  level  and continuity of service,  as well 
as  the  right of users to freely use  the  infrastructure  and 
reserved  services  and  in  particular,  leased  circuits  and 
interconnected private and public networks. 
New  transmission  techniques  not  using  the  wired  network 
should  not  be  subject  to  exclusivity.  Due  to  the poten-
tially great benefits of satellite technology in creating a 
European  telecommunications  dimension,  users  strongly  re-
commend  that  the  use of such technology should not be con-
strained by granting exclusive  supply privileges. 
Cable television networks  should be permitted  to  be  devel-
oped in parallel to allow the emerqence of new applications. 
C)  Unrestricted provision of all  services  : 
Users  fully  support  the  general  unrestricted  prov1s1on of 
services  over  the  telecommunications  infrastructure  under 
conditions  to  be  defined in the  framework  of the OPEN  NET-
WORK  PROVISION  concept  (see  annex  2). ... 
,· 
D)  Strict requirements  regarding  standards for  the  network 
infrastructure and  s~rvkes provided  in  order to  maintain 
or c.re.a.te  European-,wide  interoperability 
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Users  ask that European  standard~ be  developed  only  in  the 
absence of Internationa!  Standards,  and that these standards 
be  enforced  for  the  development  of  the  infrastructure and 
services  reserved  to  Telecommunications  Administrations, 
for  the  attachment  of  terminals  to  the  network,  and  for 
interfaces  to  be  defined  in  the  context  of  OPEN  NETWORK 
PROVISION  (see  annex  2). 
~~~;ance with  interoperability  specifications for termi-
nal~ipment and  value-adde~ services within the  framework 
~SI  s~ould be  encouraged.  In no  case  should the applica-
tion of these standards prevent the development of advanced 
function~ and capabilities outside the  framework 4efined by 
the standards  .. 
:::he  ~leers believe  that  the  development  of  standards  could 
be most effectively done  within the  framework  of  a  European 
standards institute,  j,ndependent in both its duties  and fi-
nancing,  where each member party has  an equal say  (see annex 
3).  ECTUA  is ready to parti.cipate in the work of developing 
the  stan.d8.rds. 
E)  Clear definition of general  requirements for  use of the  network  : 
-1 
Hser.s  are  of  the  opinion  that  it is  necessary  to clearly 
define the  c:ondi tions under ·which  the  infrastructure should 
be  made  availa.bl.e  to users  .and  ser-..rices  providers,  as  weli 
'8
4
~-f'h€> condl. ti  ons under whtch they  art:~  au.thorized to use the 
infrastructure.  Th:i s  should  include "ctea-r. obligations on 
interconnection  and  access  imposed  on  the  providers  of 
_infrastructure  and  public  services  in.  order  to  allow  the 
harmonious  development  of  services  on  the  national  and 
international  level  . 
.  The  _.Er.i~i  ty_2i.  the  ~"'>ers  __ t ~  t!'lc.  defj.n;~tj on of general  re-
glJi~ements that fully take into account the needs  and  views 
9 f  ~§..~.!!.:.. 
The  users  reaffit~m  that  the  concept  of  OPEN  NETWORK  PRO-
VISION  should be developed with user needs  and  interests in 
mind,  which  involves  user participaticHl in the elaboration 
of the concept.  For this reason  ..  tbey ask that  the  struc-
ttlre of the  qr·ou-.os  SOG-T  and  CAP  be modified to ensure that 
all  inte~:"est~d  parties  can  ft::.lly  part.ic:i.p~t.e  irl  the  formu-
l  ~.tion of  a  European  st'.:r:-at.r:::~-rv  f  ~e~ annex  2). 
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F)  Free provision  of terminal  equipment  : 
G) 
Users wholeheartedly support the  rule of competition  for the 
offering of all equipment that can be  connected to the net-
work  infraetructure.  There  should be  no  exceptions to this 
rule.  It is vitally important to clearly define the limits 
of the  network infrastructure in such  a  way  as  to avoid its 
uncontrolled  extension  (see  also  A-B) .  For  users,  the 
infrastructure  ends  with  the  supply of wires to the users' 
premises. 
Standardisation  should  allow  the  attachment  of  terminal 
equipment  to  the  infrastructure  on  an  international  level 
or at  least  on  a  European  level.  Conformance  testing  of 
terminal  equipment  by  an  independent  laboratory recognized 
by  a  European regulatory body  should suffice for permission 
to install in all the countries of the Community.  In order 
to  reduce cost,  the European regulatory body  should  in  the 
future consider the accreditation of manufacturers'  labora-
tories to test their own  products. 
Type  approval  specifications  (NETs)  should  be  limited  to 
protection of personnel  and  the network. 
Separation of regulatory activities and the operation 
of the infrastructure or the provision of service  : 
Users  agree entirely with the principle of separating regu-
latory activities  and  the  operation  of  the  infrastructure 
or  the  provision  of  services  (see  annex  2).  In this re-
spect,  providers of the infrastructure cannot be both  judge 
and  involved party.  In addition,  circumstances are  favora-
ble for the establishment of  a  European  telecommunications 
policy.  Users  suggest  therefore  that,  in addition to na-
tional regulatory bodies,  an independent European regulatory 
body  should be  created,  with  equality  of  consultation  and 
equality of redress. 
The  European  regulatory  body would propose  recommendations 
and directives in the context of  which  national  strategies 
would  be  developed.  This  body  would  cover,  among  other 
things,  aspects  of  standardisation,  tariffs,  assigning 
exclusivity and special rights.  The  powers of the national 
and European regulatory bodies would be defined and reviewed 
in the context of the evolution of European integration. 
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H-I)  Strict continuous  review of commercial  activities 
of  in·frastructure and service providers  : 
J) 
Users  are  in  total  agreement  that the  market  regulation of 
telecommunicaticns  infrastruct~re  and  services  should  be 
subject to the Treaty of Rome  (articles 85,  86 and  90,  among 
others) .  1 t  is  necessary  to.  entrust  the  regulatory  body 
with carrying out  a  regular review of the practices of sup-
pliers so  that  abuse  of dominant position can be  avoided  . 
Users believe that ·there is a  real danger that the competi-
tion rules will be distorted,  since the infrastructure sup-
pliers can offer services and  terminal  equipment.  They  do 
not  see  the  need  for  it.  In  cases  where  this  occurs,  a 
strict control  should be carried out to avoid any discrimi-
nation. 
Common  European  policy  : 
A  European  telecommunications  strategy  (common  policy) 
should  be  promot.ed  vis-a-vis  international  bodies.  This 
common  policy should be prepared with  the  participation  of 
all interested parties. 
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EUROPEAN  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  POLICY 
Dr.,  the  b<~s  1s  of  the  pos  1 t ion  papers 
- ANFORDERUNGEN  ZUR  NEUGESTALTUNG  DES  TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSWESENS 
iN  DER  BUNDESREPUBLIK  DEUTSCHLAND, 
- MEMORANDUM  DE  L'ABUT  POUR  UNE  POLITIQUE  DE  PROMOTION  DES 
SERVICES  DE  TELECOMMUNICATION  EN  BELGIQUE, 
- BASIC  EUROPEAN  TELECOMMUN'ICATIONS  USERS  REQUIREMENTS  as  seen 
oy  AFUTT  (Association Francaise  des  utilisateurs  du  Telephone 
k!t  des  Telecommunications)  ilu'ld  CIGREF  (Club  !nformatique  des 
Grandes  Entreprises  Francaises), 
- ~UROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS  USERS'  REQUIREMENTS  as  seen  by  the 
UK  representatives  TMA  and  TUA, 
·u-...(~  following  principles  are  sublfdtted  ;..s  a  framework  for  the 
tie',.,'·!! lopment  of  a  user  or  ient.:!cl  'ele~O,i"<ia\unica t ions  po  1 icy  in 
El.lr-ope: 
Pr-inciple  1  - USER  CONSUL ,-AT  l: ON 
Th~ practices of  national  telecommunications  network  operators,shall  be 
adapted  to  the  need  of  all European  users with  a  worldwide  orientation. 
Users  should  be  fully consulted  on  both strategic and specific issues 
~nd their views  must  be  taken  into  account  in order  that their 
requirements  are  fully  met  and  needed  services  are  developed  and 
pro~ided efficiently. 
Pt·inc:iple  2  - STANDARDS 
International standards shall  be  applied  for  the  development  of  public 
telecommunication services,  e.g.  ISDN  and  mobile  telephone  both 
nationally  and  at  the  European  level.  They shall  be  used  to  promote 
the  ~idest choice  for  users  and service  providers  and  should  be 
produced  with  the participation of  user  representatives.  Any  service 
option which  excludes  international application shall no  longer  be 
imp  l~:::mented. 
In  the  absence  of  international  st~ndards,  the  users  request  the 
establishment  and  implementation  of  NETs  CNormes  Europeennes  de 
Telecommunications)~  Their  int~oduction shall  in  no  way  inhibit  the 
development  of  advanced  applications  outside  the  frame  set  by  the 
standar~ds. 
FLOW 
Any  legal  or  tariff  barriers  t~at  haiDper  transborder  telecommuni-
cations shall be  removed  . 
LJS) E 
M.axlrrH.Jm  freedom  1r.  t:-H~  use  t:>;'  ·,;:l~:cor.•munj.cciti'l.h;  Sf2t·vlCf...?:~,  and  facilities 
Sh?!.ll  i1\.~  provided  to  tht:  :.xsc:,·:~.  :;;.·t"'l  yua!"ant~?.C!d  by  cc:npett.:nt 
authorities  innepz,-,,j~nt  fr"")m  t~·"'·  net'."':;,,·:-:  'JIH2t·,.Jt  ~;·H}  :;g<"l.lClt.~s, 
? r--~-
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Baste  services shall  be  prov~ded  econom~cally  as  allowed  by 
technological  progress  and  systems  performance.Prices shall  be  related 
as  closely  as  possible  to  the  cost  of  providing  each service.  Border 
cross1ng  surcharges  for  1nternational  telecommunications  traffic  and 
circuit  rentals shall  no  longer  be  levied  for  intra-Community 
communications. 
Volume  based tariffs should  only  be  considered  in  relation  to specific 
consumption  of  resources.  In  any  case  they shall not  be  applied  to 
leased circuits. 
Pr~nciple 6  - BAS I  C  SERVICES 
New  basic services  in  Europe  shall  be  implemented  in  a  coordinated 
manner  after  intensive consultation  of  user  representatives  on  the 
basis of  common  international or  European standards  and  service 
specifications. 
Telecommunications  policies should  encourage  the  rapid  development  of 
new  and  innovative  information services,  and  should  not  restrict  the 
form  or content  of  the  information  that  is transmitted. 
Principle  7  - S  E  CUR :I TV 
The  telecommunication  network  operators should  accept  responsibility 
fer  the  quality,  security  ar.d  secrecy  of  communications.  The  user 
shall  also  be  free  to  protect  the security  and  secrecy of  his 
communications. 
Principle  8  - TERMINALS 
Users shall have  a  free  choice  of  terminal  equipment  amongst  those 
types  meeting official european standards.  Type  approvals  issued  in 
accordance  with  such standards  by  one  national  authority should  be 
applicable  throughout  the  Community  without  any  restriction in 
application  of  relevant  EC  directives. 
Principle 9- SERVICES 
To  provide  optimum  telecommunications solutions  for  users,  the widest 
choice  of  services shall  be  allowed  on  a  competitive  basis. 
Princ1.ple  10  - REGULATION 
Tech~ological  and  regulatory  changes  currently  being  introduced  and 
con~idered  provide  the  opportunity  for  a  common  European 
telecommunication  policy.  This  pol1cy  should  be  flexible  enoygh  to 
take  account  of  further  developments  and  should  be  produced  w~th full 
part  1c ipa t ion  of  user  representatives.  The  regu  1 a tory  authority  <Z'.hou ld 
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~ec:.orruA  point oi v.:lau  on  t~1s  dev~l.opment in Eut.·ope  of  an Open  Nat-
w(;,.;c-tt;  Provision.  c-.Jnce.pt,. 
~~~A_pgsition on European Telecommunication ~oli~d~. 16/06/87. 
£~~ecommunica  \;ion Concep-t  !o-.:- Eurc-pe 
Value  Added  Service market s:lould be de-veloped within a  frame-
wock  of competition.  A  European regulating concept is neces-
sary  and  has  to  determine  the  basic  and  value  added  services 
(VAS).  ,. 
'rhis  concept  should  be  defined  for  the  present  and  future 
networks  and should be developed conform to the users need and 
interests.  This  implies· their participation in the  elabora-
tion~ 
Among  other  things,- the  users  ask  for  harmonization of  Euro-
pean Telecommunications  and for free choice between VAS  provi-
d~d by service company or developed by themselves. 
~-~!~t  the concept should be 
This  concept  should offer  free  and  non  discriminatory  access 
to  the  infrastructure  and  allow  the  elaboration of  VAS  which 
uses  advanced technologies. 
'l'L~  rE}qui r.ements  should  ba  defined  as  underlying  building 
bl.o.::ks,  that can be  used by  any  VAS  provider or by  an indivi-
dual user if users choose to develop  VAS  for themselves. 
E:1£-,ce  current  n~twc-cl."k::  htHra  J.t.m:!.-t.;ed  signaling and intelligence 
in  the-netWOrk·~-"vAsprovidez.-s and  usez:·s  generally should have 
ma ~:imum freedom in the use of transmission,  switching servi.ces 
and facilities,  and should be able to make  the choice of which 
F-~•r,!ice  to use., ·........, 
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Since  fu~~re network will have  increasing network intelligence 
and  integration  of  customer  acces  (e.g.,  ISDN),  primary  re-
quirements  will  include  "~qual  access"  to  signaling  network 
intelligence  in addition  to  access  to  the  elements  of  trans-
mission and  switching. 
More  over the concept has to cover the following aspects  : 
1.  Regulatory aspects. 
(What is meant  by basic service?  ••• ) 
(Use  without  constraints of basic services  included leased 
circuits,  except  for  the  provision of  the  public  switched 
voice services) 
(Tha  availability  and  quality  of  interfaces  in  space  and 
time  (24h/24 h)  ) 
2.  Aspects relating to tariffs. 
(Equal  basis,  namely  on  European  level  and  accordingly  to 
the type of basic service) 
3.  Technical aspects. 
(Particularly the publication of interface specifications). 
4.  Access  for  new  technologies  (the  process  of  obtaining 
authorization  for  the  elaboration  of  means  of  technology, 
which  is not  covered  by  formal  standards  and  results  from 
the evolution in the field of technology). 
The  necessary technical developments 
The  ONP  concept results  from  the  technological  evolution  (im-
brication  of  Telecommunication  and  Software  aspects).  The 
need  for  an  architectural  model  is,  however,  entirely  inde-
pendent  from  technical  aspects  which,  for  the  time  being, 
undergo  a  more  rapid evolution. 
The decisional and organisatory framework is very important. 
Efficient access  at reasonable cost to transmission and swit-
ching elements of the telecommunications operator network is a 
primary  requirement.  Thus,  transparent  transmission  of  the 
users  information,  must  be  offered  to  VAS  providers  whether 
the  user  accesses  the  network  via  switched  access,  leased 
circuits or,  in the future,  an  ISDN  ~a~ or  ~o" channel. 
~ccess to network signaling information !s becoming  an increa-
sing requirement and is described in the interface to be defi-
ned. 4  • 
.  ._. 
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:1'-.>':lw·ork  supervision  and  customer  loop  status  information  can 
a  valuable tool  for  VAS  prov·iders  and  should be  made  avai.-
).alU.ti  to  them,.  VAS  providers  require  a  ranga  of  diagnostic 
h:n.d  contr.ol  informatio:t'l  ~::-.em  t.el.ecom.munication  operators  .in 
tn:der  t:o  achif.n,wa  thai.t.'  tV«n  n"9tttork  mfir'.lageanent  obj  ecti  vas. 
'..:'his  requirement  will  incx:-ea.se  in the  ISDN  time  frame  as  VAS 
~:;~v''-"iders  become  mora  d.ap~ndent on the inherent network intel-
J.  ~!.~ence  • 
.Y:n  t:urrent  networks,  interfaces to ·transmission  and  switching 
alements are general1y defined and  ~ay be  ~dequate but in some 
,.:a~:a  may  be  packaged or bundled  in  a  way  that makes  them  im-
~.;r.·a.ct:t.cal  Ol."  ·too  costly t.:>  ust.l..  Increased versatility should 
ba provided. 
l.r\  future  networks,  such  as  in  ISDN,  additional  interfaces 
nnd/or extensions to the proposed standards may  be required to 
ps:·ovide  access  to  signaling  capabilities  as  well  as  data 
packets  being  transported  over  signaling  channel.  It  is 
imr~rtant that the  VAS  provider have  access to ISDN  "D"  chan-
nel  t:o  obtain access to a  wide  range of signaling information 
(such  as,  calling  number  identification)  in  some  efficient, 
~tandardized  form  to  ensure  that  the  increasing  intelligence 
ba.tng incorporated in the network will benefit users accessing 
any  VAS,  including  those  of  the  telecommunication  operator. 
Y.fl1en  operators  develop  interfaces  (like  '!'CAP)  between  their 
baslc switching machino  and application processors in order to 
provide  their own  value  added  services,  access  via this  same 
interface  standard  should  be  available  to  competing  value 
-'•.:.l·.:l~;d  sel:"'rice  providers,  ISDN  reference  point  M  :ln  1.310  re-
lat8s to this point.  Users consider the same  standards should 
il~.pply  at reference  points  "P"  and  "M".  If an oprator uses  a 
~ata base about their monopoly customers for advanced applica-
't:iona  these data  bases  should  be  made  available  in  some  con-
;,:rolled manner to outside users. 
In  all  cases  VAS  of all providers  should  be  basad  on  inter-
faces  and  terms/c~nditions satisfying the following parameters 
;;:,n  an equal  manuer  : 
i  \ 
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Interfac·a functional:tty,, 
Unbundling of basic service, 
Equal  ta~:ifo,  CA':>St  ori\-lntedr 
Techn1.cal  Charactarist:tcs, 
Inntallation and  Maint~adnco, 
End  Ussr Access, 
Oparatlonal  availah111  t~{, 
Minimization of  {:t:~nr.,;~?O:Ct  cost, 
No  discr1~minatic;,n? 
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On  one  hand  and  as  stated  above,  the  concept  should  not  be 
technology dependent,  but should on the other hand follow the 
European  telecommunication strategy taking  the  present situa-
tion and  future developments into account.  It can be provided 
usting  current  network  approaches  by  enalbing  access  to  un-
bundled  transmission  and  switching  in  an  equal  manner.  Cur-
rent  interfaces  and  technologies  can generally  be  used if an 
effort  1.s  madt1  to. ensure  that  VAS  provided  by  alternative 
providers  are  able  to utilise the  same  unbundled  transmission 
and  switching  elements  as  VAS  provided  by  telecommunication 
operator.  As  stated above  some  repackaging or flexibility may 
be  required  but  technological  invention  should  not  be  neces-
sary. 
With  respect to newer technologies,  such as  ISDN,  some  changes 
and  or increased  flexibility may  be  required.  ISDN  could be 
implemented in an open or in a  closed manner.  For example,  if 
equal access to the signaling function and to the data packets 
on  the  "D"  channel  are  not offered,  alternative  VAS  services 
will  not  be  provided  on  an  equal  basis.  If alternative pro-
viders are not given equal access to such functions,  they will 
not  be  able  to offer competitive  services,  and  users will  be 
deprived of competitive alternatives.  There is time to ensure 
that  ISDN  standards/recommendations  ensure  openness  and  to 
promote  implementation of  ISDN  in  a  manner  that will  be  con-
sistent with the developed concept. 
In order to fully analyze  the  impact of  ISDN  on  ONP,  it will 
be  necessary  to  develop  a  list of interfaces  required to sa-
tisfy ONP  and compare those with the intarEaces planned in the 
ISDN  environment. 
Users  and Service providers participation 
ONP  can  provide  Europe  with  the  opportunity  to  be  a  major 
world-wide influence in VAS  and to provide European users with 
a  wide  ~ange of cost affective,  innovative VAS.  This can only 
occur  if all  elements  of the  European  business  and  user  com-
munity  can  full~·  participate  in  the  definition  of  the  model 
uno  build  VP  .. S  on  an  open  network.  If instead,  provision of 
VAS  is reserved  for  telecommunication operators or provided on 
~.  preferential  basis  by  telecommunication operators,  then the 
capabilities and services that could be developed by other VAS 
providers will not be realized. 
An  euro[)ean  euthori  ty  independent  of  operators  and  services 
companles  should  excercise  control  on  the  application of  the 
concept in the prevention <;,f  discrimination. 
.  . 
• • 
, -..._. 
ECTUA  Point of  View  on  a 
European  TelecommunicatEons  Standards  Institute 
ANNE.X.  ~ 
25-11-1987 
1/2 
ECTUA,  as users association,  ::;;upport.s  th~ initiatives to  improve 
the process of standards setting in Europe.  We  believe that us-
ers'  participation  in  the process is a  positive step forward  to 
properly identify users'  requirements in the  standards area  . 
We  see ETSI  as a  positive evolut~lon of the CEPT process in setting 
up NETs. 
We  believe that CEPT  work on  functional standards has to continue 
with submission to CEN/CENELEC  for voting as  ENVs  under the cur-
rent work program of ITSTC. 
In the  short term,  we  see the  role of ETSI  as  an  efficient  NETs 
making body. 
In the  long term,  we  believe that a  European Standards  Institute 
(ESI)  should be set up  to coordin.ate  standardisation in both in-
formation technology and telecommunications  (ENs,  ENVs  and NETs). 
Wnile  recognizing that a  consensus process  (like CEN/CENELEC's  ) 
in the  approval  of standards takes more  time  than  a  voting mech-
anism,  we  believe that the  approval of standards by consensus is 
a  way  to  ensure  hiqh  quality  and  acceptability  of  them by all 
interested  parties,  including  manufacturers.  However,  taking 
into  account  the  need  for  timely  production  of  standards,  a 
carefully developed procedure of weighted majority voting appears 
to be  the most promising approach. 
9oncerning the voting, 
w~ disagree with the  CEP.T  proposal  to  assign  SO  % rights  to 
Telecommunications  Administrations,  with  the  rest  split  be-
tween users  and  industry.  This  split  will,  in  fact,  confirm 
the  dominance  of  Telecommunications  Administrations  in  the 
NETs  setting process. 
We  believe  that  linking  financial  contribution  to  voting 
rights  will  be  detrimental  for  the  users that normally have 
less financial  resources  to  'buy'  votes  than  other  dominant 
players have. 
We  will  not  object  to  an  adjustment  mechanism  that  ensures 
equal  rights  to  all  interefi!.ted  parties,  while  considering 
differences  in  financial  cap:;-:;bi li  ties  1  like  t.he  ITU  finance 
rr.ethod. 
On  the  last base,  ECTUA  is in favor  of applying voting to  the 
management  of ETSI,  to the  se·tting of priori  ties,  and  to  the 
approval  of standards producej. 25-11-1987 
2/2 
ECTUA  is  in  fnvor  of  an  efficient permanent  Secretariat.  We 
h("li(~vf'  thi~-:;  is  1-tf=:"y  t•)r  thf"  '·ll<ceDs  of  ETSI. 
We  believe  that equality of  opportunity to participate in the 
drafting of  standards  should be  offered to experts  represent-
ing users,  industry  and  A~ministrations. 
We  do not  support standards drafting by permanent or  long term 
assigned experts.Permanent  staff or  long  time  assignees  will 
lose contact with  the  continued evolution of  technology. 
We  are  in  favor  of  a  member's  contribution in terms  of peo-
ple's time,  as  a  substitute to  financial contribution. 
Adoption  of  standards 
ECTUA  believes that giving legal  force  to  approved  standards 
is  a  matter of Community  and national  legislation.  We  believe 
that a  European regulatory authority,  rather than PTTs,  should 
take  current  TRAC  responsibilities  of  giving  legal  force  to 
standards.  Users  should be  involved in this process. 
International dimension of  standards 
ECTUA  is in favor.  of European  Standards,  but  we  do  not  want 
Europe  to  take  a  divergent  path  from  the rest of the world. 
When  European  standards  are  created  separate  from  other 
standardisation  bodies,  then  it is of utmost  importance  that 
the  European  star1.dards  are  also  submitted as contributions to 
those  standardisation bodies.  Therefore  we  strongly  suggest 
ETSI  to provide  input to CCITT  and  to  ISO/IEC. 
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lntroduction 
lhe Consultative Green  Paper.  (01'.(87)290  final. ":as  pu::>lished  by  the 
European  Commission  in  Brussels  on  30  June  1987.  Its purpose  is  to  ini-
tiate a  debate  which~ recognising  the  vital contribution of  i~proved 
(uropean  te  lecorm\Unica t ions  to  the  economic  \<te l1  being of  Europe,  will 
enable  the  Commission  to consult  wid~ly and.  by  the  end  of  1987,  gener-
ate plans  for  the  achievement of:- · 
a  harmonised  and  competitive market  for  telecommunications  services 
and  equ)pment  by  the  1992  target date  for  com~letion of  the  single 
internal  community  market;  · 
a  European  telecommunication~ industry  cap~ble of  com,etin~ with  US~ 
and  Japanese  suppliers  \n  both dome$tic  and  er.port  ~arkets~ 
European  telecomnunications  infrastructures and  services  that are 
vital  to  the  achievement  of European  econOb.ic  development  and  social 
policies. 
The'Current  UY.  Environment 
The  Green  Papet·  identifies the progress  already  made  towards  a compet-
itive  telecommunications  environment  in several  member  nations, espe-
cially in the  UK;  It recognises  that the  UK  already has:-
a  liberalised and  competitive equipment  supply  ~rket (including the 
first telephone);  · 
a  competitor to  the principal  Public Telecommunications  Operator 
(PTO},  itself a  private company  rather than  a national  agency; 
a  series of General  Licences  for Value  Added  Oata  Services  (VAOS) 
and  Branch  Systems  as well  as  a  nua~er of specifically licensed net-
work  operations. 
There  are,  however,  certain key  features of  the  UK  enviro~nt which  are 
not  individually ment\oned,  but which  have  a bearing  on  the  view  to be 
t~ken of the  Green  Paper  by  any  UK  based organisation. 
The  UK  government· s  retention of  49.8~ of the  shares  of BT  until at 
le~st 1988  and  their duopoly  policy have  led to decisions  that:-
Simple  Resale  of voice  telephony  using  spare capacity on  privately 
leased network  lines is not to  be  allowed  before  1989  at the earli-
est.  --
·-
No  new  PTO  will  be  licensed to provide  basic  voice  telephony  before 
1990  in order  to give  the  newer  PTO,  Hercury  Communications  limited 
fMLt).  a  fair chance  to  establish itself. 
1  -221 We  suppo,·t  the  pro-competitive  approach  of  the  Green  Paper  and  our  com-
ments  seek  to  reinforce  this,  rather  than  to  criticise details.  We  wel-
come  the  willingness  of  the  Commission  to  consult with  users  and  with 
service  and  apparatus  suppliers  as  wel 1  as  \oti th Telecorr.nunications  Ad-
ministrations  in  fonmulating  its policies ..  ~e believe  that  the  markets 
for  tcleconmunications  service,  information  services  and  apparatus 
should  be  examined  as  a  whole.  We  also believe  that  both  the  initial 
statement and  approval  of  the  policies  and  the  subsequent  detailed de-
velopment  of  formal  proposals  to  imple.ment  them  must  be  considered care-
fully. 
Our  initial  comments  are set against each  of  the  Proposed  Positions out-




o  network  1n  rastructure 
We  accept  the  need  for  continued  privileges for  lAs  regarding  public 
network  infrastructure provision  and  operation  and  strongly support 
the  need  for safeguarding  its integrity and  financial  viability. 
However,  the definition of 'network  infrastructure'  needs  careful 
and  continuing  refinement.  We  agree  that the  situation regarding 
satellite communications  needs  further analysis  before  any  fi~ po-
sition can  be  reached. 
~cceptance of continued exclusive lrovision/special  rights  for TAs 
~?.':.~_sion of  a  1  ;cnitea ·number  o  basic services 
We  are pleased that the  Commission  has  concluded  that no  stable  'na-
tural'  boundary  is possible between  reserved and  competitive ser-
vices and  that exclusive  provision by  network  operators  must  be 
rigorously justified as  essential  to meeting  the  universal  service 
obligation.  We  agree  that voice  telephone  service is the obvious 
candidate  for  treatment as  a  'reserved service'.  It is essential 
that the  desirability, justification and  practicability of this. be 
kept  under  continuous  review  in the  light,  inter alia, of technolog-
ical  developments. 
Unrestricted provision of all other services 
In  the  area  of competitive services we  fully support  the  principle 
that  TAs  should  compete  ·on  even  terms  with other service providers. 
Fair trading conditions must  be  applied  to lAs,  other service pro-
viders  and  public and  private equipment  suppliers such  that they are 
a11  p1dced  on  the  same  footing. 
0)  Standards  for network  infrastructure and  services 
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l)  ····'"o,,,·ri  .  .:  ""'ir.:··  '·'·:;·cct; .....  c·r./361/EE.C  for  the  avoidance  of  harm 
to  the  network  and  interference  to  its users, which  must  be 
mandatory; 
2)  a  requirement  that operators of  'reserved services'  should of-
fer  those  services  in  accor·dance  with open  i nteroperabi 1  i ty 
standards but  have  the·option  to  offer them  in other ways  also~ 
3)  interoperabi 1  i ty staodar.ds  under  other  EC  legal  instruments 
which  users  can  have  the  opportunity  to  require from  their sup-
pliers, whilst retaining  the  choice  to  specify alternative re-
quirements. 
It is. agreed  that  there  is a  need  to  achieve  and  ~intain Community-
wide  interoperability of services and  tenminal  equipment.  To 
achieve  this there  is  a  need  for  harmonised  standards  for interfac-
ing  to  the services and  for attachment to  the  networks  of tenninals 
which  can  apply  those  services.  This  principle applies  in the con-
text of both  reserved and  competitive supply  of services. 
It is noted.  however,  that over-specification in general  and  in par-
ticular of attachment  requirements  adds  unnecessar.y  product costs 
and  will  inhibit innovation.  This  ~st be  avoided. 
Furthe~re, account must  be  taken of the distinction between  re-
quirements  for existing services having  an  historic installed base 
and  those  new  services where  international hanmonisation  may  be  more 
easily achieved.  In  the absence  of European  standards for access to 
these historic networks,  the publication of interface specifications 
is, of course, essential, to ensure that there is equality of oppor-
tunity in tendering for supply. 
RequireMents  for provision of competitive  services and  Directive 
on  Oe!n  Network  Provision 
While  we  welco~ the  concept of Open  Network  Provision,  we  believe 
that detailed discussions will  be  required  to  ensure  that clear and 
workable  arrangements  may  be  formulated.  ONP  covers  three broad 
areas:  technical  interfaces, tariff principles, and  usage  re-
strictions.  The  complexities of each  of these  areas alone means 
that formulation  of a  coherent set of OHP  proposals will  be  by no 
means  easy.  The  question of  ta~iff principles, for instance. will 
require careful  consideration and  balancing of potentially conflict-
ing goals, and  attempts  to reach  Europe-wide  decisions  about network 
boun~aries will  raise some  tricky problems. 
We  also draw  attention  to the  n~ed for a coherent numbering  plan and 
customer-to-network  signalling system in the  pursuit of effective 
and  economic  interoperability. 
F)  Unrestricted provision of type approved  terminal  eguipment 
We  strongly support  the open  competitive  prevision of terminal 
equipment  on  a  Commonity-wide  basis.  We  believe tnat exclusion  from 
this of  the first telephone  should  be  terminated  as  soon  as  possible 
I  '•':.  •, 
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over  other areas. 
This  Position also  requires  the  definition of  network  boundaries  for 
landline.  radio  and  satellite  transmi~~ion which  ma~imise opportu-
n  i t y  f  <> r  c  ompe t i t i v  e  p  ,. o  v  i s i on . 
G)  Separation of regulatory  and  operational  activities of  TAs 
We  support  this  Position and  its recognition  by  the  Conmission  as 
fundamental  to  achie"Jement  of  its policy objective.  It should  re-
view  its own  organisation  to  ensure effective oversight of national 
regu1atory authorities.  In  particular,  radio  frequency  spectrum 
planning activities should  be  done  on  a  European  basis,  not  in  the 
present  fragmentary  way. 
H)  and  1)  Strict continuous  review  of commercial  activities of 
TAs  and  frivate  providers under  appropriate provisions of the 
Treaty o  Rome 
We  agree  that the  relevant provisions of the  Treaty should be  fully 
applied  to  both  public and  private network  operators.  The  question 
of enforcement  needs  some  consideration.  It is essential  that mech-
anisms  are established at the  Community  level  to ensure  that both 
the  full  intent of the  policies and  their timescales  are met  by all 
Member  Governments.  The  functional  separation proposed  in G)  will 
necessitate institutional  change  in some  Member  States and  this 
should  be  carried out with a  view  to safeguarding  competition in a 
European,  not just national, context. 
We  note  that UK  experience has  shown  that it is not  practicable to 
codify,  for example,  precisely what  cross-subsidisation is unfair, 
so  that judgement  is needed  to  implement  this policy and  it can only 
be  exercised by  the separate regulatory authorities envisaged by the 
previous  position.  An  essential  feature of this  UK  experience  is the 
need  for  financial  separation of business  areas  ~ithin T~  and  con-
tinuing  transparency, at least to the  regulatory authorities. 
J)  App1ication of the Community's  common  commercial  policy 
We  recognise  the  desirability for Europe  to present a  strong and  co-
herent front in international  negotiations and  believe that this can 
best be  achieved  ~hrough a  continuous  process of consultation and 
negotiation;  this will  doubtless  be  facilitated by gradual  implemen-
tation of the  various  aspects of Community  telecommunications  pol-
icy.  However.  this should at present be  without  prejudice to the 
rights of Member  Governments  to argue  their separate  positions 
forcefully  in  international  organisations if consensus  is not 
achieved  in Community  negotiations.  Moreover.  all  telecommuni-
cations operators.  including TA's,  should be  free  to make  contracts 
outside  the Community  as  they  see fit, subject to existing require-





~e refer below  to a  few  other  issues  of concern  in  the  Green  Paper  which 
are  not  specifically addressed  in  the  above  Proposed  Positions.  We  will 
a1so  comment  separately on  the  proposed  creation of a  European  Telecom-
munications  Standards  Institute - a  proposal  we  welcome  with  the quali-
fication  that its status,  role,  tenms  of reference  and  management 
structure need  careful  study and  that it should.  within a  reasonably 
short  timescale.  become  independent of any  one  existing body. 
The  Network  Boundary 
The  first issue  to be  resolved  in  progressing  towards  a  Oirective on 
open  network  provision  is the  definition of  the  boundary  of  the  network. 
particularly in  the  context of digital  technology.  If liberalisation of 
the  supply of tenminal  equipment  is  to  be  meaningful  it is crucial  that 
the  boundary  be  defined so  that the  network  includes  only  the  minimum 
amount  of equipment  on  customer  premises.  This  equipment  should be  suf-
ficient  to  allo~ operators  to  terminate  and  test their networks  and  to 
enable  them  to protect their networks  from  all connected apparatus which 
complies with generally applicable electrical  safety requirements.  Such 
a definition will  make  clear the distinction between  te~inal equipment, 
which  is open  to competitive supply,  installation and  maintenance~ and 
network  equipment.  Tenminal  equipment would  be  subject to mandatory 
standards  for attachment;  networks,  not governed  by  these  standards, 
would  be  intended  to be  subject to an  appropriate Directive on  interface 
standards  to reflect the Open  Network  Provision concept. 
The  Commission  should urgently initiate a study of this matter with the 
full  participation of all  interested parties.  Its aim  should be  to de-
velop an  initial definition of the Network  TenMination  Point (HTP)  of a 
digital  network  and  to agree the principles by  which  future redefi-
nitions can  be  evolved  as  technology  progresses. 
~lternative Infrastructure - Cable  and  Radio 
The  Green  Paper  is unclear as to the  future status of local  cable  sys-
tems  and  responsibility for their infrastructure.  In  the  UK,  local  area 
cable systems  are developing without making  the  full  investment required 
to satisfy basic telecommunications  needs  and  thus  the implications.of 
integrating such  systems  into a  national  telecommunication  service. 
furthermore,  many  private radio networks  already extst and  intercon-
nection of these with national  telecommunications  networks  must  be  con-
sidered. 
To  enable such  systems  to be  fully  integrated into a  national  switched 
network,  due  regard needs  to be  taken of several  factors  including 
transmission  perfonmance  and  numbering  plans.  The  impact  that such  sys-
tems  could have  in Europe  needs  further study  because  such  systems,  if 
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. ln  the  context of  drafting  the  Directive  on  Open  Network  Provision  the 
Commission  should  recognise  the  need  for  coherent  attention  to  adequate 
availabil)ty of  radio  frequency  spectrum  and  planning  of  its allocation. 
A broad  long-tcnm  study  is  needed  to  ta~e account  of at  least  trunk  ra-
dio  systems,  pan-European  cellular mobile  services,  paging  and  messaging 
services,  cordless  telephones,  universal  personal  communicators,  radio 
local  area  networks,  satellite services  and  rural  radio  services. 
User  Orientation 
~e think it important  that more  should  be  done  to  identify user demand 
for  new  developments  such  as  ISON  and  Integrated  Broadband  Communi-
cations,  so  that  there  is commercial  as  well  as  technological  momentum 
for speedier progress.  There  should  similarly be  more  emphasis  on  the 
development  of Europe-wide  services on  encouraging  not only the Adminis-
trations but many  other entrepreneurs  to  provide  services which  are ei-
ther being  requested  now  by  users  or for which  infonmation  providers  and 
others  foresee opportunities to satisfy user needs. 
Open  Markets 
1)  \H thin the  ColmlUni ty 
There  is a  risk that, as  liberalisation proceeds  at a  different pace 
in each  member  country. especially as  regards  allowing more  competi-
tion in providing basic as well  as  value  added  services,  the equip-
ment  suppliers in the more  liberalised countries could be  at a 
disadvantage.  This  would  occur if competing  operators  in those 
countries chose  their suppliers on  purely commercial  cr;teria 
whereas  Administrations  in other countries  took  national  origin into 
account  in their sourcing.  As  the  Community  aims  to create an  open 
market  in Europe  for equipment  and  services.  we  consider that no 
supplier within the  Community  should  be  denied  the opportunity to 
participate in the market  for equipment  and  services,  including sup-
ply  to TAs.  The  Commission  should  ensure  that this ~-rket is both 
open  and  fair. 
2.  Worldwide 
UK  experience  has  shown  that the  very act of creating an  openly  com-
petitive, coherent market  makes  that market  more  vulnerable to  im-
port penetration, especially during  the  transitional  phase. 
However,  we  do  not wish  to press for restrictions  in international 
trade agreements  to provide  protection.  Actual  abuses of those 
agreements  should  be  disallowed.  At  the  same  ti~, the whole  Commu-
nity should  press vigorously for removal  of restrictions  by  our 
international  competitors  on  access  to their internal markets.  Some 
means  of achieving concrete  reciprocity must  be  sought as  a counter-
balance  to  opening  European  markets  to  competition  from  outside. 
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Conclusion 
Change  is desirable and  inevitable and  it requires  greater  regu~a~ory 
coherence  throughout  the  Community.  Separate  regulatory authortttes are 
required  in each  country where  they  do  not already exist,_but as  far as 
possible existing mechanisms  should  b~ used  at the  Commun1ty  level.  lf 
any  new  institution is  to be  created lt should  be  pan-European  and  not 
confined  to  the Community. 
Any  changes  need  to  be  carefully co:ordinated  sin~e their purposes and 
effects are  interdependent.  As  a  St~le b~t cruc1al  exampl~,  t~e ~b­
sence  of suitable standards at the rtght ttme  would  be  a  maJOr  lmped-
iment  to progress. in other areas.  Also,  failure to find effective 
solutions  to  problems  in  the-·are-a  of copyright/IPR,  fraud  and  security 
will  inhibit or retard the growth  of services and  diminish their overall 
economic  effect. 
Thus,  a  fully timed  implementation plan  needs  to be  evolved  which  takes 
account of both  the further  pre~aratory work  needed  and  the  inter-
dependencies of the changes  to be  made. 
These  changes  need  to be  introduced in an  evolutionary and  ~11 under-
stood manner  so as not to create a destabilised situation, even  on  a 
temporary  basis.  Such  a  situation would  not only  i~ede the proper de-
velopment  of telecommunications  in the Community  but could also threaten 
the survival  of important elements of manufacturing  industry which  have 
such  a  vital contribution to make. 
After reviewing  all the  responses  it receives.  we  hope  the  Commission 
will  next produce  at the  same  time  drafts of all its intended sub-
missions  to  the Council  and  a  timetable for their phased  implementation 
before  proceeding with any  executive action. 
Z8  August  1987 
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THE  DEPUTY  SECRETARY-GENERAL  BOJ  13/88 
3  February  1988 
EC  Green Paper  on telecommunications 
Dear  Mr.  Carpentier, 
I  have  been  asked to  inform you  about  the  preliminary 
reactions  of  EFTA  countries to the  EC  Commission's  Green 
Paper  on  the  Development  of the  Common  Market  for 
Telecommunications  Services  and  Equipment. 
The  Green  Paper  has  been  received  and  studied  by 
relevant  circles  in  EFTA  countries with great  interest. 
Particular attention has  been given to  section IX:3.1  of 
the paper  concerning  the  Community's  relations  with  EFTA 
countries  in the field of  telecommunications. 
During  the first  round  of discussions  on  the  Green 
Paper  within the  competent  EFTA  bodies  it was  generally 
agreed that co-operation  between the  EC  and  EFTA  countries 
in telecommunications  should  be  further  developed  as  a  part 
of  the creation of  a  dynamic  European  economic  space  as  · 
defined  in the  Luxembourg  Declaration.  The  EFTA  countries, 
noted  that  in  many  areas  covered  in the  Green  Paper  common 
efforts are  already  undertaken  in the  framework  of  CEPT, 
CEN-CENELEC,  the  RACE  programme  and  other  research  and 
development  programmes.  In addition  such  fields  as 
co-operation  on  standards  and  mutual  recognition of tests 
and  certificates,  public  procurement  and  application of 
telecommunication technologies  in trade  facilitation 
already  form  part of the  follow-up  of the  Luxembourg 
Declaration.  The  EFTA  countries  fe·el  that the  initiative 
taken  by  the  EC  Commission  provides  an  opportunity to 
intensify co-oper  at  ion  in these  a.r·eas. 
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Besides  developing  current co-operation  EFTA  countries 
are  also  interested  in  examining  on  which  other 
telecommunication-related  issues  the  EC  and  EFTA  countries 
could start a  search  for  common  or  parallel solutions. 
Internal discussions  in  EFTA  on  this question have  been 
started and  we  expect to  be  in  a  position to give  you  more 
information  about  the  EFTA  views  during  the  coming  months. 
Yours  sincerely, 
Bern  Olof  Johansson 




December  17,  1987 
ERT  ANSWER  TO  EEC  COMMISSION  ON  "GREEN  PAPER  ON  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF 
THE  COMMON  MARKET  FOR  TELECOMMUNICATION  SERVICES  AND  EQUIPMENT .. 
The  RoundTable  of  European  Industrialists  {ERT)  welcomes  the  "Green 
Paper  on  the  Development  of  the  Co~non Market  for  Telecommunication 
Services  and  Equipment"  issued  by  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Comunities. 
The  unification of  telecommunication  services  throughout  Europe  is  a 
fundamental  part  of  the  effort  oriented  to  the  European  market 
integration expected  for  1992. 
The  RoundTable  of  European  Industrialists  has  already  expressed  its 
opinion  through  the  paper  "Clearing  the  Lines.  A  users•view  on 
Business  Communications  in  Europe"  published  in  1986. 
Many  of  the  problems  indicated  in  the  ERT  paper  are  taken  into 
consideration  by  the Green  Paper. 
The  competitiveness  of  the  European  industrial  companies  is  today 
strongly  dependent  on  the  possi bi 1  i ty  to  have  cheap  and  advanced 
communication  services throughout  Europe. 
The  ERT  recommends  the  Commission  to  do  all  efforts  in  order  to 
achieve  the  objective  of  accelerate  the  process  of  unification  and 
innovation  of  the  European  communication  services  required  by  the 
European  users. 
For  this  purpose  the  Commission  should  ask  the  European  users  to 
participate to the preparation of  future  activity and  programs  on  the 
subject. 
As  far  as  the  proposal  to  establish  a  European  Telecommunication 
Standards  Institution,  the  ERT  welcomes  the  initiative  and  believes 
that  such  institute should  be  established  with  the  participation  of 
CEPT,  users  and  industry  and  should  evolve  into  an  overall  institute 
for  information  technology  standards. 
For  what  regards  the concept  of  basic  services  to  be  reserved  to the 
Telecommunication  Administration  it  should  be  considered  the  efects 
of  technological  evolution  that  are  drastically  changing  the 
traditional  separation  of  voice  and  data  services. 
An  example:  network  management  is provided  by  software  running  in the 
users  computers.  Therefore  shou 1  d  the  business  users  be  a  11 owed  to 
multiplex  voice  and  data  in  their  private  networks  to  achieve  the 
best  resource  utilization,  this  wi 11  benefit  both  users  and 
infrastructure  providers  by  minimizing  investments.  This  means  that 
voice  services  should  not  be  basic  services  towards  business  users. 
The  European  users  have  to  take  full  advantage  of  1  i bera 1  i sat  ion 
policies  in  the  area  of  VAN/VAS,  that  can  adopt  common  rules  at 
European  level. 
The  ERT  fundamentally  agrees  on  the  necessity of  a  separation  between 
regulations  and  operation  activities  by  Telecommunication 
Administrations. 
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presented  by  Gunter  A.  PAULI 
CEO,  European  Service  Industries  Forum 
European  Parliament 
Brussels,  04.12.1987 
1.  The  debate  on  telecommunication  policies  should  not  focus  on 
priv atisation  versus  public  ownership  and  monopoly.  The  real  key  issue  is 
flexible  access  to  cost  efficient  telecommunication  services.  The  Scandinavian 
PTT's  offer  the  widest  and  the  most  cost  efficient  telecom  services  to  business, 
even  when  operating  under  a  socialist  government,  with  a  monopoly  status. 
Six  years  of  a  rather  liberal  coalition  in  the  Belgian  government  has  not  done 
much  to  improve  efficiency  and  flexibility. 
2.  When  discussing  telecom  policies  for  Europe,  the  importance  of  telecom 
and  computers  for  small  and  medium  sized  companies  must  be  taken  into 
account.  Indeed,  the  second  largest  cost  for  all  companies,  active  in  new  and 
tradeable  services  is  precisely  computer  and  communication.  Since  two  thirds 
of  all  new  employment  in  Europe  has  in  recent  years  been  created  in 
companies  with  less  than  20  persons  on  the  payroll,  the  policies  must  be 
geared  towards  their  needs.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  interests  of  the  large 
users  and  the  manufacturers  must  be  neglected,  but  it  does  indicate  that  the 
debate  which  is  dominated  today  by  these  two  interest  groups  does  not  take  into 
account  the  complete  picture  of the  needs  of all  business  services  . 
1  :  .~ 
3.  Telecommunications  cannot  be  · seperated  from  computer  technology 
and  home  electronics  ..  It  is  the  merger  between  the  three  that  ·.  will }provide  'an 
appropriate  new  infrastructure  for  our.  economy.  Therefore,  ,. ...  the  debate·  on  the 
green  paper  on  telecom ·  ..  should  ... not  neglec~  the  ·.convergence·  with·.:::other  · 
technologies.  Even ~IBM could! noF::.on-'. its  :.:oWn~:  ..  integrate:~~  .. telecom  ·· ..  techno~9gies 
and  know-how  and;, had .  to: .  purchase·~~  Rolni ::.and  ·· ·MCI ·in · order  to  have  access  to· 
this  complementacy\, 1:-kn~w-how. ·.  ~c;>~i::('cqul,d  .the  ·PTT'~  ·preteAd  ·to··. provide  -.ihe 
needed  telecom  ·services;· without  ,i  .  .'st:fateg~~;  ~ll~ances  w.ith ··. ·  indllstry.  Telcfon1.ca· 
in  Spain,  a  cou~~  ~led  ·I. by.< a  ~~~ialist  government,  'has.  p11rsued  ·the.  .most· 
dynamic  policies.· · ·  .'  ··. Y ·  ·  ·  ·~··  ..  · 
4.  The  debate  on  leased  lines  is  wrongly  focussed.  We  are  here  confronted 
with  an  enormous .. V{aste  in  telecom · history.  Thousands  of  leased  lines  are · only 
·:  used  'for  ari ·  ·  average•4~ours~  ,;day~cau~e~law$:~prohibit:~~~)-esale~f~~s\ 
unused  infrastructure.  In  a  period  of  austerity·  there  is  an  urgent  need  to  fmd 
way  to  stimulate  a  much  more  intensive  use  of leased  lines.  This  would  first  of 
all  benefit  the  small  and  medium  sized  CO;D;Jpanies.  France  has  taken  .steps .. Yl.-
permi t  the  resale  of  excess  leased  line .  capacity  on  the,.' coridition·::'that  ·:;·the.·.~,pa:rv·: 
of  the  invoice  covering  telecom  costs  does  not ~exceed.,  ~~.%J!.,.p.~"·;~~:: .t~t.~~.J.i:it~!.~~~. 
85%  will  be  value  added  services  .. offered  .. by. ".;,matnly.::;,.the·  ·:compu~~r. 
infrastructure  of  the  reseller.  ·  .. ,  ··  ,.  · ·  ·· · 
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'l 5.  Large  companies  can  easily  afford  the  installation  of  a  custom  tailored 
computer  and  tclecom  infrastructure.  In  the  industrial  sector,  expensive 
mfrastructural  n~.~eds  C!innot  be  made  3vailab1e  throughout  the  whole  country. 
Hence  a  need  for  the  development  of  industrial  zones  which  offer  a  highly 
flexible  and  sophisticated  infrastructure  for  industry  likewise  in  order  to 
serve  the  needs  of  service  companies  mainly  of  small  upcoming  service  firms 
which  can  quickly  emerge  as  major  generators  of  employment  and  trade, 
Europe  will  have  to  install  service  parks.  This  concept  has  found  its  first 
partial  applications  in  France  and  in  Belgium,  although  a  series  of  rules  and 
regulations  still  block  their  full  operation.  Therefore,  ESIF  proposes  that  the 
reregulation  of  the  telecoms  be  in  the  first  place  applied  to  those  service 
parks.  This  would  have  an  immediate  impact  on  the  competitivity  of  service 
companies  and  offer  an  excellent  test-case  for  further  applications,  nation-
and  European  wide. 
6.  Europe  has  finally  decided  on  a  common  standard  for  mobile 
communications  which  will  start  to  be  operational  from  1993.  This  is  a  major 
step  forward,  but  in  the  meantime,  business  will  suffer  from  this  long  delay. 
Meanwhile  the  unified  Scandinavian  system  with  450.000  users  is 
transfonning  the  way  small  companie-s  do  business,  both  in  their  home  market 
and  abroad. 
7.  Europe  should  note  that  it  is  not  only  limiting  the  compeuuveness  of 
European  companies  by  its  long  and  difficult  telecom  integration,  but  that  it  is 
also  losing  out  to  the  Japanese  who  have  formed  NTT  International,  a 
consortium  of  fourteen  companies,  lead  by  NTT,  but  combined  with 
engineering.  computer,  trading  and  software  companies,  ready  to  supply 
complete  systems  to  third  world  countries.  The  first  contracts  with  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  and  Bmnei  have  already  been  signed"  , 
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Mr.  M.  Carpentier  Keerbergen,  October  12,  1987 
Director  General  DG  XIII 
Telecommunications.  Information 
industries  and  innovation 
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Dear  Mr.  Carpentier, 
Attr  .. 
Info. 11C:. - t:- -€  3  -
L  (/-X 
I  write  to  you  in  my  capacity  of chairman  of the 
European  Service  Industries  Forum.:  ESIF  set  up  in  January  1986.  brings 
together  a  group  of  leading  and  performing  service  companies  with  the  broad 
objective  of  creating  a"  service  friendly  policy  environment".  ESIF's 
credibility  and  legitimacy  stems  frbm  the  success  of  its  twenty  three  members 
on  the  market.  You  were  kind  en,ough  to  address  our  audience  at  the  Eurol-'ean 
Service  Symposium  held  in  Brussels  last  year. 
ESIF  has  studied  the  Green  Paper  of the  Commission 
and  considers  that  it  is  a  highly  'Valuable  contribution  towards  the 
development  of  the  EC  market  for  telecommunications  and  services  which  it 
wholeheartedly  supports.  It  fully  ~hares  the  assertion  in  the  Green  Paper  that 
telecommunications  -and  notably  high  value  added  and  information  services-
h~.ve  a  majo:r  impact  on  the  competitiveness  and  tradeability  of  services  in 
general  as  well  as  on  the  location of service  activities.  If Europe  is  to 
vigorously  develop  its  service  industries  it  must  enjoy  an  adequate  and 
efficient  telecommunications  infrastructure.  The  strategic  importance  of 
telecommunication  services  is  underlined  by  the  fact  that  the  second  most 
important  cost  in  all  new  services  companies  are · telecommuqications  and 
computer  related.  ·  · 
Whilst  ESIF  welcomes  the  detailed  proposals  of  the 
Commission  wirh  respect  to  telecommunications,  it  wishes  to  emphasize  in 
particular  the  key  role  of tariff policies  of the  PTTs.  For  its  part  it  is_  in  favor  of 
expanding  competition  by  authorising,  on  grounds  of  efficiency,  resale  on 
international  private  leased  lines  so  as  to  bring  prices  more  in  line  with 
costs.  This  is  of  particular  importance  for  small  and  medium  service 
enterprises.  -These  are  precisely  the  firms  whicb  are  creating  many  new 
employment  opportunities  and  which  have  a  limited  mobility  and  investment 
capacity  com;:>ared  tot .  ~arger  service  companies. 
.  ..~  . 
With  respect  to  mobile  communications.  ESIF  rcgrers 
t~e  slow  .. p,ace  of  progress  towards  Community-wide  compatibility.  The 
Scandin~y.(an  countries  already  have  an  impressive  headstart  in  this  part  of 
the  telti:b'h1  business  and  their  new  service  companies  are  bound  to  enhance  a 
competitive  advance  until  the  introduction  of  public  digital  mobile 
communications  at  the  EEC  wide  leveL 
_·:·::::-:··:-..:;:  ::  :.:  <:~:~  "\e£:-rberg8n  ·Belgium· Tel.  (32 15)517080. Tlx  65525 
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To  the  anc:ntion  of Mr.  M.  Carpentier  12.10.1987 
As ·-regards 'Videotex,  compatibility  must  be 
vigorously  plmiUCd  between  the.  various  ·national· systems  which  are  already  in 
operation. ·and  Buropcan ·wide · standards· need  to  be  developped·  without  further 
delay..  The ~blc  .breakthrough.: of·. some  of  the~c ·networks  such  as 
France's <MiDitcJ..,· ·.makes  this :all · the ·more· important..  · : Minitcl  is  the  first  proven 
success :-~bing:.  2.s  milUon 'homes,' .offering  by  now  3,000  services  of. which 
95CJ,  did DOl 'even exist 3  :y~  ago.  ;  . 
.  - -~·.  ~  .... 
~ ·  :  ESIF  urges  the  Commission  to  impress  on  the 
Member  States  the  vital  need  for  speedy  action  in  the  direction  suggested. 
its  pan it will ·  c:on.tribute  to  the  best  of its  ability  to  convince  the  Member 
States  Governments  rapidly  to  introduce  the  necessary  changes  in  their 
regulatory  systems_ 
For 
ESIF. would  welcome  an  opponunity  to  be  invited  to  a 
hearing  With  the  services  of the  Commission  with  a  view  to  engaging  in  a 
mutually  advantageous  dialogue. 
Yours  Truly, 
Bessel  Kok 
President  BSIF 
cm.s;.w  .I.F.T  . 
<f·"· ~:\~ 
~  Gunter  A.  Pauli 
.  '\"" CEOESIF 




Com.on  Position Paper of the Round  Table Ca.panies 
to the CEC  •Green  Paper"  on  Telecommunications 
The  twelve  companies  of  the  Round  Table  on  Information  Tech-
nologies  and  Telecommunications  welcome  the  initiative  the 
"  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  has  taken  for  the 
strengthening  of  European  Telecommunications  by  presenting 
its  "Green  Paper  on  the  Development  of the  Common  Market  for 
Telecommunications  Services  and  Equipment"  (Document 
XIII/197(87)).  It  will  contribute  significantly  to  the  de-
velopment  of a  strong coordinated  European  policy. 
The  Twelve  agree  that the  fast  evolution  not  only  of techno-
logy,  but  even  more  of  services,  the  convergence  of telecom-
munication  and  data  processing  and  the  increasing  importance 
of  telecommunications  for  the  economy  in  Europe  and  in  the 
world  necessitate  an  appropriate  development  and  adaptation 
of  the  structures  presently  existing  in  Europe.  They  agree 
in  particular  that  the  status  of  the  Teleco11111unications  Ad-
ministrations  in  Europe  has  to  be  developed  with  two  ob-
jectives in mind: 
1.  The  early availability of the  competitively  supplied ser-
vices that European  users will require  and 
2.  The  creation of the best environment  for the European  te-
lecommunications  industry to strengthen its position and 
competitiveness both  in  Europe  and  worldwide. 
The  Twelve  have  thoroughly  examined  the  general  and  the  spe-
cific  propositions  the  Commission  has  laid  down  in  its 
"Green  Paper"  document. 
·- Whilst  fully  supporting  its  general  orientation,  the  Twelve 
want  to  stress  that  a  considerable  amount  of  detailed  work 
will  have  to  be  done  in  order  to  elaborate  the  best  approa-
ches  in  the  different  areas  the  Green  Paper  has  identified. 
The  Twelve  hold  themselves  ready  to  participate  fully  in 
such  work. 
The  general  comments  the  Round  Table  of the  Twelve  offers  at 
this stage are summarised  hereafter. 
They  refer to  Figure  3  on  pages  022  to  025  ("Proposed  Posi-
tions")  of the Green  Paper·s Summary  Report. 
Additionally,  the  Twelve  have  commented  on  the  proposal  to 
establish  a  European  Telecommunications  Standards  Institute. 




To  A:  "Network  Infrastructure" 
The  Green  Paper  proposes  the  acceptance  of  continued  exclu-
sive  provision  of  special  rights  for  the  Telecommunications 
Administrations  regarding  provision  and  operation  of  the 
network  infrastructure. 
The  Twelve  can  accept  the  general  concept  of  this  paragraph 
provided  the  special  privileges  of  the  Telecommunications 
Administrations  are  counterbalanced  by  certain  defined  obli-
gations for 
- overall network  availability and  reliability at reasona-
ble  competitive cost 
- Europe-wide  network  compatibility and  coherence 
- public  network  integrity. 
Wherever  Administrations  retain  special  privileges  in  re-
spect  of  network  infrastructure,  the  Twelve  question whether 
the  Administrations  should  be  permitted  to  manufacture  and 
supply  network  equipment  or  terminals  without  re-
striction.  The  Twelve  suggest  that  to  prevent  unfair  dis-
crimination,  participation of  industry  should  be  secured 
1.  in  the  setting  of  standards  in  Europe  for  terminals  and 
attachments 
2.  in  defining  and  planning  main  functions  and  concepts  of 
telecommunications  infrastructure and  equipment. 
Additionally,  provisions  should  be  enacted that would  prevent 
the  cross-subsidisation of  "competitive services"  by  "privi-
lege  (restricted)  services". 
This  will  enable  industry  to  plan  new  products  and  services 
and  to compete  effectively on  a  worldwide  scale. 
As  far  as  two-way  satellite  communications  are  concerned, 
the  Twelve  do  not  support  the  idea  of  case-to-case  conside-
rations  since· this  would  create  uncertainty.  They  would 
strongly  recommend  consistent  basic  rules  in  this  field, 
based  on  further  clarification  of  the  general  understand-
lng  and  content  of  the  "network  infrastructure"  and  its re-
lationship  with  other  adjacent  infrastructures  such  as  local 
cable  and  cellular mobile  radio. • 
-· 
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To  8:  "Reserved  Services" 
Th~  Green  Paper  proposes  acceptance  of  continued  exclusive 
provision  or  special rights  for  the  Telecommunications  Admi-
nistrations  regarding  provision  of  a  limited  number  of basic 
services. 
Here  the  general  approach  is  acceptable  to  the  Twelve  on 
condition  that  a  stable  and  simple  definition  of  what  is a 
"basic  service"  will  be  worked  out.  We  suggest  that  this 
should  be  done  by  a  suitably  independent  authority  and  that 
as  a  principle the  Administrations'  special rights  s~ould be 
limited to the services so.defined. 
The  Twelve  acknowledge,  however,  that  for  economic  and  so-
cial  reasons,  the  "voice  telephone  service"  is  an  obvious 
candidate for  inclusion in the basic services. 
The  general  concept  of  a  continued  exclusive  prov1s1.on  or 
special rights for the Telecommunications  Administrations re-
garding  a  limited  number  of  "basic  services"  is  acceptable 
as  an  interim  solution  to  be  reviewed  as  it becomes  increa-
singly  impractical  to distinguish  voice  and  data  in the  ISDN 
narrowband  and  broadband  environment. 
To  C,  D,  E:  "Competitive  Services" 
The  Green  Paper  proposes  the  free  (unrestricted)  prov1s1.on 
of  all  other  services  ("competitive  services",  including  in 
particular  "value-added  services")  within  Member  States  and 
betv;een  Member  States  (in .competition  with  the  Telecommuni-
cations  Administrations)  for  own  use,  shared  use,  or  provi-
sion to third parties. 
This  paper  treats  the  paragraphs  C,  0  and  E  as  one  single 
subject.  The  Twelve  understand  "competitive  services"  to  be 
all services except those  defined  under  B. 
The  Twelve  conceptionally  agree  with  an  unrestricted  and 
fair  provision  of  competitive  services,  but  again  underline 
that  an  enormous  work  is still necessary  in  order  to  define 
details  and  - especially  concerning  a  European  concept  of 
Open  Network  Provision  - to fill out  the  necessary  regulato-
ry  framework. 
239 It  is  industry· s  view  that  the  success  of  all  value-added 
services  strongly  depends  on  fast  and  unambiguous  standardi-
sation  throughout  Europe  at  an  international  level  to  which 
the  twelve  companies  are  pleased  to  contribute  through  their 
joint efforts  in  SPAG  Services. 
European  Industry  and  Commerce  must  seek  to  take  full  ad-
vantage  in the field of  VAN/VAS  of possible liberalisation in 
Europe.  But  it is a  strong requirement to adopt  a  common  po-
licy  and  common  rules  and  regulations  in  all  E~ropean 
countries. 
With  that  as  an  objective,  the  strategy  must  be  to  en-
sure the.  possibility to  configure multi  vendor  networks,  by  an 
appropriate  standardization  policy,  in  the  direct  con-
tinuation of the present  EEC  strategy. 
To  the  extent.  pos.sible  all  VAN/VAS  should  conform  to  open 
systems  standards  (functional  standards)  as  EN/ENV  and/or 
ISPs  (International  Standardized  Profiles)  as  sooiJ  as  they 
exist. 
Steps  should  be  established  in  liaison  between  all  parties 
involved  in  order  to  permit  faster  processing  of  standards, 
otherwise  the  conformance  clauses  to  open  system  standards 
will  have  no  meaning. 
Open  Network  Provision  (ONP)  raises  major  issues  which  the 
Twelve  suggest  require  further  study  and  agreement  between 
all interested parties. 
The  minimization  and  equalisation  to  the  extent  possible  of 
tariffs for  infrastructure services all over  Europe  is a  key 
to the success  of European  VAN/VAS. 
To  F:  "Terminals" 
The  Green  Paper  proposes  the  free  (unrestricted)  prov1s1on 
of  terminal  equipment  within  Member  States  and  between  Mem-
ber  States  (in  competition  with  Telecommunications  Admini-
strations),  subject  to  type  approval  as  compatible  with 
Treaty  obligations  and  existing  directives.  Provision  of the 
first  (conventional)  telephone  set  could  be  excluded  from 
unrestricted provision on  a  temporary  basis. 
Industry  agrees  with  the  general  approach  of  this  position, 
but  has  considPrable  doubts  about  the  justification for  ex-
clusion  of  the  first  telephone  set  and  the  competitive  ad-
vantage  this would  give  the Administrations. 
If  the  Telecommunications  Administrations  compete  on  the 
market  as  terminal  equipment  suppliers,  fair  competition must 
be  guaJ. ont~ed  (e.g.  no  cross-subsidising,  transparent 
commercial  separation  of  monopoly  and  competitive  activi-
ties) . 
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The  necessity  of  the  implementation  of  common  interfaces  and 
connectivity throughout  Europe  is underlined for all types of 
networks. 
To  ensure  fair  competition  and  to  protect  users it will  also 
be  necessary that individual Member  States are not  allowed  to 
interpret  and  apply  common  standards  and  type  approval  pro-
cedures more  liberally than other Member  States. 
To  G:  "Separation of Regulatory  and  Operational Activities" 
The  Green  Paper  proposes  the  separation  of  regulatory  and 
operational  activities  of  Telecommunications  Administrati-
ons. 
Industry  fully  supports this separation  and  sees  the  need  of 
evolving  a  harmonised,  positive  ruling  for  the  different 
regulatory  activities,  including  independent  standards  set-
ting arrangements  at a  European  level. 
To  H:  "Review  of Telecommunications  Administrations" 
The  Green  Paper  proposes  strict  continuous  review  of  opera-
tional  (commercial)  activities of  Telecommunications  Admini-
strations in the context of European  competition  law. 
The  Twelve  feel  that,  in  order  to  ensure  fair  competition, 
Administrations  should  separate provision of the network  and 
of  basic  services  from  the  supply  of equipment  and  of other 
services which  may  be  procured  on  a  competitive basis. 
To  I  and  J:  "Competitive  Rules"  and  "Commercial  Policy" 
The  Green  Paper  proposes  the strict continuous  review of all 
private  providers  in  the  newly  opened  sectors  and  the  full 
application  of  the  Community's  common  commercial  policy  to 
telecommunications. 
The  Twelve  suggest  the  paper  should  explicitly  mention  that 
free  competition  must  also  be  guaranteed  for  installation 
and  maintenan9e  of terminal apparatus. 
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Conclvsion 
Though  the  "Green  Papern  possibly  raises  more  questions  than 
it answers,  the  Twelve  agree  to  the  document  as  an  important 
contribution on  the subject. 
However,  an  enormous  amount  of clarification work  remains  to 
be  done  including  a  detailed  implementation  plan.  It is re-
commended  that  the  final  document  should  also  propose  a 
planned  timescale for an  orderly  phased transition. 
Industry  requires  to  participate  in  the  various  phases  of 
forthcoming  \oJOrks  with  the  support  of  their  competence  as 
suppliers of  equipment  to the  business  community  and  to  the 
PTTs  on  one  side  and  as  users  of  Information  Technology  on 
the other side. .... 
7 
ANNEX 
European  Telecommunications  Standards Institute 
The  Twelve  have  considered  the  proposal to  establish a  Euro-
pean  Telecommunications  Standards Institute,  and  welcome  this 
initiative. 
The  Twelve  believe  that  this  Institute  should  be  estab-
lished  with  the  participation  of  CEPT,  users  and  industry. 
To  accelerate  its  procedures,  it  is  felt  that  decisions 
should  be  achieved  using  a  weighted  voting  principle. 
Furthermore,  the  Twelve  suggest  that  the  voting  structure 
should  be  such  that  it shows  emphasis  towards  the  views  of 
the  Public  Network  Operators  in  respect of the  definition  of 
the  network  infrastructure,  and  towards  the  views  of  users 
and  suppliers in respect of attachments to the  network. 
The  Twelve  recognize  the  need  for  an  as-yet-unidentified 
authority  that  determines  the  terms  of reference,  and  other-
wise  monitors  the performance  of,  the  new  institute. 
To  ensure  fair  competition  between  public  and  private  orga-
nisations,  the  Twelve  give  importance  to the  involvement  of 
the  CEC' s  Directorate-General  IV,  at  least  in  the  policy 
aspects  of  those  parts  of  the  standardisation  process  that 
have  an  influence  on  the  competitive  supply  of  products  and 
services. 
The  European  Telecommunications  Standards  Institute  should 
take  into  account  the  guidelines  on  standards  defined  by  the 
Commission  of the European  Communities. 
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SUBJECT:  ANSWER  TO  VICE-PRESIDENT  K.H.NARJES 
ON  rlfS~-WUESTWNS CONCERNING  ·sTANDA-RDIZATION 
1.  Introduction 
Standardization  policy  questions  were  presented  during  the Round  Table 
meeting  of 22nd  of June  1n  EEC  document  5684  of June  4,  1987,  and  sum-
marized  in  President  Karl-Heinz  Narjes·  telex  following  this meeting. 
The  question  concerned  the  commitment  of greater industrial resources 
in  the  accep·i:ance  procedures,  the  strengthening  o:f  standardization 
aspects  in  the  major  community  R and  0  programmes  and  the use of stan-
dards  in application  as  well  as  operating systems. 
Answerc  to these  questions will  De  related to OSI  standards. 
As  1ndicated  2.:1  ·~:he  referenced  paper;  the  support  of  industry  to  -che 
EEC  policy  is  ~ithout reservation. 
2.  Commitment.  ::Jf  lr·este:.~  industrial  n:::sou:rces 
- --·--·-"-----"""----~·-----
2. 1.  Preembh'i: 
There  are  curren~ly three  princ1p1e  regionsl  initiatives dealing 
w1th  Functional  standards/profiles.  These  are  centred  in  Europe, 
Japan  and  the  USA.  A mechanism  for  harmonizing  the  activities of 
these  groupings  leading  to  ISO  endorsee  International  Stan-
dardized Profilas  (ISP),  is being  established. 
The  p:rincip1e  European  ini  ti.ative  ~o.ras  established  by  SPAG  (an 
activity  or].ginated  by  the  r~,.;eJ.ve  Round  Table  member  companies) 
which  \'vith  thf;  active  support  and  participat·i.on  of  the  Com-
mission,  ~i_ead  to  the  procedure  to  e~tablish  EN/ENVs  (European 
Norms)  under  the  aegis  of  CEN/CENELEC  and  CEPT.  · 
The  bread  spectrum  of European  interests  now  involved  in Funr.t:lo-
nal  standardization  (and  hence  the  possibility  of  overlaps  and 
in:ompatibilities)  has  lead,  again  under  SPAG  initiative,  to 
propose  the  r:;stablishment  of  EWOS  (European  Workshop  for  Open 
Systams) . 
2.2.  European  Wo~kshop for  Open  Systems  (EWOS) 
ihe  crso•wiun  of  EWOS  will  feC:era~:e  ~JGI'i<:iJl!]  groups  of  SPAG,  EMUG 
(EurcpB:,;-:  ~'lA~:;  Users  Group  ·:::  i~\:rof.Jecm  grcuping  of  manufacturing 
users,  corresponding  to  MAP-US),  OSITOP  (European  office  auto-
mation  us2rs  group~ European  grouping  cor=esponding  to  lOP-US), 
RARE/COSIN~  (scientitic  users; 1  CEN/CENELEC 1  and,  possibly,  ECMA 
(C. urop>?;'.ln  ;_~ o:·~~::h.rcer  ~·b  t:;.,;f acturers  As::wcH1:: 2.  ~m 




EWOS  aims  to be  efficient in accelerating the functional  standar-
dization process  particularly for priority items,  within the goal 
of European  and  worldwide  harmonization. 
It will separate, 
the  (functional)  standards making  process 
from, 
the approval  process  of the national standardization bodies. 
The  combination  of  these  two  aspects  has,  on  occasions,  caused 
delays  in  the  present  realization  of  the  work  programme  of 
CEN/CENELEC. 
An  improvement  in  the  time  needed  to  establish  standards  is 
vital. 
Nevertheless,  EWOS  is also  designed  to  optimize  the  use  of the 
scarce  number  of  experts  in  avoiding  their  dispersal  in  over-
lapping working  groups  working  on  the same  topic. 
EWOS  will  also  benefit  from  users  and  vendors  experts,  not  in-
volved  presently in the CEN/CENELEC  activities. 
EWOS  is seen  as  the principle mechanism  that will ensure the best 
deployment,  and  hence  the  adequacy,  of resources  to  achieve  the 
Community  goal  of  establishing  (Functional)  standards  in  an  ef-
ficient,  representative and  timely fashion. 
2.3  National Bureau  of Standards  (NBS) 
In  the  US,  the  NBS  Implementors'  Agreements  reached  through  the 
NBS  workshops  are  recognized  as  an  acceptable  base  from  which 
procurement  standards  can  be  derived.  MAP/TOP,  COS  Architecture 
and  US  GOSIP  are all based  on  the  NBS  agreements.  The  ability to 
bring  in  a  Federal  Information  Procurement  Standard  for  all  US 
agencies  through  US  GOSIP  results from  this circumstance.  The  es-
tablishment of the European  market  for OSI  products  is critically 
dependent  on  sufficient  orders  from  big  user  communities  -
notably  national  government  agencies  - which  specify  consistent 
profile  requirements.  The  existence  of  a  generally  accepted 
functional  standards base,  such  as afforded  by  NBS  in the USA,  is 
vital for this process. 
The  United  Kingdom  GOSIP  strategy  is  an  example  of  such  an  ini-
tiative which  needs  to  find  parallels  in  other  Community  member 
states ..  :·_ 
2.4  European  Norms  (EN/ENV) 
In  EurQpe,  ENs  and .. ENVs  represent a  potential equivalent,  but the 
scope., :~·representation  and  progranvne  of  work  of  this  activity 
appears  .. _  limited . 
:  i··  l 
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The  current  ENV  formation  process  must  however  be  continued  in 
parallel both to allow  EWOS  to take over  work  in manageable  steps 
and  also  to  cover  any  areas,  where  EWOS  is  unnecessary  or  where 
other equivalent mechanisms  exist. 
2 .  5,  Overview 
In  conclusion,  we  believe that the experts  used  in the standardi-
zation process should  be: 
- of senior level  (the main  progress to date has  been  achieved  by 
the top level network  architects of European  industry); 
- directly  involved  in development  activities. 
(Standardization expez·ts  unconnected  with  indus.trial constraints 
can  sometimes  create difficulties.) 
SPAG  activities,  within  SPAG,  in CEN/CENELEC,  in NBS  workshop,  are 
presently covered  by  experts in order of 
40  in SPAG; 
16  in CEN/CENELEC; 
4  in NBS  workshop. 
These  resources  now  appear  appropriate  because  the  creation  of 
EWOS  will  permit  a  better use  of all those  experts.  Additionally, 
the  complementary  resources  from  users  (OSITOP,  EMUG,  RARE/COSI-
NE),  which  do  not  participate  presently  in  CEN/CENELEC  standar-
dization activities,  will be  added  to the  EWOS  resources. 
The  key  problem  for  Europe  is  therefore  the  creation  of  EWOS.  A 
financial  support  from  the  Coi'Mlission  to  EWOS  will  help  this 
synergy  of all European  forces  in this field of information tech-
nology  standardization. 
3.  Strengthening of standardization aspects in the major  R/0  programmes 
3.1.  ESPRIT  1 
ESPRIT  1  has  contributed  significantly  to  the  development  of 
standards  in  many  domains  (VLSI/CAD,  software  engineering,  logic 
programming,  etc.). 
In  the field of OSI,  the main  successful  projects are well  known. 
Many  SPAG  members  participate in these projects: 
SEOOS 
ROSE 
For  the  production  of Estelle and  LOTOS  tools for OSI 
software  products  design,  in liaison with  NBS  (BULL, 
ICL  and  universities); 
which  permitted  prototyping and  direct experimentation 
of transport,  session,  FTAM,  messaging,  and  which  is 
now  experimenting  network  management  (BULL,GEC,ICL, 





CNMA  1 
CNMA  3 
4 
for directories  (BULL,GEC,ICL,OLIVETTI,SIEMENS); 
for office document  architecture with  Demo  in  CEBIT 
1987  (BULL,ICL,CGE,SIEMENS,OLIVETTI); 
for  MAP  2.1  (lower  layers)  and  MAP  3.0 MMS  Demo  in Han-
nover  1987  with  worldwide  impact  (BULL,CGE,SIEMENS, 
OLIVETTI,  NIXDORF,  major  users  - British Aerospace, 
BMW,  Aeritalia,  Peugeot-,  and  Fraunhofer Institut); 
for  European  participation in testing of MAP  profiles 
for the end  of June  88  (BULL,CGE,ICL,SIEMENS,OLIVETTI, 
NIXDORF). 
These  projects with  measurable  fall-outs,  have  taught industry to 
work  together  and  to  contribute  efficiently  and  fast,  to  the 
international  standardization  and  testing  scene.  They  have  also 
contributed  to  the  acceleration  of  implementation  of  OS!  in 
products. 
3.2  ESPRIT  2 
Some  of  the  existing  projects  will  hopefully  be  continued  in 
ESPRIT  2  (SEOOS,ROSE,POOA)  and  permit  progress  in the future  con-
cepts  for OSI. 
Other  fundamentally  new  undertakings  will  take  place,  mainly 
"OSITIP"  (TIP  A},  which  is in its definition phase,  and  can  be  a 
major  contribution  to  the  promotion  of  OSI  implementation  (see 
5.2.1.);  same  can  be  said  of the  continuation of  CNMA  1  (CNMA  2, 
3,  4). 
3.3  Future  Standardization aspects 
The  key  question  now  is  indeed  the  strengthening  of  stan-
dardization aspects  in the major  community  programmes. 
As  stated in paragraph  4,  page  8 of the  EEC  document  5684  of June 
4,  it is necessary to envisage  now: 
- a  viable  Information  Exchange  System  for the European  research 
community  based  on  OS!; 
the  use  of  OS!  standards  in  the  main  EUREKA  and  EEC  projects 
(ESPRIT,  RACE,  etc.),  when  applicable. 
It is  understood  that  the  EEC  is ready  to  support  such  underta-
kings.  The  European  industry  is  ready  to  cooperate  in  the 
proposals. 
l'  .. ·-' 
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4.  Use  of  standards  in operating systems 
A  number  of  European  industrial  companies  (BULL,ICL,SIEMENS,OLI-
VETTI,NIXOORF,PHILIPS)  ha¥e  created  the  X/OPEN  group  to  define  a 
programming  environment  around  UNIX. 
This  grouping  has  a  worldwide  impact  (because  of  its  US  membership: 
AT&T,UNISYS,OEC,Hewlett-Packard),  as  well  as  its  EFTA  member  (ERICS-
SON). 
The  activity  has  been  introduced  to  ISO  for  international  standar-
dization.  X/OPEN  is  now  studying  the  recommendations  concerning  OSI 
profiles,  and  their programming  interfaces. 
5.  OTHER  CONSIDERATIONS  - the  implementation  of profiles in products 
5.1 Preamble 
In  addition  to  Vice-President  Narjes'  questions,  another  funda-
mental  issue  to  be  addressed  is the  implementation  of profiles  in 
products. 
Four  areas  have  to be  addressed: 
-the implementation  of OS!  in vendors  products  (market  push); 
-the development  of the market  (market  pull); 
- single  validation  and  certification testing  environment  (market 
unification); 
acceleration of work  on  base  standards  in  key  areas  (further OSI 
development) . 
Market  take-off  and  product  implementation  are  interdependent, 
and  the  problem  of  "deadly  embrace"  in  which  suppliers  hold  back 
on  volume  product  production until there  is a  market  demand  and  a 
return  on  investment,  and  users  hold  back  from  providing  the  mar-
ket  until there  is sufficient evidence  of  a  selection of  products 
to choose  from,  is all too  familiar  in this area. 
5.2 Implementation  of OS!  in  vendor  products 
The  principle  issue  is the  implementation  of  EN/ENVs  in products. 
BULL,ICL,SIEMENS,OLIVETTI,NIXDORF,PHILIPS  - together  with  US  and 
Japanese  participants  - have  already  demonstrated  in  CEBIT  1987 
the  interworking  of  products  implementing  the  CEN/CENELEC  profile 
for  messaging. 
Most  of these  European  companies  have  in their catalogues  produc~s 
implementing  the  lower  layers of the  OSI  Reference  model  up  to the 





The  real  marketing  period  for  p~oducts implementing  OSI  (European 
and  US)  appears  to  be  1988,  which  will  coincide  both  with  initial 
applications of the  EEC  Directive of  December  22nd,  1986,  for  ap-
plication of EN/ENVs  in public procurements. 
5.3 Development  of the market 
Large  projects,  like  the  UK  GOVNET,  and  more  projects  under  the 
INSIS  umbrella  are  required.  They  should  be  consistent  with  the 
foregoing  standards  strategy. 
Another  aspect is the creation of evolutionary  integrator projects 
to  move  forward  the  progression  to  OSI  profiles  in  parallel with 
their evolution.  Here  we  can  contrast the  position in Europe  with 
that in Japan.  In Japan,  the  project  INTAP  is being  used  as  a  ma-
jor  integrator  for  a  phased  implementation  of  OSI  and  for  under-
standing  the  problems  of  managing  large  network/distributed  data-
bases.  In  Europe  good  feeder  projects  exist,  e.g.  OSI  prototyp-
ing  in  ROSE  and  the  PODA  project,  but  we  lack  sufficient integra-
tor projects. 
A major  property  of  integrator  projects  is  the  presence  of  users 
and  of a real application.  In the particular area of MAP,  the  CNMA 
1  project  is  an  illustration  in  this  respect;  more  such  projects 
are  required.  In  particular,  the  ESPRIT  2  project TIP"A",  as  pro-
mised  as  an  integrator  for  the  Networked  Office  - and  on  a  scale 
like INTAP  - should  enable  an  understanding  to  be  built up  of the 
problems  of managing  European  wide  networks. 
A powerful  European  policy  in the  field of public  procurements  is 
also  needed  (i.e.  a  European  GOSIP),  similar to  the  certain  ini-
tiatives referred to earlier. 
The  role of users associations,  such  as  EMUG,  OSITOP,  RARE/COSINE, 
will be  fundamental. 
The  deregulation  policy,  as  described  in  the  Green  Paper,  shall 
take  care  that  VAN  rules  shall  in  no  way  jeopardize  the  present 
European  OSI  policy.  Moreover,  the  creation of new  VANs  under  the 
EEC  umbrella  for  specific  community  needs  shall  be  good  opportu-
nities for OSI  promotion. 
5.4 Harmonized  Conformance  Tests 
Harmonizing  of  conformance  tests  is required.  The  objective  must 
be  to  achieve  a  single suite for  a  given  purpose.  (Note  that this 
does  not  require  a  single  test  engine.  It does  require  a  single 
set of test scenarios). 
SPAG  has  been  successful  in  establishing  close  relations  between 
Europe  and  US  in that field through  COS  and  MAP/TOP. 
The  recent constructive discussion between  SPAG  Services,  MAP/TOP, 
the  CNMA  3 . project  and  COS  illustrates  the  type  of  cooperation 
that must  be  fost~ed. 
'  I 
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5.5 Acceleration of base  standards 
Aside  from  the  acceleration of the  production  of functional  stan-
dards  from  existing base  standards,  a  major  problem  exists in that 
we  are missing  certain stable base  standards.  This  is particularly 
serious  in  the  Network  Management  and  Security  areas  of  OSI,  and 
in matters  relating to  ISDN  as  an  underlying  sub-network.  COS  has 
in  fact  asked  for  a  special  exercise  on  Network  Management:  SPAG 
and  POSI  have  been  less  sure  of  the  value  of  this  step,  without 
some  preparation  of  the  ground.  ECMA  is  an  effective  organisa-
tion.  Acceleration  of  the  work  in  ECMA  task  groups  together  with 
the  inclusion of outside experts to these  should  be  considered  to 
address the Management  ___ and  Security aspects. 
It is  anticipated  that  the  proposed  ETSI  will  address  the  ISDN 
issues.  Otherwise  CEPT  must  be  directed  to  finalize  these  stan-
dards. 
6.  Coordination with activities in the field of Telecommunications 
In  the  growing  intersection  of telecommunications  and  data  processing 
there is a  "grey  area"  where  the responsibility for the standards mak-
ing  process is not clear. 
This  is  particularly  so,  where  (mandatory)  procurement  standards  are 
being  established  which  may  effect  the  design  of  connected  end-
systems.  The  issues embrace  both  connection  and  interworking consider-
ations. 
Given  the  establishment  of  EWOS  and  of  ETSI  (European  Telecommu-
nications  Standards  Institute)  the  scope  of  both  groups  should  be 
clearly  established.  Subsequent  harmonization  of  their  activities 
should  be  capable  of  being  activated  by  normal  liaison  mechanisms  or 






Ref.  :  HG/db/00080501/489 
Cher  Monsieur  Nedzynski, 
RE<;U. le 
11  NOV.  1987 
Monsieur  S.  NEDZYNSKI 
secretaire General  IPTT 
38,  avenue  du Liqnon 
CH-1219  LE  LIGNON/GENEVE 
Suisse 
Bruxelles,  le 5  novembre  1987 
Conformement a !'accord fait en  juillet 1987,  l'EUROFEOOP  vous  fait par-
venir par la presenee les  remarques  et les considerations par rapport au 
"Livre vert" qui  nous  a  ete envoye. 
Au  cours  de la reunion du Conseil Professionnel PTT,  les pays affilies se 
son~; i:>enches  sur le contenu du  "Livre vert". 
L'EUROFEOOP  reconnait la grande  importance du  "Livre vert" et a  adopte 
une  attitude elementaire positive par rapport a son contenu.  Le  Conseil 
professionnel s'ese limite a une  discussion elaboree sur les positions 
comme  elles sont incluses dans  l'encadre 2  du  "Livre vert". 
En  general 
Le  Conseil professionnel ne  peut pas nier avoir trimpression que les 
positions proposees  sont surtout rediqees en faveur de la vie d'entreprise 
privee.  Nous  estimons qu'elles devraient beaucoup plus accentuer !'im-
portance essentielle d'une meilleure infrastructure pour la vie d'entre-
prise.  En  consequence des  nouvelles  technologies,  celles-ci peuvent etre 
utilisees pour ameliorer plus profondement les infrastructures.  A ce 
propos,  la coordination entre les pays membres  est essentielle. 
L'EUROFEOOP  estime que  les pays membres  ne  devraient pas se concurrencer 
mais  se soutenir  reciproquement.  Ce  n'est que dans  cette condition que 
les developpements  dynamiques  dans  le domaine  technoloqique peuvent 
etre entierement mis a profit  • 
A.  L'EUROFEDOP  souscrit la premiere partie de ce point, a !'exception 
d;  la liberalisation de  certaines parties des infrastructures du  reseau. 
L'EUROFEOOP  estime que  cela provoquera une  desinteqration continue des 
droits exclusifs et speciaux des administrations des  Telecommunications. 
En  ce qui  concerne  la seconde partie,  l'EUROFEDOP  tait remarquer que 
lorsque les satellites sont introduits  :PO~  _,le  reseau public, il devrait 
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etre determine que  !'administration est exclusivement  reservee aux 
administrations des  Telecommunications.  En  d'autres mots,  la liaison 
par satellites est une  autre  forme  d'infrastructure,  pour  laquelle les 
memes  reqles c.q.  les  memes  droits doivent etre appliques que  pour 
!'infrastructure actuelle existante.  Si cela ne  se realise pas,  !'in-
frastructure actuelle sera  soumise a beaucoup de  p~ession. 
~- Selon  l'EUROFEDOP,  il semble opportun de  demander des  explications 
plus  precises a la commission.  La  telephonie phonique constitue toujours 
la base d'infrastructure a court terme.  Des  que la telephonie digitale 
sera tout a fait introduite, il sera impossible de faire une distinction. 
Etant donne les developpements  techniques,  la notion de service de base 
doit etre differemment definie.  Lors  de  la digitalisation de la trans-
mission d'informations, il sera pratiquement impossible de maintenir 
les limites adoptees.  Les  developpements  techniques doivent permettre 
d'offrir des  services inteqres. 
D'apres !'opinion de  l'EUROFEOOP,  !'assurance de gains financiers suf-
fisants doit etre garanti en  vue  de  !'execution continue des  taches non 
rentables assignes  (tache sociale). 
C.  L'EUROFEOOP  n'a pas  de  commentaire a ce propos. 
~- L'EUROFEDOP  veut insister  pou~ que  des  normes  europeennes scient 
redigees qui  sent valables pour toutes les instances.  Ainsi,  nous  dis-
posons d'un bon  fondement qui nous  mettra en mesure d'entrer en concurrence 
avec d'autres nations  en dehors  de  l'Europe. 
E.  Une  des  revendications generales doit etre que  les infrastructures 
ne  doivent pas  etre mises a disposition,  si celles-ci constituent une 
concurrence deloyale pour !'administration des  T.  avec les reseaux prives. 
(Il faut penser aux  lignes  louees et sous-louees) • 
F.  L'EUROFEDOP  sousc=it ce point de  vue.  Cependant,  nous  pouvons  faire 
une  remarque  en marge.  A long  terr.le,  il ne  sera plus possible de  parler 
du  premier appareil  telephonique conventionnel, a cause des developpements 
technologiques.  Peut-etre, il vaudrait mieux intr8!uire une  securite elec-
tronique entre les appareils utilises par le consommateur et les infra-
structures,  en vue  de proteger les infrastructures.  (Aux  Pays-Bas,  une 
telle chose existe avec !'introduction d'un fusible principal dans le 
circuit electrique des  habitations).  Par rapport a ROES,  la reglementation 
doit contenir une  determination de  la notion cu terminal.  Il faut prevenir 
l'emploi  impropre des  infrastructures publiques par la connection 
e•lentuelle des  terminawc. 
G.  Cette position semble  raisonnable  en soi.  Cependant,  une  realisation 
t=es  rigoureuse  de  la separation peut causer de grands problemes,  parce 
que  des  personnes  non  concernees pourraient prendre des decisions qui 
causent des  dommages  aux infrastructures et par consequent,  qui peuvent 
nuira  serieusement a la tache principale des  P.T.T. 
H.  L'EUROFEDOP  se demande  comment  le respect de cette position peut 
~tre controle.  Cela s'averera impossible et incorrect,  p~rce que  des  . 
previsions paralleles se creent pour  un  certain nombre  d'autres services 
(Television par cables,  etc ...  )  avec  un  reseau de  large bande et la 
soi-disant liaison phonique.  L'inverse.existe aussi.  Par  l'emploi du 
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cable a fibre de  verre,  une  coupure est impossible.  Le  maintien de  la 
position H siqnifiera qu•a long terme  les administrations des  T.  doivent 
affronter une  limitation,  qui mettra en danqer la continuite. 
I.  Par  rapport a ce point,  les memes  remarques  peuvent etre avancees 
que  pa~ rapport au point H. 
J.  Aucune  remarque. 
En  outre,  l'EOROFEDOP  estime qu'il est d'une importance essentielle que 
les administrations  PTT  consacrent: une  attention particuliere aux 
problemas  suivants dans  les annees a venir  : 
- des  programmes  de  formation et de  recyclaqe: 
une  politique sociale adaptee et justifiee; 
!'adaptation des conditions de  travail et des autres reglementations 
impossibilite de  licenciement force a cause des developpements actuels 
au sein des administrations  PTT.  Les  licenciements  forces  ne  peuvent 
pas avoir lieu. 
Finalement,  l'EUROFEOOP  a  plaide parmi  ses membres  pour ouvrir.la dis-
cussion du  "Livre vert"  dans  les deliberations avec  les PTT  c.q.  les 
autorites publiques.  Alors,  une  position definitive peut etre etablie au 
niveau europeen et les avis des  g~uvernements peuvent etre dfiment 
influences.  One  premiere contribution a ce sujet est apportee par la 
resolution ci-jointe comme  elle a  ate adoptee au cours de  la reunion de 
l'EUROFEOOP  du  24  septembre 1987. 
Nous  assumons  que  vous  prendr.ez soin d'envoyer un  assemblage des  re-
vendications a la Commission  europeenne.  La  delegation de  l'EUROFEDOP 
espere pouvoir  vous  rencontrer le 2 decembre  prochain a Serlin. 
Nous  esperons avoir ainsi remp1i  1es conventions prises. 
Avec  mes  sentiments distingues. 
Annexe  1 
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Pour  le President du Conseil Professionnel  PTT 
Beldert GROOTENDORST 
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COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE 
La Fecteration Europ&enne des Services Publics 
B..R::fEJ:XP 
Rue de Treves 33 
1040 BRUXELLES 
Tel. : +32.2.230 60 go 
P-.rsonne de Uaison :  Jos DE CEULAER (Secretaire Gen9ral) 
A roccasion de :  Le Consea Professionnel P.T.T. de I'EUROFEOOP, reuni a  Bruxelles 
EUROFEDOP-P.T.T. ET LE UVRE VERT 
Le Conseil Professionnel P.T.T. de I'EUROFECCP, reuni a Bruxelles,  a procece a  un premier echange de 
vues concernant le projet de •LJVRE VERr sur s..:~  developpement des telecommunications en  Europe. 
L.e  Conseil  salue robjectif vise par Ia Commission  des  Communautes  Europeennes,  qui est de creer un 
reseau  european de telecommunication  techniquement avance  et competitif,  en  particulier,  d'installer un 
reseau  numerique european a Ia  fois  ultra-moderne et compatible. 
Dans  !'elaboration de  cette  future politique europeenne des telecommunications,  I'EUROFEDOP,  par son 
Conseil Professionnel P.T.T. demande notamment: 
•  l'offre  et l'exploitation  de  !'infrastructure  du  reseau  general  doiverirrester de  Ia  competence  exclu-
sive des administrations des postes et telt§communications; 
..  Ia fourniture  du premier combine  telephonique doit aussi  rester un  droit exclusif des administrations; 
l'ouverture a Ia concurrence du marche des terminaux doit impliquer le droit pour les administrations 
de participer l  ce march&; 
•  afin  que  les  administrations  des  telecommunications  puissant continuer de  remplir  leur mission  de 
service  public,  elles doivent non  seulement conserver l'exploitation  du service  telephonique  de  base 
mais  avoir Ia possibilite  de foumir toutes  les prestations du  secteur ouvert a Ia concurrence. 
Par ces revendications, le Conseil Professionnel P.T.T. veut tenir compte des interits du grand public at 
surtout sauvegarder le statut social des personnels. 
Les organisations affiliees sont invitees a  discuter des orientations contenues dans Ia projet de 'Uvre 
Vert• avec las autorites competentes de leurs pays rospectifs. 
L·EUROFEDOP est attentive a  Ia realisation de I'Unite europeenna et. par cons4quent. accueille 
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LIVRE  VERT  SUR  LE  DEVELOPPEMENT  DU  MARCHE  COMMUN 
DES  SERVICES  ET  EQUIPEMENTS  DES  TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
AVIS-
Sur  base  des  premieres constatations  de  ses  experts,  EUROCHAMBRES  souligne 
!'importance du  Livre  Vert  dont  le  principal  merite  est d'avoir  expose  en 
detail et en  toute  objectivite  la necessite  d'une  politique  communautaire 
~n matiere  d~ telecommunications. 
t:.  ~ffet,  de  nos  jours,  aucun  Etat  membre  n'est en  mesure  de  reorganiser 
S(  systeme  de  telecommunications  sans  tenir  compte  des  evolutions 
inc  ·nationales.  D' autre  part,  les  services  de  telecommunications  sont 
de·:~:1.us  des  marchandises  commerciales  soumises  aux  dispositions  du  Trai te 
d··  .~?me,  en  particulier  aux  regles  de  concurrence  et  de  prestations  de 
se:··:ices.  Cette evolution a  rendu d'autant plus n6cessaire l'etablissement 
d'une politique communautaire. 
1.- EUROCHAMBRES  et  ses  associations  membres  se  doivent  d'exprimer  d'une 
man1ere  complete  et  pragmatique  non  seulement  les  interets  de 
l'economie  en  general,  mais  aussi  des  clients-usagers,  moyens  et 
petits,  producteurs  et  distributeurs  de  biens  et  services.  C' est 
pourquoi  elles  s'interessent  aux  problemes  de  politique  et 
d'organisation des  services et des  equipements  de  telecommunications. 
2.- Face  a  la  revolution  telematique,  nee  de  1' integration  des 
telecommunications,  de  l'audio-visuel,  de  l'informatique,  un  processus 
de  coordination  unitaire et operationnel  des  strategies  politiques  et 
des  decisions  legislatives  des  12  Etats  membres  en  matiere  de 
telecommunications  est  un  objectif  prioritaire  urgent.  Cette 
coordination  qui  concerne  la  liberalisation,  les  taches  et  les 
modalites  d'action  des  administrations  dans  le  secteur  des 
telecommunications doit etre effectivement conduites de  fa90n  coherente 
avec  l'Acte Unique  et influencer directement le progres  des entreprises 
europeennes  en  termes  de  competitivite.  D'autre part,  le Marche  Commun 
des  services  de  telecommunications  organise  sur  les  principes  de  la 
libre  prestation  de  services  et  de  regles  de  concurrence  doit  etre 
considere  comme  un  element constitutif du  Marche  Interieur  de  taus  les 
secteurs economiques  mais  surtout du  secteur des services. -2-
Comme  chacun  sait,  malheureusement,  les  grandes  potentialit~s 
d'integration  des  telecommunications,  de  l'audio-visuel  et  de 
l'informatique  dans  certains  Etats  membres  souffrent  encore  des 
limitations  imposees  par  des  systemes  de  reglementations  differentes  : 
les  telecommunications,  traditionnellement,  sont  dominees  par  des 
monopoles  d'Etat,  l'audi-visuel  est  soumis  a  une  gestion  mixte 
publique/pri  vee,  et  1' informatique  au  contraire  s'  est  developpee  dans 
un  environnement ouvert a la concurrence,  certes  imparfaite  ou  dominent 
cepcndant  l(~s  pui ssantes societes  mul tinationales. 
Taus  les services  avances  qui  caracterisent la societe de  !'information 
sont  des  services  qui  exigent  un  niveau  de  recherche  et  de 
developpement  tres pousse  qui  doivent etre rapidement  commercialises  vu 
1' acceleratj on  des  progres  dans  le  respect  des  mecanismes  du  marche 
pour  se  developper. 
Le  Livre  Vert  propose  comme  objectifs d'une politique cornmunautaire  : 
- d' une  part  d' entreprendre  une  transition  progressive  mais  dynamique 
visant  un  marche  ouvert  a  une  concurrence  loyale.  Une  telle 
ouverture  doit permettre,  en  premier  lieu,  aux  industrials  europeens 
de  disposer  d'une  base  continentale a partir de  laquelle ils pourront 
affronter a pieds d'egalite leurs concurrents americains et japonais. 
- d'autre  part,  de  permettre  aux  utilisateurs  de  developper  ou 
d'utiliser au  moindre  coOt  les  nouveaux et nombreux  services et d'une 
qualite suivie,  ce  qui  implique  notamment  le mariage  des  technologies 
de  l'informatique et des  telecommunications. 
De  l'avis  des  experts  d'EUROCHAMBRES  les  importantes  affirmations 
suivantes  du  Livre  Vert  doivent etre soutenues  : 
- "1' integration europeenne  ne  pourra progresser  que  dans  la mesure  ou 
elle  disposera  de  reseaux,  de  systimes  et  de  services  de 
telecommunications  et  d'information  performants  accessibles  aux 
meilleur coOt. 
les systemes et les  services  de  telecommunications  de  !'information 
contribuAront  de  maniere  decisive  a  la  mise  en  place  du  Marche 
Unique,  pour  la competitivite  de  l'industrie et des  services et pour 
la  cohesion  interne  et  externe  que  la Communaute  s'est  fixee  comme 
objectif". 
3.- Au-del a  de  1'  engagement  poli tique  general  de  creer  le  Marche  Unique 
pour  1992.  EUROCHAMBRES  prend  acte  avec  satisfaction  des  motivations 
q'-li,  en  detail  et  en  toute  objectivi  te  dans  le  Livre  Vert  justifient 
1' urgence  d' une  revision  de  fond  des  poli  tiques  et  des  structures  en 
matiere  de  telecommunications  : 
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la aatiataction dea  beaoins  de  communication, 
la  multiplication  de  nouvel lea  forme a  d' aceta  aux  sources 
d'intormation, 
la rapid1t6 dea  diversifications technoloaiquea, 
!'importance  majeure  des  effeta  d'6chelle  :  le  Livre  Vert  pr6aente 
des donn6ee  quantita~ives d'un arand 1nt6rlt dana  le cadre du  march' 
et dea  inveatiaaementa actuels et ceux  pr6vua  juaqu'l l'an 2000. 
1'  1mpoaaiblit16  de  rforaaniser  lea  aervicea  de  t6l6commun1cations 
dana  une  viaion autarcique dea  d1tt6renta !tats. 
4.- EUROCHAMBRES  ne  peut qu'approuver la Commission  lurop6enne,  quant  l  la 
m6thode,  loraque  pour  entreprendre  une  politique  commune  des 
t616communieationa,  elle propose 
- de  taire  entrer  aetivement  dana  le  prooeaaua  de  d6eiaion  des 
d6marchea  de  concertation avec  lea partenairaa 6conom1quea  et aociaux 
directement  int6reaa6a  uaaaera,  induatriela,  producteura 
d'6quipementa,  personnel des  adminiatrationa dea  t616communicationa. 
- de  reconnattre avec  elart6 la d1verait6 dea  situations de  d6part dana 
lea  12  Etate  membrea.  Le  monopole  dea  t6lfcommunicationa  a  6t6 
juatit16 dans  le  paas6  par  dea  notions  de  politique  nationale et  de 
services publica.  D'apr~a lea  experta  d'IUROCHAMBRIS  une  analyae  au 
fond  de  pro ou  eontre une  situation de  monopole  ou  de  concurrence eat 
n6ceaaaire en  reapectant lea 6volutions  techniques  ou  internationales 
surtout pour  lea r6aeaux et aervicea  de  t616phonie.  La  d6r6aulat1on 
pose  done  des  questions difficilea et d61icatea. 
- de  proposer  aux  !tats  membrea  un  processus  d)'namique  a  caract,re 
1 t6ratif,  1 •  ouverture  des  march6a  de  services  et  de 
t616commun1oationa  l  la  concurrence.  La  technoloaie  a  aea 
applications rapidea,  maia  ll encore  aoumiae  l  beaucoup  d'6volut1ona 
nouvelles.  Ce  processus  doi  t  aussi  inc  lure  une  poaaibili  t6  d' une 
6volution plua avanc6e  pour  quelques Etata membrea. 
5.- L1orientat1on  de  base  de  l'action  ccmmunautaire  semble  toutefois 
possible et rialiate : 
aauveaarder le r8le des  administrations de  t616communicat1ona  dana  la 
dtir6aulat1on  de  1'  of'fre  des  infrastructures  pour  le  transport  des 
informations,  mais  en  m&me  tempe  r6aliaer !'inter-action dea  r6aeaux 
des  terminaux  et des  services  en  acc616rant  activement  la  politique 
de  normalisation mise  en  oeuvre  depuia  1984  au  niveau  europ6en.  Cet 
effort de  normaliaati.on  devrai  t  ltre  conduit  en  rapprochant  encore 
toutea lea parties 1ntareaa6ea.  Dana  ce  aens,  l'action d'un inatitut 
europ6e~ de  standardisation doit 8tre aoutenu. 
. .  .... 
I  '.,•  f 
259 -
12-14-87 12:42  T-EUROCHAM32  2  2300038  ~493 -03 
-4-
- placer lea  services  d6Jl  exiatants  ou  l  d6velopper  dana  un  cadre  de 
concurrence  en  permettant  d'une  part  aux  administrations  l 
oondi tion  qu' elles  n' abuaent  paa  de  leur  poai  tion  dominante 
d • intervenir  parmi  lea  candidate  l  la  f'ourni ture  de  services  et, 
d'autre  part,  en  aasurant  des  nouvelles  poaaibilit••  pour  les 
preatataires  de  services.  Dana  cea  matitrea,  l'ouverture  au  march6 
ooncurrentiel  et  contorme  aux  int6r8ta  et  awe  beaoina  dee  clients 
aoua  r6aerve  que  aoi  t  respeot6  lea  prinoipea  de  v6ri  t6  des  prix, 
transparence  des  coOts  et  concurrence  loy  ale.  Par  ail  leurs ,  11 
convient  de  tenir  compte  des  enaeianementa,  dea  initiatives  priaes 
par certains Etata membres,  par exemple  comma  la France en matiire de 
aervicea l  valeur ajout6e. 
Lea  orientations  de  baae  de  l'  action  eommunautaire  1ndiqu6e  par  la 
Commission  Europ6enne  devraient  ltre  appuy6ea  quant  awe  aujeta 
suivanta: 
- a6paration  compl!te  des  fonctiona  exerc6ea  par lea organiamea  publica 
en  mat16re  de  r6alementat1on  d'une  part,  et  d'exploitation  d'autre 
part ; 
- investisaements  dans  lee  nouveaux  services 6aalament dana  lea r6aiona 
p6riph6r1ques afin' d'6viter de  nouveaux  et plua  aravea  d6a6quilibres 
au  niveau territorial et pour  d6velopper  au  contraire la coh6aion des 
pays  de  la Communaut6  ; 
- application  des  dispositions  du  Trait6  de  Rome  en  mat16re  de 
oonourrence et de  libre prestation de  aervicea 
a)  ouverture  proareasive et compl6te  du  march6  l  la  concurrence  en 
mati~re de  terminaux  ; 
b)  ouverture proareasive pour  lea prestationa de  services  ; 
c)  libert6  d' ace•s  l  partir  de  tout  point  de  connexion  pour  lea 
r6aeaux  ; 
- priparation et aestion  des  positions  communes  pour  lea  n6aociations 
au  aein  des  oraaniaations  qui  a'int6reaaent  aux  d6oiaions 
internationales  ; 
- concertation 6troite avec  lea  partenaires  sociaux  pour  faciliter  lea 
tranai  tiona  et  exploiter  au  mieux  l'  evolution  des  r6seaux  et  dee 
se~viees en  vue  de  susciter la cr6ation d•emplois nouveaux. 
6.- Lora  de  la 62°  Assemblee  Pleniire d'EUROCHAMBRES  tenue  l  La  Hayt,  lP 
septembre  1987  et  consacr6e  au  th~me  ''Lee  transports  .sur 
danamique  du  Narch6  Unique  Europ6en",  la resolution  finale  porter. 
lea  transports  comma  outil  de  product1vit6  pour  lea··  entrepri:· 
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et  de  l'application  de  l'intormatique  et  de  la  t616matique  pour 
l • indiapenaable  am611orat1on  de  la productivit6  dea  entrepriaea".  Il 
eat  done  n6ceaaaire,  en  particulier  •  d' arriver  l  une  normaliaation 
europ6enne  pour  lea  6chana••  automatiquea  de  donn•••  11•••  aux 
tranaporta. 
7.- En  conclusion,  le  but  d'une  action  communautaire  doit  bien  ltre  de 
fournir  aux  entrepriael  europ6ennea  lea  meilleura  aervicea,  aux 
meilleura  prix  et  qual1t6.  Maia,  auaai  pour  lea  uaaaera-clienta  de 
aarantir  : 
- la libert6 de  choix 
- la qualit6 de  aervice 
- 1'6aalit6 de  traitement 
aur  1'  enaemble  du  terri  to  ire,  en  terme  de  deaaerte  aur  un  certain 
nombre  de  produita de  baae.  Ainai,  la concurrence  jouera-t-elle  mieux 
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EUSIDIC 
EUSIOIC  is the  European Association of Information Services.  The 
Association  was  started in 1970  and  currently has some  180 
corporate members  (current list attached).  The  Association is 
active in the field of  the  international electronic information 
industry and  its members  comprise  ti1ree  major  categories: 
- Major  users of electronic  information services 
- Major  providers of electronic information services  (hosts) 
Major  producers of electronic information services  (database 
producers). 
Members  of the Association have  to be corporations with a 
physical presence in Europe;  this currently accounts for  some  140 
of  the  180  members.  Other  organisations not present in Europe  can 
join as non-voting Associate Members,  but are not eligible for 
posts as Members.of  Council or  as Officers of the Association. 
The  fundamental  aim of the Association is to aid in the creation 
of a  dynamic and  harmonious  European marketplace by bringing 
together  users,  hosts and  information providers.  The  Association 
has  an active Telecommunications Chapter,  is a  founder  member  of 
INTUG,  creates Guidelines and  Codes  of Conduct  by  consensus 
within the ·industry and  has a  prestigious Annual  Conference and 
annual Technical Meeting where it examines new  movements  and  new 
technology on  behalf of its members. 
Each  year,  EUSIDIC  conducts  a  survey of European public data 
networks on  behalf of its members  (copy  attached);  the 
Association's interest in telecommunications  is long-standing, 
since telecommunications forms  the essential link between its 
members. 
The  enclosed comments  on  the Commission's Green-Paper were  drawn 
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I.  The  Commission's  strength 
The  Commission draws political strength for  the  regulatory 
changes  proposed  in  the  Green  Paper  particularly by  linking  them 
with  the  Internal  Market and  the endorsement of the Commission's 
White  Paper  on  Completing  the Internal Market - agreed by  the 
Heads  of State at the  Milan  summit  in June  1985. 
"  The  regulatory aims  in telecommur.ications must 
reinforce  these overall policy goals.  Re-regulation 
of the  telecommunications sector must strongly 
promote  the development of  intra-Community trade 'in 
services and equipment and  which enhance overall 
market efficiency.  The  White  Paper  draws specific 
attention to the  importance of  the  rapid development 
on  a  European  scale of certain value-added services, 
such as electronic  banking  and  videotex --·. 
It is significant to note  that the  Commission not only argues a 
logical case  in the  Green  Paper  for  concerning itself with 
telecommunication regulation but has also armed itself with some 
political  weapons. 
On  top of  this  the  Commission flexes its unexercised Treaty 
muscles  and points to its own  suc.cess  in developing  legal 
instruments  when  necessary. 
II.  The  European Dimension 
Much  of what  the Commission is seeking to achieve is evident from 
the  Green  Paper.  It would  ideally like to see a  re-structuring of 
European  telecommunications  through coordinated changes in the 
regulatory environment.  However  its influence on  the  internal 
decisions of  member  states is severely limited - except where · 
there is an  impact at the  Community  level. It is on  the intra-
European  national frontiers  where  the Commission's priorities lie 
and  where  its strength is.  As  the  Green  Paper states •  - In 
particular,  national frontiers  should not be  allowed to hamper 
the development of a  consistent communications system within the 
European  Community"  (Presentation  Pl}. 
III. The  National  Effects 
The  Commission appears surprisingly optimistic regarding the 
consensus  which has  been  reached  in Europe on regulatory 
directions.  It does  however,  quite  rightly,  point to  the fact 
that the European  regulatory climate is changing  and  the Green 
Paper  is  timely  in  that it may  influence,  to some extent,  the 
development  of  some  national regulatory policies. However  (and  as 
usual)  there  will  be  wide  national differences and  as political 
re3lists  the  most  that the Commission will expect is that there 
will  be  regulatory  harmony  at the  European  level. This  raises  the 
interesting question of  who  will  keep  everybody  in  tune. 
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IV.  The  Commission's  future  role 
Just what  role the Commission sees for  itself in a  harmoniously 
regulated  Europe  is not clear.  As  guardians of the  Community's 
competition  rules it may  have  an  important part to play. Also  the 
Commission has adopted an  increasingly active role in 
telecommunications over  recent years which is now  apparently 
extending  into the  regulatory area.  There are some  worrying 
aspects  to  this and  the prospect of a  kind of supra-national  FCC 
producing a  European  regulatory quagmire is one  which  few  would 
welcome.  On  the other hand  European coordination will be 
certainly  be  necessary. 
v.  The  Aims of the Green Paper 
The  prime aim of  the Green  Paper  itself is said to be  to launch a 
debate amongst all the interested parties.  EUSIDIC  like other 
interested parties is joining in the debate. 
VI.  THE  COMMISSION'S  PROPOSED  POSITIONS 
Introduction 
The  Green  Paper  has  a  number  of attractive features not least of 
which is the clarity and brevity with  which the Commission's 
proposals for adoption at the Community level by the member 
states are presented.  This makes  life a  little easier for 
everybody and  for  convenience  the proposals are given below in 
full prior to adding  comments. 
It is difficult not  to appear  carping when attempting to analyse 
the  Commission's proposals.  This is because the good  things in it 
tend  to  be  obvious while  the problem areas are less apparent and 
require  more  detailed treatment. 
Lest it be  thought otherwise it should be said at this point that 
the  Green  Paper  is,  in EUSIDIC's  view,  an admirable document.  It 
must  always  be  born in mind  that the Commission is bound  by 
political reality and  that any  proposals it makes  must be,  or at 
least appear  to be,  a  reflection of  the political'will of the 
twelve member states. In these circumstances the  ~mmission 
deserves  the many  congratulations which will no-doubt come  its 
way.  We  feel,  however,  that a  valid general criticism could be 
that the  Commission  in this Green  Paper  appears to be too prone 
to  find  reasons to advocate  the least possible disruption in its 
ideas as presented.  EUSIDIC  takes  the view that the normal 
situation in industrial life is that there is compet1t1on and 
choice;  it is monopoly  and  exclusions that need  to be  justified 
and  defended,  not changes  that require exhaustive  justification. 
Some  of  the ambiguities  which will be  referred to may  be due-to 
some  extent to  the  brevity of  the  proposals and  the approach here 
will  be  to give  the  benefit of  the  doubt - while pointing to the 
potential problems  which  ambiguity could create  • 
..  . 
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The  general objective of  the positions set 
out is the development in the Community  of a 
strong telecommunications infrastructure and 
of efficient service;  providing the  European 
user  with  a  broad variety of 
telecommunications services on  the most 
favourable  terms,  ensuring  coherence of 
development between Member.  States,  and 
creating  an  open competitive environment, 
taking full account of the  dynamic 




It is unfortunate that the Commission appears to get its 
priorities wrong  in the very first sentence.  The  need  to provide 
the  European user with better and  cheaper services should of 
course  come  first and  the other objectives - including the need 
for  a  strong  European  infrastructure - should be secondary to this 
basic aim. 
There  are  some  signs  in  the Commission's proposals - particularly 
in its seemingly over-protective attitude to PTT  Administrations -
where  the priorities appear  to be  a  shade askew. 
A.  Exclusive infrastructure provision by Administrations. 
Acceptance of continued exclusive provisions 
or special rights for  the  Telecommunications 
Administrations regarding provision and 
operation of  the  network  infrastructure. 
Where  a  Member  State chooses a  more liberal 
regime,  either for  the whole  or parts of the 
network,  the short and  long  term integrity 
of the general  network  infrastructure should 
be  safeguarded. 
Closely monitored competitive offering of  .r 
two-way satellite communications systems 
will need  further analysis.  It should  be 
allowed on a  case~to-case basis,  where  this 
is necessary  to develop European-wide 
services and  where  impact on  the financial 
viability of  the  main provider{s)  is not· 
substantial. 
Common  understanding and definition 
regarding  infrastructure provision should  be 
worked  out  under  E}  below. 
Comment 
The  Commission  argues  a  good  case  in  the Green  Paper  for  providing 
the  Telecommunications Administrations with exclusive provision of 
the  telecommunications  infrastructure - at this  time. 
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Certainly  there  seems  no  viable alternative as yet which  is more 
likely to achieve  the objectives set out. 
It would  seem  that  the Commission  is proposing that 
Telecommunications Administrations would  be given this exclusive 
right on  a  permanent  basis.  Such  a  proposal,  though politically 
expedient,  may  not be  as  binding  in nature as it appears.  No 
action is proposed  to give it any  teeth and  beyond  a  requirement 
to maintain network  infrastructure integrity Member  States can 
accept this proposal  and  yet make  up  their own  mind. 
Competition law  as it relates  to  telecommunications  remains 
largely untested  and  it could  be  that even the existing sole right 
of administrations  to provide  the so-called infrastructure could 
be seriously questioned.  Should,  as seems distinctly 
possible,  the  telecommunication networks  be  found  to be a  service 
within the meaning  of  the Community  rules then competition in the 
network  infrastructure area could  become  a  reality - irrespective 
of the adoption of this proposal. 
Until  the legal situation has  been clarified it would  seem  unwise 
to grant unconditional exclusive provision of the infrastructure 
to  telecommunications administrations. 
The  CEC  itself has  recognised that in one area at least  (two-way 
satellite systems)  the question of competitive provision needs 
further analysis and  should be  allowed under certain 
circumstances. This is no  doubt  because of the relative ease of 
provision and  the obvious  scope for .the rapid introduction of 
innovative and  beneficial new  services through competitive 
satellite offerings of this type.  It is therefore 
prudent to leave  the door  open on  this aspect of the 
infrastructure and  the  intention to do  so is applauded.  However 
the conditions associated with  the proposals give rise to a  number 
of questions. 
For  example: 
Who  will be  the  judge as  to whether  a  competitive offering is 
necessary to develop European-wide services?  .. 
- Who  will determine  whether  the financial viability of the 
main  provider is or  is not substantial? 
- What  of  the  financial  burden placed on  European  businesses if 
an otherwise beneficial services is judged to adversely 
effect the  financial viability of the main provider? 
Singling out  two-way  satellite services as  a  special case is also 
a  curiously outdated  and  potentially dangerous  approach.  To 
protect the terrestial infrastructure in the way  proposed would 
provide  no  incentive  to adopt  newer  technologies or  to become  more 
efficient. 
There  is no  real evidence  that  the  integrity of  the network  is 
threatened  by  competitive provision and  the British. experience 
suggests  that  there  may  be  substantial benefits  in introducing  a 
form· of  competition  fn  the  basic network.  While  it is too early 
to say'whether  Europe  as  a  whole  would  be?efit from  such 
5 competition  it would  be  folly  to  close  the door  on  the 
possibility.  If  the  Administrations were  given,  as  the  proposal 
suggests,  continued  (which  might  be construed to mean  perpetual) 
exclusive provision or special rights regarding provision and 
operation of  the  network  infrastructure  then valuable future 
opportunities may  be  lost. 
In  the  U.K.  the  invigorating effects on  the efficiency of BT 
through  competition  from  Mercury  are evident.  It is significant 
to  note  that competition with  BT  became  a  viable  pros~ct through 
a,combination of  new  technology allied with a  railway .system 
!covering most of  the  country  (enabling  the laying of optical fibre 
cable without usual  problems of  obtaining wayleaves).  Europe  as a 
whole  simply cannot afford  to turn its back  for  ever  on  this kind 
of opportunity.  The  approach  to  the question of competition 
within the network  infrastructure should  be  tempered  by at least 
providing for  a  periodic review. 
B.  Exclusive provision by Administrations of certain reserved 
services. 
Acceptance of continued exclusive prov1s1on 
or special rights for  the Telecommunications 
Administrations  regarding provision of a 
limited number  of basic services,  where 
exclusive provision is considered essential 
at this stage for  safeguarding public 
service goals. 
Exclusive provision must be narrowly 
construed and  be subject to  review  within 
given  time  intervals, taking account of 
technological development and particularly 
the  evolution  towards a  digital 
infrastructure.  'Reserved  services'  may 
not  be  defined  so as  to extend  a 
Telecommunications Administration service 
monopoly  in a  way  inconsistent with the 
Treaty.  Currently,  given  general 
understanding  in the Community,  voice 
telephone service seems  to  be  the only 
obvious candidate. 
Conunent 
This proposal  has  understandably  received wide acclaim amongst  the 
user  conununity. 
If,  as  is suggested,  the  telecommunications Administrations were 
to have  the exclusive  right only  to  supply public speech services 
then  this would  be  welcomed  by  the  majority of users  (see also c. 
Below).  It is,  however,  assumed  that the  exclusive provision of 
voice  telephone  service would  not  be  extended  to private voice 
networks  or  to  voice  value-added  services at this stage as  this 
would  be  an  unacceptable  extension of  the service monopolies. 
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Free  (unrestricted)  provision of all other 
services  ('competitive services', 
including  in particular  'value-added 
services')  within  Member  States and between 
Member  States  (in competition with. the 
Telecommunications Administrations)  for own 
use~  shared  use,  or provision to third 
pa.rties,  subject to  the conditions for  use 
of the network  infrastructure to be defined 
under  E). 
'Competitive  services•  would  comprise all 
services except basic services explicitly 
reserved for  the Telecommunications 
Administrations  (see  B). 
Conunent 
Again this proposal which  is closely allied with B.  above has been 
widely welcomed  by  users.  To  open  up  the whole  network  to 
competition - including services such as telex and  packet 
switching - is an appealing prospect. 
The  Commission  might however  be  accused of pressing for  something 
which is already a  right.  No  new  instruments are needed  (or 
proposed)  to establish this principle for services across European 
boundaries and all that seems  necessary is the full application of 
the  EEC  Treaty to telecommunications.  The  Commission  appears 
merely to be reflecting the inevitable outcome  in· the event that · 
the competition rules were  to be  thoroughly tested. 
The  real benefit of  this proposal  in the Green  Paper  may  be  to 
provide  a  common  understanding of  the competition rules as they 
effect telecommunications.  The  proposed  Community  Directive on 
Open  Network  Provision  (~ee E.  below)  could,  in principle at 
least, also be  very helpful. 
The  main  problem is how  to achieve a  free competitive market while 
allowing  telecommunications Administrations to  ~o;rpete. 
one  of the fears,  which  the Commission  evidently recognises is 
that cross-subsidisation by Administrations could lead to abuse of 
their dominant positions and  consequently deter or destroy 
competition in the  'unreserved'  services area.  However  they 
stress that any  abuse  under  the competition laws would  be as a 
result of predatory pricing rather  than cross-subsidisation. 
The  Corr~ission refers  to  the  need  for  strict continuous  review of 
the activities of Administrations  and  others under.  the Community 
competition  laws  (see  H and  J  below) •  Also  to  the extension of a 
oirective·which  requires  transparency  in the financial  relations 
between  governments  and  their  public undertakings}. 
Exactly  how  this all could work  - particularly in an  ISDN 
environment - is  not  explained and  this could  prove  to  be 
extr,emely. difficult in practice. 
..  ..  :•e 
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7  271 rf  competltion  for  the  non-reserved  services  is ever  to  become  a 
reality  then  there must  be  equal opportunity for  competitors 
regarding  the provision of the  infrastructure - which  must  itself 
be cost-based.  A particularly close eye  would  have  to  be  kept on 
services  such  as  the  Managed  Data  Network  Services  (MONS)  offered 
jointly by  European  telecommunications Administrations. 
The  opportunities  for  anti-competitive standards or  network access 
conditions· would  also  have  to  be  removed  (seeD and  E  below). 
o.  Standards for  Infrastructure and Services 
Strict requirements regarding standards  for 
the  network  infrastructure and services 
provided by  the Telecommunications 
Administrations  or  service providers of 
comparable  importance,  in order to maintain 
or  create Community-wide  inter-operability. 
These requirements must build in particular 
on  Directives  83/189/EEC and  86/361/EEC, 
Decision 87/95/EEC and Recommendation 
86/659/EEC. 
Member  States and the Community should 
ensure and promote provision  by  the 
Telecommunications Administrations of 
efficient European-wide and worldwide 
communications,  in particular regarding 
those services  (be  they  reserved or 
competitive)  recommended for Community -
wide provision,  such as according to 
Recommendation  86/659/EEC. 
Comment 
Community-wide  operability is to  be  fervently desired and  the 
Commission's  recognition of the need  for  standards and  its 
promotion  of standards activity is  in many  respects admirable. 
However  standards activity can  be  and  frequently is anti-competitive 
and  the  ICC  has referred to the  'beggar-thy-neigh8our' 
attitude which  is now  currently prevalent in this area. 
The  future  role of  the  European  PTTs  in  the standards making 
process has  therefore  to be considered very carefully. 
The  secrecy of  the  CEPT  is notorious and  this extends even to its 
standards work.  The  whole  telecommunications standards making 
process  in Europe  in fact needs  to  be., more  open and widened  to 
allow  comments  from all the  interested parties. 
The  Commission's  own  record  in  seeking  and  encouraging  the 
participation of  users  in  the  standards making  process  has  so  far 
left much  to  be  desired  - notably  in  the  ISDN  area which  is of  key 
importance. 
To  prove  anti-competitive  behaviour  under  the competition  rules. 
could  be  difficu.lt - particularly if the  standards  body  concerned 
were  to  be  goverTh~ent sponsored  (some  redress against standards 
groups  which  comprise  commercial  undertakings is possible).  Thd 
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commission  has  never  dealt with  such  a  case  in  the 
telecommunications  field and it seems  unlikely to do  so  in the 
future. 
some  curious legal questions could  therefore arise if standards 
setting  (being considered a  regulatory function)  is separated from 
Administrations  (see G.  below) •  Whereas  a  CEPT  standard might 
well  be  challenged  under  competition law  (if a  complainant had 
good  grounds  for  showing  its effects were  anti-competitive)  such 
redress would  seem  less certain if the  standards  body  comprised 
government  representatives rather  than commercial  undertakings. 
In  these circumstances it becomes  essential to prevent rather 
than attempt to cure anti-competitive standards behaviour  in the 
telecommunications  field and this can only be  done  by ensuring 
that the decision making  process is as open and fair as it can 
possibly be made.  As  yet the Green  Paper does not give sufficient 
grounds for  confidence  in this direction but there are one or two 
hopeful signs  (see  G.  below) 
E.  Open  Network Provision  (ONP) 
Clear definition by  Community Directive of 
general requirements imposed by 
Telecommunications Administrations on 
providers of competitive services for use of 
the network,  including definitions regarding 
network  infrastructure provision. 
This must include clear  interconnect and 
access obligations by Telecommunications 
Administrations for trans-frontier service 
providers in order to prevent Treaty 
infringements. 
Consensus  must  be  achieved on standards, 
frequencies,  and  tariff principles,  in order 
to agree  on  the general conditions imposed 
for service provision on  the competitive 
sector.  Details of this Directive on Open 
Network  Provision  (0  N  P)  should  be  prepareQr 
in consultation with the Member  States,  the 
Telecommunications Administrations and the 
other parties concerned,  in the framework of 
the Senior Officials Group  on 
Telecommunications  (SOG-T}. 
Comment 
In  principle this is an admirable  notion and  the only problem lies 
in  the  decision making  process.  If the  Administrations are given 
the greatest influence  in determining  on  what  terms  their  · 
competitors are  allowed  onto  the  network it will only  be  natural 
if their  thoughts stray  instead on  to what  could best keep  them 
off.  This  may  be  understandable  but it is not  the stuff of which 
open  competition  is made. 
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The  comn1ission  foresees  Directives on  open  network  provlSlon and, 
with  the proviso mentioned earlier.  regarding  the  necessity not  to 
dilute  the competition  laws,  this  seems  a  sound approach.  The 
Directives would  cover: 
- technical  interfaces 
- tariff principles 
- restrictions of  use 
The  Commission  also sees  the Senior Officials Group  -
Telecommunications  (SOG-T)  providing  the  framework  for  developing 
these  important Directives.  Herein lies the same  kind of problem 
with balance mentioned  above  for  the greatest influence within the 
SOG-T  is currently with  the Administrations.  This is not in any 
sense a  criticism of  the Commission  for it is the Member  States 
who  determine  the  representation to the SOG-T.  The  establishment 
of a  Senior Officials Group  to provide assistance and advise is 
perfectly normal  for  a  Directorate. 
Should  there  be  a  clear separation of regulatory activities from 
Administrations  (see  G.  below)  then  the composition of the SOG-T 
would  hopefully  be  in fairer balance for this kind of task. 
However,  as  elsewhere  in the Green  Paper  there is a  question of 
timing  and  the separation of regulatory and operational functions 
will  take several years  to achieve  in most member  countries. 
There  is a  danger  that the formulation of the ONP  Directives 
(enforceable on  member  states)  will be greatly influenced·by those 
who  have  the greatest commercial  interest in the outcome. 
F.  Unrestricted Provision of Terminal  EqUipment 
Free  (unrestricted}  provision of  terminal 
equipment within Member  States and between 
Member  States (in competition with 
Telecommunications Administrations}, subject 
to  type approval as compatible  with Treaty 
obligations  and  existing  Directives. 
Provision of  the first  {conventional) 
telephone set could  be  excluded from 
unrestricted provision on  a  temporary basis. 
Receive  Only  Earth Stations  (ROES)  for 
satellite down-links should be assimilated 
with terminal equipment and  be subject to 
type  approval  only; 
Conunent 
Since  the  resolution  of  the  German  modem  case  and 
other effective action  by  the  Commission  under  Community 
compet.~tlon rules  this proposal  might appear  to  be  stating  the 
obvious. 
•  The  proposal  does  however  have  the  merit referred  to earlier  o~ 
getting  a  common  understanding  and  therefore  introducing  change  in 
a  smoother  ana  less  combative  way.  A curi9sity of  the  proposal  is 
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the  reference  to  Receive 
approval  for  there  seems 
connected  to a  network. 
Only  Earth Stations  being subject to  typ:US~ 
to be  no  need  for  this unless  they are 
An  important point to note  here  is that competition law  cannot  be 
compromised  by  any  kind of  temporary  amnesty.  Although  the Member 
States may  agree  on  some  kind of phased relaxation of  PTT 
restrictions any  would-be  competitive  terminal supplier who  chose 
not  to wait would  be  in a  very  strong  legal position. 
G.  Separation of Regulatory and Operational.Punctions · 
Separation of  regulatory and  operational 
activities of Telecommunications 
Administrations.  Regulatory activities 
concern in particular licensing,  control of 
type  approval  and  interface specifications, 
allocation of frequencies,  and general 
surveillance of network  usage condition; 
Comment 
This  is by  far  the most  important of the Commission's proposals. 
Given  the necessary powers  and  scope,  adequate staffing and good 
co-ordination the national regulatory bodies could provide most of 
the answers to Europe's chronic regulatory problems. 
The  proposal as presented seems  ambiguous  for it suggests 
separation of the  regulatory and operational functions only within 
a  Telecommunications Administration.  However  it is apparently the 
Commission's intention that the  functions should be absolutely 
separate.  Furthermore  the Commission  is acutely aware  that this 
is the most critical aspect of its proposals and  feels  that it 
already has the ne.cessary consensus  between the Member  States. 
This again raises  the question of the Commission's future  role 
vis-a-vis  telecommunications regulation. If, as seems  probable 
now,  the national  regulatory bodies  become  a  reality then the need 
for  co-ordination at the  European  level - particularly with regard 
to competition  rules - would  appear  to  be critical. The  Commission 
staff itself does  not appear  to have  developed  an~firm views on 
this point  (although there might well  be  some  hopes)  and  seems  open 
to  ideas and  suggestions.  · 
There  is some  ambiguity  in the Green  Paper  regarding what 
regulatory activities really comprise.  No  mention of tariff 
principles is made,  for  example,  in this particular proposal and 
this is perhaps  a  deliberate omission.  The  reason for  the 
ambiguity appears  to  be  that the Commission  has not yet agreed 
internally what  should  be  included  under  the regulatory heading  -
this explair.s  the  inclusion of  the  words  "-- concern  in 
particular". 
One  very  important activity for  which  the  new  national bodies 
should  be  given  responsibility  is  in  the  international 
representation  for  their governments  on  telecommunications 
regulatory matters.  It is also extremely  important that these 
bodies  should  have  the overall authority  for  tariffs. 
B.  Review  of Administration Commercial  Ac~ivities 
11 
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r  Strict continuous  review of operational 
(commercial)  activities of 
Telecommunications Administrations according 
to Articles  85,  86  and  90,  EEC  Treaty.  This 
applies  in particular  to practices of cross-
subsidisation of activities in the 
competitive services sector  and of 
activities in manufacturing; 
Conunent 
The  requirement for  this is obvious.  The  only question is how  it 
can  be  done  and  who  will do it. 
I. Review of Private Providers Activities 
Strict continuous review of all private 
providers  in the newly opened sectors 
according  to Articles 85  and  86,  in order to 
avoid  the abuse of dominant positions; 
Comment 
This  is allied with  H.  above  and  although it may  appear  to be 
cosmetic it is not.  Although abuse  by private providers seems 
less likely the Commission  is obliged to be equally diligent in 
this respect as with Administrations. 
J. Full Application of Community  Commercial POlicy 
Full application of the Community's  common 
policy to telecommunications. Notification 
by Telecommunications Administrations under 
Regulation 17/62 of all arrangements between 
them or with Third Countries which  may 
affect competition within the Community. 
Provision of information  to  the extent 
required for  the Community,  in order  to 
build up  a  consistent Community position for· 
GATT  negotiations and  relations with Third .r 
Countries.  -
Comment 
Many  references have  been made  earlier to the application of the 
Community's  rules to telecommunications  and  this proposal merely 
confirms  the existing position.  What  is interesting is the 
emphasis placed on  the  regulation relating  to notification in the 
context of  the Administrations'  foreign  agreements. 
The  Commission  has  not  been directly involved  in the  PC/WATTC 
process  and  appears  to  be  unaware  of  tne  line adopted  by 
the  European  PTTs  - with  the notable exception of  the  U.K.  -
during  the preparatory wor.k  which  is  now  ended. 
The  new  dr.aft  Regulations  to  be  considered  for  adoption at the 7 
WATTC  meeting  in November  1988  appear  to conflict in a  number  of 
important  respects with  the  Commission's proposals. 
'I 
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r  r  It is far  from  clear  which  would  take  legal precedence in  the 
event that new  telecommunication  regulations  (imposing  Treaty 
obligations on  all the  ratifying countries)  were,  in the event,  to 
conflict with community  proposals or  rules. 
Nor  is it clear  whether.  and  to what extent the new  GATT  round  will 
be affected by  the  WATTC  process. 
The  notification  requirement by Administrations is too late to 
affect the outcome  of  WATTC.  The  process of notification referred 
to is not obligatory but is the means  whereby  exemptions  may  be 
sought to behaviour  which might otherwise be  judged to be anti-
competitive. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The  Green  Paper  and  the important proposals it contains represent 
a  cross-roads for  the European  Community.  Whether,  in the event, 
the  Member  States· take the right direction (or even the same 
direction)  remains  to  be  seen.  · 
we  agree with the Commission that telecommunications is an 
industry in rapid  transition from  being centralised on the 
concept of public or  social services to being a  vital and 
integral part of modern  business.  We  miss  in the Commission's 
Green  Paper  what  we  feel should be  a  necessary sense of urgency 
that should be injected into the question of re-regulation if 
Europe is not to find itself at an ever-increasing disadvantage 
with its main economic competitors,  the United States and  Japan. 
The  gap is already wide,  and the international telecommunication 
industry outside Europe is widening  the gap_ every year. 
We  also regret that the public and  social aspects of 
Telecommunication Administrations are not examined  in a  more 
fundamental way.  We  would  welcome  a  move  to examine these in more 
detail and, if necessary,  ask  more  fundamental  questions 
concerning  how  any national, social or public duties could  be 
financed  and  safeguarded;  we  suspect that guaranteeing certain 
fundamental  monopolies is not the only way  in which national, 
social or public obligations can continue to be  .,~ 
The  Commission draws strong links in its discussion document 
between telecommunications and  the Community's policy for  a 
common  information market and it deserves the last word. 
h  Adequate  telecommunication  infrastructures and 
services are  a  condition sine-qua-non for  the free 
expression and free flow of  information in the 
Community  in  the  future ---"  (Green  Paper  Pl40) 
-- END  --
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COMITE NATIONAL FRANCAIS 
DE LACHAMBRE DE COMMERCE INTERNATIONALE 
Projet cfavis du Comite National Fran<;ais de Ia Chambr~  de Commerce 
lnternationafe sur le livre vert de Ia C.E.E. (COM {87) 290 final) 
Le document  pubfie  le  30  Juin  1987 regoit  l'approbation du  C.N.F.-C.C.I.  pour 
ses  objectifs  de  developpement  et  de  promotion  du  marctie  commun  des 
biens  et  services  de  telecommunications  dans  un  environnement 
concurrentiel  fibre  et  loyal. 
Ce  document  lui  semble  d'autant  plus  interessant  que  rien  ne  parait  devoir 
s'opposer a son  application  ni  a ses  projets  vis-a-vis  des  pays  europeans 
extra  communautaires,  ce  qui  rejoint  l'universalite  du  propos  de  Ia  C.C.I. 
Plutot  qu'une  exegese  detaiHee,  le  Comite  prefere  soumettre  a  Ia 
commission  quelques  commentaires  sur  les  propositions  regroupees  a Ia 
figure  13 du  document COM  (87)  290  final. 
Avant  toute  chose  et  pour  eviter  des  segn3gations  arbitraires  entre 
exploitants  prives  et  administrations,  le  Comite  propose  d'utiliser 
l'expression  "entreprise  de  telecommunications",  pour  toute  societe 
autorisee  par  un  Etat  Membre  a etablir  un  reseau  de  telecommunications 
ouvert a des  tiers,  ou a ouvrir a des  tiers  un  tel  reseau  qu'elle  a etabli. 
Ainsi,  Ia  proposition A  (exclusivite  ou  droits  speciaux)  s'applique-t-elle  a  toute  entreprise  de 
telecommunications a  laquelle un Etat Membre a accorde les droits et les obligations d'installation et de 
gestion  d'un  reseau  general.  Ces obligations comportent Ia couverture de  Ia totalite  du  territoire,  les 
liaisons international as, les necessites de Ia Defense et des Pouvoirs Publics, ainsi que celles des usagers 
domestiques et professionnels.  · 
Elles  impliquent. d'assurer a tous  l'acces  au  service  de  base,  et de contribuer a  Ia  recherche,  au 
developpement eta Ia formation dans le domaine des telecommunications.  "' 
II serait souhaitabJe de rappeler au titre de cette proposition que l'infrastructure doit tendre a  ramelioration 
et Ia facilitation des liens europeans, internationaux, mondiaux. 
La proposition 8 (service de base} est d'autant plus appreciee qu'elle envisage les prestations exclusives 
dans une optique etroite et restrictive. 
La  proposition C (services  concurrentiels}  gagnerait  aux  yeux  du  Comite a  affirmer  Ia  necessaire 
neutralite de l'exploitant vis-a-vis des utilisateurs, sans clauses restrictives d'activites ou d'associations , 
ni de complementarites. 
Le Comite soutlent pleinement Ia proposition D  (normes) et en particulier Ia creation d'un lnstitut European 
des Normes, a  Ia condition que celui·ci implique Ia participation des usagers et des constructeurs et soit un 
facteur d'acceleration des travaux de normalisation. 
La proposition E (exigences d'utilisation du reseau  et O.N.P.) doit effectivement etre poursuivie par une 
serie  de  definitions  claires  des  exigences  et  des  obligations  concernant  Ia  mise a disposition. 
l'interconnexion et les acces.  Elle implique aussi aux yeux du Comite , que les utilisateurs professionnels 
scient partie  prenante a  Ia  concertation  envisagee  pour  l'offre d'un  reseau  ouvert  (O.N.P .),  car  cette 
concertation doit avoir parmi ses objets, les principes de tarification de  l~pr.~station de  s~rvices. _, 
La proposition F (offre libra d'equipements terminaux)  n'appelle pas de commentaires autres que ceux 
exprimes a  l'occasion des propositions H  et f. 
La s6paration des activites de reglementation et d'exploitation prevue a  Ia proposition G  devrait pr4clsar 
que les principes tarifaires ressortent au domaine reglementaire. 
Les propositions H  et I (suivi des activites des entreprises de telecommunications) sont comprises par le 
Comite comme impliquant que le droit commun communautaire commercial  s'appliqve a  tous, qu'il s'agisse 
de foumiture, d'installation, de maintenance ou 9_e  service, et exclut les possibilites de subvention croisee 
ou perequation ainsi que rinterdiction des abus de position dominante ou d'integration verticale. 
Ces  points semblent aux  yeux  du  Comite necessiter une vigilance  attentive  en  ce qui concerne  plus 
particulierement les perequations entre services reserves et services concurrentiels, dans les domaines 
. commerciaux, fiscaux,  financiers ou tarifaires. 
La proposition J (politique commerciale commune) attire de Ia part du Comite Ia remarque suivante : 
L'ouverture du grand marche des telecommunications ne doit pas se faire au detriment des usagers ni des 
industrials europeans qui exigent de leurs partenaires transparence et reciprocite. Cette reaprocite doit 
s'appliquer dans le cadre du G.A.T.T. sur une base d'e)(amen produit par produit, marche par marche, 
pays  par pays.  Elle doit egalement jouer vis·a-vis des pays a  structure federate ou confederate dans 
lesquels une decision du pouvoir central peut etre contrecarree au niveau des autorites de l'etat federe ou 
contedere.  De meme, dans les relations extra europeennes les regles evoquees dans Ia proposition J 
doivent  etre  applicables  aux  entreprises  de telecommunications  sans  tenir compte  de  leur  nature  : 
administration publique ou privee. 
En  conclusion,  le  Comite  Fran~ais de  Ia  C.C.I.  adresse a Ia  Commission  ses 
felicitations  pour  l'oeuvre  deja  accomplie  et  soulignee  dans  le  livre  vert, 
reaffirme  son  accord  gtobal  sur  ~es  propositions  qu'il  contient  et  l'assure 
de  son  soutien  enthousiaste  pour  promouvoir  un  marche  liberal  et  efficace 
des  telecommunications. 
Le  21/10/87 
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POSIZIONE  DELL'F.T.I.  SUL  "LIBRO  VERDE"  CEE 
SULLO  SVILUPPO  DELLE  TELECOM\JNICAZIONI 
Il  presente documento  esprime le valutazioni sul  "Libro  Verde" 
che  le diverse componenti  del  ForUm  Telematico Italiano (F.T.I.) 
hanno  concordato  di  proporre all'attenzione  della  Commissione 
CEE. 
Commento  generale 
L' FTI  apprezza particolarmente la chiarezza col\···la  quale il Libro 
Verde  affronta alcune delle questioni principali  relative  allo 
sviluppo  delle telecomunicazioni  in Europa.  La  chiarezza  nella 
enunciazione  delle posizioni e'  infatti preferibtle ad  ogni tipo 
di equivocita•. 
Vengono  di seguito elencate le linee espresse nel Libro Verde  che 
soddisfano particolarmente il requisite della chiarezza. 
-.,. 
1.1)  I  servizi riservati,  oggetto di monopolio,  vengono  indicati 
con  precisione in una  lista,  da  considerarsi  modificabile  nel 
tempo,  e  non  tramite una  definizione.  Questo fatto permette di 
eliminare le zone  grigie e  di poter considerare consentito  tutto 
cio
1  che non  e'  espressamente proibito. 
1.2)  E'  indicata con  chiarezza la separazione delle funzioni  di 
regolamentazione e  normativa del settore da  quelle gestionali. 
1.3)  E'  evidenziato  il fatto che  lo  strumento  tariffario  e' 
capace  di  sostituirsi a  quello normative allo scopo di  fissare 
condizioni  generali per il settore delle  telecomunicazioni.  Lo 
strumento  tariffario  ·e'  infatti tecnicamente in grado  di  dare 
valore  effettivo  a  norme  generali  per  il  settore  delle 
telecomunicazioni,  onde  evitare che  le regole adottate rimangano 
lettera  morta  per  l'impossibilita'  pratica  di  controllarne 
l'applicazione.  Lo  strumento tariffario non  deve tuttavia essere 
usato  in  modo  tale da modificare o  distorcere le dinamiche  del 
libero  mercato ed inoltre devono  essere chiari i  criteri  con  i 
quali  le tariffe sono fissate. 
1.4)  E'  evidenziata l.'importanza attribuita alla  promozione  ed 
applicazione  di  standard comuni.  A tale proposito l'istituzione 
di un  organa normativo  europeo,  al quale  concorrano  CEPT.  CEN  e 
CENELEC,  industria e  utenti,  se opportunamente studiata,  potrebbe 
essere particolarmente utile. 
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L'FTI  ritiene che  debba  essere fatta  invece maggiore  chiarezza su 
alcuni  punti  del  Libro Verde,  allo scopo di  rendere ancora piu' 
precis! gli scenari  che esso propane.  In particolare: 
2.1)  Deve  essere chiaro  che il monopolio dell'infrastruttura  di 
rete riguarda la trasmissione trasparente di segnali,  analogici  o 
digitali  (in quest'ultimo caso di stringhe di bit),  non  importa 
se originati dalla fonia,  da datf o  da  inunagini. 
Le  funzioni  di  commutazione  svolte da apparati pubblici tra linee 
pubbliche all'interno della rete sono,  ovviamente,  di pertinenza 
del  gestore  dell'infrastruttura di  rete,  mentre  deve  essere 
permesso  ad  un  apparato privata fare  commutazione tra due  porte 
di accesso all'infrastruttura di rete  pubblica~  •. 
. ' 
2.2)  Mancano  indicazioni  sulla  regolamentazione  e 
tariffazione della futura rete pubblica a  larga banda.  ... 
.... 
sulla 
2.3)  Mancano  indicazioni  chiare sulla definizione del confine tra 
i  domini  di  competenza del fornitore dell'infrastruttura di  rete 
e  quelli dei  fornitori di servizi e  degli utenti. 
2.4)  E'  opportuno  sostituire  alla  parq.la  "terminale" 
l'espressione  "sistema di utente",  costituito dall'insieme  dei 
dispositivi che l'utente usa ed ha  in proprio possesso. 
L'evoluzione  tecnologica rende infatti equivoca.la qualifica  di 
"terminale
11
,  che  sempre  piu1  ha  prestazioni e  caratteristiche 
analoghe  a  quelle di sistemi complessi di  elaborazione  (quali 
calcolatori,  PABX,  •. ). 
2.5)  Mancano  indicazioni precise sui sistemi e  sui  servizi  di 
informatica  che  usano  la  rete per  la  distribuzione  rna  che 
restano,  fisicamente  e  in termini di  architettura  OS!,  fuori 
dall'infrastruttura di rete.  Occorre infatti fare chiarezza: 
- sui  protocolli degli strati dell'architettura OS!  compresi fra 
il 4  (Trasporto)  ed il 7  (Applicazione); 
- sui  protocolli dei servizi applicativi specifici  (all1interno 
della strato 7),  come,  ad  esempio,  quelli per la gestione di 
transazioni  in arnbiente  bancario,  turistico,  commerciale  (EDI), 
grafico,  ecc. 
sulle  strategie  relative  alla  creazione,  diffusione,  uso, 
verifiche di  conformita'  delle  implementazioni,  ecc.t  di norme 
elaborate per questi ambiti. 
E'  quindi  irnportante  che la Commissione  chiarisca se  abbia  in 
preparazione  un  documento  "gemello"  del Libro Verde  su  questi 
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Commento  per punti 
Vengono  considerati nel seguito solo  i  punti sui quali 
commenti,  intendendo  che  su  quelli  non  citati vi  e' 
rispetto alla posizione comunitaria. 
ci  sono 
accordo 
A)  Affinche'  il punto  in oggetto sia chiaro,  occorre  precisare 
che la rete a  cui si fa  riferimento e'  la rete pubblica.  In essa, 
come  gia'  detto  nel  commento  generale,  la  trasmissione  e' 
monopolio,  la  commutazione  interna e'  pertinenza del  gestore, 
mentre  e'  consentita la commutazione  esterna alla rete  ad  uso 
pubblico da parte di apparati di utente,  con  regolamentazione  e 
tariffazione da studiare opportunamente. 
.  . ' 
B)  Per  "servizio  telefonico  vocale"  deve  intenders!  la 
trasmissione  trasparente di un  segnale analogico  oppure,  nella 
prospettiva  delle  reti  digitali,  di  stranghe  di  bit, 
indipendentemente dalla loro origine (fonia,  dati o  immagini). 
D)  I  servizi  su  cui  i  gestori  dovranno  impegnarsi 
prioritariamente  sono  quelli ad essi riservati.  I  gestori  non 
dovrebbero  invece essere forzati  a  competere  su~tutti i  servizi 
rna  dovrebbero  godere di una  autonomia tale  da  garantire  !oro 
flessibilita'  nell'affrontare le situazioni locali di mercato  e 
agli  utenti uniformita'  nel livello di servizi di  base  offerti 
nei diversi Paesi  comunitari. 
E)  Deve  essere chiarito che si fa  qui  riferimento alla  fornitura 
dei soli servizi riservati (quelli del punto B). 
F)  Occorre parlare di offerta di  "sistemi di utenteu  e  non  piu' 
di  semplici "terminali" perche'  1'  evoluzione tecnologica  rende 
questi ultimi  poco  significativi.  Deve  essere inoltre chiaramente 
indicato  che  1
1 organa  di sezionamento  (ad esempio.  la  borchia 
d'utente) e'  il limite di separazione tra il dominic del  gestore 
dell'infrastruttura di rete e  quello di utente. 
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Buro· und lnformationstechnt" 
Erlauterung  und  vorlaufige Stel lungnahme  des~~ 
zum  Grunbuch  der  EG-Kommission 
Ober  die  Entwicklung  des  gemeinsamen Marktes  fur 
Telekommunikationsdienstleistungen  und 
Telekommunikationsgerate 
.. .  --I 
VI»4At 
I  I 
6000 Frankfurt!M. 11 
(Ntederrad) 
Postfach  71  08 64 
Lyoner StraBe 18 
Telex  4 11  32, 
Telefax  069·66 03·S10 
Telefon  069-66 03 0 
Das  Grunbuch  der  EG  beschreibt  die  GrundzOge  ihrer Telekommuni-
kationspol itik  und  leitet  als  weitere  Aufgabe  ab,  die  institu-
tionel len  und  ordnungspol itischen  Rahmenbedingungen  der  EG-Mit-
9 I i eds I ander  auf  dem  Te I ekorrmun i kat i onssek tor  konve.rg i eren  zu 
lassen.  Die  Voraussetzungen  fur  ein gemeinsames  Vorgehen  inner-
halb  der  EG  werden  zum  einen  Teil  als  bereits  erfullt  und  zum 
anderen Teil  als  erful lbar  angesehen.  Auf  dieser Grundlage  wer-
den  fur  al le  EG-Mitgl iedslander  einheitliche  telekommunika-
tionspolitische  Positionen vorgeschlagen: 
A) 
B) 
Die  EG  akzeptiert,  daB  die  ausschl ieBiichen  und  besonderen 
Rechte  der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  fur  Angebot,  Bereitstel-
lung  und  Betrieb  der  Netzinfrastruktur  aufrecht  erhal ten 
werden  (Netzmonopol).  Sie  akzeptiert  aber  auch  fur  das 
ganze  Net z  ode r  fur  .Te i I e  de sse I ben  e i nen  fre i zug i ge ren 
Status;  auch  dann  ist  die  kurz- und  langfristige  lntegri-
tat  der  al lgemeinen  Netzinfrasturktur  sicherzustel len. 
Ein  konkurrierendes  Angebot  von  Zweiwege-Satell itenkommu-
nikationssystemen  ist  zu  erwagen.  Es  sol lte  fal lweise  fur 
europaweite  Dienste  erlaubt  Werden,  wenn  di,e  Lebensfahig-
keit  des/der  lnfrastrukturbetreiber(s)  damit  nicht  wesent-
lich beeintr?.chtigt wird. 
Die  EG  akzeptiert  weiter,  daB  eine  begrenzte  Zahl  von  Oa-
sis- (Grund)-Diensten  als  11reservierte  Dienste"  aus-
schl ieBI ich·durch die  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  angeboten  wer-
den  durfen,  wenn  damit  Aufgaben  des  offentl ichen  und  al 1-
gemeinen  lnteresses  erful It  werden.  Die  ~G-Kommi~sion 
sieht  dies  derzeit  nur  fur  den Telefon-Dienst  (Sprachuber-
tragung)  als  notwendig  an. 
C)  AIle  anderen  Dienste  sol len  uneingeschankt· angeboten  wer-
den  konnen. 
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D)  Strikte  Auflagen  sollen  die  Einhaltung  von  Normen  fur  die 
Netzinfrastruktur  und  die  Dienste  der  Fernmeldeverwaltun-
gen  sowie  fur  Dienste  anderer  Anbieter  mit  vergleichbaref 




In  einer  EG-Richtl inie  sol I  ktar  festgelegt  werden,  welche 
Auflagen  die  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  den Anbietern  von  Wett-
bewerbsdiensten  (auch  von  grenzubergreifenden  Diensten) 
fur  die  Benutzung  des  Netzes  machen  durfen.  Dazu  soli  ein 
Konzept  fur  einen  offenen  Netzzugang  {Open  Network  Provi-
sion,  ONP)  vorbereitet  werden. 
Das  Angebot  von  Endgeraten  muB  EG-weit  unbeschr~nkt  sein. 
wobei  der  erste  Telefonapparat  am  HauptanschluB  fur  eine 
Obergangszeit  ausgenommen  werden  kann.  Satelliten-Erdsta-
tionen,  die  nur  fur  den  Empfang  bestirrrnt  sind,  sind  wie 
Endgerate  zu  behandeln. 
Die  hoheitlichen  sind  von  den  betrieblichen  Tatigkeiten 
der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  zu  trennen. 
H)  Die  unternehmerischen  Tatigkeiten  der  Fernmeldeverwaltun-
gen  sind  strikt  und  fortgesetzt  zu  uberprufen  (gemaB  Art. 
85,  86  und  90  EWG-Vertrag). 
I)  AIle  privaten  Anbieter  in  den  neu  ge5ffneten  Marktberei-
chen  sind strikt und  fortgesetzt  zu uberprufen  {gemaB  Art. 
85  und  86  EWG-Vertrag). 
J)  ·Die  gemeinsame  Handelspol itik  der  EG  soli  auch  auf  das 
Fernmeldewesen .angewandt  werden. 
Die  EG  akzeptiert  Unterschiede  zwischen  den  Mitgl iedstaaten  in 
Bezug  auf  den  c5ffentl ich-rechtl ichen  oder  privaten  Status  der 
Netzbetreiber.  Falls  die  finanzielle  Leistungsfahigkeit  einer 
Fernmeldeverwaltung  es  erfordert,  erlaubt  die  EG-Korrmission. 
daB  entweder 
a)  der  bloBe  Wiederverkauf  der  Sprachkapazitat  von  Mietlei-
tungen  verboten wird  ~der 
b)  benutzungsabhangige  Gebuhrenelemente  in  die  Gebuhren  fur 
Mietleitung~n einbezogen werden. 
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den  bereits  eingeleitete~ MaBnahmen  der  EG  wie 
Besch I eun igung  der  Konvergenz  und  I ntegr ita  t  der  Netz in-
frastruktur  durch 
Durchfuhrung  der  Programme  RACE  und  STAR. 
einheitl ich digitate Mobilfunk-Kommunikation 
europaweite  Verwirklichung  der  ISON-Empfehlung  (86/ 
659/EWG}. 
Ausweitung  der  gegenseitigen Anerkennung  der  Zulassung  fur 
Telekommunikations-Endgerate 
R i cht I in i e  zur  Of fnung  des  Zugangs  zu  o  ffent I i chen  Te I e-
. korrrnun i kat I onsauft ragen 
schlagt die  EG-Kommission  in  ihrem Grunbuch  folgende  erganzende 
"Aktionslinien"  vor: 
(I)  Wesentl ich verstarkte  Entwicklung  von  Normen  und  Spe-
z if  i kat ion  en:  S.cha f fung  e i nes  europa i schen  Ins t i tut  s 
fur  Telekommunikationsnormen. 
(II}  Bereitstellung  eines  110ffenen  Netzzugangs
11  (ONP) 
{ I I I )  Ge~einsame Entwicklung  europaweiter.Dienste 
{IV)  Europalsche  ·Position  zur  Satell itenkorrmunikation 
(V)  Konzept  fur  Drittlander  (GATT} 
(VI)  Analyse  sozialer Auswirkungen . 
.. ..  • 
.)·· 
\ ....... 
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Stel lungnahme  des  VD~~ 
Der  VDMA  begruBt  grundsatzl ich  die  im  Grunbuch  der  EG  vorge-
schlagenen  Positionen  sowie  geplanten  neuen  Aktionen  ~nd nimmt 
dabei  zu  einzelnen Aspekten  wie  folgt  Stellung: 
,  . 
2. 
3 . 
Die  ausschlieBI iche  Zuordnung  des  Angebots  der  Netzinfra-
struktur  zu  den  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  (Position A)  ist  mit 
besonderen Auflagen  insbesondere  bezuglich der  Gebuhrenre-
gelungen  zu  verbinden: 
Anpassung  der  Cebuhren  an  die  Kostenstruktur  und  den 
technischen  Fortschritt,  d.h.  insbesondere  Senkung 
der  Ferntarife  im  Fernsprechnetz  und  im  ISDN 
breites  Angebot  von  Obermittlungsleistungen,  insbe-
sondere  auch  von  pauschal  tarifierten  Festverbindun-
gen. 
(In diesem  Zusanmenhang  sei  auch  auf  die· ausfuhrl iche  11 Po-
sition  des  VDM.A  zu  den  Telekommunikationsgebuhren  der 
Deutschen  Bundespost
11  vom  26.11.1986  hingewiesen.) 
Die  "Erfullung  von  Aufgaben  des  offentl ichen  und  allgemei-
nen  lnteresses"  ist  kein  ausreichend  klares  Entscheidungs-
kriterium  fur  die  Einstufung  eines Dienstes  in die Katego-
rie  "Reservierte  Basisdienste11  (Position B).  Insbesondere 
bes teht  die  Ge fahr,  daB  mit  der  umfangre i chen  Lis te  von 
Telediensten,  die  in  der  Empfehlung  des  EG-Ministerrats 
zum.  ISDN  vom  22.12.86  enthalten  ist,  Edne  erhebl iche  Aus-
weitung  dieser  "Basisdienste"  erfolgt.  Die  Fernmeldever-
waltungen  k6nrrten  dagegen  die  ausschlieBliche  Bereitstel-
lung  der  Obermittlungsdienste  ubernehmen,  das  heiBt  jener 
Dienste,  die  sich  auf  die  reine  Obertragung  und  Vermitt-
lung  uber  das  physikal ische  Netz  (die  lnfrastruktur)  be-
schranken.  In  diesem  Sinne  soli  auch  die  Einstufung  des 
Telefondienstes  als  "reservierter  Dienst"  verstanden  wer-
den.  Auch  hier  sol I ten  die  uber  das  Vermitteln  von  Tele-
fongesprachen  hinausgehenden  Zusatzleistungen  (z.B.  Rufum-
leitung,  Sprachspeicherung}  nicht  unter  die  reservierten· 
ausschl ieBiichen  oder  besonderen  Rechte  der  Fernmeldever-
waltungen  (allen. 
Die  Einrichtung  eines  europ~ischen "lnstituts  fGr  Telekom-
munikationsnormen"  (Aktionslinie  I)  wird  im  Umfeld  der 
jetzt  schon vielfaltigen Gremien,  die  an  der  Standardisle-
rung  von  Te I ekorrmun i kat i onse i nr i chtungen  und  Te I el(ptt:mur i.-
kationsdiensten  arbeiten,  mit  Skepsis  betrachtet.  Oe.r  ~­
ha It  die  gegenwa r t  i ge  Vorgehenswe i se  be i  CEN,  CENEL~.G  . H,d 
CEPT  fGr  grundsatzl ich  ausreichend,  um  die  im  RaH1111.~  .Is 
Europil i schen  IT-Normenprograrrms  an fa II enden  Arbe t ten.  ~!l)r 
Normung  der  Funktionalen  Profile  zu  bewaltigen  (EN,ttNvl. 
Dies  gi It  insbesondere  wenn,  wie  geplant,  mit  ~OS (~uro-
·  .. 
•  .. 
•  • 
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pean  Workshop  for  Open  Systems)  eine  Koordinationsplatt-
forrn  geschaffen  wird,  urn  diese  Profile  europa- und  welt-
wei t  abzus t irrmen..  In  d i esem  Rahmen  so II te  auch  die  CEPT 
die  Verantwortung  fur  die  bis  heute  definierten  NET  wahr-
nehmen,  dabei  al lerdings  Vertreter  der  Anwender- und  Her-
s t e I I e r s e i t e  h i n z u z i e hen ,  urn  s i e  g I e i c hbe r e c  h t i g t  an  den 
Entscheidungsprozessen  mitwirken  zu  lassen.  Ole  Erarbei-
tung  von  Grundnormen  ("basic  standards")  sol I  weiterhin  in 
der  Verantwortung  der  n~tionalen Normenorganisationen  lie-
gen. 
(Ein  Fernziel  konnte  allerdings  sein,  ein  11 lnstitut  fur 
IT-Normung  in der  EG"  aufzubauen,  in welchem die gegenwar-
tig  von  CEN,  CENELEC  und  CEPT  wahrgenommenen  Aufgaben  zur 
Normung  Funktionaler  Profile  (EN,  E~~.  NET}  fur  die  gesam-
te  lnformatfonstechnik  zusammengefaBt  werden.  Die  EV~S-Ak­
tivitaten muBten  dann mit  denen  dieses  lnstituts  zusammen-
gefuhrt  werden.  Ein  solches  europiisches  "lnstitut  fur 
IT-Normung 11  sollte  offen  sein  fur  die  gleichberechtigte 
Mitarbeit  aller  interessierten  Kreise  und  eno  mit  den  in-
ternationalen  Normenorganisationen  ISO,  IEC  und  CCITT  zu-
sarrmenarbeiten.} 
4.  Die  Bereitstellung  offener  Netzzug?nge  durch  den  Netzbe-
treiber  wird ·in  den  USA  (Open  Network  Access- ONA}  als 
notwendige  Bedingung  fur  einen  fairen  Wettbewerb  zwischen 
Dienste-Anbietern  mit  gemieteter  und  eigener  Netz infra-
struktur  angesehen.  Das  im Grunbuch  vorgeschlagene  europa-
ische  Pendant  "Open  Network  Provision- ONP 11  ist  zu  be-
gruBen,  wenn  es  sich  als  Instrument  zur  Erzielung  fairer 
5. 
Wettbewerbsbedingungen  erweist.  Es  bedarf  jedoch  noch  der 
genaueren  Spezifizierung  und  internationalen  Harmonisie-
rung,  bevor  es  Gegenstand  einer  EG-Richtlinie  werden  kann 
(Ak t ions I in i e  I I ) • 
Bei  der  gemeinsamen  Entwicklung  europaweiter  Telekommuni-
kationsdienste  (Aktionsl inie  I I I)  sollte nach  dem  Wortlaut 
des  Grunbuchs  darauf  geachtet  werden-,  "insbesondere  das 
Potential  von  privaten  lnitativen  voll  zu  mobilidiseren". 
Dies  schl ieBt  auch  minimale  Nutzungsbeschrankungen  und 
kostengerechte  Gebuhren  fur  die  benotigten  Obermittlungs-
(Trager)-Dienste  ~in.  Damit  wird  auch ·ein  Anreiz  fQr  pri-
vate  Mehrwertdienste  geschaffen,  die  an  speziel len  Anfor-
derungen  b~stimmter Benutzergruppen orientiert werden  kon-
nen. 
lm  ubrigen  stimmt  die  im  Grunbuch  der  EG  dargelegte  Tetekommu-
nikationspol itik uberein mit  den  Grundsatzposition  des  VDMA  zur 
T.~ I ekorrmun i kat ion. 
Frankfurt,  den  24.08.1987 
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Bereits  im  Jahre  1980  hat  der  VDMA  seine  Grundsatzpositionen 
zum  Thema  Telekonmunikation  veroffentl icht  un.d  dabei  u.a.  die 
technisch-organisatorischen  Crundlagen  fur  eine  Trennung 
zwischen  Monopolbereich  der  Deutschen  Bundespost  und  markt-
wi r t scha ft I i chem  Bereich  lm  Te I ekonmun t kat i onssektor  beschr i e-
ben.  Die  seitherigen  Ansitze  z.B.  der  Monopolkonrnlssion  "Zur 
Rolle  der  Deutschen  Bundespost  im  Fernmeldewesen"  oder  der 
Enquete-Korrmission  des  Deutschen  Bundestags  "Neue  lnformations-
und  Korrmunikationstechniken 11 ,  die  wirtschafts- und  ordnungspo-
1 itischen  Voraussetzungen  fur  eine  solche  irrmer  dringl icher 
werdende  Trennung  zu  klaren,  wurden  vom  ~A  nachhaltig  unter-
stOtzt  und  mitgetragen. 
Der  inzwischen  vorl iegende  Bericht  der  Regierungskommission 
Fernmeldewesen  bestatigt  die  vom  VDMA  schon  bisher  vertretene 
Haltung  zu  den  Herausforderungen  der  Telekommunikationspolitik 
an  Wirtschaft  und  Staat.  Hierzu  wird  der  Verband  noch  detail-
! iert  Stel lung  beziehen. 
Aufgrund  des  rasanten  technischen  Fortschrittes  in  der  Halblei-
tertechnik,  der  Konstruktion  modernster  Endgerate,  der  digita-
l isierten  und  integrierten Obertragung  von  Sprache,  Daten,  Text 
und  Abbi ldungen  entsprechen  die  gesetzl ichen  Rahmenbedingungen 
immer  weniger  den  Erfordernissen  der  privaten,  gewerbl ichen  und 
industriel~en Nutzer  der  Telekommunikation. 
Die  Bundesregierung  hat  mit  Einsetzung  der  Regierungskommission 
Fernmeldewesen  im  Jahre  1985  die  Notwendigkeit  erkannt,  die 
Schere  zwischen  den  technischen  Moglichkeiten  einerseits  und 
den  organisatorischen,  wirtschaftl ichen  und  rechtl ichen Voraus-
setzungen  andererseits  zu  schl ieBen.  Sicherlich  kann  die 
....._  Liberalisierung  einer  Caber  hundert  Jahre  gewachsenen  Marktsi-
tuation  nicht  in  einem  einzigen  Sctiritt  vollzogen  werden.  Sie 
s t e I I t  v i e I  me h r  e i n en  k on t i n u i e r I i chen  Pro  z e B  d a r ,  i n  d em  au  c h 
kunftige  informationstechnische  Entwicklungen  ihren  Nieder-
schlag  finden  mussen. 
Der  vn.t-.\A.  empf i eh It,  die  fur  die  informations techn i sche  I ndu-
strie  wichtigen  Empfehlungen  der  Regierungskommission  Fernmel-
dewesen  unverzugl ich  zu  real isieren,  insbesondere 
Liberal isierung  des  Endgeratemarkts 
Der  freie  Wettbewerb  bei  allen  Endeinrichtungen,  auc~ mit 
Betei I igung  der  Deutschen  Bundespost  zu  marktgerechten 
Kond it  i onen,  is  t  fur  den  V[')~  e i ne  se I bs tvers tand  I, i che 
Konsequenz  der  wirtschaftl ichen  Ordnuno  der  Bundesrepdbl ik 
- f 
I  •  ,~  • 
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Deutschland.  Hlnslchtlich der  Zulassung  von  Endeinrichtu~-· 
gen  begruBt  es  dIe  informations techn I sche  Indus t r i e,  daB 
die  bisherlge  Verfahrensweise,  insbes.ondere  was  ihre 
administrativen Anforderungen,  die  Prufzeit  und  die  Kosten 
betrifft,  auf  efn  vernOnftiges  MaB  zuruckgeschraubt  werden 
. so I I. 
Wettbewerb  bei  den  Telekommunikationsdienstleistungen 
Konsequent  im  Sinne  einer  Neuordnung  der  Telekorrmunikation 
ist  das  Recht  fOr  private  Unternehmen,  al le Dienstleistun-
gen  der  Telekommunikation,  insbesondere  auch  die  sogenann-
ten  Mehrwertdienste,  selbst  anzubieten  und  zu  erbringen. 
Der  VDMA  akzeptlert  den  Vorschlag  der  Regierungskommission 
Fe rnme I dewesen,  daB  der  Te I e fond i ens t  vor I auf i g  de r 
Deutschen  Bundespost  als Monopol  verbleibt.  Gleichwohl  ist 
abzusehen,  daB  durch  die  Integration  mit  anderen  Telekom-
mun i kat i onsd i ens ten  im  Ze ita Iter  des  I  SON  das  Monopo I  im 
Telefondienst  an  die  ordnungspot itischen  Regelsetzu~gen 
fur  die  anderen  Telekommunikatfonsdienste  angeglichen 
werden  muB. 
Bedingtes  Festhalten  am  Netzmonopol 
ne r  VDMA  wen de t  s i ch  n i ch t  dagegen  da s  Net zmonopo I  de r 
Deutschen  Bundespost  aufrecht  zu  erhalten,  sofern  entspre-
chend  den  Empfehlungen  der  Regierungskommission  Fernmelde-
wesen  die  Bundesreg i erung  daruber  wacht,  daB  Fest- und 
Wahlverbindungen  zu  angemessenen  und  wettbewerbsfnhigen 
Bedingungen  entsprechend  dem  qualitativen  und  quantitati-
ven  Bedarf  von  der  Deutschen  Bundespost  zur  Verfugung 
gestel It  werden.  Die  von  der  Kommission  empfohlenen 
Ausnahmen  i~ Bereich drahtloser  Netze,  beim Satel I itenfunk 
sowie  bei  grundstucksuberschreitenden  privaten  Kabelver-
bindungen  werden  vom  ~~  begruBt. 
Liberal isierung  und  Gebuhrenpol itik sind  untrennbar  miteinander 
verknupft.  Der  VDtv~  sieht  sich  in  seiner  bisherigen  Haltung 
durch  die  Erklarungen  des  Bundespostministers  bestatigt,  daB 
die  vorgesehenen  Liberalisierunsschritte  nur  dann  tatsachlich 
zu  neuen  Anwendungen  und  einer  besseren  Marktnffnung  fuhren 
werden,  wenn  die  heutigen  nutzungszeitabh?.ngigen  Tarife  fur 
Festverbindungen  deutlich  gesenkt  und  mittelfristig  durch  ein 
anderes  Gebuhrensystem ersetzt werden. 
Der  VD~.,AA  wird  wie  bisher  aile  ~chritte  unterstutzen,  die 
Empfehlungen  der  Regierungskommission  Fernmeldwesen  zur  Neuord-
nung  der  Telekommunikation  schnel I  und  konsequent  zu  verwirkl i-
chen.  Der  YD"-"A  wi rd  auch  in  Zukunft  an  der  Erarbe i tung  prak-
tisch  handhabbarer  Losungen  mitwirken  und  in  allen Detai lfra9en 
und  Gremien  seine  fachl iche  Kompetenz  und  seine  praktischen 
Erfahrungen  einbringen . 
. 8 on n ,  den  9 •. , 0 • 1 9 8 7 
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STATEMENT  zum  Grunbuch  der  EG-Kommission  uber  die  Entwicklung  der 
Telekommunikation  im  Gemeinsamen  Markt 
I  Forderungen 
1.  Zur  Beseitigung  der  bestehenden  Wettbewerbsverzerrungen  im 
Bereich  der  Telekommunikation  der  EG-Mitglieder  ist es  not-
wendig,  eine  Vereinheitlichung der  Benutzungsbedingungen 
aller Fernmeldeverwaltungen  der  EG  schnellstm6gliGh ·herbei-
zufuhren. 
Die  EG-einheitlichen  Benutzungsbedingungen  mussen  so  liberal 
wie  irgend  moglich  formuliert  werden. 
In  den  (vereinheitlichten}  Benutzungsb~dingungen muG  fest-
geschrieben werden,  ~aG  jed~r Teilnehmer  die  von  ihm  legal 
genutzten  Wahl- und  Festverbindungen in jeder  ihm  geeignet 
erscheinenden  Weise  nutzen  darf. 
Die·s  bedeutet,  dal3  je'd'er =Teilnehmer  das  Recht  haben  muG, 
uber  die  genutzten  Anschlusse  (Wahl- und  Festverbindungen) 
Informationen  jeder  Art  (Sprache,  Daten,  Festbilder,  Be-
wegtbilder  usw.)  zu  ubertragen,  Festverbindungen  durch  Ka-
nal- bzw.  Frequenzteiler aufzusplitten und  gleichzeitig  fur 
verschiedene  Zwecke  zu  nutzen,  Nachrichten  jeder  Art  fur 
Dritte  zu  ubermitteln,  aber  auch  das  Recht  hat,  seine  An-
schlusse  (Wahl- und  Festverbindungen)  teilweise  oder  ganz 
Dritten  zur  Nutzung  zu  uberlassen. 
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2.  Der  Auffassung  der  EG-Kommission  (Zusammenfassung  Seite 18, 
Paginierstempel-Nr.  027)  "Es  (wurden)  weiterhin  ~edeutende 
Unterschiede  zwischen  den  Mitgliedsstaaten bestehen,  die 
jedoch  zu  akzeptieren  sind",  muG  mit  Nachdruck  widersprochen 
werden!!! 
Es  kann  in einer  Gemeinschaft  nicht  hingenommen  werden,  daG 
" ...  auch  die  Unternehmenspolitik  bezuglich· der  Bereitstel-
lung  von  Mietleitungen  und  des  Wiederverkaufs ·von  Kapazita-· 
ten  auch  kunftig  den  Netzbetreibern_uberlassen  werden  darf." 
3.  Wenn  die  EG-Kommission  bei  dieser  Auffassung bleibt,  dann 
sind alle Gbrigen  Bemuhungen  um  Vereinheitlichung sinnlos. 
Dann  bliebe  es  beispielsweise dabei,  daG  in GroGbritannien 
Agenturen  zum  Nutzen· der  Anwender  auch  aus  anderen  Mit-
gliedsstaaten der  EG  weiterhin tatig sein durften,  aber  in 
der  Bundesrepublik  auch  kunftig  verboten  waren. 
Die  bestehenden  unterschiedlichen  Nutzungsbedingung~n be-
gunstigen  seit Jahren  einseitig "groGe"  (multinational  t~­
tige)  Anwender  und  benachteiligen. "kleine"  (nur  national 
tatige)  Benutzer,  sie  wirken  demzufolge  nicht  nur  wettbe-
werbsverzerrend,  sondern ·auch  konzentrationsfordernd. 
4.  Besonders  dringlich  neben  der  Vereinheitlichung  der  Benut-
zungsbedingungen  ist die  gegenseitige  Anerkennung  von  Zu-
lassungen  fur  Telekommunikationseinrichtungen  jeder Art. 
Dies  bedeutet,  daG  kunftig  die  Zulassung  einer  fernmelde-
technischen  Einrichtung  durch  eine  Fernmeldeverwaltung  eines 
Mitgliedsstaates der  EG  automatisch  dazu  fuhren  muG,  daG 
diese  Zulassung  im  Bereich  der  gesamten  EG  gilt. 
Grundsitzlich ist fur  di~  Zulassung  von  fernmeldetechnischen 
Einrichtungen  jeder  Art  den  nationalen  Fernmeldeverwaltungen 
vorzuschreiben,  daG  eine  Zulassung  nur  dafin  verweigert  werden 
darf,  wenn  die·von  der  Fernmeldeverwaltung  nachzuweisende  Ge-
fahr  besteht,  daG  von  dem  :zur  Zulassung  vorgestellten Gerat 
Storungen  in  das  Netz  ausgehen  konnen.· 
Diese  Forderung  hat  das  Bundesverfassungsgericht  der  Bundes-
republik  Deutschland  fur  Endgerate bereits  mit  dem  BeschluO 
vo~ 12.10.1977  (1  BvR  216/217/75)  festgeschrieben. 
5.  Um  die  bestehenden  Wettbewerbsverzerrungen  zu  beseitigen,  ist 
es  daruber  hinaus  notwendig,  daG  in  jedem  Telekommunikations-
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dings  ist den  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  ein  angemessener  Ge-
winnzvschlag  zuzugestehen,  damit  sie auch  kunftig  in  der 
Lage  sind,  Investitionen  in  neue  Dienste  und  weitere  In-
frastrukturaufgaben  zu  finanzieren. 
6.  Mit  der  Ourchsetzung  kostendeckender  Tarife  in  jedem  Dienst-
zweig  (siehe  Nr.  5)  ist die  (volkswirtschaftlich  kaum  sinn-
volle)  Zulassung  von  Wettbewerb  auf  der  Netzebene  entbehrlich . 
Dies  ist umso  wichtiger,  als eine pr§zise  und  ~eicht Gber-
prufbare  Abgrenzung  zwi~chen Monopol- und·Wettbewerbsbereich 
durch  die  zunebmende  Integrierung von  Sprache,  Oaten  und  wei.-
teren  Informationen  (Festbild,  Bewegtbild  usw.)  nicht  moglich 
is  t  ( z . 8.  IS ON) . 
7.  Das  Endgeratemonopol  der  Fernmeldeverwaltungen der  EG  am 
einfachen  FernsprechhauptanschluG· ist aufzuheben. 
Es  muG  dem  Benutzer  uberlassen  werden,  welche  zugelassenen 
Endgerate  er  benutzen  will  und  seine Entscheidung  jeder-
zeit  andern  zu  konnen,  ohne  daG  er  dazu  einer  Genehmigung 
der  fur  ihn  zustandigen  Fernmeldeverwaltung bedarf. 
8.  Die  EG-Kommission  muG  darauf  hinwirken,  dae  in  jedem .EG-
Mitgliedsstaat  durch  eine  unabhangige  Institution  uber-
pruft wird,  daG  die  nationale  Fernmeldeverwaltung  die  vor-
gegebenen  Bedingungen  auch  einhalt. 
Jeder  Anwender,  der  sich benachteiligt fuhlt,  mua  einen  An-
spruch  darauf  haben,  daO  die  Aufsichtsbehorde  seine  Beschwer-
de  uberpruft  .· 
9.  Der  EG  gehoren  ausschlieOlich  Mitglieder  an,  die  das  Prin-
zip  der  Rechtsstaatlichkeit  anerkennen  und  praktizieren. 
In  einem  Rechtsstaat  hat  aber  eine  Fernmeldeverwaltung  aus-
schlieGllch  dienende  Funktionen  fur  ihre  Burger  (und  na-
turlich  auch  Unternehmen  und  Institutionen der  Offent-
lichen  Hand)  auszuuben.  · 
Allein  schon  aus  diesem  Grund  muGte  die  Erfullung  der  in 
diesem  Statement  aufgestellten Forderungen  selbstverstand-
lich sein. 
10.  Die  Realisierung  dieser  Forderungen  ist mit  absoluter  Prio-
ritat voranzutreiben. 
·:. 
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II  Anmerkungen  zu  den  Vorstellungen  der  EG-Kommission 
1.  Das  Ziel  der  EG~Kommission  (Zusammenfassung,  Seiten  12  und 
13,  Paginierstempel-Nr. ·018  und  019),  einerseits den  Fern-
meldeverwaltungen  zur  Sicherstellung  ihres offentlichen 
Dienstleistungsauftrages  den  "herk6mmlichen"  Fernsprech-
dienst  (Sprachubertragung)  als·aasisdienst  im  Monopol  zu 
belassen  und  andererseits ·fur  die  Mehrwertdienste  Wettbe-
werb  zuzulassen,  ist nicht erreichbar. 
Die  Kommission  schreibt  s~lbst (Seite 12,  Paginierstempel-
Nr.  018),  daG  "eine stabile  •natilrliche•  Grenzlinie ... 
nicht moglich"  ist.  .··.;. ... ,.! 
Da  die  Kommission  andererseits die  F6rderung  des  ISDN  for-
dert, ·muG  der  Kommission  klar sein,  daB  Sprache  von  der 
Ubertragung  anderer  Informationen nicht  mehr  zu  trennen ist. 
2.  Strikt abzulehnen ist die  Vorstellung  der  EG-Kommission, 
"gemeinschaftsweite  Standards"  (Seite  20,  Paginierstempel-
Nr.  029)  zu  entwickeln.·  · 
Dies  wurde  gegenuber  der  bisher ublichen  Vereinbarung  von 
Standards  auf  CEPT- bzw.  CCITT-Basis  einen erheblichen 
Ruckschritt  bedeuten  und  ~amit zwangslaufig  neue  Handels-
hemmnisse  schaffen. 
3.  Genauso  strikt abzulehnen ist die  Bereitschaft der  EG-Kom-
mission,  den  nationalen  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  fur  eine_ zeit-
lich nicht  konkret definierte Ubergangszeit  das  Monopol  an 
Endgeraten  bei  gewohnlichen  Fernsprechhauptanschlussen  (Pa-
ginierstempel-Nr.  024)  zu  belassen. 
4.  Wenn  man  dem  rechtsstaatlichen Prinzip zustimmt,  daG  die 
Fernmeldeverwaltungen  ausschlieGlich eine  dienende  Funktion 
den  Bilrgern,  der  Wirtschaft  und  der  tlffentlichen  Verwaltung 
-~  gegenuber  ZU  erfUllen  haben,  dann  ist entweder  uberhaupt 
'- nicht vertretbar,  daG  die  Fernmeldeverwaltungen  am  Wettbe-
werb  in  den  Endgeratemarkten  (im  weitesten Sinne dieses 
Wortes) ·teilnehmen,  oder  dieses Recht  muG  zumindest  mit  dem 
Verbot  gekoppelt  sein,·  ~ie  Teilnahme  am  Wettbewerb  durch 
Alimentierung  aus  ErlH~en der  Netzmonopole  auch  nur  teil-
weise  zu  finanzieren. 
5.  Die  Gesamtheit  der  Vorschlage  der  EG-Kommission  birgt die 
Gefahr  eine  Uberregulierung  in  sich,  die  dem  Trend  zu~ Li-
beralisierung  zuwiderlauft. 
VF.RBAND  DER  POSTBENUTZER  E.V. 
De:- Vorstand 
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IB.\1  EUROPE 
1.0  Introduction 
IB.\1  Europe is  pleased to have the opportunity to submit these comments to the 
Commission of the European Communities on the Corrunission·s Green Paper on 
the Development  of the Common  ~Iarket for  Telecommunications Ser\'ices  and 
. Equipment.•  · 
These conuuents take into consideration IB:\f's .experience in pro\iding information 
processing  and  telecommunications  equipment  and  services  to  ~ur .  customers 
throughout Europe.  Today IB:\I  is  an integral part of the European Information 
Technology industry, as we employ close to  100,000 nationals in :\-lember States of 
the European Community (including over 5,000 engaged in research and develop-
ment in six laboratories and development centers) and operate fourteen production 
facilities covering almost our entire range of producu.  ·  · 
The requirements of  our customers, who increasingly ask for products and senices 
integrating telecommunications and information processing apabilities, reflect the 
gro\\ing interdependence of these two industry sectors.  These emerging demands 
are in many cases constrained by the complexity and rigidity of  telecommunications 
regulations and restrictions that can be found across Europe.  This is of  great. con-
cern to our customers and limits our ability, and that of  other systems and senice 
providers, to meet their requirements satis(actorily.  • 
IB~  Europe therefore welcomes the initiative of  the Commission in seeking to fos-
ter a more open and competitive  telecomrn~nications regime in Europe.  'Ve have 
been particularly impressed by the ,,·ork already achieved by the Commission in the 
past years in the field of  telecommunications and by the openness of  the consulta-
tion process that has been elected; it is in this constructive S})irit  that we wish to 
offer several thoughts that we believe will  enhance the potential of achie\ing the 
Conunission's objectives.  Our aim is to contribute to the discussion on this impor- · 
tant subject in order to promote rapid development of the Information Society in 
Europe.  \Ve believe that this goal is a common objec:tive ofusers, ofthe Informa-
tion  Technology  industry,  of Telecommunica.tions  Administrations,  of Member 
State goven;unents, and ofthe European Commission. 
I  CO~I(87) 290 final.  Brussels. 30 June 1987. 
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JB.\1  J:."C.:ROP£ 
2.0  Sum1nary 
I BJ! fully tndorses tlze  pro·comperitive directions of  the  Commissio,·s Green  Paper. 
The  Commission has recognised tire  critical imporrmrce ofttlecommwzications to the 
European econontv and the 11eed for i11creased competition on a Comnrwzity-widt basis 
in order to eruure to all users the benefits of  technological inno,•ation. 
\Vhilc the Commission refers to and even quotes from papers addressing user inter-
ests  in  telccomn1unications  liberalisation,  the ·starting point  of the Green  Paper 
·  ..  ~eems to be the status quo.  The principle question asked is where sho':lld competi-
tion be introduced. 
JVe  suggest that the more appropriate starting point is the recognition char the goau 
of  a Community-wide market can best be achieved through the maxinrwnfeasible reli-
ance orz open competition.  J.,fonopoly protection should be viewed as lht exception. only 
tO  be permiued where it Call be demoristrated that marketp/aceforces Wt1lnqt SUCCeed 
in achieving certain publicly desirable goals. 
In order to ensure that the perspectives of  all panies concerned are properly taken 
into consideration, it is necessary to draw upon the wisdom of  experts representing 
myriad interests.  The Commission established in 1983 a Senior Officials Group on 
Telecommunications (SOG-T).  It appears however that SOG-T, as presently con-
stituted,  is  comprised  primarily of Teleconununications Administration represen-
tatives.  Commission  proposals  on  the  limits  of  monopoly  protection  for 
Administrations and on obligations to be imposed on Administrations to enable the 
development of a competitive marketplace warrant a broader spectrum on consul-
tation. 
IB~\1 suggests char the Commission should reexamine 1M composition of  chi's adrisory 
body and encourage Jl-lember  States to designate natiiJnal delegations 10 SOG-T re-
flecting a consensus of  informed opinions of  national industry lJIUI ustr inlerests as weB 
as those of  the Administrations. 
Summary 
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There arc several areas that we believe \\ill be particularly important to achievement 
of Community objectives  for  completion of the internal market in  telecommuni-
cations services and equipment: 
•  Open /Vctwork ProJ•ision 
Essential  questions  to  be considered  include  what  comprises  the  monopoly 
network  infrastructure,  what are  the  requirements  of users  and competitive 
service providers for access  to  the network infrastructure, what is  the proper 
boundary between  the infrastructure and user-provided  equipment, and how 
best  to ensure the Community-wide availability of a  broad spectrum of tele-
communications services meeting user needs.  · 
IBL\1 belie,·es that so long as JJze  bcuic network infrastructure is provided on  an 
exclusi\•e basis or subject to special rights. nondiscriminatory access for all users. 
including competiti\•e service pro\·klers. muse be ensured.  .  .~ 
•  Teleconrnrunications standards and standardisation procedures 
Important matters for consideration at the Conununity level include tenninal 
equipment type approval, standardisation procedures, and the  Commissions· 
proposal for a European Telecommunications Standards Institute. 
J·Ve  belie\'e  char  the  success of  a competiti.,·e marketplace in  telecommunications 
is dependent upon the esta6/ishment of  simple and uniform interface standards for 
access co the basic nen.,·ork. dereloped in open fora with "user anti industry partic-
ipation.  Attlz--t same time. care must be taken _chat standards in the competitire 
arena are no'l made mandatory. so that the workings of  the free marketplace will 
not be inhibited. 
•  Tariff  principles 
• 
A  long history of different pricing practices in different Member States has re-
sulted in tariff anomalies that have a tangible impact on the business commu-
nity and on national and European economies. 
J·V e observe that there is a critical need to rebalance today'  s distorted tariffs for 
Sl"'itched ser.·ices. not only as a mauer of  equity to business users but also as clze 
best means to assuage Administration fears ()f'  cream skimming'.  Business users 
and competiti1·e service providers are highly dependent on leased circuits. and their 
availabiliry at  flat rate. cost-based tariffs ITUl:it be ensured.  ~ 
Participation of Telecommunications Administrations in  the competitive 
marketplace 
The Commission stated that Telecommunications Administrations should be 
permitted to participate in the competitiYe marketplace. 
fVe  agree, bur mechanisms must bt!  established to ensure that they are not able ro 
rake  unfair  ad·.:antage  of the  fact  that  they  also  control  the  bcuic  nenvork 
infrastructure  and offer reserved  ser.'ic~s under  monopoly protection  or special 
rights. 













Our comments on  the  ten  'Proposed Positions' of the Conunission,  as  set forth  in 
Figure  13 of the Green Paper, ar·e as follows  :  .. 
A)  Network infrastructure: 
B) 
I B.\1 has no quarrel with national decisions to maintairr a regime of  exc/usb:e 
provision  or  special  rights  for  the  operatioll  of tire  public  neot.·ork 
infrastructure, so long  as tlrat tam is narrowly d.:fined to mean the physical 
neru:ork of  transmission and switching facilities and does not include functions 
that can best be pro  .. ·ided on a competitive basis.  JJ'e point our. however, that 
competition  in  rlre  nerwork infrastructure may sllinulate greater efficiencies 
in  che operation of  the network and improved responsi,·eness to user require-
~~~  . 
Reserved services: 
I'Ve  agree with  the Commissio1i that the  r~servation of anj services for ex-
clusi,:e provision or special rights must be narrowly construed and subject to 
periodic  re.,·iew.  Telecommunications  Administrations should be protected 
from competition only where it can be demonstrated that benefits to users are 
nor likely to resulc from open compecition. 
C)  Conzpetith·e se1Tices: 
JY e welcome the proposal chat all services not explicitly resen·ed to the Ad-
ministrations be open co free and unrestricted pro,·ision subject to the general 
law.  Conditions  that some  Adminisrrations seek to impose  Olt competitire 
sen•ice pro-.·iders could. howe  ..  ·er, make a mockery of  competziion. 
D)  Standardised scn•ices: 
E) 
F) 
A -priori decisions  rhat  A'lember Srates should ensure the  Community-wide 
pro.,·ision  by Telecommunications  Administrations of  an  extensive  menu of 
standardised ser;ices -- whether demand has been  demonstrated or not -
.could  dZ..-err  the  Administrations from  their  essenti"al  infrastructure  obli-
gations.  JVhile it is indicated char nor all of  these serrices would be 'reservetl, 
financial or ocher  incenrives  a\·ailable  to  the  Administrali"ons could damage 
the workings of  the compeciri\·e marketplace. 
Open Network Provision: 
Open  access  co  the  nerwork  infrasrructure  on  nondiscriminatory terms  in-
cluding  cost-based tariffs  is  essential to  the development of competition  in 
telecommunications services.  Conditions imposed on competiti\·e service pro-
viders for their  use  of the  nene..·ork  must be  kept to  a minimum.  lest the 
workings of  the free marketplace he impacted. 
Terminal equipment:  .  _ 
JVe fully support the  Commission's objective for free and unrestricted com-
petition in all terminal equipment.  We see no reason why the first telephone 
cannot also be provided competitively. as it is today in some J."'lember States; 
and believe thar digital as  well as analogue network terminating equipment 
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G)  ·separation of  regulatory and operational acti1•ities: 
JVe  endorse the Commission·  s proposal that the operational and regulatory 
activities  of the  Telecommunications  Administrations  must  be  separated. 
Care must be taken, however, to ensure that the regulatory authority is truly 
independent of the  Administration's operational actiritits and  encompass~s 
all regulatory aspects, including tariffs for reserved sen·ices  . 
H)  Legal rel·iew of  Telccomnrunications Adnrinistrations: 
JVhile it is heartening to see a clear statement as to the applicability of  these 
prorisions to the Telecommunications Administrations, we  believe- the Com-
mission should provide guidelines as to what constitutes cross-subsidisarion 
and other competitive abuses by Telecommunications Administrations, so long 
as they are granted special rights or exclusb.·e provision of  sen·ices. 
I)  Legal review of  private providers: 
The  general  applicability  pf competition  ~aw to  all  undertakings  should 
minimise the need  for any special requirements applicable to competitive ser-
vice pro,·iders to prevent abuse of  a dominant position. 
J)  Conznron Conrmercial Policy:. 
The de\·elopment of  a common commercial policy should help to further the 
Commission's competitive  opjectit;es  in  international fora such  as  the new 
G A 1T round,  intended to  reduce  barriers  to  aade co  telecommunications 
services, and the ITU JVATTC in  /988, which presents a risk of  extending 
restrictions inhibiting open competition in  i'!ternarional telecommunications 
services. 
Summ:u-y  s 
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/B.\1  EL'ROP£ 
3.0  Open Net,York Provision. 
The primary responsibility of  Tclcconununications Administrations must be the ef-
ficient  operation of the public  network infrastructure and the  provision of basic 
network services.  Quality telecommunications capacity to handle myriad commu-
nication needs is  essential to the continued growth of  the Information Technology 
industry and its contribution to national economies. 
3.1  1'-letli'Ork  Infrastructure 
IB~I has no quarrel with national decisions to maintain a regime of exclusive pro-
vision or special  rights for  the network infrastructure.  The term 'infrastructure·, 
however,  must  be  narrowly  defined  to  comprise_ the·  physical  transmission  and 
S\\itching  facilities  operated by Telecommunications Administrations as a  public 
obligation,  including  the  necessary  capability  to  manage  and . control  the 
infrastructure.  As network operators, the Administrations must be obliged to make 
available to users,  on a  nondiscriminatory basis, the capacity for transmitting in-
forn1ation of  a user's choosing, between points specified by the user., \\ithout change 
in the form or content of the information, at reasonable, cost-based rates, inde-
pendent of the intended application or the type ofinfonnation. 
The Commission also proposes that voice telephone senice be accepted as a ~enice 
reserved, for the time  being, to exclusive provision or special rights.  \Ve consider 
this acceptable only insofar as it is narrowly construed to include only the provision 
on a. universal basis of  public switched voice telephone service, and does not ser\"e 
to impede the implementation of private voice networks or the pro\ision of  ·,'alue-
added· voice services on a competitive basis. 
As privileged providers of the network infrastructUre, Administrations· must offer 
users a choice among basic network sen  ices - circuit smtched, packet switched, and 
fL'(ed  connections or leased circuits.  These are the essential building blocks for pri-
vate networks and also  serve as the backbone for competitive senices.  Pro\iders 
of competitive sen·ices should not be forced to build their offerings on top of  public 
S\\itched services, but should have the flexibility of choosing the underl)ing trans-
mission capacity best suited to  their senice design.  Restrictions  maintained by 
T decommunications Administrations in many ~!ember States must be eliminated 
so that the ability of the private sector to offer cost-effective competitive scnices is 
not inhibited. 
IB::\I  has observed \\ith concern that the Council Recommendaft'On on ISDN2 does 
not include leased circuits in the list of  services to be specified.  Business users today 
are highly dependent on leased circuits for their voice and data communications re-
quirements.  They have made substantial investments in hardware  and software 
utilising the advantages of  leased circuits, and cannot be expected to abandon this 
investment.  They will continue to need leased circuits at cost-based, Oat rate tariffs. 
Standardised interfaces to basic network services should be implemented and pub-
licly disclosed  to facilitate:  ( 1)  production of  compatible tenninal equipment; (2) 
ncnvork interconnection nationally and internationally; and {3) implementation of 
competitive services. 
)~ 
Council Recommendation of 22  December 1986 on the coordinated introduction of the integrated 
services digital network (ISDN) in the European Community (86.659/EEq. 
Open ~ctwork Provision 
.. 









IB.\1  EL'ROPE 
Once  ~cccss to  the infrastructure has been definetl and  irnplementc~ provision of 
specialised sen  ices to meet a diversity of  user needs Can best be ensured through the 
mechanisms of  the free market.  Open access to the network is the essence of  effec~ 
tive competition in tclccommunicati?ns service. 
Sunu11ary: 
•  Telecommunications Administrations have an obli"gation to pro\'lae a menu 
of  cost-based faciliries,  including leased circuits. 
•  Tire  'resen·ed sen•ices'  category proposed by the  Commissi011  should be 
limited to public swirched telephone service . 
•  . Special rights for the  us~ of network facilities should be· limited to  the 
provision of  reserved telephone service. 
•  Access  to  resen•ed  facilities  and  services  must  be  a\·ailah/e  through 
standardised and publicly disclosed interfaces. 
•  Allticompetitive  practices  such  as  discriminatory  tariffs.  limziarions  on 
interconnection  of leased circuits  to  public  switched nentrorks.  and  ie~ 
strictions  against  the  offering  to  third parties  of applications  involving 
message switching must be eliminated. 
Open JVetJvork  Access 
So  long as Telecommunications Administrations continue to enjoy special rights 
\\ith respect to the network infrastructure, they should not be allowed to operate the 
network so as to favor their own competitive services and foreclose efficient access 
for  the provision of competitive services, nationally and internationally.  To deter 
this action, the Commission proposes Open Network Pro\ision {0:\1>)  to  require 
Administrations to offer network access  on a nondiscriminatory basis.  ONP is  a 
criti~al step tO\\-ards  fair  participation by Administrations in  offering  competitive 
sen1.ces. 
[8:\! is  encouraged that the Groupe d'.Analyse  et de  Prevision (GAP) established 
by  the  SOG-T  has  already  initiated  a  study  of  user  requirements  for 
nondiscriminatory access  to Administration networks.  In ortirr to develop  and 
stimulate competitive services, the 0 NP concept has to be developed in conformity 
\\ith service provider and other user perspectives and requirements. 
Cost~effective access to transmission and switching elements· of  the Administration 
networks is a primary requirement.  Users may choose to access competitive services 
through packet- or circuit-switched access or via leased  circuits~  In all  cases, the 
user·s information stream, including protocols of his choosing, should be  ~nsmit­
ted transparently to the competitive sen·ice provider.  Where users access the net-
work at lo\\. bit rates, Administrations should offer senice pro\iders the option of 
concentrating or multiplexing input from several users  so as to minimise the trans-
port costs to the service provider premises.  · 
0:\P should be  on an equal access basis, at the same tariffed rates charged to the 
Administration's own competitive services.  Basic service functions should be made 
available to an Administration's competitors on a  stand~alone basis with technical 
0 pen :"  etwork Prolision 
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JB.\1  EUROPE 
specifications, functiona.l  capabilities, and other quality and operational character-
istics  (such as  instJ.Ilation  and  maintenance time)· equal to  those available  to  the 
Administration's competitive services. 
\Vith the evolution to digital technology, there is  increasing intelligence in the net-
work  which  can  offer  greater. functionality  for  competitive  senice  pro\iders  . 
. \Vhercvcr technically feasible, 0:\P should include such options as reverse charging, 
abbreviated dialing,  call  barring,  and  the  designation  of customer-selected  closed 
user groups.  Another option should be 'virtual qiar capability, which provides users 
\\ith local public S\\itchcd telephone access, but routes calls automatically to a node 
of the  chosen service  provider.  Calling number identification and ans\yer super-
vision are other important features that should be made available. 
A range of  diagnostic and control options should also be available so that compet-
itive service providers can achieve their own network management objectives.  Such 
options shol,lld include, for example, access to information on the status of  a user-s 
local access line, and the ability of  a sen·ice pro\ider to perform loop-back testing 
from his 0\\11 premises.  · 
In order to fully analyse the impact of 0:-\P on  ISO~,  it becomes necessary to de-
velop a list of  interfaces required to satisfy O~P  and compare those \\ith the inter-
faces  planned in the  lSD:'\ environment.  For example, the CCIIT schematic· of 
lSD:-\ reference points depicts a  point 'i\-1'  for  specialised service pro\iders and a 
point  ·p·  for  specialised  network  resources,  but  there  appear  to  be  no  efforts 
undenvay to specify  the interfaces at these reference points in CCITI or GEPT.l 
\Ve suggest that the Commission should encourage prompt standardisation of  these 
interfaces on a  compatible basis,  so  that competitive senice pro\iders can be as-
sured  of nondiscriminatory  access  to  the  specialised  resources ·of the  network 
Ulfrastructure.  · 
Properly defined,  O~P  can enable competitive entrepreneurs to offer users a \\ide 
range of cost-effective,  innovative services  on  a  pan-European basis,  and enable 
Europe to become a  major world-\\ide influence in teleconununications and infor-
mation senices.  As a provider of  value-added network senices throughout Europe 
and as a supplier of  information technology systems used by our customers in their 
own value-added networks,  IB~l would welcome the opportunity to offer our tech-






IB~YI fully  supports  the  Commission's  emphasis  on .O'!fP  lo  achieve 
European-wide private nenvorks and competitive services.  . 
The definition of  0 1.Y P is essential to successful achievement of  other action 
lines proposed in the Commission's Green Paper. 
OlYP conrenr should be defined by users, indusrry. and the Administrations 
on equal terms, and should be in line  with international standards. 
0 1.YP  definition  should be  based on  a ser of  basic functional elements as 
unbundled building blocks for use in  prb:are netv.:ork.s and competitive ser-
vices. 
l  CCITT Fascicle 111.5- Figure 4,.1.310. 
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3.3  JVetu'ork  Teruzi11ation  Point 
IB~l  supports  the  Commission's  c?mmitment  to  a  Community-wide market  in 
telecommunications  terminal  equtpment.  \Vhen  tenninal  equipment  is 
competitively obtained by the user, the physical boundary between the network and 
the user·s equipment must be clearly defined so  that the interface can be precisely 
specified.  The most natural physical boundary is a passive tennination of the local 
loop interconnecting the user"s premises \\ith the network provider's centr.:tl office. 
This boundary most economically permits users ·to interconnect their equipment and 
en~bles Telecommunications Administrations to miniinise their costs. 
Some Administrations argue that termination equipment should be included on the 
network side of  the boundary, thereby inhibiting effective competition.  For todats 
networks the Commission has resolved this question in favor of competition \\ith 
respect to both stand-alone and intcg_rated modems previously provided by Admin-
istrations on an exclusive basis. 
\Ve  are concerned,  howe~·er, that the Council Reconunendation on  lSD~  implies 
that for basic access 'at least the NT  I  function· '"ill be provided by the Adminis-
trations.  Administ:rntions should be pennitted to pro,id~  l\"Tl as a user option, but 
users should also be free  to attach their equipment at a simple 2-wire interface de-
fined at the 'U. reference point.• 
There are those who argue that definition of the interface at ·u· is  dependent on 
loop technology; but while it is  true that, just as \\ith analogue loops, there will be 
a  range of minimum and maximum signal levels and characteristics, specifications 
can be set that are·rlilll and stable within their range.  Another argument is that the 
loop-back function on customer premises is  needed for central office maintenance 
of  the local loop.  The loop-back function, however, can be precisely specified as a 
requirement for user-provided as well as Administration-provided equipment.  . 
A  standardised interface  at 'U' is  the  only way to facilitate  a  Community-wide 
market in l\71 equipment, enabling scale economies and assuring cost-effectiYeness. 
Allowing  users  the freedom to select  their NTI  supplier will  help to develop  the 
marketplace, and \\ill also  enable equipment manufacturers to  achieve  economies 
of scope by incorporating 1\  II  functions in  their terminal equipment offerings.  If 
·u· is  standardised on an international basis, it "ill also permit European manufac-
turers to penetrate the non-European environment. 
Until the interface at U is  standardised, manufacturers may prefer to produce ter-
minal  equipment that ·connects ·at  the established interface_ar""r, and Adminis-
trations should offer this option.  The Council Recommendation on lSD~  proposes 
that the basic access interfaces at 'T' and at 'S' be identical, so  that the same ter-
minal equipment can be attached to NTI or to l\'T2 (eg, a  PABX); and we agree 
that this is desirable. 
At the same time, however, it should be recognised that the inside wiring on user 
prem.ises,  as  between a  PABX and telephone handsets, may be  incapable of sup-
porting a four-\\ire 'SJT' interface.  To ensure that users \\ill be able to access  lSD~ 
\\ithout going to the expense of four-wire cabling, a simpler two-wire interface on 
the terminal side of a  PABX will  also  be  needed; this should be  defmed to be  the 
-'  :-:Tl (network  t~rmination 1) includes functions broadly cqui\·alcnl. to layer 1 of the OSI  reference 
model; ·u· is the reference point between the 1\'Tl and the e.tchangc LT (line termination). 
Open :'\ctwork Pro"ision  9 
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same as the interface specified at ·u·, so that a telephone handset, for example, can 
be connected to a PABX or directly to the ISO:\. • 
Sunrnrary: 
•  Nt!n-..·ork  teruiinating equipment for digital networks ( t!f. NTJ for ISDS) 
slrou~d be competitively provided, just as tire  Commissio11 hcu decided with 
respect to terminatti1g equipment for analogue nenvorks ( eg. modems).· 
•  Tht!  interface  at  the  ISDN 'U'  refc:rence  point should be  stantf.ardisid 
inrernationa/(v. 
3.4  Cortutuuzlty- J·Vide  Se,.Jrices 
.· 
The Green Paper proposes that Member States ensure the Community-v.ide avail-
ability of an extensive array of  services, including several value-added senices.  'Ve 
welcome the concept of  Community-wide services. 
A preordained catalogue of such services, however, does not ensure acceptance by 
potential users.  \Ve suggest, rather, that a critical mass can best be achie.,·cd if  the 
market for new sen;ces is  allowed to evolve naturally, in response to user r~quirc­
ments.  This would allow small and medium-sized as well as larger entrepreneurs to 
offer innovative services \\ithout substantial fmancial risk.  There would be no need 
to impose interconnection obligations on these service providers since  they would 
be motiYated to interconnect with others in order to broaden the appeal of their 
services. -
If Administrations are  obli2ed  to  offer a  menu of standardised telesenices on a 
universal basis, they will  be  -subjected to fmancial burdens if  the expected demand 
does not materialise.  Offsetting these burdens through special financial consider-
ations would not solve the problem, since that would only transfer, not eliminate, 
the costs.  :Vf oreover, if competitive services are provided on a preferential basis by 
Telecommunications Adniinistrations, then the capabilities and senices that could 
be developed by other service providers v.ill not be realised. 
3.4.1  k!DNS- A Case in  Point 
The CEPT is  currently considering a  cooperative venture amo!i European Tele-
communications  Administrations  to  provide  Managed  Data  Network  Services 
(MD~S).  on a  pan-European basis.  MDNS  offer users and application service 
proYiders another option to establishing and managing their-ovm leased circuit net-
works.  They not only offer users added function but also facilitate the performance 
of  application services and stimulate the introduction of  new applications.  Thus an 
~~D~S  pro,;des application independent techniques, which might include security, 
problem management, and performance monitoring.  These form the basis on which 
the :VI 0:\S provider himself, his customer, or a third party such as an application 
provider or a software house could supply specific applications services. 
l\10::\"S  are already provided competitively in the  UK, and on the continent within 
closed user groups; but restrictions on the use of international leased circuits have 
inhibited the development of MD?"S throughout Europe and overseas.  Telecom-
munications Administrations, either individually,  or in concert with one another, 
Open :\"ch\·ork Provision  10 












should be  permitted to  offer  :Vt Dl\S only  on  the s3me  basis as  other service pro-
viders.  If  they were  to offer i\IDNS by means ofpri\'ileged access to the underl}ing 
network facilities,  it would be  impossible for  others to compete  on tcnns that are 
at all fair.  As a result, the market power of  the Administrations would be extended. 
Any reduction in entry to  this market, or any extension of  the market power of the 
Administrations, would inevitably reduce  the choice and range of  senices available 
to  users • 
Sunznzary: 





The response to this demand will more quickly materialise in an open and 
competitive markerplace. 
Competitive ·service pro1•iders need OJ.VP  to permit  achi~emenr of rhe 
Commi'ssiotr·s objecri  ..  ·e of  Commimicy-wide services. 
k!DNS should be recognised as a competitit.·e service and by no means a 
part of  the infrastructure.  · 
1\-l DNS warrants special arrent  ion  by the  Commission to  properly safe-
guard I he business community from rhe poi  en rial of  unfair pr~crices lt:hen 
Telecommunications Administrations also participate. 
Open i"eh\·ork Provision  309 





~'l  .  ~-- J 
~  ( 





.  { 
i  \. .. 





4.0  Telecommunications Standards 
The success of a  competitive marketplace in telecommunications  servi~es and tcr-· 
minal equipment is dependent on the establishment of  simple and unifonn interface 
standards for access to the basic network.  · 
\Vc  agree  that those standards that address  safety and protection of the network 
ngainst  harm  and  personnel  against  injury  can  be  made  mand:uory.  Standards 
however also have  a  place within  the  competitive  marketplace;  here,  compliance 
ought to be voluntary, lest the benefits of  competition be lost.  Voluntary standards 
have been  highl~· successful in the information processing area where, tor example, 
there is  almost uniform voluntary compliance with International Standards for the 
Cobol programming language, for the Universal Product Code for consumer pro-
ducts, and for i\lagnetic Ink Character Recognition for bank checks. 
4.1  Ter11zbzal Equip111ent  Type ApprOl'al 
The Council Directive  on terminal equipment type appro\"als is a significant step 
towards  simp~ing and expediting the type approval process.  The establishment 
of Cornmunity-\\ide 1\ETs6  \'will  reduce· the  burden on manufacturers who  today 
must tailor equipment to disparate national requirements for interfacing '\\ith public 
telecoriununications networks and will facilitate the development of a  Comii!unity-
\\ide market in terminal equipment. 
'Ve express concern, however, that ?'\ETs currently under development by the CEPT 
might result in  ·mandatory conformance to specifications beyond those necessary to 
ensure safety of users and network employees and to ensure protection of public 
networks  from  harm.  The Council  Directive includes  as  a fourth  requirement 
"interworking  of terminal equipment,  in justified cases",  although this  is  not ex-
plained.  IB:.\1  does not object if  this refers to requirements that terminal equipment 
provide proper signals for network usage accounting or comply with certain trans-
mission signal characteristics such as maximum transmit leYel so as not to interfere 
\\ith other network subscribers; such requirements are appropriate to 'access"1\Es 
(  eg, proposed !\ETs 1-4).  It should not be used, however, to establish mandatory 
conformance \\ith additional requirements, such as for example end-to-end proto-
cols. 
Experience in a number of Member States has demonstrated that manufacturers are 
motivated to comply ·with standards on a voluntary basis to achieve, for example, 
compatibility with  public  services.  While  harmonisation  of.cch specifications 
among Member States will  facilitate  compliance, it does not justify defming the 
scope of  type approval requirements to include any requirements beyond the mini-
mum necessary to achieve personal safety and network integrity.  . - .. 
If  users seek assurance that terminal equipment is compatible with a particular ser-
vice, or is able to interoperate with other terminals, they can request manufacturers 
to declare conformity.  Such procedures would be less costly and time consuming 
than including these requirements in the type approval process, and would allo\V 
innovative products to be brought to the marketplace more rapidly. 
s  Council Directive of 24  July 1986 on the initial stage of the m~tual recognition of  c;ype appro\'3.1 for 
telccommuniCJtions terminal e<Iuipment (86/34/EEq. 
'  Normcs europeennes de telecommunications. 
Telccommunic:~tions Standards 
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For terminal-specific 1\ETs (eg, proposed i\ETs  5-~). which arc application specific, 
we  believe that voluntary standards would be sufficient. Today intcropcrability has 
been achie,·ed on more than 600 million telephones world\\ide \\ithout mandatory 
interoperability standards.  Thus while a mandatory NET would be needed for every 
basic network senicc, for all other senices a voluntary standard would suffice. 
In  order  to  facilitate  intcn\·orking  of terminal  equipment  \\ith public  services, 
international rather than European standards should be  established, 'With  the par-
ticipatiop of users  and manufacturers.  Standards addressing  teleconununications 
functions must meet world-wide user requirements if  European manufacturers are. 
to participate effectively in world markets.  ·  · 
iVIanufacturers must also be free to improve the marketability oftheir produc~s by 
incorporating additional features and functions beyond those required for interfac-
ing  with  public senices, such as the Yariety  of enhancements that can be imple-
mented in PBXs.  - - _  ·  ·  ·  · 
iVl utual recognition of test results is  a  welcome initial stage.  As  Member States · 
develop confidence in these procedures, we encourage the Commission to propose 
further liberalisation through the acceptance of manufacturer Yerification of com-
pliance and the mutual recognition of  type approYal, which will funher stimulate the 
development of  a Community-\\ide market. 
Sunzmary: 
•  The  termi'na/ equipment type appro\·al initiatires of  the  Commission are 
welcome. and we support the 1.VET concept. 
•  A1  andatory conformance should he limited to standards dealing  with  dr.e 
safety of  users and nenvork personnel and v;irh pr6ention of  harm ro the 
nen,·ork. 
•  Conformance to other standards as for example for inrenvorking should 
be 1:olunrary. 
•  Tlzere should be no limitations on the freedom of  manufacrurers to incor· 
porare additional functions or features. 
•  The Commission action line on mutual recognition of  type approval should 
be implemented promptly. with national specifics reduced to a minimurtL 
!""' 
4.2  Standardisation Procedures 
The Council of :\[inisters has entrusted significant responsibility for the develop-· 
ment of Community-\\ide 1\'ETs to the CEPT, an association where membership is 
restricted to Telecorrununications Administrations.  As a consequence, 1\Tis to be 
established by the CEPT (and by the TR...-\C  established under the CEPT .:\-icmo-
randum  qf C nderstanding)  are  likely  to  reflect  primarily  the views  of Adminis-
trations and may not be responsi\"e  to the needs of users and terminal equipment 
manufacturers. 
Only recently has the CEPT allowed industry participation in its standards-making 
activities.  Specifically, it  allo\\·s national delegations to technical meetings to in-
T decommunic:1tions St:utdards  JJ 
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elude at most two industry representatives and allows ECi\fA and ECTEL each to 
send two rcprcscntatiYes.  \Vhilc this is  a step in \he right direction, it docs not go 
far enough.  There are several shortcomings: 
•  CEPT meetings where work  items and schedules are established remain closed 
to industry participation. 
•  TI1cre  is  an  arbitrary limit on  the  number of industry  reprcsontati\'es  on  na-
tion;ll delegations  to technical working  sessions, inhib1ting the ability of :\(em· 
bcr  States  to  avail  themselves  of technical  e:<pertise  available  outside  the 
Adnlinistrations. 





A.n  interactive process of consultation during the development of each stand-
ard,  both by  representative  national  review  groups  and  by  the sponsoring 
orga~sations, is essential to achieve acceptability. 
?\ational delegations of mosi Member States are led by Telecommunications 
Administrations which are ·not obliged  to represent a  national consensus of 
users, suppliers and the Administrations. 
Participation is  not open to user bodies such as EcruA and 1:\'TUG, many 
of  whose members are \\·ell qualified to make valuable technical contributions. 
There is no opportunity for industry or user consultation or involvemen~  in the 
TR.-\C decision process on 0:ETs. 
Sunu11ary: 
•  Users  and the relecommunications  and information processuig industry 
should have an equal voice with the Telecommunictllions Administralions 
in rhe development of  s_tanda~ds. 
•  Csers  and the  relecommunications  and informaiion processing industry 
should have an  equal .,·oice  with  the Telecommunications Administrations 
in the decision process on 1YETs. 
4.3  European  TelecoJnmunicatiOifS Starttlttnls Institute 
IB:\f recognises the n~ed for better staffing and improvements  ..  in the process of 
creating harmonised telecommunications standards for Europe.  Hov."ever, we  do 
not feel that there is  an inunediate need to establish a  European Telecommuni-
cations Standards Institute.  ·  . 
By impro,ing the openness of the CEPT process, and increasing industry and user 
panicipation, significant progress can be made tov,-ards the harmonisation of tele-
conununications standards. 
Recognising that CEPT has the European responsibility for the production ofi\cTs 
in accordance with Council Directive 86/361/EEC, CEPT should provide a mech-
anism by which equipment suppliers and users can panicipate in  the management 
of the process.  Also, improving CEPT procedures, such as strengthening the sup-
porting secretariats and impro\ing the modus operandi. could help to produce ac-
ceptable results more expeditiously. 














JJJ.\1  EUROPE 
\Ve  do  not agree ''ith the suggestions that acceptable standards could be written 
by people recruited on long-term assignments.  The most suitable people arc those 
with detailed current experience of  the subject area of  the standards.  \Vithin months 
their knowledge of the subject would become outdated if  they were withdrawn from 
their professional acti\itics.  Also, long-term assignment to standards writing alone 
is  unlikely to attract those \\ith the best talents. 
In the long term, consideration should be  give%}  to the possibility of establishing a 
framework for the integration of the multiple functions that are developing stand-
.a.rds in Information Technology and telecornmunications.  Such a framework which 
!night constitute a  European-\\ide standards institute would allow for  the partic-
ipation of all  interested parties and provide an interrelationship \\ith the national 
standards activities.  · 
Of utmost importance to the success .of harmonisation is the need for close cooper-
ation  between  CEPT,  CEK/CENELEC and international  organisations  such  as 
IEC, ISO and CCITI to ensure that European standards and International Stand-
ards are not contradicting each other. This should provide the European platform 
for global harmonisation.  National standardisation bodies should continue to de-
velop 'base" standards (standards which are the basis for Functional Standards) and 
contribute to the:  International Standards process. 
Sunzn1ary: 
•  Ar  this  time  we  do  nor  ~elieve  that  a  European  Telecommunications 
Slandards Institute should be created. 
•  By improving and opening ihe CEPT process for developing technical po-
sitions and standards to all interested parties, indutf"mg industry and user 
organisations. the Commission will be able to realiu us objectwes. 
Tdccommunic~tions St:mdards 
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5.0  Tariff Principles 
A  long history of  different tariff rractices among the ~I  ember States has resulted in 
anomalies that have a  tangible unpact on the business community.  Today, there 
exist four-fold price differences for the Silmc telecorrununications service in different 
· European countries; this clearly demonstrates th:lt tarilTs  are not in line \\ith  ·  eco-
nomic reality. 
In  a purely competitiYe  \vorld,  prices  are based on costs.T  That is, if  a  company 
prices its offerings above costs, they will  fail  in the marketplace; if it prices them 
bela\\" costs, the company \\ill fail too.  Tariff principles in the area of  resen·ed ser-
vices should reflect this same cost orientation. 
In telecommunications, the \\"ell-kno\\n cross-subsidisation of  local telephone ser-
vices by long distance has been a  burden on heavy users of  long distance services, 
primarily businesses.  1\tl ost Telecommunications Administrations are taking unrea· 
sonable advantage of their exclu$ive franchises and are "cream skimming" tlieir large 
customers in a way that is no longer affordable or in the public interest.  Telephone 
charges are a cost of doing business, and like other costs must be reflected in the 
prices charged to consumers for products and services that are the end products of 
businesses. 
\Ve  belieYe  that the proper approach is  the rebalancing of tariffs  to  follo\~ cost 
trends.  \Ve  therefore  welcome  the  Corrunission·s  direction  towards· cost-based 
tariffs, and the recognition that some tariif rebalancing is necessary.  In arguing for 
a  "fair trade off between cost-orientation and universal sc:nice, however, the Com-
mission lends weight to the myth that there is a conflict between the two objectives. · 
IBM does not agree. 
Reducing long d!stance  tilrilfs  to bring  them in line with costs would ine\itably 
mean an increase in local rates~ but this should not be \ie\\-ed as a burden on soci-
ety.  The Director General of  OFTEL in the UK has stated that reducing long dis-
tance charges is  socially desirable as it  helps the regions, even the poor in those 
regions, and removes some of  the unjustified privilege of  urban dwellers. 
~fost significandy,  cost-orientation  of local  and  long  distance  telephone  tariffs 
would remove both the incentive and the potential for 'simple resale", that is, the 
offering o(  public switched voice services over leased circuits..  _,  · 
To allay concerns that increased local telephone rates would impact the penetration 
of  telephone service, a subsidised sen  ice targeted to the infirm and pensioners could 
be implemented if  a Member State determined it to be necessary.  Any subsidy that 
may be needed for some telephone subscribers should be visible to regulatory au-
thorities and preferably be borne out of public funds.  While it may be decided to 
finance such a subsidy out of  general telephone revenues, it would be unfair to pass 
any part of  the costs onto users of  other telecommunications senices such as public 
data networks or leased circuits. 
7  The term 'costs' in this sense includes not only operating expenses but also interest on loans, depre-
ciation. and a reasonable retum on inn:stment 
Tariff Principles  16 
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Suuunary: 
•  The Commission·s direction tolvards cost-based tariffs is welcomt!. 
•  The burden of  subsidised local telephone sen·ice should not be passed on 
to users of  other sen•ices. 
5.1  Leased Circuit  Tariffs 
The Commission postulates a need to reduce the risk of  potential ·cream skimming' 
in order to presen·e the fmancial viability of  Telecommunications Administrations, 
and proposes that usage-sensitive tarilfs for leased circuits and banning simple voice 
resale should be considered acceptable approaches, leaving it to the ~-iember States 
to elect which they choose to implement.  !':either should be conside~d an accept- · · ·  · 
able alternative in the long term; but a ban on simple voice iesale at least has the 
merit of  minimum side effects  .I 
\Vbile usage-sensitive tarilTs for leased circuits may in fact deter simple voice resale, 
they would also severely impact private voice and data networks and stifle the de-
velopment of value-added services, while at the same time imposing the costs and 
other burdens of measurement on users and,'or on Telecommunications Adminis-
trations. 
L" sers select leased.circuits for reasons of reliability, a\'ailability, response time, se-
curity, the ability to use  bulk encryption, flexibility of bandwidth allocation, net-
work management and control, to name just a few.  The availability of flat  rate 
lea~ed circuits has enabled the implementation of  applications that are not feasible 
over the switched  network,  such as  computer aided  design  and computer aided 
manufacturing (C.~D/CAM), that significantly increase the efficiency of  companies 
in  such  industries as  aircraft  and automobiles.  European flrins  \\ith world-wide 
operations need to manage their 0\\11 networks for file  transfers, document distn"b-
ution, :.tnd secure electronic mail that transcends time zones; manufacturers need the 
ability to have instant comrnunication \\ith their suppliers and dealers, reducing the 
need to maintain large stocks of  inventory. 
The tendency in  some :\fember States to introduce usage-sensitive charges, or sur-
charges,  for  leased  circuits  would  impact  the  profitability  and  international 
competitiveness of European fmns.  Such lion-cost-based ano~C$  \\"'ould make it 
impossible to base investment decisions on an informed assessment of  technological 
and productivity gains. 
Prof.  von \Veizsaecker in chapte·r III of his book convincingly  demonstrates the 
adverse impact of excess leased line charges not only on the growth of  the VANS 
market but also upon a nation's entire economy.' 
Pricing distortions, developed to achieve near-tenn objectives, are not sustainable 
in  the long run.  Once set in motion, however, they are difficult to alter.  The in-
•  This is  the interim approach that has been adopted by lhe  l"K. \\ith a commitment to ree:t· 
amine it in  1989. 
'  C.C. von \Veizsaecker. -rhe Economics of  Value Added Network Senrices' (Cologne: C.C. von 
\Veizsaecker. 19S7). 
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traduction of  a new regulatory regin1e  offers a unique opportunity to  effect an or-
derly  tr:1nsition  fron1  today·s  distoned  tariff patterns  to  a rational,  cost-based 
system  that better  sen·es  the  needs  of users  and  telecommunications  adminis· 





The  a\·ailabiliry  of leased circuits  should. be  guarant~ed throughout  the 
Community. 
Tariffs for leased circuirs should be af cost-based  flat rarts  • 
For  a transitional period.  banning of simple resale of  kased circuits  to 
provide public swirched u!lephone service is a retUOnabk rtspOIUt to Ad· 
ministrati()n concerns.  •  · 
.. 
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6.0  Role of Administrations in Competitive 
Markets 
IB~I agrees  with  the  European  Commission  that Telecommunications  Adminis-
trations should be permitted to participate \\ith other entities in the free and unre-
stricted provision of terminal equipment ~nd competitive services. 
If users  are to benefit fully from competition in terminal equipment and telecom-
munications services opened to unrestricted pro\ision however, it is important that 
T elcconununications Administrations compete equitably when  they panicipate in 
the competitive marketplace.  If Administrations are able to derive unfair advan-
tages from the fact that they also control the basic netw·ork infrastructure and offer 
resez?ed sen·ices under monopoly prqtection or special rights, the competitive mar-
ketplace \\ill be inhibited. 
The following are key elements to ensuring fair competition by Telecommunications 
Administrations:  · 
•  Accounting separation to protect against unfair cross-subsidisation; 
•  1\"ondiscriininatory availability of basic transmission; 
•  Oversight of  the Telecommunications .t~dministration·by an Independent Public 
Authority. 
Each of these is addressed briefly below. 
6.1  Accounti11g Separation 
\Ve are encouraged by the Corrunission's position that it regards the Telecommuni-
cations Administrations as  commercial undertakings subject to the application of -
Co~r..munity competition law and that it proposes strict continuous review of their 
operational activiti.!s under these provisions, particularly as applied to practices of 
cross-subsidisation  of competitive activities  by revenues  .from  reserved  activities. 
\Ve are concerned, however, that cross-subsidisation may be difficult to detect, or 
that the impact on their competitors and on the public at larg~y  be difficult to 
correct after the fact.  .  .  :  .  . 
If  the costs of  a Telecommunications Administration's terminal equipment or com-
petitive service offerings are improperly attributed to its reserved services, users of 
the reserved senices will bear the burden, and participation in the competitive arena 
\Vill be impacted.  We believe that greater transparency in Administration account-
ing is required, and that the Commission should propose principles for effective cost 
allocation  and  accounting  procedures  to  segregate  costs,  revenues,  assets and li-
abilities bet\\teen an Administration's resen·ed and competitive activities. 
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•  Greater rraruparency in  Administration accounting is required as regards 
the costs and re'.·enues for resen•ed services a11d facilities and as regards 
transactions between resen•ed and competitive accounts.  . 
•  ~\I  ore specific guidelines would be  welcome  orr  accounting separatioll oe-
llt.'terr resen·ed and conrperirire accounts.  . 
6.2  Availability of  Basic  Trans11zission 
The nondiscriminatory availability of  basic transmission is essential to the pro\ision 
of  competitive senices.  \Ve are encouraged by the Commission"s proposal that the 
Telecommunications Administrations be subject to clear obligations to interconnect 
and to provide access to the network infrastructure for competiti\-e senice pro\iders 
- Open }';etwork Provision or O~P.  \Ve  believe it is essential that competitive 
sen  ice and equipment providers and users of telecommunications senices ha\-e an 
opportunity to participate fully in the development of  O~P. \Ve offer the Com-
mission specific suggestions on what we consider to be the most imponant aspe<:!S 
of  07\"P in Section 3 of this paper.  · 
Basic transmission utilised  in the Administration's competitive senices shoUld be 
functionally equivalent and at the same cost-oriented rates and on the same sched-
ules, terms and col'!ditions as available to competitive senice pro\iders. 
Competit.ive  service  providers and end-users must be free  to attach to the basic 
nenvork infrastructure any terminal equipment of their choice, subject only to re-
quirements of  personal safety and prevention of  harm to the nenvorL 
Technical information on network operating characteristics and interfaces to basic 
transmission  offerings  of  the  Administrations  should  be  available  on  a 
nondiscriminatory basis to all pro\iders of  competitive services and terminal equip-
ment. 
Sunznzary: 
•  Competiti1,.e  service  providers  and  end-us~rs  must  b~  assured  of 
nondiscriminatory access to the network infrastrucrur~.  -•  · 
•  Technical information on infrastructure interfac~s  should be made mailable 
on a timely and nondisc_riminarory basis. 
6.3  Oversight by an Independent Pllblic  Aut/zor~ty. 
\Ve  believe  that fair  competition by  the .Telecommunications Administrations .is 
feasible  only if in  each Country an independent Public Teleconununications Au-
thority is  established overseeing the need for and availability of  basic transmission, 
safeguarding  competition,  and  carrying  out the  regulatory functions  (hereinafter 
called the Authority). 
Role of  Adminis~rations in  Competith·e :\l:llkc:ts 
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The Authority should  oversee  the reserved operations of the Telecommunications 
Administration to ensure availability of  adequate basic transmission.  The Authority 
must ensure that users and manufacturers are continu::tlly in\'olved in the definition 
of the  reserved services  thnt  best suit  their requirements.  In addition appropriate 
appeal  procedures  for  any  disagreement  with  a  Tclecomnlunications  Adminis-
tration's reserved activities in general must be made possible. 
The Authority must safeguard  fair competition where,·er the Telecommunications 
Administration also engages in competitive activ.ities.  The Treaty of Rome gives the 
Conunission of the European Communities clear authority to ensure fair competi-
tion  in  telccorrununications  services  and  products.  "\Ve  are  encouraged  by  the 
Conunission·s \\illingness to  take action, as  evidenced in the case of cordless  tele-
phones and modems and in the case of  telex fonvarding in the UK.  The full powers 
of the  Treatv of Rome  should  be used to  ensure that both the full  intent of the 
policies and their time scales are met by all Member States.  Specifically the national · 
Authority should have a mandate to establish the necessary measures as mentioned 
above, and oversee adherence to these .. 
The Authority should carry out the telecommunications regulatory functions in the 
~Iember State.  It should be responsible for various specific regulatory functions 
now carried  out  by the Telecommunications Administrations  in  many  Member 
States.  Specific examples are the attachment policy to public networks, including 
the establishment of minimum requirements for type approval of terminal equip-
ment, as well  as  1\fember State representation on telecommunications matters in 
regional  and  international  organisations  such  as  ITU,  CCITI, CEPT,  and  the 
European Community. 
The establislu-nent of  such an Independent Authority would necessitate institutional 
changes in  some  ~!ember States. These changes should be carried out with a  view 
to  appropriate representation of all  involved  parties:  users,  manufacturers,  Tele-
communications Administrations, and government, :and with a view to safeguarding 
competition in a European, not just a national, context. 
Sunznzary: 
•  The  Commission  direction  on  independent public  authority  oversight  is 
I . 
• 
This aurhoriry should nor report to the got.•ernmenr Jfinistry responsible for 
the prO'.'ision of  the network infrastructure. 
The independent aurhoriry"s responsibilities should encomllfis: tariff  prin-
dples and levels. standards. type approval, resolution of  issues between the 
Administrations on  the  one  hand and their users and competitors on the 
ocher hand. and representation of  naiional interests to regional and inter-
national bodies. 
i'. 
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Brussels,  December  1,  1987 
IDEA  - International Data Exchanqe Association -
POSITION  PAPER  ON  GREEN  PAPER  (~INAL) 
1.  Presentation 2t ~ 
IDEA  groups  most all major  EDI  network operators  (VANS)  and 
users  in Europe  and  beyond,  and  includes such  influential 
bodies  as  the customs  co-operation council,  the International 
Article  Numbering  Association  and  CEPT.  Electronic  Data 
Interchange is,  by nature,  international and  spans not solely 
the European  but the  world's horizons.  IDEA  is  built upon 
this understanding,  although the  Association is  European  in 
character and has,  consequently,  a  strong interest in European 
activities aimed  at enhancinq the  EC  market.  The  result is 
that  a  majority  of  IDEA  members  are  based  in Europe  and 
interested in  promoting Europe's  economy.  In  addition,  the 
standardization of  EDI  worldwide will stimulate  the European 
economy  since  EDI  will facilitate trade  wi~h non-E.C.  member 
States.  IDEA  has,  as such,  a  substantial  interest in  the 
development of  a  European  policy favouring  deregulation and 
private  enterprise.  The  appendix gives  more details  about 
IDEA. 
2.  Endorsement gt ~Green Paper 
E.C.  approach towards  telecommunications  and 
on  promoting  competition  and  removing 
the  usage  of  telecommunications.  IDEA 
efforts in  the telecommunications  market 
IDEA  welcomes  the 
its  firm  stand 
restrictions  for 
asserts  that  E.~. 
must  move  towards  : 
-Harmonisation  of  the  development  and  the  provision  of 
telecommunications  infrastructures  and  services  throughout 
member  States.  The  STAR  program  is a  case  im  point.  Special 
attention should be paid  to synchronising the introduction of 
ISDN  in all member  States so  that the  servi~es for voice,  and 
certainly  data transport  mechanisms,  are  usable within  the' 
Community  in  the  same  way  and  at the  same  time,  and  to an 
acceptable degree  (reference to the 86/659  recommendation of 
the EEC). 
European-wide  harmoni~ed telecommunications services are vital 
for  Electronic  Data  Interchange  and  thus  for trade.  This 
requires an  Open  Network  Provision  framework. 
At the  same  time  we  vould also  support a  smooth transition 
from  to-day's services to those of the next century. 
321 -Harmonisation of tariffing  principles and pricing strategies 
allowing  competition  between  services  so  that  the 
implementation of EDI  will provide the European  economy with  a 
vital competitive edge. 
-Provision of  harmonised  security and  secrecy  aechanisms,  as 
an  integral part  of the  telecommunication services,  always 
allowing  for  the privacy  aspects  of  both voice  and  data 
transmission to be taken into account. 
Specific attention  is requested  for this  important aspect of 
data  transmission  in  the standardisation  work  at  network 
level.  -
At  the same  time we  would  insist that end-to-end security and 
secrecy mechanisms  should remain  under the  full authority of 
the end user. 
-Provision of harmonised user  oriented aocesa  on the network. 
When  maintaining the  network,  the  services offered  for use 
should be maintenance checked at all times. 
As  far as  access  to  the basic  network  is concerned,  all 
service  providers should  have  equal access  to the  network 
functions. 
-The  leqalization of electronic documents,  as is the case for 
telex documents. 
Idea strongly suggests that  exhaustive studies and directives 
be  issued  on the legal  aspects of electronic data  usage for 
general trade. 
3.  ~  consultation 
IDEA  welcomes  the principle of user  consultation established 
by  the E.C.  Commission.  The Association  feels that  this 
-~proach  is consistent  with  a  sound  planning policy  which 
.esults from  the rapid evolution of the telecommunications and 
information technology markets.  I 
IDEA  recommends  the creation and/or  improvement  of a  channel 
for the voicing of end-user  opinion.  To this extent the SOGT 
sh.ould be  enabled to represent  all of the  parties concerned 
including telecommunications operators,  industries and users. 
IDEA  proposes to voice the specific needs of the operators and 
users.  of  Electronic  Data  Interchange  reqardinq 
telecommunications,  since they provide a  major sector forum. 
. 
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4.  Standards 
IDEA  strongly  supports  the Community  efforts  towards  the 
establishment of  universal standards and  in  particular,  work 
towards  the Electronic  Data  Interchange  for Administration, 
Commerce  and  Transport  (EDIFACT)  and related  efforts such as 
ISO  7-Layer model  and  X400. 
At the  same  time  IDEA  is convinced that the  Commission will 
take  all the  necessary steps  to ensure  that the.  standards 
evolve with  modern  technology  and that  it will  prevent the 
employment  of protocols,  or even standards,  that may  limit the 
deployment  and use of state of the art electronic services. 
IDEA  welcomes all efforts to strengthen standards work  such as 
the Standards  Institute proposal.  It is  concerned about the 
feasibility  of  such  an  Institute,  unless  it  involves 
across-the-board  participation of  users  and  industries with 
in-depth knowledge of the technology. 
IDEA  believes,  at this time,  that the thinking on this subject 
is vague  and therefore seeks further clarification. 
As  pointed  out;  IDEA  perceives  itself  very  much  as  a 
Consultancy  forum  and  it is,  as  such,  eager  to contribute to 
the standards  pr~cess on this basis. 
In  any case  IDEA  assumes that any  fPrm.of  Institute or similar 
operation will liaise directly with  a  forum  like IDEA  through 
existing bodies. 
5.  'l'esti  n·;] 
IDEA  endorses  the  E.C.  proposals  for  verification  and 
certification  of  telecommunications  equipment  and  even 
services. 
IDEA  particularly suggests guarding  the integrity and  quality 
of tests and tests organisations. 
IDEA  strongly  supports the  mutual  aqreement of  test results 
_throughout  member  States. 
~.  ~ 
'f·he  conkission,  IDEA  believes,  needs  to be  more  informative 
about the  rol~ it  expects the  PTT  federation  CEPT  to play. 
IDEA  expresses the willingness to  continue to liaise with the 
Telecomaunications  authority,  through  the  EC  Commission  if 
need  be. 
...  ,,  \•' 
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,·.:, 7.  Comments  QD  Green  Paper 
IDEA  recommends  that comments  made  on  the Green  Paper by other 
interests be made  available by  the Commission. 
Conclusion 
IDEA  acknowledges  with  enthusiasm  the  siqnificant 
policy-maki~q  advances  made  by  the  E.C.  Commission  as 
presented  1n  the  Green  Paper.  It  looks  forward  to  the 
implementation of a  liberalised yet orderly telecommunications 
environment throughout Eurofe. 
IDEA,  once  more,  likes to  take the opportunity to express its 
willingness to cooperate with the relevant parties in order to 
bring this about. 
IDEA  believes it can play a  significant role in this activity, 
since it  represents an operational  EDI  forum  for  both users 
and providers. #  • 
, 
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INTUG  submission on  the  EEC  Green  Paper ~  the  Development  of 
the  common  Market  for  Telecommunication Services and  Equipment. 
The  International Telecommunications  Users  Group  (INTUG) 
1 •  INTUG  represents  internationally the  interests of national, 
European  and  other  international  telecommunications  user 
groups.  Its  full  members  are  user  associations  which 
together  include  several  thousand  businesses  and 
individuals.  Its  associate  members  are  corporations 
which  make  significant  use  of  international 
telecommunications.  Most  of  its  members  operate 
in all the EEC  and  EFTA  countries.  The  views  expressed 
in this document are  those  of  a  working  party  specially 
chosen to be  representative  of  the  European  members  of 
the Group.This  input  is  INTUG's  response  to  the  EEC's 
express wish  to obtain a  wide  range  of  views  from  the 
community at large.  INTUG  hopes  that,  as  it  emanates  from 
telecom-literate businessmen,  it  will  balance  the  views 
which  emerge  from  the administrations  and manufacturers. 
Introduction 
2.  INTUG  welcomes  the initiative taken by  the  Council  in  the 
various  processes it has  launched in  the  telecommunication 
field,  and  in particular in the  preparation  of  the  Green 
Paper.  It is heartened that the Council is taking  pains  to 
encourage  input  to the  debate  by  end  users  of  the 
services in question.  Although the  emphasis  of  the  Green 
Paper is on  telecommunication markets  and  their  supporting 
infrastructures,  we  should  like  to  remind  the  Council 
that  commerce  and  industry in general depend  increasingly on 
info~mation technology for their efficiency and  competivity, 
and  that .telecommunications  is  integral  to  this  for  all 
sizes  of  company.  Thus  telecommunications  directly  affects 
the  ability  of businesses  to  create  wealth,  and  hence 
support  employment  and  the quality of "life. 
3.  This  being  so,  agreement  must be  reached  among  the  member 
states that the interest of businesses  . as - a  whole  should 
take  precedence  over  the  narrower  interest  of  the 
telecommunication sector should  any  difference  arise.  In 
this context,  INTUG  offers the  following  comments  on  the 
ideas  expressed  in the Green  Paper.  For  easy  reference  we 
discuss first of all the  proposed positions raised in Figure 
13  of  Chapter  10  of  the Green  ~aper  under  the heading  "The 
Ingredients of  a  Solution." 
Proposed  Positions  Introductory-Remark 
4.  We  understand _that  the first purpose of the document  is  to 
promote discussion,  and  think it succeeds  in this  by·  being 
discursive  and  by  not  taking  positions  in  some  areas. 
- 1  -
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325 However  we  should  have  much  preferred  a  more  user-orientated 
introduction stating  that  the  general  objective  was  to 
provide  "the  European  user  with  a  broad  variety  of 
telecommunication  services  on  the  most  favourable 
terms"  by  means  of  the  development  of  a  strong. 
infrastructure  and  of  efficient  services,  etc,  thus 
changing  the  emphasis.  We  believe  that  economic  advantage 
is more  directly  influenced  by  the effective business use  of 
telecommunications  than by  infrastructure. 
Position A 
5.  Position A accepts  monopoly  of provision  and  operation  of 
the  network  infrastructure,  and  suggests  safeguards  when  a 
more  liberal  regime  is  chosen..  Again  we  should  have 
preferred a  different emphasis.  We  believe that  competition 
should  now  be  the  clear  objective,  with  derogation  for 
continuing monopoly  in interim situations.  Although  it  has 
not yet been  tested in this particular context it  is  clear 
that the treaty of Rome  does  not  favour  monopoly,  and  it 
would  be  prudent  not  to  perpetuate  an  undesirable 
situation.  The  scope  of  monopoly  is  not  defined, 
and  of  course  ·it  is  governments  and  not 
administrations which  should  be  the  arbiters.  We  should 
have  liked to see  some  mention of the responsibilities which 
should  accompany  the  "special rights"  and to make  it  clear 
that one  is contingent on  the other. 
6.  The  singling out of  two-way  satellite systems  for mention at 
this juncture  seems  to  us  inappropriate.  We  welcome 
analysis but we  do  not agree with the  propo~al  which  seems 
to offer unfair and  unnecessary  protection  to  terrestrial 
systems  and  to  be  inimical to  innovation.  It  also  appears 
to  limit choice  and  users  value  choice  above  all  else. 
Furthermore it is not clear who  would 
11closely monitor"  such 
developments, _and  for  what  purpose. 
Position ~ 
Position  B  accepts  the  continuance.  of  rights  of 
administrations  to monopoly  prov1s1on of a  limited number  of 
basic services  to  safeguard  public  service  goals.  These 
goals must,  of  course,  be  defined and  provided  for  by  the 
nation  concerned  rather  than  by  the  administration. 
Certainly the administrations  must  be assured of the ability 
to finance  their public and  universal  service  obligations, 
but  "exclusive  provision
11  of  the  total  network 
infrastructure  may  not  be  the  only  or  best  way 
to  assure  this.  It  seems  clear  that  the  continuance 
of  monopoly  will  be  challenged  in  future  in  many 
countries although it exists widely at present. 
8.  INTUG  welcomes  the  proposal  that exclusive provision must  be 
narrowly  construed  and  subject  to  review.  The  admonition 
against allowing  monopoly  to  creep  outwards  by  liberal 
- 2  -
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definition of  reserved  services is strongly  supported.  The 
identification of  "voice telephone  service"  as  the  only 
obvious  candidate  to  be  "reserved"  is  also  supported 
during  transition,(but see paragraph  10  below).  We  should 
prefer the  more  specific  phrase  "public  switched  voice 
service." 
As  we  see  it  even  this  "right"  to  reserve  the  public 
switched voice  service  to  the  administration  carries  a 
corresponding  duty.  This  is  the  duty  to  provide  an 
efficient and  effective service.  Peripheral activities  and 
the  prov~s~on  of  supplementary  services  should  not  be 
engaged  in  at.  the  .expense  of  the  sound  operation  and 
development  of  the basic public service where  monopoly  is in 
force.  Governments  should  insist  that  ·where 
administrations  do offer supplementary  services  they  earn 
the right by providing the best possible basic service.  All 
new  services  should,  of  course,  be  introduced  in  the 
competitive sector. 
There  is,  an  equally  important  basic  service 
which  may  be  implied in the phrase "voice telephone  service" 
but is not  specifically mentioned  in Position B.  This is the 
supply of private leased circuits for·use  as  highways  for 
private networks •.  Business  attaches  great  importa~ce  to 
this facility,  wide  and  narrow band,  digital  and  analogue, 
now  and  in the future.  Competition in the supply of  private 
circuits ·is desirable,  but where  monopoly exists there  must 
be  an obligation on the administration concerned  to  ensure 
an  adequate  service in this area.  The  Commission's attention 
is invited to the outmoded  regulations  which  prevent  the 
free  interconnection  of  private  circuits·  with  public 
networ~s thereby inhibiting the optimum use of both. 
Position  C 
11  •  We  strongly welcome  Position C,  with  its  explicit  support 
fer  'the  concept  that  supplementary,  or  enhanced,  or 
value-added  services  should  be  open to competition.  There is 
no  tradition  which  supports  monopoly  supply  of  such 
services,  originating as  they  do  from  a  data-processing 
rather than  a  telecommunication background.  Indeed,  there is 
much  to suggest that the monopoly  suppliers do  not  perform 
well  in this area.  In any  case,  these  services  are  often 
highly  specialised  and  cater  to  a  small  market; 
standardisation  and  regulatory  considerations,  which 
administrations use  to defend  their monopoly  positions,  do 
not apply.  Users  have  seen  such  services  develop  quickest 
and  best in a  competitive  environment.  If  administrations 
are  deemed  to  have  earned  the  right  to  compete 
in  this  area  there  may  be  no  harm  in  their 
doing  so  but  there  should  be  no  obligation  on  them  to 
compete,  and  where  they  do,  there  must  be  strict  rules 
which  prevent  cross-subsidisation and  the  exploitation  of 
the  ~dvantages  attached  to  ownership  of  the· 
. .  .. 
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- 3  -infrastructure.  We  have  noticed  that 
easy  to ensure  fair  competition  in 
Position Q 
it  is 
these 
not  in  fact 
circumstances. 
12.  INTUG  supports Position D  in its recommendation  to  support 
strict standards  for  the basic network  to maintain or enable 
inter-operability. It endorses  the view  expressed that  such 
standards  should  be  not only  Community-wide  but  worldwide. 
It is  important  that  such  standards contribute to uniformity 
of  access  for  users.  However  the strictness should  not apply 
to non-basic  service where  requirements are  different  and 
inter-operability,  for  example,  is  a  user  option.  A 
mandatory  inter-operability  here would  ·unacceptably  limit 
the  range  and·use of  services.  In fact,  no  standard  for  a 
purely European  service should be mandatory. 
13.  The  most  effective  standards  are  minimal  (to  avoid 
inhibiting innovation and  competition),  unambiguous,  timely, 
and  quickly  formed.  Unhappily  current  arrangements  for 
standard-setting do  not respond well to these  requirements. 
If,  in  creating  a  European  Telecommunication  Standards 
Institute,  the Council  can  respond  to these  aims,  it  will 
deserve  the gratitude of the user community. 
14.  We  are uneasy  about  the  suggestion elsewhere  in  the  paper 
that the ETSI  should  be  controlled  by  CEPT.  It  would  be 
preferable for  any  such  body  to be  independent,  and  whilst 
it might be necessary  to  call  on  the  resources  of  the 
administrations  to  support  detailed  work,  it  would  be 
wholly  inappropriate  for  them  to set objectives for  the  same 
reason  that they  should  not  do  so  in the  regulatory  field 
{Position G).  We  regard it  as  imperative  that  users  and 
manufacturers  should participate actively in decision making 
relating  to  the  standard-setting  process.  EEC  should 
consider  funding  user  involvement to encourage it as  much  as 
possible. 
Position E 
15.  Position  E  recommends  that  administra~ions  should  not 
unfairly restrict  providers  of  competitive  services  and 
INTUG  supports  this stance.  We  oppose  the  application  of 
special tariffs or conditions  on  suppliers  of  value-added 
services,  as this distorts the price and  hence  the  market 
for  the service.  They  should  pay  the  same  price for  service 
as  anyone  else. 
16.  To  the  extent  that  administrations  themselves  provide 
competitive  services  they  should access  the  network  on  the 
same  conditions  and  prices  as  others.  In  saying  that 
the directive  on  Open  Network  Provision  should  be  prepared 
in  consultation  with  other  parties  concerned,  in  the 
framework  of  SOG-T,  we  are  confident  that  the  author 
intended  to  include  user  interests,  bu~  as  users  and 
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manufacturers are not currently represented in this  forum  we 
would  have  wished  this to be  a  specific recommendation.  If, 
because of  the nature of  SOG-T  direct  involvement  presents 
problems,  it would  be  necessary for  all  inputs,  analyses, 
reports  and  decisions to be published for  comment. 
Position K 
1 7.  Position  F  promotes  unrestricted  provision  of  terminal 
equipment within and  between Member  states,  and this  is  an 
objective dear to the hearts  of  users  who  have  suffered 
inconvenience,  inefficiency  and  unnecessary  expense  for 
years as  a  result of current  restrictions.  Users  have  no 
sympathy  in any  circumstances with  the  exclusion  of  the 
first  telephone  from  this  recommendation 
and  would  not  wish  to  accept 
the  implication  that  it  is  reasonable  for  any  item 
of  terminal  equipment  to  be  provided  only  by  the 
administrations.  Such  a  restriction of  competition  is,  in 
the  user's  view,  always  unjustified.  Competition  in 
the  provision  of  the  first  telephone  already  works 
well  in  UK  and  France.  Also,  true  competition  is  only 
possible  when  the  network  terminates  at  a  suitable 
standard  interface point on  the boundary of  the  customer's 
premises,  and  arrangements  for  this  must  be  agreed 
Community-wide.  A  common  physical connexion would  be  a  great 
benefit. 
18.  INTUG  congratulates  the Council  on  its  action  to  promote 
Corr~unity-wide type approval  which will contribute  to  this 
objective,  but  draws  attention  to  the  benefits  of 
self-verification to assist the process.  INTUG  joined  ICC 
in  drafting  ICC  document  373/15  which  makes  relevant 
recommendations  (copy enclosed). 
19.  The  reference  in Position F  to type  approval of Receive Only 
Earth Stations is not  understood.  Such  equipment  is  not 
normally  linked to public networks  and  thus  type  approval 
requirements  do  not apply. 
20.  The  whole  process  of  type-approval  · could  be  greatly 
simplified,  if not  abandoned entirely,  in  the  new  digital 
environment,  if  public  networks  were  designed  to  be 
self-protecting.  The  greatly enhanced  intelligence available 
in  them clearly makes  this practicable,  but  there  is  no 
incentive for  the administrations  to  promote  the  concept 
and  so  a  directive would  be  necessary. 
_}'osition  G 
2  .. 
I  •  The  proposal  in Position G that regulatory  and  operational 
activities of  administrations  be  separated  is  regarded  by 
INTUG  as  a  most  fundamental  and  important factor  in creating 
a  basis for  change  at  national  level.  It  is  thus  most 
strong.~y supported.  The  continuance  of  monopoly  as  an 
- 5  - ,. .  . 
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329 interim measure,  where  it occurs,  is  all  the  more  reason 
to  promote  separation to ensure equitable  use  of  resource 
by  end  users,  and  to permit change to  occur  when  national 
objectives are appropriately positioned.  It is  of  course 
essential  that  the  regulatory  function  should 
be  carried out by  a  totally independent  body,  and  not  by  a 
separate division of  the  same  entity.  We  should  have  liked 
to see tariff principles and  standard-setting  included  in 
the list of regulatory activities,  and  would  be  happy  to 
supply our  proposals for  a  more  detailed list on request. 
Position H 
22.  Position H proposes  a  continuous review of  the  commercial 
activities of  the administrations against the provisions  of 
Articles  85,  86,  and  90  of  the  Treaty  and  INTUG  would 
welcome  such an arrangement.  It does  not  dissent  from  the 
Position I  proposal to review providers  in  the  competitive 
sector.  An  area  where  it  is  difficult  to  ensure  fair 
competition  is  in  the  installation  and  maintenance  of 
-,  customer  equipment  and  careful drafting will be necessary to 
~  bring  this about. 
Position  J 
23.  Position J  recommends  full application of  the  Community's 
common  commercial  policy to telecommunications  and  this  is 
supported.  The  proposal  that  the  Community  examine  its 
position relative to the GATT  is welcomed  as  evidence of  an 
intention to be  outward-looking in such matters. 
Additional  Points 
24.  It will be  seen  from  the  above  that  INTUG  supports  the 
positions taken in the Green  Paper and  that our  comments  are 
in clarification,  amplification,  and  emphasis,  rather  than 
in opposition.  There  are however  some  relevant matters which 
we  feel  have  not emerged  from  the  positions  identified  in 
Table  13. 
'- Tariff Principles 
25.  The  helpful  examination of Tariff Principles  in  the  Paper 
did  not give rise to  a  position  in  Table  13.  INTUG  is 
concerned that  when  public  service  tariffs  are  set  by 
monopolies  or near monopolies  they should be  fair  to  all 
parties.  Artificially high  tariffs  are  cur~ently  common. 
They  are  bad  for  commerce  and  industry and  by  inhibiting use 
may  also be  bad  for  the  administrations  which  impose 
them.  They  often  come  about  through  a 
requirement  to  support  loss-making  postal  services 
and  to  contribute  large  sums  to  central  funds. 
We  . have  no  quarrel  with  the  principle  of  universal 
service.  We  believe  that  cost-related  tariffs  can 
support this  and  unremunerative  public  services,  such  as 
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emergency  services,  and still provide  a  reasonable  return 
for  the  service provider  to encourage  him  to  continue  to 
invest  in network  development.  We  accept that if tariffs are 
cost  related  they  cannot  be  harmonised  throughout  the 
Community  but  we  d~ not see this as  a  problem. 
26.  Sound  tariff  principles  should  not  discriminate  between 
different uses  of  the  same  facility.  The  format  and  content 
of  information are  the concerns of  the user and  not  of  the 
network  provider.  In  the approaching digital environment  it 
will not be  practicable to distinguish between  data,  text, 
image  or voice  in the  network.  It  is  illogical  to  charge 
volume  tariffs for  a  fixed  co.st  service  such  as  leased 
circuits .  and  INTUG  sees  such  tariffs  as  threatening 
innovation and  destructive of much  useful past progress. 
Cable  TV  ~ Satellite 
27.  we  are concerned that  the "close surveillance  proposed  of 
cable-TV and  the relationship  of  satellite  communications 
and  its  interface  with  the  overall  network
11  could  be 
)  restrictively  interpreted  when  it  is  implemented.  The 
'- principle should be  that where degradation  of  the  network 
service experienced by  the user will probably not occur  then 
connection  should  be  permitted,  rather than  prohibition  of 
connection when  degradation might occur.  A  presumption  in 
favour  of  connection  should  be  implemented,  with  each 
prohibition being justified.  In this  connection  we  should 
have  wished  the Green  Paper to do  more  to open  the door  for 
these alternative technologies to emerge. 
) 
WATTC 
28.  We  note  the  reference  in  the  Green  Paper  to 
the desirability of  EEC  establishing a  common  position  on 
WATTC.  We  would  support this on  the assumption that  such  a 
position would  arise  from  the  reasoning in the Green  Paper, 
and  would  favour  the  competitive  supply  of  value-added 
services.  We  realise however  that  obtaining  consensus  on 
~uch a  matter will not  be  easy in the  time available.  It  is 
apparent that member  administrations with the  exception  of 
UK  ignored  the  position  on  VANS  recommended 
in the  Green  Paper  when  attending  PC/WATTC,  and  urgent 
action by EEC  is  required  if  this  situation  is  to  be 
remedied before  November  1988. 
Technical  ~raining 
29.  There  is no  mention  in the  Green  Paper  of  the  need  for 
Member  Countries  to  promote  and  ensure an  adequate  supply of 
qualified  engineers  and  managers.  The  ability  of  all 
business organisations  as  well  as  of  the  administrations 
to  take  full  advantage  of  the  benefits  of  information 
technology_~&n be  ser~ously impeded  by  a  shortage  of  such 
l  .......  !  peop.e.  ':;·.·. 
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30.  INTUG  congratulates the Council  on  the  rapid progress it has 
made  with  telecommunication matters  in the past  few  years. 
In particular it.identifies with recognition of  the  need  for 
increased  competition,  plans  to  bring  about  a  single 
European market,  plans  to promote  broadband  facilities/ISDN 
throughout Europe,  and  the harmonisation of type approval. 
31.  It believes  the Green  Paper is fulfilling  its  ·purposes  of 
provoking wide  discussion of  the issues.  It hopes  that  the 
discussion  will  result  in  a  positive  document 
committing to firm  plans  and  directions for the  future.  It 
welcomes  the setting of  a  target  date  for  progress  and 
believes  1992  is realistic in the context. It would  like  to 
think that the Council will do all in its power to encourage 
the  involvement  of  user  representatives  in  its  own 
deliberations,  and  will  similarly  encourage  its  member 
countries to do  likewise.  If  the  Council's  staff  wishes 
INTUG's  opinion  on matters raised in the  contributions  of 
other organisations or individuals,  or amplification of  any 
of  the  points  made  above  we  should  be  most  happy  to 
cooperate. 
G  G  McKendrick 
Executive Director 
INTUG 
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London 
October  1987 
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IMTERHATIOHAL  CBNmER OF  COKKERCE 
COHKENTS  ON  'l"BE  GREEN  PAPER  ON  TilE  DEVELOPMENT  OP'  THE  COMMON  MARJCBr  FOR 
'rELPJOOKKOHICATIOHS  SERVICES  AND  PIJOIPKEHT  ("GREER  PAPER") • 
I.  INTRODOC"l'IOR 
The  International Chamber  of Commerce  ("ICC"J,  the world business 
organisation, set up in 1981 its Commission  on Computinq, 
Telecommunications and  Information Policies  (CTIP)  to represent and make 
known  the interests of its membership on  information  technoloqy and 
telecommunication  related matters.  Attached to this body is a  Workinq 
Party on  Telecommunications. 
Throuqh  the CTIP  Commission  and its Workinq  Party on  Telecommunications, 
the  ICC  is the spokesman  for business worldwide  in the field of 
information technol09y,  and  services.  Its qeoqraphical spread combined 
with its membership base  (users and  suppliers of all sizes)  makes  it a 
unique  body.  Its membership is aware  that the converqence of computinq and 
telecommunications  technologies into a  sinqle discipline,  information 
technoloqy,  has  enormous  potential and  impact  on  business development.  ~he 
development and application of information  technology and particularly 
telecommunications can  be  fostered or hindered both with and across 
national boundaries by  the actions of governments  and  requlators. 
OVer  the  recent months,  the CTIP  delegates have  shown  considerable 
interest in the Green  Paper on  the  Development  of the Common  Market  for 
Telecommunications Services  Equipment  issued by  the Commission of the 
European  Communities.  Having  received a  copy of the document  we  were 
grateful for the opportunity to meet  with Commission  representatives on 
8th September  1987  and  now  wish  to confirm the tenor of those 
conversations by the  following comments  on  the Green  Paper. 
The  strong  response to the Green  Paper within the  ICC  is one of support 
for  a  very welcome  document  whose  approach to telecommunications  policy in 
the  E£C  is mainly positive and encouraging.  Telecommunication  networks  can 
no. longer  be  conside~ed as  merely a  convenience,  but as a  vital business 
tool.  As  the  European Commission  has clearly  ~ecoqnised it will be 
impossible  for  industry and  commerce  to thrive without a  satisfactory 
telecommunications environment. 
The  Green  Paper  has  stimulated wide  interest and  allayed many·  fears over 
its presumed  content.  It provides  an  excellent  framework  for debate.  Of 
course,  the Green  Paper cannot  be all things  to all people and  so several 
points  ~ill need  further clarification and discussion,  notably with  ~egard 
to tariff principles and  standards. 
333 -
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for  convenience  the  comments  which  follow  relate  to  the  proposed  positions 
contained  in  fig.  13  of  the Green  Paper. 
II.  THE  POSITIVE  ASPECTS 
A)  £XCLUSIVE  PROVISION  OF  THE  NETWORK  INFRASTRUCTURE 
The  EC  COmmission  recognises  the right of Member  States to choose the 
organisational  scheme  for  provision of network infrastructure that best 
suits their own  needs,  provided that the integrity of the network is 
maintained.  The  EC  Commission  notes that many  Kember  States will want to 
maintain exclusive provision of the network.  The  ICC  accepts this view 
provided that network  infrastructure is narrowly defined and that the 
opportunity for competition in the infrastructure is not foreclosed should 
it provide a  better means  of completing the internal market. 
The  arguments  for  exclusive provision and operation of the network 
infrastructure may  appear  strong at this time.  However  the  EC  Commission 
has  rightly recognised telecommunications  technology in the areas of 
adjacent infrastructure  (satellite mobile  radio and cable TV)  are 
advancing so rapidly that the question of competitive provision needs 
further analysis and  that under certain circumstances such competitive 
provision may  be desirable.  It is our view that the Green  ~aper does not 
go  far enough on  this latter point.  Particularly with respect to two-way 
satellite systems.  The  unique  properties of such systems could be of 
particular benefit at the Community-wide  level if exploited fully and 
should  not  be  subject to artificial reg\\latory constraints. 
In this context the Commission's  frequent  reference to the need to 
safeguard the  financial viability of Telecommunications Administrations is 
understandable  ;  telecommunications  between  Member  States are one of the 
most  profitable areas  for Administrations.  On  the other hand 
telecommunications costs are an  important part of business expenditure 
and  the  reaching of a  single  European market will not be facilitated by 
distortions in national tariff approaches.  While  recognising the arguments 
for maintaining financially viable Telecommunications Administrations, 
this should  not  in any event  be at the expense of business as a  whole. 
B)  PROVISION  OF  BASIC  SERVICES 
The  EC  Commission  is to be  congratulated for  not perpetuating the 
fruitless debate on  technology-based boundaries  (basic/value added,  etc.). 
The  position that exclusive provision of telecom services should be 
narrowly defined and  subject to periodic  review is correct.  This would  be 
a  major  and essential step forward  providing  such  reviews do  not  e~pand 
the  range  of  those  services  reserved  to the monopoly. - 3  -
The  Green  Paper  suggests  that  voice  telephone  service  is  the only obvious 
candidate for  exclusive provision.  We  can  understand  this viewpoint 
providing that it relates only to public  switched  telephone  service. 
Furthermore  there  should  be  flexibility  for  those countries that have 
opened or will decide to open voice  telephony to competition.  The  ICC 
would  not support a  set-back to such decisions.  However  exclusive 
provision should not  include private voice networks or integrated services 
where  voice is but one element.  In this latter regard we  agree with the 
Witte commission  report  (Federal  Republic of Germany)  which states 
"Telephone service is understood as meaning exclusively voice 
communication.  The  storage or conversion of signals  (e.g.  voice mail)  and 
the integration of speech into text,  image or data communication are 
excluded  from  the monopoly". 
It is the  ICC's view that there are no  other legitimate candidates than 
voice telephony  for  such exclusive provision.  To  extend the list of 
services reserved for the exclusive provision of Administrations would  be 
to seriously weaken  the Green  Paper proposals.  The  EC  Commission are urged 
to make  a  firm stand on  this point. 
The  Green  Paper  notes that in some  Member  States the following services 
are accepted as  "new  basic services"  :  packet switched data networks  1 
circuit switched data network  ;  teletex  ;  electronic mail  and videotext. 
While it does  not  say that they should be provided exclusively by 
Administrations,  the EC  Commission  indicates that these services should be 
available universally at the Community  level.  We  believe that the 
development of such services  by  Administrations has  been far  from 
satisfactory and that competition will foster rather than hinder the 
development of the up-to-date Europe-wide services which are needed  by 
business. 
An  Administration that wants  to go  beyond  voice telephony to include other 
services should be  required to demonstrate that benefits for users are not 
likely to result  from  open competition.  In order to strengthen the 
European  market  comparable definitions of reserved services among  Member 
States will be  necessary.  Monopoly  protection should be the exception,  for 
without  some  kind of guarantee that a  newly offered service will not 
subsequently be  reclassified as  a  reserved service,  companies will be 
reluctant to offer them.  The  importance of limiting exclusive provision 
will  be  even clearer when  in later years,  moves  into an  ISDN  environment 
will require the resolution of how  to distinguish voice services. 
C)  COMPETITIVE  SERVICES 
The  tee endorses  the  EC  Commission's  intention to remove  transborder 
barriers on  an  European level and its position on the  freedom to provide 
cross-border services.  Providers will nevertheless need to have access to 
the  underlying transmission services on  equal  terms  and conditions with 
the  Telecommunications Administrations otherwise such cross-border  freedom 
will  not  help. -
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The  Green  Paper  refers  to  separate tariff offerinqs  for 
"bearer"  and  "value  added"  components.  It will  be  vital to ensure that 
Administrations  and  potential  competitors  in  the  value added  area would  be 
offered  the  same  tariffs for  the bearer components. 
If a  policy is established to monitor compliance its implementation and 
enforcement  by  use of various  EEC  instruments should  be clarified. What 
will be  the method of redress available to industry and  use~s when  such a 
policy is not applied on a  national level  ?  Will  procedures be streamlined 
for  test cases  ?  The  ICC  would  welcome  some  clarification  ~egarding the 
appropriate methods of enforcement which are to be  introduced. 
EEC  competition policy will play a  most  important role here and its 
vigorous application will be  necessary to protect against  improper cross-
subsidisation and other unfair trade practices by Telecommunications 
Administrations. 
D)  STANDARDS 
Community-wide  inter-operability is a  laudable aim and standards are a 
necessary element in achieving this qoal.  However,  as the Commission 
is aware  standards can stifle as well  as  foster progress.  It must  be 
r~coqnised also that standards can  be  and  indeed are used as a  trade 
barrier.  The  users are inevitably the sufferers and are certainly ill-
served when  this occurs.  Examples  of misuse  include the mandatory 
application or premature establishment of standards.  We  would like to draw 
attention to the enclosed CTIP  Position paper  N°9  on  the development and 
implementation of telecommunication  st~ndards. 
The  Green  Paper puts forward  a  proposal to create a  European Standards 
Institute.  The  ICC  would  appreciate future clarification of the proposed 
role and  aims of the Institute as the Green  Paper is not sufficiently 
explicit on  this point. 
At  first sight the  idea of a  European Standards  Institute appears 
attractive.  It could  be  a  good way  to ensure direct user and  industry 
participation in the development of standards.  However,  we  are anxious to 
avoid duplication with existing standards body  and would  not wish the 
Institute to become  an additional administrative hurdle for business. 
Furthermore,  the Institute should  not  be  used to perpetuate the existing 
-situation where users are rarely consulted or given the opportunity to 
comment  (we  take  for  example  the Recommendation  on  ISDN). 
There is also a  need  for users/industry to play an equal  role in 
developing  those standards which  may  be created outside the  framework of 
the Standards  Institute,  and  to be  allowed to participate at every stage 
of  the  standards setting process.  It is necessary to have  a  balanced view 
of business  and  Administration  requirements.  The  ICC  is an  ideal 
participant and  we  would  be  happy  to propose our assistance as  the 
spokesman  for  world  business  to provide  industry/user participation and 
input. 
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E.  OPE&~  14£T\o.f0RK  PROVISION 
The  EC  Commission  position on  network  infrastructure indicates a  need  to 
establish common  principles  regarding the general conditions  for access to 
the network  infras~ructure  (Open  Network  Provision).  The  EC  Commission 
intends to develop directives that will cover technical  interfaces, tariff 
principles  (unbundling of bearer and  value-added capabilities), and 
conditions of use.  It will seek acceptance  by  the Administrations of clear 
obligations to interconnect with and  provide access for transfrontier 
providers. 
The  ICC  endorses  the need  for principles regarding open  and equal access 
conditions to network infrastructure and  the obligation for 
Administrations  ~o interconnect with and provide access for transfrontier 
providers. 
If the process of developinq these access conditions were to be 
independent  from  the Administrations then a  truly Open  Network  Provision 
could indeed become  a  reality. If however,  as appears probable,  the 
Administrations would  have  a  major,  if not entirely dominant,  role in the 
process,  then  the network  seems  more  likely to remain closed. 
Moreover,  with regard to important  new  services new  developing such as 
Managed  Data  Network  Systems  (MONS)  we  foresee potential difficulties 
in relation to fair,  open  and equal  access to network infrastructures 
for competitive service providers unless a  proper balance is achieved in 
determining and  implementing  ONP  provisions. 
The  conditions  for  the use of the network infrastructure must  not  leave 
roorn  for  anti-competitive behaviour  by  Administrations from  which there 
would  be  little or no  protection under the Community's competition rules. 
Under  these ciccumstances it seems  extremely doubtful whether  the benefits 
of true competition could be realised. 
We,  therefore,  emphasize the  need  for user participation in the definition 
of ONP,  and  would  be  in a  position to assist the·Commission in this 
conneetion. 
F)  TERMINAL  EQUIPMENT 
A progressive full opening of the terminal market  to competition is 
happening already and is due  in no  small  measure  to the action of the  EC 
Commission  under  the Community  competition rules.  The  ICC  fully endorses 
open competition in all equipment  located on customer premises  including 
the first telephone and digital as well as analoque  network  termination 
equipment . 
G)  SEPARATION  OF  REGULATORY  AND  OPERATIONAL  FUNCTIONS 
The  EC  Commission  sees this proposal  as  a  fundamental  precondition for  the 
establishment of a  competitive market  and  the participation of 
Administrations  in this market. 
It would  appear·that  the proposal  is to separate the  regulatory  function 
from  Administrations  in which  case  the  proposal  is warml¥ .~Pplauded and -
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supported  by  business.  Such  separation  is critical to having  a  sound 
telecommunications  policy and  regulatory  powers.  Ho~ever, it could  be 
interpreted to mean  simply  a  separation of  the  regulatory and  operational 
fur.c~ions within an  Administration which  in our  view would  not suffice. 
In callinq for  a  clear separation of regulatory and operational functions 
the Commission quite rightly pointed out that Administrations cannot 
continue to be  both referee and player.  Business aust,  as a  rule,  be 
provided not only with equality in opportunities but also equality in 
obtaining redress.  The  Community  should ensure that national bodies 
created to ensure compliance  and  enforcement of such separation should all 
be  set up on  similar lines,  be totally independent have  a  full spectrum of 
powers  and  responsibilities and  be open to public  input and  review. 
K)and  I)  REVIEW  OF  ADMINISTRATIONS  AND  PRIVATE  PROVIDERS 
Strict and equitable application of Community  competition rules will 
be essential if the Green  Paper proposals are to be effective.  In this 
regard  the national  regulatory bodies will have an important role to 
play and this further  emphasises  the need  for  agreement within the 
Community  on a  common  approach to the role and structure of these bodies. 
J)  COMMON  COMMERCIAL  POLICY 
In the context of this proposal  the  ICC  views with concern the draft 
Regulations  for  international telecommunications services prepared by 
the Preparatory  ~mmittee for  the· World  AUminist~ative Tele9~aph and 
Telephone Conference  (PC-WATTC  88).  Representation on this Committee 
froat Member  States was  mainly  from Telecommunications Administrations.  The 
Regulations as drafted are,  in our view,  unacceptably restrictive,  and 
conflict both with the Green  Paper  proposals and with the liberal 
regulatory trend already shown  in some  of the Member  States. It would also 
seem that as  things  stand the  WATTC  process could prejudice the 
discussions on telecommunications services which  we  hope and expect will 
be  included in the Uruguay  round of the GATT. 
The  Corr~ission is urged to alert the Member  States to the unsatisfactory 
nature of the draft Regulations  which could,  if ratified,  place 
unreasonable constraints on  the development of telecommunications  related 
services  and  also on  international business. 
II  I.  0'1'HER  COIOIENTS 
A)  TARIFFS 
A major  weakness  of the Green  Paper  in our  view is that it does  not 
adequately address  the question of tariff principles on which so much 
depends  for  the  telecommunications  sector. 
The  use  of  telecomrnunlcation tariffs has  varying political and  investment 
implications  in different countries.  However,  as  we  have  already  str~ssed, 
telecommunications  networks  can  no  longer  be  considered merely  a 
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convenience.  Business  relies on  their effective and  efficient operation  in 
order  to develop in  the  same  way  as  raw  materials are  required  for  the 
manufacture of qoods.  Companies  will  invest  in an  area where  they can get 
facilities and  plan  for  costs,  but  the  reverse is also true.  Tariffs 
constitute in 1uny cases a  barrier to such  investment through a  lack of 
transparency.  The  importance of tariff harmonisation should therefore be 
more  clearly referred to in  th~ EC  Commission's  proposal as an issue of 
priority.  A distortion of tariffs across  European  boundaries will not 
encourage companies  to invest if they cannot ascertain potential costs. 
The  ICC  believes that companies  need  to have a  reliable costs and tariffs 
plan across  Europe  in order to reap greater benefits from technological 
advances  in a  European dimension. 
The  EC  Commission  believes that tariffs should follow overall cost trends 
and  that a  certain amount  of rebalancing of tariffs will be  inevitable.  It 
states that a  fair trade-off between cost orientation and the aia of 
universal service on  reasonably the same  terms  for all will have to be 
developed.  It would  like to see a  gradual emergence of a  European tariff 
zone,  as well as a  higher transparency and convergence of accountinq 
cates.  In our opinion,  this will require a  consensus on  the general tariff 
principles for access  by users and  providers of competitive services 
including agreement in the degree of unbundling of tariffs required for 
fair access,  and general principles for the provision of leased lines. 
Althou9h the  EC  Commission  has the power  to investigate and  terminate 
abuses,  it seems content to leave it to the Administrations whether to 
apply usage-sensitive,  flat rate,  or a  mixture of both tariffs for leased 
lines. 
It is interesting to note that the  Eu~opean Commission  itself views usage-
sensitive tariffs as a  deterrent, at least in a  voice telephony context. 
This,  in our  view,  would  indeed  be the inevitable effect for value added 
services as well if such methods  were to be applied to the basic 
infrastructure. 
We  reaffirm our belief in the importance of cost-based pricing and flat 
rate tariffs for  leased circuits.  Usage-sensitive tariffs are not 
compatible with cost-based pricing.  We  take this opportunity to remind  the 
Commission  of our views on  leased lines as expression our position paper 
N°  4  ''International Private Leased Circuits - The  Business User's View". 
B)  PUBLIC  PROCUREMENT 
A fully  inteqrated,  competitive  European  market  for telecommunications 
services and  equipment  would  be  incomplete without  reference to network 
equipment  in the Commission's  proposed positions.  As  network  equipment is 
the  foundation  for  the telecommunications  network infrastructure over 
which  services travel and to which  terminal equipment is attached,  lack of 
competition  in this important  market  segment has direct implications for 
telecommunications  services and  for  terminal equipment. 
In its regulatory  framework,  the Commission  recognizes the  importance of 
creating a.  fully conunon  internal market  for  network equipment  in order for 
European  suppliers to achieve  the  necessary economies of scale.  We 
undC!rstand  tha-t· ·this position is supported  by  UNICE' s  statement on  "A 
TeleCORU:\Un.ic§~t"io~s  Policy  for  Europe". 
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'l'he  Green  Paper states  that  "the development  of  a  conunon  market  in  network 
~quipment must  therefore  go  hand  in  hand  with  a  substantial increase 
in  the  transparency of  procurc~ent procedures of  the Telecommunications 
Ad~inistrations,  in order  to ensure an  open market  in  telecommunications 
equipment". 
In  ~his area  the  EC  Commission  has  indicated its wish to increase 
transparency of procurement  practices  ;  progress rapidly towards  common 
specifications for  network equipment  and their use in public procurement; 
have close surveillance to quard against discrimination  ;  and  require the 
full application of the procurement  recommendation.  The  ICC  agrees and 
supports  these aims. 
The  ICC  notes with pleasure the  EC  Commission's aim to replace the current 
Recommendation  84/550 by  a  Council  Directive and  supports prompt  EC 
Commission  action on  this.  We  also support the extension of the public 
procurement  Directive  (77/62/EEC)  to cover telecommunications.  In this 
context  we  consider it appropriate that the GATT's  government procurement 
code  should be extended to include telecommunications. 
C)  THE  GLOBAL  NATURE  OF  TELECOI<MUNICATIONS 
The  Green  Paper's approach to non-EEC  trading partners is encouraging as 
the  ICC  believes that business activities are 9lobal in nature. 
Unrestricted access to an  interconnection with European services by 
trading partners will be essential.  It is of qreat importance that the 
competitive environment  to be established in the  EEC  should not be limited 
to the  Member  States and that no artificial barriers to trade are created. 
The  ICC  recognises  the intensified co-operation with the  EFTA  countries 
since the  Luxembourg  Declaration of 1984 and ventures to hope  that a 
co-operation of this nature can  be  further intensified and extended to 
other trading partners. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The  CTIP  Cor.mtission  has  formulated  position papers on  topics pertinant to 
the Green  Paper  (ISDN,  standards,  liberalisation of telecommunication 
services,  homologation of equipment attached to telecommunications 
networks  and  private leased circuits)  and is in the process of finalisinq 
a  future  paper on  worldwide  information technology without barriers. It is 
convinced of the desirability for greater industry/user involvement on the 
proposals contained in the Green  Paper  notably with regard to the 
Standards  Institute,  tariffs and  the promotion of competitive provisions. 
The  ICC  would  be  happy  to put its expertise at the  EC  Commission's 
disposal  on  an  ongoing basis. 
*  *  *  * 
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ISA  submission on  the  EEC  Green  Paper  on  the  Development  of the 
Common  Market  for Telecommunications  Services and  Equipment. 
The  Institute of Satellite Applications  (ISA) 
ISA  is an  independent  international  foundation  based  in 
Amsterdam,  The  Netherlands.  ISA  has  as its main  objective: 
- To  promote,  in the broadest  sense,  the peaceful uses 
of outer space,  by  implementing  the scientific and  research 
activities into their practical applications. 
ISA  intends to reach this objective by,  a.o.  : 
- conducting  scientific research  in the field of  space-
and  telecommunication  law. 
In  this  capacity  !SA  welcomes  the  initiatives  of  the 
Commission of  the European  Communities  as  expressed  in the  "Green 
Paper  on  the  development  of  the  common  market  for 
telecommunications  services  and  equipment." 
With  the Green  Paper,  we  are of  the opinion  'that the overriding 
aim  is  to  develop  the conditions  for  the  market  to  provide 
European  users  with  a  greater  variety  of  telecommunications 
services,  of  better quality and at lower cost,  affording Europe 
the  full  internal  and  external  benefits  of  a  strong 
telecommunications  sector.' 
We  also agree  that the  timing  is right and  there is  'the genuine 
possibility  of  finding  agreement  for  broad  common  regulatory 
aims'. 
As  said  in  the  Appendices  to  the  Green  Paper:  'European 
geography,  with  relatively small distances  between  major centres 
of  population,  is  not  a  natural candidate  for  the  extensive 
application of satellite communications'. 
The  existing European  regulatory structures,  however,  may  make  it 
one  of  the  most  promising  candidates  for  international 
networking,  where  satellites could be  used  to  'bypass'  the major 
regulatory  obstacles.  The  aims  of  the regulatory changes  in the 
European  countries  should be  to change  this situation  so  that 
satellite communications  can  be  the natural choice  for  users  who 
are  attracted  to  the  characteristic  advantages  of  satelite 
communications. 
registered in Amsterdam  KvK  S 205.009 It  is  not  a  secret that  the  slow  development  of  satellite 
communications  in  Europe  is to a  large extend  the result of  the 
existing  regulatory  structures.  We  are of  the  opinion  that 
regulatory  changes  could  have  a  stimulating effect on  the  usage 
of  the proliferating communications  satellite systems  in Europe. 
The  emergence  of  a  'flexible high-capacity'  infrastructure and of 
new  services  and  terminal  equipment  and  their  availability  on 
even  the  remotest  places,  could bring closer the objectives  of 
programmes  like RACE,  ESPRIT  and  STAR.  Further analyses  and  study 
of  the  effects  of  different  scenarios  are  required  but 
fundamental  decisions  should  be  taken  relatively  soon.  Of 
special  concern  here  should  be  the  changes  in  the  market  for 
international  communications  and  emerging  intermodal  competition 
)  of other ~acilities and  providers.  Furthermore,  the interests of 
the  space  industry and  the  interests of users,  worldwide,  should 
be  taken  into account. 
In  response  to  the  proposals  of  the  Commission  and 
preceding  analyses,  ISA  has  taken on  the  invitation  to 





These  comments  are  ment  as  a  reaction on  the general  proposals 
on  international  communications  and  in  particular  on  the 
proposals  concerning satellite communications. 
It  may  be  concluded  from  the  following  that  ISA  welcomes  the 
atmosphere  and  supports  the positions of  the Green  Paper.  Our 
comments  are to emphasize  and  clarify,  more  than  to oppose.  In 
our consideration and  conlusion we  add  some,  in our view,  relevant 
matters. 
)  CONSIDERING: 
1.  That  the characteristics of satellite technology  could cost-
effectively  enlarge  choice  for  the  user and  provide  him  with 
new  opportunities,  irrespective of his geographical  location, 
to  share  in  the benefits  of  information  and  communication 
dependent  industries. 
2.  That  satellites  can  form  a  temporarily  backbone  for  the 
development  of  ISDN  infrastructure and  therefore could  stimulate 
the  early  implementation  and  development  of  this  network. 
Terrestrial  tails  to  a  satellite- based  ISDN  infrastructure 
could  develop  before  the  possibly  more  economical  fibre 
infrastructure is realised. 
Satellite  capacity  will  for  the  next  decades  be  the  nessecary 
backup  for  high  speed  terrestrial networks  and  will  give  the 
operators  of  these  networks  the  flexiblity  needed  to  act 
according  to the market  forces  on  new  locations. 
2 
• 3.  That  satellite  communications  can  stimulate  the  early 
development  of  new  services  since  satellites  can  in  many 
instances  function  as  'step up'  technology  for  new  services  and 
new  entrants  in the  European  markets.  The  satellite distributed 
television  channels  are illustrating this.  And  satellites  can 
stimulate the early development  of  ISDN  services,  also in regions 
where  networks  will not  be  of  ISDN  quality for  the  foreseeable 
future.  CAD/CAM  applications  ,  new  multipoint direct access 
services  such  as data  base distribution  and  videoconferencing 
will  be  made  feasible  without  the direct  need  for  extensive 
terrestrial  infrastructures and at reasonable costs  for  medium 
and  small  service providers. 
)  4.  That  satellite systems  and  capacity will proliferate in the 
very  near  future  while  demand  for  public trunk connections is not 
growing at a  substantial level.  The  move  of satellite  providers 
to  a  strategy for  specialised services like television and  data 
distribution reflects fundamental  changes  in the market but could 
cause  again oversupply  in the  longer  term.  The  governments  and 
industries  of  Europe  have  made  substantial  investments  in 
satellite technology  and  capitalisation of  these  investment could 
be  in the first place realised by greater use  for  the benefit  of 
all parties. 
5.  That  the  Telecommunications  Administrations  have 
responsibility  for  marketing  the  transponder  capacity  and 
determining  the  rates,  terms  and  conditions of  service  that 
originates  from  their territory,  and  that these vary  form  country 
to  country.  And  that the pricing of  the  separate  parts  of  a 
satellite link is not  transparant. 
6.  That  the existing international treaties limit the access  to 
satellite  systems  to these Administrations  which  have  often 
conflicting  interests  when  marketing facilities to end  users. 
That  end  users are  limited in operating  and  owning  satellite 
earth  stations  and  in obtaining cost based  access  to  satellite 
communications  facilitites. 
7.  That  the  ECS  transponder  lease  contracts  contain  no 
restrictions to domestic  services but  that international services 
are  limited tot the  following criteria:  'The dedicated  capacity 
may  only  be  used  for  distribution  of  TV  programmes, 
_unidirectional  video  transmissions,  TV-like  programmes  and 
distribution of  sound  programmes  and/or data  channels  associated 
witht  and  that  are  an  integral  part of,  any  of  the  foregoing 
programmes  or transmissions.' 
3 8.  That  a  downlink  agreement  has  to be  signed  for  reception of 
the  signal  in  each  additional  country  outside  the  lessee's 
country,  also when  the  usage  remains  the  same. 
9.  That  television  applications are by  contract  still  'non 
primary'  services  and  preemptible ·by  the Eutelsat  'main  mission' 
(Public  international  telephony,  satellite  multiservices,  EBU 
service  and  occasional  use  services)  even  now  television 
distribution is the  most  successful  service. 
10.  That  satellite distribution of  TV  programmes  and  data  are 
) 
converging  and  that  the  communication traffic pattern of  multi-
point  data  distribution  is  closely  related  to  that  of 
broadcasting  and  therefore arguably  regulated  by  rules  on  freedom 
of  information,  freedom  of  speech,  and  intellectual  property 
rights. 
11.  That  two-way  satellite communication  for  high  speed  data 
communications  has  a  natural disadvantage  compared  to terrestrial 
communications  because of  the  so called  'echo'  time  difference. 
And  that  therefore  satellite  technology  will  face  strong 
competition of terrestrial networks  on paralel routes,  as  soon  as 
these are digitally upgraded.  The  threat of  loss of traffic to  a 
deregulated  satellite  communications  market  by  the 
Telecommunications  Administrations will  be  limited. 
12.  That  prohibition  of  connection to  the  public  switched 
network  of  high  speed  satellite  . links  could  prevent 
-)  'creamskimming',  especially when  combined  with  reasonable  limits 
to  resale and  reuse  for high  speed satellite links. 
13.  That  complete deregulation of  the VSAT  market  is  in  the 
interest  of all parties concerned,  could generate  considerable 
new  terrestrial traffic and  that  64  Kbps  should only  be  kept  as 
a  limit  as  long as it is not  jeopardizing the  emergence  of  new 
desirable services. 
14.  That  leased satellite capacity on Eutelsat II satellites 
may  be  marketed  in the  UK  by  other Eutelsat members  to  promote 
access  of  new  providers  to  satellite  capacity,  but  that 





WE  CONCLUDE 
That  satellite 
users  and  the 
dissemination  of 
speed  connections 
technology  has  very  much  to  offer  to  European 
European  telecommunications  industry.  Wide 
services and  accelarated development  of  high 
for  telecommunications  are  only  two 
the  unique  characteristics  of  satellite  applications  of 
technology. 
To  enjoy  all  potential benefits of  satellite  communications, 
utilisation  of  the proliferating capacity should  be  stimulated. 
Therefore marketing structures need  to be  changed  and  new,  more 
flexible,  service  offerings  are  required.  As  a  first  step, 
liberalisation  of  receive-only earth stations and  permission  of 
limited ancilary use  of  domestic  (and  private)  satellite  systems 
for  transborder services between  the various countries within the 
European  region,  in  combination  with choice  for  the  user  to 
lease capacity  from  different providers,  could create incentives 
for  the  Telecommunications  Administrations  to  price  satellite 
capacity  (up- and  downlinks),  realisticly and  competetively,  and 
to introduce  new  services and  minimize  regulatory obstacles. 
COMMENTS  ON  THE  PROPOSED  POSITIONS  A,B,C,D,E  and  F: 
·)·  A.  We  agree  that the  long  term  integrity of  the general  network 
,h  should  be  safeguarded.  We  should  like to emphasize  that continued 
exclusive provision or special rights for the  Telecommunications 
Administrations  regarding  provision and  operation of  the network 
infrastructure  needs  a  very  well  defined  set  of  special 
obligations and duties. 
We  welcome  further analyses of the competitive offering of  two-
way  satellite  communications  systems  but only where  they  form 
part of  the  public infrastructure.  We  agree that this competition 
should  be  closely monitored  but it has  to be clear in advance  why 
this  monitoring  is  done  and  what  the  impact  could  be  on  the 
operator  of  the monitored  system.  Preferably  the  monitoring 
should  be  the  task of an  independent authority.  Concerning  VSAT 
systems  we  agree  that there are very  few  reasons  to believe  that 
they  will  have  considerable  impact  on  the financial viability of 
the  main  provider(s)  while  they  could  be  very  important  in  the 
development  of  European  wide  services. 
The  competitive 
through  separate 
offering  of  two-way  satellite 





basis',  where  impact  on  the  finacial viability  of  the  main 
provider(s)  is  not  substantial,  therefore  we  agree  with  the 
sentence  in  the  appendices  (p.129)  that  'a  common 
interpretation  of  the  "economic  harm"  provisions  contained  in 
Articles  XIV  and  XVI  of  the  INTELSAT  and  EUTELSAT  Conventions  as 
regards  their  impact  on  satellite  communications  in  the 
community will be  required.' 
There  is,  however,  a  considerable difference  in the  international 
position  of  EUTELSAT  compared  to that of  INTELSAT  in respect  to 
the  offering of  international  services.  All  possible effects of 
liberalisation of satellite communications  on  the public  tasks  of 
these organisations  should  be  taken  into account 
Here  is independent  judging  needed  as well.  In  addition,  clear 
definitions  on  the  'specialised  services',  not  needing  the 
'economic  harm'  test,  have  to be established very  soon. 
At  the  same  time,  EUTELSAT  should get the opportunity  to  have 
access  to its end  user market,  especially in service areas where 
Telecommunications  Administrations  have  no  particular  interest 
in  implementing  and  marketing satellite communications. 
Since  competition  is  coming  from  all sides  and  the  European 
landscape  is changing  fast,  we  think that  a  thorough  review  of 
the  EUTELSAT  Agreement  and  the position the organisation  should 
hold  in the  changing  telecommunications  environment is  essential 
to  its  future  and  the  future  of  satellite  communications  in 
Europe.  At  the  same  time  the effects  of  the  European  wide 
offering of  services  through  domestic satellite systems  should  be 
considered. 
B.  Everything except public voice  telephony, 
on  a  competitive  basis  this  should  also 
communications. 
should  be offered 
concern  satellite 
c.  All  other  services connected  to and  meant  for  the  general 
public  should  be  considered  end  user services  and  be  provided 
in competition.  When  satellite communications  networks  are  part 
of  the  (inter-)national  infrastructure or are  connected :tb  the 
public  switched  telephone  network,  only  closely  monitored 
offering  of  competitive  two-way  satellite communications  should 
be  allowed.  Data distribution on  the  broadcasting pattern  is 
very  close  to broadcasting  and  will also technically  be  close 
since  there  is a  tendency  to use  spare capacity  on  television 
signals  for  the distribution of data.  This  is very  much  related 
to  freedom  of  speech  and  freedom  of  information.  The  cable 
distribution  of  these data  services  using  addressable  decoders 
will  be  possibly connected with  the public  switched  network  but 
it  will  need  extremely high  investments  to adapt  the  existing 
cable  networks  to  the high  standards  needed  for  interactive 
services.  Competition  on  this level  should  be  closely monitored 
6 •  I 
but  also  stimulated since very  interesting  new  services  could 
develop out of  these  new  combinations. 
D.  Standards  are  needed  we  agree,  but  should  be  very well  timed 
and  not  be  to protect markets  but only  on  basis of  common  sense. 
E.  This  is one  of  the  most  sensitive areas  since  regulations 
concerning  interconnection  and  access  are  decisive  for  the 
success  of  every  privatisation  or  liberalisation  of 
telecommunications  structures.  To  prevent  the  long  legal battles 
on  these  regulations  they  should  be  extremely  clear  and 
the  proposed directive should  therefore contain provisions  that 
)  regular  updates  by  way  of  regulation  or  decision  could  be 
implemented  easily.  It should also be clear and  agreed  on  what 
the  basic  objectives  are of  the  regulations.  We  respect  the 
courage  of  the  Commission  in this and  hope  that this  will  also 
contain access,  tariffs and  interconnect provisions  for satellite 
communications  in Europe. 
F.  Ideally,  the  primary  purpose of certification should  be  to 
ensure protection of  the public network  and  network  personel  from 
possible  harm  caused  by  the connection of  the customer  premises 
equipment.  All  other criteria should  primarily be  left  to  the 
market  place.  Therefore,  type  aproval  should only be  considered 
when  connection of  ROES  to the public network is allowed. 
Furthermore,  it should  not be  required  that satellite  rece1v1ng 
facilities be  licensed,  but one  should retain the possibility of 
a  simplified optional  licensing procedure  for  those  receive-only 
.) satellite  earth station owners  seeking  interference  protection  ) 
~  from  terrestrial  transmitters  through  a  frequency  coordination 
process.  Protection  from  interference resulting  from  transmitting 
facilities  is not afforded to owners  of unlicensed  receive-only 
earth  stations and  such  owners  waive  any  rights of objection  to 
existing  or  future  interference.  Consequently,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  obtain approval  to install and operate  a  receive-
only earth station. 
Every earth station operator is,  however,  required to comply  with 
all  national  and  international copyright  laws  and  communications 
regulations  that  prohibit  unauthorised  reception  and  use  of 
communications  (Art.  17  International  Radio  Regulations) 
Institute of Satellite Applications 
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PROJET D'AVIS du CNPF sur le LIVRE  de Ia C C E 
2  C:..  .'1,.,  . 6 +-
Oe- ~  JJJ,~ 
ell' 
La  Commission des  Communautes  ElKop6ennes  ( C C E ) a pubM  le  30  juin  1987  un 
Livre  Vert  SlM'  le  developpement  du  marche  commun  des  service&  et  tqutpernents  des 
Mf~communications. 
Ce document vise 6 lancer un  d~bat et a  susciter des commentaires de Ia part des  acte~s 
&\l'op6ens  afm  de  favoriser  le  d6veloppement  des condtions  dans lesquelles  le  march6 
offrira  aux  utihsatetn  eu-op6ens  une  plus  vande  veri6t6  de  WVIC88  de 
teJ6communications.  de  meillelre  qualite et A  un  coOt  moincte.  permettant 6 rewope  de 
recueHrr.  tant  A rint«ieur  qu'A  l'ext«ieur  ,  1es  pleins  b6n6fices  dun  sedell'  des 
tettcommunitations  puissant.  · 
Le  Conseil Nation81  du Patronat  Fran~is ( CNPF  ) tient 6 exprimer eon acccrd ~~  sur 
les positions propos6es par  Ia CCE  en les  accompa~  de quelques commentai'es. 
Tout c.tatxrd D paraft souhaitable  au  CNPF  d'utifiser d6scrmais cfune mani«e gfn«aae le 
terme  •  d'en1re~ise de  t61ecommunications  ••  Par  en1reprise  de  t616commtrieations.  fe 
CNPF propose d'entencte toute  soci6t~ autaiste par un ·  Etat Memtre 6 ttabli' un rtseau 
de  t616communications ouvert l  des tiers,  ou a  ouvri'  aux tiers un r6seau qu'ele a 6tabli. 
De par Jetr caracttre industrial et commercial les  adminlstations  des  t616communieations 
sont  couvertes par  cette  appellation  qui  offre  l'avantage  de  mleux  identifter  Ia  nat\l'e  du 
secteur  des  telecommunications. 
Dans ces condittons Ia position A- elin~a 1 deweit  s"appliquer  6 ceRes  des  entreprise$  de 
telecommunications qui ont dans les Etats Memtres l rempli'  les  obligations  d'installation 
et de disponibflit6 d'un rtseau g6n«al.  U  seratt utile de p-tciser <t]"un  rtseau  gen6raJ  doi1 
dans I'Etat Membre oll U  est autorise  couvrir  l'ensemble du territoire, aearer  les  baisons 
internationaJes,  et  rtponcte  aux  imp6rat~s de  D~fense, aux  besoins  de  communlcafion 
des  Pouvors Publics et  des usages domestiques  et  P'ofessfonnels.  II  aSSU"e  6galemont 
l'acc6s  de  tous  au  service  t{,16phonique  fixe.  et  son  exploitaticn  contribue  au 
~veloppement  de  Ia  recherche  et  de  Ia  formation  dans  le  seetu  des 
t616communications 
La position A·  alin6a  3 mb'iterait quant  ~ elle  ct&tre  eompl6t6e afin  cfafficher fobjedit  de 
promouvoi' des s~uekl"es commerciales de tournittxe de services i  r6chelle  wop6enne. 
queUe  que  soit  rinfrastructu-e  de  r~seau  ufifis6e  6  cette  ftn.  Une  telle  coorclnation 
apponerait  • aux  utaisateurs  ~ofessionnels notamment.  simplifteation  e1  efficadt'  pour  le 
satisfaction de leu's besoins de raceordements et de liaisona. 
L  es  principes  enonc6s  dans  Ia  position  B  quant  aux  services  de  base  r6serves 
meriteraient dune part une  precision.  d'autre  part une  observation. 
:on,, 9 
(~)  '~" Par  services de  base  . il  serait  sans  doute  utile  de  preciser  qu'il  s'agit  de  services  dont 
l'objet  principal  est  de  transmettre  et  d'acheminer  des  signaux  sans  let6  faire  subir 
d'autres taitements  que ceux  n~COS$Aires A  leur transmission etA leur .acheminement. 
D'autre  part  l'interpretation  ~troite  qu'il  convient  de  donner  au  p-incipe  de  prestation 
exclusive  par  certaines  entreprises  de  telecommunications  poc.rrait  egalement  tenr 
compte  de  seuils  de  diffusion  internationale  qui  font  qu'au  dell  du  service  t"ephonique 
vocal.  le  service  telex  et  le  service  de  transmission  de  donnees  pw  commutatiOn  de 
paquets poliTaient 6tre  susceptibles  d'~tre retenus dans une &ste restrictive. 
P04X le developpement des services concurrentiels vislts dans Ia position C. i pcurait 6tre 
utile  ctaffrmer  Ia  neu1ralit~  de  rexploitant  par  rappa-t  6 Mdentitt  des  utisateu-s  de 
flatsons  lou6es.  sans  condtions  d'activites  essoci6es.  compl6mentai'es.  ~alogues ou 
connexes. POll les services offerts sur Jes reseaux ouverts A  des tiers. D  parattrait J'gitime 
qu'en  fonction  de leurs  tailles  soient  imposees  des  conditions  relatives  6 hM  apport  en 
valet.r  ajoutee  I*' rappa1  a un  simple  transport  • 6 lelJ'  confcrmitt  ou  IN'  mise  en 
conformite  avec les ncrmes  ~voqu6es dans  Ia  p-oposition  D et  6 letl's  contributions  au 
d6veloppemeilt des reseaux  g6n6raux.  II  faut  en  effet  veiller 6 Ia  coh«ence  ~obale des 
positions A,  B  et C . 
En  mati~e de  na-malisation  , objet  de  Ia  position  D.  le  CNPF  soutient  le  p-ojet  de  Ia 
aeation  d'un lnstitut Ec.rop6en de  NormaJisa~on sous reserve qu'i acc61«e les tavaux de 
Ia CEPT et du CEN.CENELEC.  qu'H permene une conoertation accrue avec les utilisate'-l's 
et les  cons1ructeurs.  et qu'il contribue  A  une meillelle  perception  des  int«Ma  i\dus1nels 
europe ens.  Ce dernier objectif dewait !tre 6galement pis en compte dans ~  position r. 
II  semble nat...-el  au  CNPF  de  consid&-er  dans Ia  position  E- af106a. 3 que les utilisateurs 
professionnels  sont  com~Jis dans  les  parties  concern6es  per  Ia  concertation  Slf tOpen 
Network  Provision  ( ONP  ).  En  effet  cette  concertation  dewait  notamment pater sur  Jes 
principes  de  tarification  du  secteLE  concurrentiel  en  ce  qui  concerne  Ia  prestatiora  de 
~~~~  .  -
la proposition  G vise  Ia  ooparation  des  activit6s  de  r6glementation  et  cfexploitation  des 
actuelfes  administrations  de  tet~communications.  Le  CNPF  consid«'e  quo  Jes  activites 
reglementares  de~aient inclure  les  principes  tarifares  cfutilisation  des  r6seaux  car  les 
transfa-mations  du  secteur  des  tel6communications  lui  paraissent  devoi'  obligatorement 
&tre  guidees par des consid«etions 6conomiques  et sociales. 
PotK  toutes  les  en1rep-ises  de  tel6communications  (  propositions  H et  I ) • 1e  aoit 
communautue  commercial  de~ait  s·appliquer  ~  Ia  fabrication,  rinstdation.  Ia 
maintenance d6quipements etA Ia foumitll'e  de  services.  Ceci ~  notamment Je  contr~e 
des  positions  dominantes  et  des int6g-ations  verticales.  Simuttan~ment, afin  de  favcriser 
Ia  cr~ation d'enfteprises  ctenvergure  mondiale  dans  Jes  domaines  des  6quipements  et 
des services. 0  serait  t~s souhaitable  de  definir  les statuts  de  soci6t6s de  ctoit etrop6cn 
dans un secteur  qui plus que d"autres a besoin  de -se r6crganiser  pet  des  alliances  et  des 
fusions. 
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Par allleurs.  pour  ce  qui  est  plus  particuli~rement du  suivi  des ectivit6s  d'exploitation  des 
entreprises  de  t6t6communicatrons  gh'ant  des  r~aux g6neraux  et  pas  seulement  des 
administrations  • les pratktues  de  subvention  aoisee  des  services  concwrentiels  et  des 
services reserves devraient &tre  observ~es tant sous letrs formes fiscales  que financi«es 
et tarifaires. 
Les  acc~ds et  les regles  evoques  dans Ia  position J au  ti1re de  Ia pofttique  commercia1e 
.commune  au  sein  de  Ia  Communaute  devraient  quant  6 eux  61re  1ransferables  ou 
epplicables  aux  en1reprises  de  t61~communications.  queUe  que  sat  lttK  nature 
d'administration  . dentreprise  publique  ou  privee. 
Enfin  il  apparaft  6galement  souhaitable  que  Ia  CCE  demande  l  toceasion  des 
n6gocietions GATT aux pays A  &1ructll'e f6d6rale ou  conf6d6rale une stride r6cip-ocit6  de 
condtions d•change de services au niveau de lell's 6tats f6d6rts. 
En  conclusion le CNPF reaffirme  son accord  global  st.r  les  positions  proposees  dans  le 
liwe  Vert  de  Ia  CCE.  et  partage  son  souci  de  Jl'end'e  pleinement  en  compte  les 
d'Jff«entes  situations  nationafes  afm  de  r6atiser  prog-essivement  lea  6volutions 
n6cessaires  6 rhorizon  1992. 
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STA't'EMENI'  00 THE  GREEN  PAPER  CN  TiiE  DEVELOPMENI'  OF  'IHE  CXM-Q.J  MARKET 
FOR  'I'ELEXXMUNICATIOOS  SERVICES  AND ~ 
Preamble 
f\j((_ 
The  Green  Paper produced  by the Camrl.ssicn of the E\.lrq;;)ean  Connuni  ties has  as 
its objective  "a  technically  advanced  European-wide  arrl  low-cost  teleccmnuni.-
cations  ne~rk (which)  will provide  an essential infrastructure for i.mp:r'ovin;J 
the canpeti  tivi  ty of the  European  econany,  achievirg  the  Internal Market  and 
~  Connunity  c::rl"lesicn''.  The  PM'I,  which  favours  European  .integra-
tim and,  therefore,  the developnent of coherent <XllllU1  ec:oranic p:>licies,  not 
only for  the  European  Cannunities,  but  also for the whole of Western  Europe, 
welccmes  the  Camrl.ssion' s  efforts  to  pursue  this  objective  in the  field of 
teleccmnunications. 
The  Camrl.ssicn'  s  endeavours  to bring  alx>ut  a  cx::mron  approach  to  teleccmnuni-
cations policies are of great i!rq;x)rtance rot only to the countries of the Euro-
pean Catmm.i.ties,  but to the wh:>le  of Western  Europe.  The  search for the can-
liOil approach slx:uld,  therefore,  involve EFTA,  as well as the EEC  countries. 
The PITI  European Camrl. ttee insists that the policies of the European Cannuni-
ties  should  safeguard  the viability of the  public  teleccmrrunications  admini-
straticns and their ability to provide adequate services,  accessible to all at 
reasonable prices,  and that they sl"nlld also  aim at :i.mprovirg and hanronisix:g 
employment  conditions  of  the  workers  concexned.  The  developnent  and  appli-
cation of teleccmnunicatioos policies stx::W.d  be made  in c::x:nsu1 tation and after 
negotiations with the trade .unions,  at the nati0Cla..1,  and Connuni  ty levels. 
Principles of PITI Policies 
The European Cotmittee recalls and reaffinns the policies laid Cbwn by the Prl'I 
European  Congresses,  and in particular the Resolution  aCbpted by the  Congress 
held in Copenhagen in August 1986,  the text of which is attached to this State-
ment.  The Camrl. ttee re-emphasises the fundamental principle that "PIT sexvices 
sh::>uld  be  organised  as  public  services,  the  major  aim  of which  is to  ensure 
that  all  members  of  the  ccmnunity  have  access  to  good,  up-to-date  ccmnuni-
cations services at prices which they can afford,  regardless of their location 
or wealth". 
we  recall that "PITs have traditionally been able to provide universal sexvice, 
because they were granted the exclusive privilege of providing certain services 
to  the  public  which  allowed. PTI's  to  operate  systems  of  cross-subsidisation, 
whereby  profitable  services  could  support  those  which  were  unprofitable  but 
considered socially necessary". 
The  European  Cotmittee  reaffinns  the  demand  of  the  Copenhagen  Congress  that 
"any changes in regulations sh::>uld  enhance the ability of PITs to offer univer-
sal  services  and  rerrove  any  restrictions  on  PIT  activities",  and  the  demand 
that  "PTI's  sh:>uld  be  free  to develop and offer new  services and  types of ser-
vices,  whether  or not  these  are  in cx:mpetition with canpanies  in the private 
sector". 
The Cotmittee also recalls the demands of the European c.awess that "all plans 
to change services,  personnel  policies and structures should be the subject of 
prior consultation  and  real  nec]Otiation with  the unions  concerned",  and  that 
"whatever changes in st:Iucture are agreed with trade unions,  systems of nation-
al barga.ini.rg  covering all activities of PITs  and,  as far as p:>Ssible,  uniform 
conditions of work  and  employment must  be maintained  and that PITs provide the 
necessary tra.i..n.irg  and retra.ini.rg for employees".  ·· 
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General Ccmnents 
The  PIT!  European  Cannittee  welcanes  the PJSitive  :Etmdarrental  elements of  the 
I;X)licies proposed in the Green Paper.  We  share  the Cannission's conviction as 
to the growl.nJ  ifnt:xJrtance  of tele<x:mTtUI1i.cations  and its powerful  impact oo the 
econany of each  member  State  and  on the Camrunity as  a  wt'x:)le.  We  encbrse  the 
Ccmnissicn'  s  stand  against the deregulation of European teleccmnuni.cations  and 
its preference for re-regulaticn. 
'!he  Green  Paper rightly  regards  "an  intensive  dialogue  with the scx:ial  part-
ners"  as  necessary  "in  order  to  ensure  a  s:rooth  transition  to  new  techno-
lOCJies",  and  also  correctly  ~ises  as  the  aost important  factor  for  the 
future  evolution  of  the  telecarmunications  "the  degree  of  social  o::::nsensus 
which can be  achieved regard.irq  the  new  techn::>logy"  (page  074).  The ~is 
on the need  for consultations with trade unions at the Ccmnuni. ty arrl naticoal 
levels regard.irq telecx::mm.m.ications tx>licies is -welcx:med. 
The  European Carmi.ttee  fully enibrses  as crucial  the  follCMi.I'YJ  stat€l00nt  c::x::n-
tained in the Green Paper  (pages 018-019): 
"the current  and future  integrity of the basic neb-.ork  infrastructure 
must be maintained or created; 
this implies,  in particular,  a  continuir:g st:rong role for Teleccmnun.i-
cations Administrations  in the provision of neb-.ork infrastn.,ctures,  a 
st:rong  ~is  on  Europe-wide  ne~rk standards.  It  also  implies 
safeguard.irq  the  financial  viability  of  Telecx::mnunicatioos  Adm.ini-
strations,  in order  to  ensure  the  build-up  of the  new  generation of 
teleccmnun.ications  irifrastructures  and  the  necessar.y level  of invest-
ment."  · 
The  European  Carmi  ttee reiterates the  PIT!' s  support for the Connission'  s  en-
deavours,  once again emphasised in the Green Paper,  to prorote the co-ordinated 
introduction of  ISDN  and  IBC,  a  Camruni  ty-wide  nobile  ccmnunications  system, 
prograrnne of assistance to less-favoured regions in telecx::mnunicaticns develop-
ment  (STAR),  research programne  RACE  and  ESPRIT  and the ha:rnonisation of stan-
dards and specifications. 
On the other hand,  the PIT!  European Corrnittee is concerned about the restric-
tive qualifications  in the  Green  Paper,  which  seriously  limit the  "exclusive 
provision or special rights for the Teleccmnunications Administrations regard-
ing provision and operation of the network infrastructure".  It is particularly 
disquietin3 to see  the  statement in the Green Paper  (page 104),  which is o::xl-
trad.ictocy to the one previously quoted and which is to the effect that "exclu-
sive network provision must be n.arrowly defined". 
) 
We  are also precx:;cupied with the excessive reliance in the Green Paper on c:x:xn-
peti  tion as  the  force  for  the  developnent  of  teleccmnunications  services  and 
the  tendency  to  protect  private  canpeti  tors  fran  Teleccmnunications  Admi.n.i-
strations,  with  inadequate  regard  for  the  need to  protect the financial  via-
bility of  the Administrations  and  their:  right to c::x::Jil)ete  on an equal  footin3 
with others in the field open to canpetition. 
The  carmi  ttee  expresses  the  gravest  cbubts  alx>ut  the  Corrnission'  s  prop:>sals 
rega.rdin] the soope which should be open to c::x::Jil)etition. 
Industrial policies  sh:::>uld  be  formulated,  taking into consideration,  as one of 
the  essential  factors,  the  employment  and  socia~ _aspects.  It is,  therefore, 
"' I 
. ) 
- regretted that the Green  Paper,  th:>ugh  recogruSJ.n;;J  the  importance of this fac-
tor,  Cbes n::>t  make  appropriate p:rop:>sals  as part and parcel of its general cx:n-
ception of telecx:xmu.mications policies. 
While  appreciati..rg the problans which these matters present for the Q:mnission, 
we  car1r0t  but  regret  thr~  ab..senco  of  an expression of defin.i  te support for  the 
concept of telecx:xmu.mications as a  public sexvice,  best nm as a  publicly-avned 
undertaki.NJ,  as well  as  the assurance  that the policies a.dvcx:ated  in the Green 
Paper c:anrxJt  and must not by implication be regarded as advocacy for the separ-
ation of teleccmnunications fran p:>sts in oountries where  they are part of the 
same  Administratioo. 
In our opinion,  there are  sane  contradictiaLS in the policies outlined in the 
Green  Paper.  The  one  of ubrost  ilrq;x:>rtance  concerns  the rreans  to achieve the 
general  objective of the  developnent of stron:J  teleccmnunications  infrastruc-
tures  and efficient services.  This calls for  the  invesbnent of large arrounts 
of rroney by the Teleccmnunications Administrations.  We  are conce:roed atout the 
d.an3er  that  other  reccmnended  p::>licies,  those  relatfn3  to  canpeti  ticn  and 
cross-subsidisation,  will  .impair  the  ability of Administ:raticns  to develop  a 
sb::onJ  teleccmnunications  infrastructure  ( ISDNs  in particular)  and  new  ser-
vices. 
Prop.?Sed Positions in the Green Paper 
It is assumed  that  Figure  13,  entitled  "Prop::>sed  Positions",  is n::>t  merely  a 
sumnary of the reccmnendations made  in the Green Paper,  but also constitutes a 
set of definite proposals.  Our ccmnents are based en this asSlJI'li)tion. 
The preamble in Figure 13 sh::W.d,  in our opinion,  include the following phrases 
(in the definition of objectives) : 
ensurirg that all members  of the carmunity have  access to gcod,  up-to-
date  ccmnunications  services at prices which they can  afford,  regard-
less of their location or wealth; 
establish.irg  a  ccmron  approach  to teleccmnunications  on  the basis  of 
agreement with the social partners and with due  account being taken of 
employment,  M:>rkirvg conditions,  training and other social aspects  . 
It is also suggested  that after  "creatfn3  an  open canpetitive environment"  a 
qualification slnlld be  added  alo!YJ  the  following lines:  "to the extent of its 
ccmpatibility with broader econ:mi.c  and social objectives". 
As  for Position A,  the PIT!  European Carmi  ttee endorses the first paragraph in 
it,  but  calls  for  the  addition  of the  follaving  paragraph,  contained in the 
main b:::>dy  of the Green Paper and already quoted: 
"This  implies  a  continuing  str'olYJ  role  for  the  Teleccmnu.nications  Admini-
strations  in the  provision of  netv.ork  infrastructures  and  safeguarding their 
financial viability to ensure  the build-up of the  new  generation of telecarrnu-
nications infrastructures and the necessary level of investment." _ 
Further,  in our view,  the best way  in which to ensure the achievement of these 
objectives is for each country to have one  sin:]le public network of telecatnn.l-
nications and we  urge that this slx>uld be advocated by the Carmission.  The in-
troduction of nore than one neb-.ork in any country is rot only unnecessary,  and 
wasteful of resources and  finance,  but makes  the objective of a  fully integra-
ted European netM:>rk  much  nore difficult to achieve. 
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We  express  the rrost  serious reservations arout the  paragraph dealing with ~ 
way  satellite <XlllTIUnications  systems.  In our opinion,  the open:in:J  of  Tho-way 
satellite ccmnunications to canpetition,  h::Mever closely nonitored,  is OOurrl  to 
have  a  serious negative effect on the financial viability of Telecarmunications 
Administrations.  It w::JU.ld  create  a  a:mpeting  netv.ork which ~d  allow  a  sig-
nificant diversion of traffic of all kinds  which  is in contradiction with the 
{X)Si tion with the p::>si ticn (A)  prop:>sed by the O:mn:ission. 
The  PIT!  European  Ccmni ttee  raises  serious  reservations  and  objections  to 
Position B.  In our opinion,  it is oot in line with the emphasised need for a 
strong  role  of  Telecamrunications  Administrations,  for  their  financial  via-
bility and their ability to invest large arrounts. 
We  urge that an  arrendment  slx>uld  be made  in the first sentence,  in order that 
it sh:Juld  speak of  "exclusive  provision"  of basic  services by  Telecx:mnu:nica-
tions  as  be~ "considered essential  for safeguard.i.rg the  financial viability 
of  the  Admi.nistratic:ns  and  their ability  to  invest in developnent of  future 
netw:::>rks,  as well as for safeguard.i.rg public service goals". 
In Position B,  the Ccmni.ssion expresses the view that "exclusive provision must 
be  narrowly  construed  and  be  subject to review within given tirre intervals". 
This proposal Cbes rot shew  arr:J  concern for the financial viability of Telecan-
munications Administrations,  but seems  to shcM  concem only for the ccmnercial 
interests  of  private  enterprises  provic:li.n;]  services  open  to  cx:mpeti  tian. 
Clearly,  if uncertainty about  the future classification is detrimental to pri-
vate providers of value-added services,  as stated on page 049,  so it is to the 
Telecarmunications Administrations. 
Even rrore  importantly,  the  PITI  EUropean  Conni  ttee is in disagreement with the 
funclomel1tal  {X>licy  prornmcenent  that  the  basic  services  should  be  narrowly 
defined.  On  the contrary,  they  slx:ruld  be  defined broadly,  with a  view to en-
suring the  strong role of Telecamrun.ications Adninistrations,  their financial 
viability  and  ability  to  develop  future  netwurks.  We  reccmnend  that  the 
"exclusive  provision"  by  Teleccmnuni.cations  Administrations  slx>uld,  with:Jut  a 
time limit being already sp::>ken  of at this stage,  include rot only voice tele-
ph:>ny,  but also telegraphy,  telex,  digital and data transmission and any system 
capable of two-way transmission  . 
We  also  urge  that  adequate  protection  be  given to the exclusive provision of 
services by Telecx::mnunications Administrations,  in particular lJt: 
- the Ccmnunity-wide prohibition of the resale of leased circuits,  as the only 
effective  way  of  preventing  the  "skimning  off"  of  traffic  on  the  rrost 
profitable routes; 
- guaranteeirg universal and equal access to basic services as defined above. 
i 
Position C  should be  drastically altered to reflect  the  amendments  which  the 
PTI'I  European  Camti.  ttee reccmnends  for Position .B.  In particular,  the phrase 
"free  (unrestricted)  provision  of  all  other  services"  slx>uld  rDt  be  used. 
Position C  shJuld  speak  of the  provision,  on  a  canpetitive basis,  subject to 
restrictions defined under B,  of value-added services. 
We  wish to question again the over-reliance on canpetition,  which may,  in sane 
cases,  be detrimental to the majority of custcmers. 
The  Comti.ssion' s  declared  aim  is to strengthen  the  European  presence in tele-
c::cmm..zn.ication.s  in Europe  and  in dea.lin)s with the rest of the \o.Drld.  How-rever, 
the unnecessary openir'g up of a  wide  raNJe  of services  to canpetition will en-
. able  a  flcod of products frcm  ron-European countries to enter the European mar-
ket.  In  many  of  those  countries  there  are  ro  reciprocal  opr;x:>rtuni ties  for 





It sh::uld also be enphasised again that where services are open to ccmpetition, 
Teleo:::mnunications  Adni.nist:rations  rrust  have  the  right to ccmpete  on  an  equal 
foot.in;1 with other sez:vice providers. 
With regard to Position D,  the PIT!  European Catmittee fully shares the Comti.s-
sim's concern at:out mmm standards and specifications.  At the same  time,  we 
wish to emphasise our view,  which is that CEJ?T  sh:Jul.d cx:ntinue to play the cen-
tral role in all these matters.  Standards and specifications sl'x:uld  be estab-
lished with reference to the requirements of the networks which the Administra-
tions provide  and sh:uld apply to all countries of Western Europe.  Both these 
arguments militate in favour of the contirurl.nJ role of CEPT. 
In  the  last  sentence  of Position  ~,  the  trade unions  should be  specifically 
mentiooed  as  parties concerned  which  sh::uld  be  consul  ted.  The  proposed  text 
could  be  interpreted  as  reccmrend:in;J  that  consul.  tations  to  be  held  in  the 
search for  a  consensus  should be ·exclusively "in the  framework of the Senior 
Officials Group on Telec:x:mrunicaticns".  We  regard this  framework  as  much  t:c:o 
narrcM  and urge cx::r'lSiderably wider consul.  tat:i..oos.  N:>  "open network provision" 
ONP  sh::uld bring restrictions en the technical  developrent of the main public 
network or ~er  its financial viability. 
We  are  inclined to  agree with the statement in Position F  that  "provision of 
the first ( cx::nventicnal.)  teleph.:rle set could be excluded fron unrestricted pro-
vision",  except  that  the  ~rd "could"  ought to be  replaced  by  "should",  the 
~  corwentional  in brackets  should be  deleted and  that this  sln.lld not  be 
done  "on a  temp:>rary basis",  as recx:mnended by the Ccmni.ssion. 
The  PTI'I  European  Conni  ttee  cbes  not  agree  wi  til  the  reccmnendation  that 
"Receive  Only  Earth  Stations  for  satellite  down-links  should  be  assimilated 
with terminal  equipnent  and  be  subject to type  approval  <Dl.y".  A  measure of 
this kind would inevitably lead to the open:l.rg of the whole of satellite ccmnu-
n.ications to ccmpeti  tion,  which would have serious unfavourable effects on the 
telecarrnunications network providers. 
In  Position  G,  the  Connission  recx::mnends  the  "separation  of  regulatory  and 
operational  activities  of  Teleccmnunications  Administrations"  and  defines 
broadly the  "regulatory activities".  The  view that a  public• authority sln.ll.d 
be  vested with the regulatory process can hardly be contested,  but when  Tele-
CCITilllUti.cations  have the status, of a  State deparbnent or underta.kin:;J and provide 
a  single  netv.crk  infrastructure  and  broadly  defined basic  services,  it seems 
reasonable and practical for such an Mninistration to act as  the public auth-
ority entrusted with the regulatory process,  to be exercised under derrocratic 
control.  In other situations,  in sane  of which  the separation of regulatory 
frcm  operational  activities is desirable,  steps  must  be  taken to ensure that 
the  regulatory  au"t:hJri  ty does rot cane  under d:mination of equipnent manufac-
turers or large providers of canpetitive services.  The operations of the regu-
latory b::xiy should be open to public scrutiny,  particularly by the trade W"lions 
and users. 
When  Telecarmunications  Administrations  are  not responsible  for standard set-
ting  and  approval  procedures,  Member  G:JVemments  nrust  provide ·adequate  finan-
cing and organisation of the proper facilities. 
Positions  H  and  I  make  an  a.lm:>st  identical  reccrrmendation  with  regard  to  a 
II strict continUOuS review of operational  ( ccmnercial )  activities of Telecomru-
nications  Administrations"  and  "of all  private providers  in the  newly-opened 
sectors".  However,  as  far  as  the Teleccmnunications Administrations  are con-
cerned,  there is an  a~tional rec::x:mnendation which applies only to them.  This 
is to  the  effect  that  the  review  sh:>uld  apply  "in particular to practices of 
cross-subsid.isation  of  activities  in  the  ccmpetiti~- §ezyices  sector  and  of 
activities in manufacturing" . 
• 0 
The  distinction made  between  the  Adn.ini.strations  and  private providers  is un-
warranted.  Indeed,  the  Gn~en Paper i t!:ielf contains,  en page  109,  the reccmncn-
c.L"lt.ion  that  "close surveillance of  c::~s-subsidisatioo practices in  tl1e  oper-
a tiona!  activities of tx:>th  Teleccmnun..ications Administrations  and private pro-
viders in  the  newly-opened  cx:mpetitive  services  and  terminal  sectors will  be 
required  • • • II 
We  urge the Comri.ssion to replace the present word.i.n:1  in Position I  by the for-
mulation quoted a.l:xJve. 
· In  presenti_nJ  our  further  cx::mrents  an  cross-subsidisation,  we  refer  to  the 
statements on  page  109  of the  Green Paper,  with which we  are in agreement:  "A 
certain  am::runt  of  cross-subsidisation  is pennissible  in any  ccmnercial  ven-
ture.  EXisting prcxluct lines may subsidise new  product lines dur:i.:rg their cru-
cial  phase  of  initial  market  entry  in virtually  every  cor{X)rate  marketing 
strategy." 
The  above-quoted  :rule  slnJ.ld  apply  to  Telecc:mnunications  Administratioos  as 
well as ·to private providers of services. 
Furthenrore,  cross-subsidisation  by  Telecx:mnuni.caticns  Adn:inistratic:ns  sh:::JUld 
be  pennitted in order  to  provide  adequate  funds  for  socially desirable  ser-
vices,  such  as  public  call  offiCes,  emergency  services,  as  well  as  lONer 
pric:inJ  for  residential  users  wtx:>  are  financially  or  otherwise  at  a  dis-
advantage. 
The PIT!  European Carmi  ttee is aware of and supports the STAR  progrC31T1llG  and,  in 
the same spirit,  prqx:>ses the addition of the folladrg Position: 
. "Econ::mic,  financial,  technical  and  regulatory measures  t.;ill  be  taken by the 
Carmission to ensure the  developnent of  telecx:mnunications in all the  member 
States,  particularly Where  they  are  deficient  in relation to nore  developed 
areas,  with a  view to all the European Administrations befn3 able to contribute 
to the achievement of the goals defined in the Green Paper." 
We  also urge  the Cannission to add  further Positions :in respect of the social 
impact of  the prol_X)Sed  l):)licies  and  the need  for  traini.rg  and re-traini.rg of 
personnel.  Without these additions  1  the O::mnission' s  rea::mnendations 'WOUld,  in 
our opinion,  be.  incanplete.  These are our prop:)sals: 
1  The  need  for  a  ccrrm:n  analysis of the social  impact  and conditions for  a 
srcooth transition must  be  recognised.  In ·the  fonnulation of policies  and 
regulations in respect of telecannun:i.cations  I  account must be  taken of the 
impact on jobs  I  and measures to ensure job security and the creation of new 
jobs to replace "t:h:)se  which disappear sf'Duld be taken. 
2  Training  and  re-training  of  personnel  are  an  integral  part  of  any 
ccmprehensive  programne  for  teleccmnunications.  Adeq,uate  finances must be 
provided  for  these  activities,  as  well  as  for  training  of  trade  union 
representatives,  to enable  them  to participate effectively,  at the  local 
and  national  levels,  in discussions on  the  introduction of tecl'ln:>lOCJical, 






The  general  objective of  the  pos1t1ons  set  out  is  the  development  in  the  Community 
of  a  strong  telecommunications  infrastructure  and  of  efficient services  : 
providing  the  European  user with  a  broad  variety of  teleco~ications services  on 
the  most  favourable  terms.  ensuring  coherence  of  development  between  Hember 
States,  and  creating an  open competitive  environment,  taking  full  account of  tbe 
A) 
B) 
dynamic  technological  developments  underway. 
Acceptance  of  continued exclusive  prov1s1on  or  special  rights  for  the 
Telecommunications  Administrations  regarding provision  and  operation of  the 
network  infrastructure.  Where  a  Hember  State chooses  a  more  liberal  regime, 
either for  the vhole  or parts of  the  network,  the  short  and  long  term 
integrity of  the  general  network  infrastructure should be  safeguarded  • 
Closely monitored  competitive  offering of  two-way  satellite communications 
systems will  need  further  analysis.  It should  be  allowed  on  a  case-to-case 
basis,  where  this is necessary  to  develop  European-vide  servicea.and where 
impact  on  the  financial viability of  the  main  provider(s)  is not 
substantial  . 
Common  understanding  and  definition regarding  infrastructure provision  should 
be  worked  out  under  E)  below  • 
Acceptance  of  con~inued exclusive  prov1s1on  or  special  rights  for  the 
Telecommunications. Administrations  regarding provision of  a  limited number  of 
basic  services,  where  exclusive provision  is considered  essenti~l at this 
stage  for  safeguarding public  service goals. 
Exclusive  provision must  be  narrowly construed and  be  subject  to reviev 
within  given  time  intervals,  taking  account  of  technological  development  and 
particularly the evolution  towards  a  digital  infrastructure.  "Reserved 
services"  may  not  be  defined  so  as  to  extend  a  Telecommunications 
Administration service monopoly  in  a  vay  inconsistent with  the Treaty. 
Currently,  given general understanding  in  the  Community,  voice  telephone 
service  seems  to be  the only  obvious  candidate. 
C)  Free  (unrestricted)  prov~s1on of all other services  ("competitive services", 
including  in particular "value-added services")  within  Member  States and 
betveen  Hember  States (in competition with  the Telecommunications 
Administrations)  for  ovn  use,  shared use,  or  provision  to  third parties, 
subject  to  the  conditions  for  use  of  the  network  infrastructure to be  defined 
under  E). 
"Competitive  services" would  comprise  all  services except  basic  services 
explicitly  reserved  for  the  Telecommunications  Administrations·(see B). 
359 D)  Strict requirements  regarding  standards  for  the  network  infrastructure and 
services  provided  by  the  Telecommunications  Administrations  or  service 
providers of  comparable  importance,  in order  to maintain  or  create 
Community-vide  inter-operability.  These  requirements must  build  in 
particular on  Directives  83/189/EEC  and  86/361/EEC,  Decision  87/95/EEC  and 
Recommendation  86/659/EEC. 
Hember  States and  the  Community  should ensure  and  promote  provision  by  the 
Telecommunications  Administrations of efficient European-vide  and  worldwide 
communications,  in particular regarding  those  services  (be  they reserved or 
competitive}  recommended ·for Community-vide  provision,  such as according to 
Recommendation  86/659/EEC. 
E)  Clear definition by  Community Directive of  general  requir~nts i~osed by 
Telecommunications Administrations  on  providers of  competitive services for 





This must  include clear  interconnect  and  access obligations  by 
Telecommunications  Administrations  for  trans-frontier service providers in 
order  to  prevent Treaty  infringements. 
Consensus  must  be  achieved  on  standards,  frequencies,  and  tariff princi9les, 
in order  to  agree  on  the general  conditions  imposed  for  service provision on 
the  coQpetitive sector.  Details of  this Directive  on  Open  Netvo~k Provision 
(0  N  P)  should  be  prepared  in consultation with  the  Member  States,  the 
Telecommunications  Administrations  and  the other  parties concerned,  in the 
framework of  the Senior Officials Croup  on Telecommunicacions  (SOG-T). 
Free  {unrestricted)  provision of  terminal  equipment  within  Member  States and 
between  Member  States  (in competition with  Teleco~ications 
Administrations),  subject  to  type  approval  as  compatible vith Treaty 
obligations  and existing Directives.  Provision of  the  first  (conventional) 
telephone  set could  be  excluded  from unrestricted provision on  a  temporary 
basis. 
Receive  Only  Earth Stations  (ROES)  for  satellite  down-link~ should be 
assimilated vith  cerminal  equipmenc  and  be  subject  to  type  approval  only 
Separation of  regulatory  and  operational  activities of Telecommunications 
Administrations.  Regulatory activities concern  in particular  licensing. 
control  of  type  approval  and  interface specifications,  allocation of 
frequencies,  and  general  surveillance of  network  usage  conditions  ; 
36G H)  St~ict continuous  review of  operational  (commercial)  activities of 
Telecommunications  Administrations  according  to Articles 85.  86  and  90,  EEC 
Treaty.  This  applies  in  particular  to  practices of cross-5ubsidiaation of 
'  activities in  the  competitive  services sector  and  of  activities  in 
manufacturing  ; 
) 
I)  Strict continuous  review of all private providers  in  the  nevly opened  sectors 
according  to Articles 85  and 86,  in  order  to avoid  the  abuse  of doainant 
positions 
J)  Full  application of  the  Community'&  common  commercial  policy  to 
telecommunications.  Notification by  Telecommunications  Administrations  unde~ 
Regulation  17/62 of all arrangements  between  them  or  with Third Countries 
which  may  affect competition within  the  Community.  Provision of  information 
to  the extent  required for  the  Community,  in order  to  build up  a  consistent 
Community  position for  GATT  negotiations  and  ~elations with Third Countries. 
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THE  GREEN  PAPER  ON  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  COMMON  MARKET 
FOR  TELECOMMUNICATION  SERVICES  AND  EQUIPMENT  (COM  (87)  290] 
THE  POSITION  STATEMENT  BY  THE  PLESSEY  TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
DIVISION  OF  PLESSEY-UK  LIMITED 
1.  OVERALL  VIEW 
2. 
Plessey  supports  the liberalisation objectives of 
the  EEC  Commission  and  welcomes  the constructive 
proposals  for  development  of  an  advanced European 
telecommunications  infrastructure with  a  Community 
wide  competitive market  for  telecommunications 
equipment  and  services. 
Whilst  the Green  Paper establishes broad 
principles,  it nevertheless raises detailed issues 
that require further  study  and  discussion. 
Principal  amongst  these are:-
o  The  establishment  and  authority of  a  European 




o  The  proposed restrictions on  the resale of 
voice  telephony. 
o  The  regulatory arrangements  necessary to ensure 
fair competition between  Public 
Telecommunications Administrations  ("PTA • s ••} 
and their competitors. 
SPECIFIC  ISSUES 
Plessey's position on  each of  the Commission's  main 
proposals is:-
1  2.1  Exclusive or Special Rights  for  PTA's  to provide 
and operate  network  infrastructures. 
Case  by  case liberalisation of  two  way  satellite 
communications. 
o  Plessey accepts  that  PTA's  are entitled to 
special privileges where  they  have  obligations 
to  provide  a  universal  public  network 
infrastructure. 
o  Such  privileges may  be  necessary to protect 
PTA's  financial  viability and  are  conducive  both 
to  network  integrity and co-ordinated 
infrastructure development. 
365 .  ~--.... 
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o  Public  Network  Infrastructure must  be defined so 
as  to clarify whether it includes  local cable 
systems,  mobile  communications  and similar 
activities.  Plessey's view is that the  PTA's 
exclusive rights  should be restricted to  such 
infrastructure  as  is traditionally associated 
with  public  telephone  and telex networks, 
including the  provision  (but not operation),. of 
point to point private circuits.  Such rights 
should not  include local cable systems,  private 
networks  (except for the provision of private 
circuits)  and  mobile  radio,  even  though  they may 
carry public traffic to and  from public 
networks • 
o  Plessey believes it is reasonable to expect that 
any  special  PTA  privileges are counterbalanced 
by  special  PTA  obligations regarding:-
public  network availability and reliability. 
community  wide  interoperability. 
o  For all system interfaces stable network 
boundaries will have  to be defined as well as 
interface standards  and performance  impairment 
allocations that do  not unfairly favour  PTA's. 
o  Public  Network  Termination points  should also be 
fixed at the outermost practical physical  limit 
of  customer premises.  This will provide  a 
safeguard against the  tendency  for public 
networks  to migrate  on  to customer premises  on 
technical  grounds  to  the detriment of 
competition  in the  s~pply of~ttachments. 
o  Numbering  plans  and associated signalling 
systems  will  have  to be  universally applied if 
network  interconnection and interoperability are 
to be  assured. 
o  If two  way  satellite communications  are freed 
for  competitive operation then this should not 
be  on  the  "case  by  case"  basis suggested,  which 
can  only create uncertainty. 
The  telecommunications  industry cannot sensibly 
commit  to the  development  and  supply of  new 
equipment  and  services if the boundaries  between 
"reserved"  and  competitively operated systems 
are  unstable  and  susceptible to interpretation 
case  by  case. 2.2 
. , 
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for  PTA's  to  rovide  a 
asl.c  serv1.ces. 
o  Plessey accepts  that certain basic  services may, 
for  the  time  being,  be  reserved for ·PTA's  but 
only  where  this is essential to ensure  the  PTA's 
financial  viability and  the  achievement of 
community  social objectives. 
o  Plessey suggests  that financial viability is not 
the exclusive preserve of PTA's.  European 
liberalisation arrangements  must  also recognise 
that manufacturers,  suppliers and service 
providers  have  to invest heavily and  the 
regulatory arrangements  must  also encourage 
their financial viability with an  eye  to both 
European  and  global markets. 
o  Plessey welcomes  the proposal  to define basic 
services  narrowly,  but does  not  accept that 
voice  telephony  should be defined as  a  basic 
service.  The  distinction between voice  and data 
will  become  increasingly difficult and costly to 
make,  especially with the widespread adoption of 
digital technology  and  the  introduction of  ISDN. 
o  Reservation of voice  telephony to the  PTA's 
could act  as  an  artificial brake  on  the 
introduction of  such  new  technology  and 
competitive services.  This  would be 
particularly so if usage  based tariffs are 
imposed  on  leased lines since users  (and 
industry in particular)  would be  denied the full 
economic  benefit of  lower  communication costs 
that such  technology  and  servic~ can offer. 
o  Plessey suggests  that basic services be limited 
to the provision of  a  conveyance facility which 
both  PTA's  and others could use  to convey 
information in competition.  Tariffs for use of 
the facility would be payable by service 
providers  based  on  the cost to the  PTA  of 
providing the facility and  not the nature of the 
information conveyed. 
0  If,  for  economic  reasons,  (since voice currently 
dominates  European  PTA  revenues)  the provision 
of voice  services  is temporarily reserved to 
PTA's,  then Plessey would wish to see 
competitive  supply of voice  in association with 
data subject,  perhaps,  to tariff  restr~ct~ons on 
~voice element.  Such  an  arrangement  would 
iimit the frustrating effect of reservation of 
voice  on  introduction of  ISDN  and  the 
realisation of  the  economic  benefits it can 
confer on  European  industry  and  commerce. 
') ~  ~J 
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o  Centrex services  should not be  included as part 
of  basic  voice  services  ~to  do  so  would 
unfairly disadvantage  PABX  suppliers  and the 
development  of  private networks.  Plessey 
suggests  that both  PTA  owned  'Centrex Service 
Providers'  and_their competitors  should have  the 
right to use  PTA  network  switching 
infrastructure on  equivalent terms,  so that both 
can offer Centrex  services to users in 
competition. 
o  Plessey believes reserved basic services are  a 
critical area for  further study by  the 
Commission with the overriding aim that the 
distinction between basic and competitive 
services  should be  stable and  simple to apply. 
2.3  Unrestricted 
.(particularly va 
border"  supply. 
services, 
trans-
o  Whilst welcoming  the opportunities this proposal 
_affords  to suppliers,  operators and users, 
Plessey believes they will only be realised if 
competition is fair. 
o  Fa_ir  competition means  that in.-built PTA 
competitive  advantages will have  to be 
counterbalanced by  firm regulatory control.  For 
instance the  PTA's  can enjoy:-
prior knowledge  of  network  improvements 
affecting the  design of attachments. 
privileged access  as  a  netwo~ operator to 
valuable  information on gustomers'  needs  for 
attachments. 
the  "one  stop  shopping"  tendencies of network 
users. 
opportunities for  hidden cross-subsidy 
to  support predatory pricing. 
privileged access  to the exploitable 
functionality  of  the core infrastructure. 
(For  example  use of embedded public switching 
facilities  to provide  enhanced services  such 
as-Centrex could undermine  PABX  pricing-: if 
Centrex  charges  do  not  accurately reflect the 
cost of  acquiring  and  operating such 
facilities). I  'rJ~  ~  ,.:;~,  ', 
_:·~(· 
,_ 
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o  Plessey's  view is that such  competitive 
advantages  would  be  minimised if PTA's  were 
obliged to separate  their competitive services 
from  other activities and to allow regulatory 
authorities to inspect their accounts  for 
competitive services. 
o  Plessey suggests it will also be necessary to 
ensure that PTA  prices for competitive services 
do  not discriminate between  charges  made  to 
PTA's  "in house"  businesses  ~nd those  made  to 
competitors.  Whilst cross subsidisation may  be 
a  legitimate business tactic it becomes  unfair 
if income  from  an  area of restricted competition 
(such  as  'basic services') is used to manipulate 
prices in the competitive areas.  Equivalent 
pricing both to  'in house'  and external entities 
would  help to  reduce  the  incentive for predatory 
pricing. 
o  Furthermore,  Plessey suggests that competitive 
services require  the co-ordinated adoption  (in 
the absence of consensus if necessary),  of 
Europe  wide  mandatory standards to be  used for 
Open  Network  provision.  These  should include 
commitments  to OSI  to forestall progressive 
adoption of proprietary standards that might 
otherwise  favour  individual  suppliers. 
o  Plessey is concerned that the Green  Paper  makes 
no  mention of  installation and maintenance. 
Experience  suggests  these must be liberalised if 
competition is to  be  effective.  Accordingly, 
Plessey suggests  installation and maintenance 
should be  confirmed as  competit~ve services even 
for equipment connected directly to  "reserved" 
network  infrastructure. 
2.4  Strict Standards  requirements to ensure Community 
wide  interoperability. 
..  i  • 
; • :;.  f 
o  Plessey supports  the  Commission's  commitment  to 
international standards  such  as  OSI  and  the 
initiatives already  taken with  ISDN. 
o  Plessey agrees  that  immediate mutual  recognition 
of  standards might  damage  the competitiveness of 
_the  European  Telecommunications  industry and 
that  p~agress towards  recognition,  coupled with 
gradual  harmonisation,  is the best route 
forward. 
') 6  9  ~  . - 6 
o  The  key  to  success  is the acceleration of  the 
harmonised  standards  making  process,  and  Plessey 
welcomes  the  proposal  for  a  European  Telecom 
Standards  Institute  ("ETSI"). 
o  Plessey  does  not believe that ETSI  can  be 
successfully operated as  a  minimal  resource 
addition  to CEPT.  Plessey's view is that scarce 
resources  must  be co-ordinated and  financed to 
generate  an  ETSI  in which  industry and users are 
adequately  represented with the capacity to 
develop  standards  rapidly. 
o  Whilst recognising  the  key  role of  PTA's  in 
network  standards,  Plessey is convinced that 
fair competition  in the supply of  attachments 
and  the provision of  "competitive"  services will 
only  be  possible if CEPT  and the  PTA's  cannot 
dominate  ETSI.  This  is particularly important 
for  Attachment  Standards where  the  PTA's  could 
apply  such  dominance  to their commercial 
advantage.  Furthermore,  rapid progress on 
European  wide  integrity will only be  made  if, 
even  in the case of  Network  standards,  they can 
be  adopted and  imposed without full European  PTA 
consensus. 
o  Plessey believes that the detailed structure of 
ETSI  can  only be  defined once  the extent of its 
role  and  powers  have  been agreed.  Whatever 
structure is adopted  mus~ provide  industry and 
users  with voting power ln both the creation and 
adoption  of  standards.  It will also be 
essential to ensure that European  Standards  are 
not  unduly  onerous  and that theY" do  not conflict 
with emerging  international standards.  The 
European  telecommunications  industry must  not be 
placed at a  disadvantage  in the global 
marketplace  by  having to design  and manufacture 
European  products that are not globally 
competitive.  Furthermore,  Network Standards 
(where  the  PTA's  may  legitimately have  a 
controlling influence)  must  not be  configured in 
such  a  way  as  to restrict the choices of 
attachment  standards that are necessary to 
support  international competitiveness. 
o  Plessey  supports  Open  Procurement being  imposed 
by  a  Directive,  provided there are  regulatory 
controls  to prevent PTA's  from unfairly  . 
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0  en  Network  revision  and  trans-border  revision 
o  serv1ces. 
o  Plessey agrees  that consensus  must  be  sought  on 
standards,  frequencies  and tariff principles for 
the  introduction of  Open  Network provision, 
which  Plessey supports. 
o  Plessey also supports  the Commission's 
encouragement of trans-border service provision, 
provided that national tariffs and  access 
conditions  are  not  allowed to create artificial 
imbalances  in service provision between Member 
States.  Plessey suggests  that trans-border 
service providers must  be  regulated to prevent 
dumping  of  services or predatory pricing. 
o  Plessey believes that competitive services must 
include  commitment  to OSI  and that full 
functional  standards  (profiles)  for  such 
services covering all relevant layers of  the  OSI 
Reference  Model  should be published and 
maintained by  service providers to ensure 
harmonised European  OSI  implementation. 
o  Plessey regards  the  suggested separation of 
"bearer"  and  "value  added"  tariffs as essential 
for  fair competition in competitive services 
where  the  PTA's  may  also be  service providers. 
~ 
2.6  Unrestricted competition in Terminal  Equipment 
o  Whilst  welcoming  the  almost complete 
liberalisation of  terminal equipment,  Plessey is 
concerned at the possible retention of the first 
telephone monopoly  and  the competitive  advantage 
this will confer on  PTA's  for  a  wide  range of 
attachments.  Plessey does  not believe there is 
any  technical or regulatory justification,  (even 
on  a  temporary basis),  for exclusion of  the 
first telephone  from  liberalisation. • 
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o  Plessey believes that fair competition in 
terminal  supply  can  only  be  assured if the  PTA's 
separate  any  commercial  involvement  they  have  in 
terminal  manufacture  and  supply  from their 
privileged network activities and that cross 
subsidisation between the  two  is prevented. 
2. 7  erational Activities 
0 
o  Plessey regards this proposal as  fundamental 
and,  as  already  indicated,  part of  a  process 
that  should also deny  the PTA's  the option of 
regulating indirectly through manipulation of 
the  standards  making  process. 
o  Plessey•s  opinion is that the liberalisation 
process,  and  achievement of  the Commission's 
objectives,  are  dependent upon there being a 
strong  independent Regulatory Authority with the 
resources  and powers  to restrain abuses before 
they  occur.  The  Authority  should be  responsible 
to the  Commission  for  supervision and 
implementation of  telecommunications regulatory 
policy.  Such  an Authority could be  a  co-
ordinator of National Authorities  such as OFTEL. 
2.8  Strict  A~plication of  EEC  Competition  Law  to 
competit~ve service providers. 
o  Plessey  accepts  that competitive service 
providers  should be  subject to regulations to 
prevent  abuse  of  a  dominant position.  Here 
also,  Plessey  suggests  the appr!Priate authority 
is  a  European Regulatory Authority. 
2.9  Application of  the  EEC  Common  Commercial  policx to 
Telecoms 
.  ' 
o  Plessey  supports  the objective of  a  single 
internal  European  market  and the progressive 
removal  of constraints upon its realisation, 
particularly legal and  regulatory barriers. 
National  laws  and  regulations on copyright, 
liability, confidentiality and fraud must  be 
harmonised if they  are not to deter achievement 
of  the  internal market • 3. 
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o  Plessey  urges  the  Commission  to take  a  firm 
stand in GATT  negotiations regarding reciprocity 
in both  equipment  supply  and  service provision 
in order  to prevent  European liberalisation 
providing  a  conduit  for  increased imports. 
Plessey takes  the  view that in this 
fundamentally  important area  the Green  Paper is 
long  on  intent and short on  specific proposals. 
o  Access  to  a  liberalised European market by 
overseas  suppliers  must  be conditional  upon 
genuine  equality of  opportunity being 
established in the overseas supplier's domestic 
market.  Such  access will have  to be established 
product category by  product category in order to 
prevent  reciprocal  sales in one  category  (such 
as  public  switching)  "balancing"  the decimation 
of European manufacturers  in another. 
o  Plessey also  suggests that when  assessing 
potentially unfair foreign competition it will 
not  be  sufficient to look solely at imports,  but 
that it will also be  necessary to examine  inward 
investment operations designed to achieve  the 
benefit of EEC  status with minimal  added value. 
TIMESCALE 
Plessey  suggests  that achievement  of  the 
Commission's  objectives will require  a  publicly 
announced  timescale  so that transition can occur in 
an orderly planned manner.  In particular,  Plessey 
suggests that,  recognising the  sca~city of  human 
resource,  emphasis  should be placed on  standards 
and liberalisation for  new  products  and  services  so 
avoiding  the  squandering of resources  in futile 
attempts to reconcile  the historic analog 
distinctions between  systems  already installed in 
Member  States. 
With  its experience  of  liberalisation in the United 
Kingdom·  and enthusiastic support of  a  European 
approach  in  Telecommunications,  Plessey confirms 
its willingness  to assist the  Commission  in 
whatever  way  it can. 
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I.P.T.T. 
c:xMITE  ElJROP~ 
(Madrid,  16 et 17  septembre 1987) 
Dl:X.:I.ARATICN 
concernant  .. 
LE  "LIVRE VERT"SUR  LE DEV.ELOPPEMENr  00 MARCHE  cx::MfJN  DES  SERVICES  ET 
~EMENI'S  DE  TELEXX.Mti.JNIO\TICN; 
Introduction 
Le  "Livre Vert"  elamre par la Ccmn:issicn des O:mm.mautes  Eu:rc:.:Jpee.nn 
a~  but "t.m reseau  europeen de  telecannunications, ala fois peu o:Uteux: 
et techniqueroent avance  (qui) jouera un role essentiel poor 1 'amelioraticn 
de la cc:xnpetiti.vi:te de 1 •ecx:n::no.e  eu:r:op9enne,  la reaJisaticn du marche  in-
terieur et  1~ renforcanent  de · la o:::i'lesicn  de. la o:mituna.ute".  L'  IPTT  qui 
p:recanise  1 'integraticn eu:r:opeenne  et,  · par ~t,  1e developpeoont de 
p:>litiques  eccn:miques  Carmunes  ·coherentes,  non seulanent  · p:ur les Cormu-
nautes  eurc~ennes mais aussi p::Ur  1 'Europe occidentale dans  SC1t'i  ensemble, 
approuve  les efforts de la Cormunaute  p:ur atteindre cet objecti.f dans 1e 
d::maine des tel.ecx:mnuru.cations.  · 
Les tent:ati.ves de la Ccmn:issicn visant a pax:venir a une attitude cx:m-
nu.me  au sujet des polltiques des telecomu.micat:f.oos  sent d'une grande  :lm-
iX)rtance,  rx:n  seulement  pour  les  pays  de  la O::mmJnautG  eu:r:opeenne, ·  mais 
p:JUr  1 'ensemble  de  1 'Europe  cx:cidentale.  La  recherc:he  de cette attitude 
CClTII1JI'le  doi  t  ~  inq;)~  1'  1:\ELE  tx::ut ·  aufant que les pays de . la CEE:. 
Le  Coni  te Eu:ropeen  de . 1'  IP'IT  insiste pcur  que les p.Jli  tiques de  la 
Connunaute  europeenne  sauvegardent la vi2hilite des adninistr:ations publi-
ques  de  teleccmnuru.ca.tions  ainsi que  leur capacite  d'  offr:ir des  services 
adaptes,  accessjb] es a tous a des prix raisonnables, et qu. elles aient ega-
lement r:our  oot 1'  amelioration et 1 r harnoni.sation des  con.di  tic.ns d'  enploi 
des  t.ravailleurs  o::n::emes.  Le  oeveloppeoo."lt et 1'  application des p:Jli  ti-
que.s  des  ttllecx::mm.m.i.cations  d:>ivent  se fai.re en acoord avec  les synl:i.cats 
et apres negociatioos a~  niveaux national et de la ~-B:t..~  •. · 
.  . 
~pe  .des·  p?litiaCi~ de·  1 'IPTI' 
Le  Conite  EtJ.rop§Em ·ratJI:elle et reaffi.nne leS r;ol.itiques aefinies par 
le.s  Co~es Eu:rc:peen  de  1 I IPIT et,  en partiOl.lier,  la rerolution  aebp-'cee 
par le ~  qui s'est tenu a Cope.nhague,  en aofrt  1986 et dont le texte 
figure en anne..xe.  Le Conite  souligne a rcuveau le principe fondamental que 
"  les PIT ooivent etre organises en tant que services publics,  dont le but 
principal  est  d' assurer  a  tous  les  membres  de  la Carrnunaute,  quels  que 
soient  leur  lieu d'habitation  et leurs  rroyens  financiet."S,  un acces  a  des 
services de ccmrunications qui scient tons et rroc1ernes,  a des tarifs qu' ils 
pu.i.ssent supp:>rte!:". 
Nous  rappelcns que,  "traditionnellement,  lt?..s  ?IT,  parce que  le privi-
lege  ~<clusif ce  fournir  certains  service.s  au  public  leur etait acoorde, 
cnt ete  capables ce  fournir  un service  universe!,  ce qui a  permis aux  PIT 
d r utiliser le systeme par lequel les services rentables powaient  fir'.ancer 
cel..lX  qui  ne 1'  etaient pas,  mais  qui etaient cependant consiceres ccmne  so-
cialeme.nt necessai res" .  '  '  ! 
Le  Canite  Eu..""'peo...n  reaffirme la  p:JS~t:.cn du  Ccng-res  ~..e. Ccperll1c.~e de-
m2!"'.dant  que  •• teet  C.~err.ent des  reglements  Vise  a  ren£orG£:~ .la CcQaC.i.te 
'1  ,.., c· 
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des PTT  a offrir des services universals et a lever 1:x>utes  restrictions sur 
1es activites des  PTI'",  et la demande  que  "1es  PIT soient libres de deve-
lopp?-r et d'offrir taus  les types  de n::l\.M!aux  services,  que ce soit ou ra1 
en cxlnc;urrenca avec des o:::mpagn.ies  du secteur prive". 
Le  Conite  rappelle  aussi  1es  demandes  du  Ccn]res  european que  "tous 
1es projets visant a c:hartger  les SeJ:Vices,  les p:>litiques  de  perso:mel et 
les structures,  fassent 1 'objet de a::nsultations prealables avec les syndi-
ca  ts concernes  et de  veri tables  negociations  avec  ceu.~-c.i",  et celle qui 
insiste "~  que,  quels  que soient les char;;ements de st::ructures sur les-
quels un accord aura eta rea.l.i.se  avec les syndicats,  les systEmes na:tialaUX 
de n€gociaticn couvrant toutes les activites des Prl',  ainsi que,  dans toute 
la mesure  du  t:OSSible,  des  conditions  de  travail  et d'  emploi  unifOlllleS, 
scient mainterrus,  et pour que les Prr foumissent la fox:maticn professial-
nelle et le recyclage nQcessai.res aux employes". 
Connentaires 9en!raux 
Le  Q:mi  te EUropean de 1'  IPIT  approuve les elEments :foodamentaux p:lSi-
tifs des  p::>litiques pr;q;:x::sees  dans le "Livre Vert". ·n part:age la cxnvic-
tion de la Carmissicn <X10Cemallt  1' ~  croisSant:e des tel.ecamui.ica-
tions et leur impact .  sur 1'  eo:n:::nu.e  de chaque eta.t Iretbte et Sur la camu-
naute dans sen ensanble. Il approuve la p::lSi tim de 1a Caimissial co1txe la 
deregle.mentaticn des  telea:mnun.icatioos  eu:r:opeennes  et sa pre£irer¥:e pc:ur 
leur "re-reglemantaticn". 
Le  "Livre Vert
11  considere a juste titre qu'"lm. dialogue intense avec 
les partenai.res sociaux" est necessaire "p:ur ga:rantir une transiticn soup-
le aux I"OJVelles techrx:)logies",  soulignant aussi "le degx:'9  de CXJnSenSUS  so-
cial qui peut etre att:emt a propos dss ro.welles techcologies"  (page 066) 
est le facteur le plus ill'p:xctant en ce qui COE'lCeO'le  1 'l!!volut:ial future des 
tel9o::mnunicatioos  •  L  I accent m.is  sur la necessi te de la consul  tat::J.cn  avec 
les syndi.cats aux niveaux de la Cotmunaute et national au sujet des politi-
ques de teleo::m:nuru.cations est accueilli. avec sati.sfact:ial. 
Le Coni  te EUropean approuve entieremant et considere cx:mne  essentielle 
la declaration suivante figurant dans le "Livre Vert"  (page 016-Q17)  : 
- "l  ':integrite actuelle et future de ·1 'infrast:ructure du riseau de ba-
se d::>:i.t etre pr9servee ou creee;  .  .  ..  .  . 
.  .  . 
- ceci impl.ique que le role. des administrat:i.cils des t:eleccmnunicat:f.ons 
ccmne fournisseur des infrastructures de.S  reseaux doit rester impor-
tant et qu'il faut  accorder la plus grande  attent:Lcn aux 1'X)X1DeS  de 
reseau  eu:rope.ennes.  Cette orientaticn implique egal.ement  la sauve-
garde  de la viabili  te fi.nanciere des  adninistratials des teleccmnu-
nicaticns afin d' assurer la mise  en oeuvre de nouvelles generations 
d' infrasb:uctures  de  tE~lecarmunications et le niveau  d 'investisse-
ment necessaire. " 
Le  Coni  te Europeen  rei  tere 1'  appui  de  1' IPrr a  1 'egard des efforts de 
1a Carmission,  soulignes,  a  rcuveau,  dans 1e Livre  Vert,  visant a  1'  intro-
cTJction  C(X)recnnee  des  RNIS  et  IBC,  d I un systeme  de  cx::mrunicaticns  mobile 
au ni  veau  de  1a Carmunaute,  du  prcgramne d I aice au deve1cppement  des  t~le­
carmunications en faveur  des regions  1es rroins  favorisees,  (STAR),  despro-
gramnes  de  rec.~erche  RACE  et ESPRIT,  et 1'  harrronisation des  rormes et des 
specificaticns. 
D'un  autre  a5te,  le  Conite  EuropE:en  de  l'IPTT  s'irquiete des  ~­
t.ions  restricti#Jes,  qui  figurent  dans  1e  "Livre Vert".  et qui  1imiten1! ~ 
~an.Ce mesure  "le  princi~ de  1 'e:<clusivite ou  les droits s:-..kciau.x  des ··~d­
mi.nistraticr.s  ce-s  telf.kanm..tnicaticr..s  en  ce  qui  ccnceree  l'o::::-e et 1'  ~­
lei  ta  ticn ce  1 · .L  ~  :-astr  -.;cture  du  reseau . "  I l  est partic~lis::-eme.'lt  ala.rr-.nt 
ce voir la C.E:c~a=aticn, a la page 097  "du Livre Verc",  qui est en ccntrad.ic-
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a disposition exclusive de l.  infrasb:ucture de reseau doi  t  etre oofinie de 
fac;on etroite" 
Le  Ccmi te  europeen est E:galement  preoccupe  par la con£iance  e.xcessive 
qu'acoorde le  "Livre Vert"  a la concurrence en tant que  m.:::>teur  du oovelop-
pement  des  services  de  te.lecx::mnuru.cations  et sa  tendance  a proteger  les 
concurrents  prives  des  aCninist:rations  de  tel€cx:mnunications,  et qui  ne 
tient pas  suffisarrme.nt canpte de la necessi  te de proteger la viabili  te fi-
nanciere  des  administrations,  ni.  de  leur droit  a la c::x::lOC'U:l:re,  sur  l.\f\ 
pied d'egal.ite,  d..;ns  le d::maine ouvert a  la concur.rence. 
Le Coni  te exprime de serieux cklutes en ce qui o:nce:me les p:tq:X:)Si  tioos 
de  la  Comtission  relatives  aux  dc:maines  qui  devraient etre  ouverts a la 
concurrence. 
i,es p:>litiques industrielles devraient prendre en cx::lOSideraticn en tarot 
que 100S\.lrE:S  detexminantes l'enploi et les aspects sociaux.  11 est &:inc xe-
grettable que  le "Livre Vert",  bien qu'il rec:x::xmaisse  l'impJLLar,ce  de  ce 
facteur,  ne presente aucune prq:ositicn appropiee dans le cadre de sa cx:n-
ceptioo generale des poli  tiques de tel6camunicat:i.a"ls. 
Tout en reccnnaissant les probl~.  que. ·ces dif;f:erents ab1::€Ci:s ~t  a 
la Ccmnissicn, ~  ne p::uvcns que regretter que  ne soit e.."'Cprline  aucun ap-
pui concret a i 'egard du o::ncept des teleccmnuru.cations en tant que service 
public,  rn:i.eux  gere  en tant qu'  entreprise public,  ni aucune  assurance. que 
les pJliti.ques ~  dans  le "Livre  Vert"  ne  peuvent nine ooivent 
etre considerees ccm:ne  favorables a la separation des telec:x:xn:mm.icatiCilS et 
de la p:.::lSte,  dans des pays oo elles f~t partie d'  Ul".e m3na  adnin:i.stra:tioo. 
A notre avis,  les :p:::>litiques  deflnies dans le "Livre Vert"  muportent 
quelques rontradictions.· La plus ~te  d'.entre elles o:r.tCel."l'le les moy-
.  ens  d' atteindre  1 'obj  ectif gene..  -raJ.  du  oovelopp€.ment  d'  infra.st:ructur  de 
telecamtunications se>lides et de se...-rvices  efficaces. Ceci requiert 1 'inves-
tissemo_nt  d'  im{;x:>rtantes  scmnes  d'  argent de la pa.rt  des  Adm:inistrations  de 
Telecamtunic.ations.  Nous  scmnes preoccupes  par le dang'er que d'  autres poll-
tiques :r:ecc:mna:nc:1,  par e.'l:emple celles concernant la concur:rence et la pe-
r8quation tari:faire ne diminuent la capaci  te  des Mnini.strations a develop-
per  une  forte  in:fra.sb:uctur  de  tel.ecamu.xnications  (en  particulier  les 
RNIS)  ai.nsi de que nouveaux services.  ,... 
Positions ~  dans le ·Livre Vert 
Il est penn.i.s de  supp::ser .que  1 'encad:re No  13 intitule "Positioos pro-
~"  n 'e...c;t  pas ·sirnplement Un  resume  des  reccmnandati<:ns faites dans le 
.. Livre Vert",  mais qu' il  . cx::nsti.tue  un  ensemble  de  proposit:io:'ls  ~tes. 
Nos  carrnentaires sent d:::lOc  bases sur cette 5Upi:OSi  tion. 
L' irrtroduction  devrait  inclure,  a  rotre  avis, les  phrases  suivantes 
(dans la definition des objecti£s): 
la garantie que  tous  les rnenbres  de  la c:cmntll."laUte  aient acces  a  de 
bans  services  de  ccmr.unications  m:::xJernes,  a  des  pri..-.:  atordables, 
quels que soient leur lieu de d::micile ou leurs revenus; 
1'  etablissement d'  une  apprcx::t-2  cannune  concen1ant les telecarmunica-
tions  sur  la  base  d'  un  accord  avec  les  partenai.res  scciau..~  tenant 
canpte  de  1 'emploi,  des  conditions  de  travail,  de  la formation,  e·t 
autres aspects sociaux. 
'  ' 
Il est egalerr.ent suggere qu'  apres la partie de phrase  "creer un envi-
rcr:.r.ement ouvert a la concu.r:::er'Ce",  une  COf'~tion devrait etre ajoutee dans 
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les  lignes  5\l.ivantes:  "dans  la mesure  de  sa a:mpatibilite  avec des objec-
tifs a-:oroniques et scciau.~ plus vastes". 
En ce qui ccncerne la Position A,  le Canite Europee.n de 1 'IPIT approuve 
son  p.cemier  paragraphe,  mais  demande  1 'adjonction  du  paragraphe  suivant, 
qui  figure  dans  la partie principale  du Livre Vert et qui a  deja ete  men-
tionne: 
"Ceci  implique  q'l.le  le  role  des  Administrations  des  Telecx:nm.m:icaticns 
en tent  ~e fourniss~=;ur de  1 I infrastructure des  reseaux  Cbi  t  rester inp:>r 
tant,  ainsi que la sauvegarde de  leur viabili  te financiere,  a£  in d'  assurer 
la mise en oeuvre de  n:JUVelles generations d'  infrastructures de  tel~­
nications et 1e niveau d' investissanent necessaire." 
En outre,  a rotre avis,  le mei1leur noyen  de garantir que ces objectifs 
scient atteints est que  chaque pays  di.spJse d'un seul reseau  public de te-
lea:mnun.ications et nJUS  incitons la Cannissioo a p.reo:niser  ce p:rint de 
vue.  L 'introductioo.  de  plus  d'un  reseau  dans  quelques  pays  que  ce  soit 
n'  est pas  seulement inutile mais  o::nstituerait un gaspillage financier et 
rendra.it plus difficile a atteindre 1 'objectif d'un reseau  eu:::r:opeen totale-
ment integre. 
N::>us  exp.r:i.mJns  la plus  e..~  reserve  en ce qui conceme le paragra-
phe  qui trai  te du syst€me bi  -di.rectionne1 de ccr.munications par satellite. 
A  rxJtre  avis,  1 'ouverture  a 1a  cx:r.cun-ence  du  systerne  bi  -d:irect:i.alne  de 
ccmnunicatians par satellite,  merne  s'il est etro.itement o::ntr01e,  ne peut 
manquer d'  avoir de graves cx::ns€quences  negatives sur la viabilite financi&-
re  des  administrati.oos  de  telec.anruru.caticns.  La  fornule  :retenue  c::ree  un 
reseau  concur:rent,  porteur d'  imp:Jrtants  detoumements de trafic de toutes 
natures;  cecl est en contradiction avec la Position Apr:~  par laCon-
mission. 
Le Coni  te Eu:ropee.n  de 1'  IPTr e..~  egaJ.ement  de seneuses reserves et 
objections en ce qui concen1e  1a Position B.  Il nous sanble qu' elle n'  est 
pas  oon£onne  aux  besoins  -. qui ant ete  sciiugnes  - d 'un role pr:imJrdial 
{X)Ur  les Administrations  des  Teleccmnunicat:i.oos,  de  leur v:i ahi  1;  :te  finan-
ciere et de leur capacite a investir des m::ntants irnportants. 
Nous  dema.nOOns  que la premiere phrase soi  t  uodifiee de f~  a  indiquer 
que le "principe d'e.:-cclusivite"  p:x.xr  1a prestaticn de seft'ices de base par 
les Teleccmnun:tcations  soit "c::i::lnsidere  cx::mne  ~tiel..  a la -Sauvegarde  de 
la viabilite financiere des adnini.Strat:i.ons et a  leUr capacite d'.investis-
serrent dans le developpernent de futurs reseaux,  ainsi qu' a la sauvegarde Oe 
leur mission de service public".  · ·  · 
Dans la Position B,  la eaTmi.ssicn e.xprilre le IX=>int  de vue que "le prin-
ci:pe de prestation e..xc1usive  ooit etre interprete de  fac;cn etroite et doit 
etre susceptible d'une revisicn a des periode.s regulleres".  Cette p:rop:>Si-
tion ne  5  I interesse  pas  a la viabili  te  financiere  des  ACmi.nistratioos  de 
telec.arrnurucations,  mais  semble se pr9occuper uniquerne.nt  des interets cx:m-
me.rciau."'C  des  entreprises  priv~_s qui offrent des  services  c:onc:u.n:-entiels. 
Il est evident que si 1'  incertitude concernant la classification future est 
~rejudiciable au.x  fournisseurs  prives  de  ser~ces a valeur ajoutee,  oomme 
c.=::. L-?  est indique  a la page  049,  il en est de meme  pour les AOni.nistrations 
c2  T~lecommunicaticns. 
Plus  .i.mp::)rtant  encore,  le Conite  Europeen  est en de.saccord  avec lade-
claration politique fondamentale  selon laquelle les services de bases doi-
ve..'1.t  etre defi.nis Ce  fa<;on  restrictive.  Au  ccntraire,  il Cevraient etre de-
finis  largeme..'lt,  en  vue  de garantir le role  ilr.Portant  des  ACninistrations 
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lopp:=r  de  futurs  reseaux.  Nous  reo::mnanOOns  que  la "prestation e.'\.clusive" 
par  les  Administrations  de  TelOCannunications,  sans  fi..'Cer,  a ce  stade,de 
limite dans le temps,  devrait a:xnpre.ndre,  non seulement le service telept:o-
nique vocal,  mais aussi le telegraphe,  le telex,  la transmission I'lUitl&ique 
et de d:lnnees,  ainsi que tout systeme de transmission bi-directionnelle. 
l\bus  rea:::rrmandons  egalement qu'  une protection appropriee soi  t  apJ;XJrtee  a 
la prestaticn e.xclusive par les Administrations de Telea:mnunicaticns,  en 
part".iculier,  par  : 
- 1'  interdiction,  au  r.iveau  de  la  Cormunaute  de  la revente  de  circuits 
loues,  seul  iroyerl  efficace  d'emp&.her  1'  "ecremage"  des  se:rv:ices  lE?..s  plus 
rentables; 
- La garanti.e d'un acces  universel et egalitaire aux services de base tels 
que aefini.s au paragraphe precedent. 
La  Posi  ticn  c  cbi  t  etre  profCI"ldement  rrodi.fiee  afin  de  refleter  les 
amendements rea:nii1a.nc1es  par le Coni  te Eu:ropeen  de 1 '!PIT a:::oce:mant la Po-
sition B.  En  pari:i.culier,  la phrase  "offre  libre  (sans  zest:r.icticrlS)  de 
tous les aut:res services"  ne doit pas etre uti.lisee.  La Positicn c devrai.t 
parler. de .la  fou:rniture,  sur  une  base·  CXX'lCl.1r:reiltielle,  sous  reserve  des 
restr:i.ctions definies sous B,  des services a valeur· ajcutee. 
Nous mettons eu d:Jute,  une fois de plus,  1 'exces de confiarice acc:x:>rc:lee 
a la o:::ncurrence,  laquelle,  dans certains cas,  peut eb:e prejudiciable ~a la 
majori  te d9S usagers. 
Le but avooe  de la Ccmnissioo est de renforcer la presence ~ 
dans  les  telea:mnun.i.cations  de  1 'Europe et dans les negcx::iations  avec  le 
reste du  nonde.  Toutefois,  1 'ouverture  inutil~ d 'une vaste ganme  ee  servi-
ces a .ia  C01Ctrrrence pe:t:nettra a un flot de produi  ts en provenance de pays 
r.cn-€u:ropeens  de penetrer sur le ma.rch9  europ8en.  Pa.tr :nc:xrbre  de ces pays, 
i.l  n' existe  pas  de reciproci  te permettant  aux produits europeens d'  entrer 
sur: leurs marches. 
Il  COC!Vie.'1t  aussi  de  souligner a  rxJU.VeaU  que,  lorsque  des  services 
sent ouve.rts  a la  roncurrence,  les Administrations  des  TeJ.ecannun.i.eations 
cbi-vent  avoir  le droit de  faire  c:cncu:r:rence,  sur un pied d'€galite,  avec 
les a~tres fournisseurs de services. 
En ce qui ~  la· Positicn D, · le Conite Europeeri  de 1 'IPIT partage 
totalemP..nt la  prSoccupation ·de la cOrmi.ssion  au sujet des oormes et sp€.ci-
ficaticn.s ccmnunes.  En  meme  temps,  nous  voudrions sculigner ootre p:Jint de 
vue  selon  lequel  la  CEPT  devrait continuer a jouer le role central  p:JUr 
toutes questions- Les nonnes et sp€.cifications Cbivent etre etablies selcn 
les e."d.gences  des  re..seaux  fournis par les Administrations et s'  appliquer a 
toes  les pays  d'Europe  OC".cidentale.  Ces  deux  arguments militent en £aveur 
du maintien du role actuel de la CEPr. 
Dar.s  la derniere phrase  de la Position E,  les syndicats devraie.'l.t etre 
menti.crr.es  sp2cifiquement  en tant que  parties concemees qui  ooive..'1t  etre 
ccr.sul. t?es.  Le  te.  .....  -t:e  prop:>se ~  t  etre  interprete ccmne  rea:mnandant 
c:-t.:e  les ccnsul  taticns visant a atteindre un consensus aient lieu exclusive-
~nt ''dans  le cadre du groupe de haut fonctionn.aires sur les Teleccmnun.ica-
tic."\S".  N::ius  considerons que ce cadre est beaucoup trap etroit et reccmnan-
d::r.s  des  cons-ultations  oonsiderablement  plus  larges.  L' of  fre  d'  un  reseau 
()tiVe-rt  au:<  uti  lisa  teurs  et  prestataires  de  services  (  ONP  :  Open  Networr<: 
~sicn) r.e  cbi  t  pas  app::Jrter  de  restrictions au ceveloppement  technique 
eu  i:-eseau  principal public,  ni mettre e.'l  danger.sa viabilite fina.  .. :ciere  ... 
~;ct.:.s  p::;t.:.:-.:-icns  etre d' accord avec  la declaration de la Positicn ~ sel~ 
~ 2c..:elle "la :cu..."":l.i ture du premier cor.bi..ne  telept'Cnic;:ue  ( ccnve.'ltic:--r.el )pour-
:.·,~;::  .ec:::-e  t~r~er.ent e:-cclue  c!e  l'offre sans  restricticn",  scu::  que  le  "';:  F"J 9 
tc::::::-.e  ";:cur::ait"  cevr:ai.t etre rerr.place par "devrait",  que le rrot ccnven- v  ~ - 6-
ticnr.el ,  entre  parantheses,  devrai  t  etre  supprime  et que  eel  a  ne  devrai  t 
pas  etr.-e  '"temp:::>rairement"  ccmne  le recx:mnande la COrmission. 
Le  G::mite  Europ8en de  1'  IPIT n' est pas d'  aca:>rd  avec la reccmnandatian 
selon laquelle  "les stations terriennes de  reception p:JU.r  les liaisonS par 
satellites de.scendantes devraient etre ass.imi.lees au.x  terminau."C et sournises 
uniquement  a une  pr-ocedure  d I agreement •  "Une telle mesure  mene_"d.i  t  mevi ta-
blement a 1  I ouverture a 1  a  amcurrence de  1  I ensemble des CCITit'lUn.ications  par 
satellites,  ce  qui  aurait  des  gravo_s  cc..'lSequences  defavorabl~ p:::ur  les 
fo~TTli.sseurs de reseaux. de teleccmnum.cations. 
Dans  la Position G, la Camri.ssion  rea:mnande  "la separati.al des acti.vi-
tes de  reglementation-et d'exploitation des Adm:inistratioos des Telecamu-
nications"et d.efinit de maniere ge.nerale "les activites de reglanentaticn". 
Le  ,I;X)int  de  vue  qu'une  Mninistration  publique  OOi.t  etre ~e  du 
processus  de  rEg-lerrentation peut  d.ifficilement etre consteste,  mais quand 
les TelEkx:nm.mica:ticns ant le statut de c:Iepartement  ou d'  entreprise d'Etat 
et offrent une infrastructure de reseau  unique et des servi.ces de bases de-
finis de  mani.ere  globale,  il semble  ra:i.scnnable et pratique qu'une  telle 
Administraticn agisse  o:mne une  autori  te }.:WJlique  respoosable du pro:::essus 
de  reglementaticn,  qui  doi  t  etre  e.~  sous  cx::ritrOle  di!mx:rati.que.  Dans 
certains autres cas p:JUr  l~els  une separaticn Ces acti.vites .de  reglenen-
tation et des a...--tivites d'exploitatlcn est souhaitable,  des mesures doivent 
etre  pr:i.ses afin d'  assurer que 1'  autori  te resp::nsable de la reglemartatim 
ne soi  t  pas  d:::rninee  par des  fabricants d'  €quipements  ou par de g:ros  fa.Ir-
nisseurs de services concurrentiels.  Les activites de 1 ·~  de regie-
mentation  ooivent  faire  1 'objet d'un exarren  public,  en parti.culier de  la 
part des syndicats et des usagers. 
I.orsque  les ACninistrations de Tel.ec.o:mu..uu.cat:i.cns  ne sent ~es 
ni de  la fixaticn des ronres,  ni des  procedui:-es  d'agrement,  les gaxveme-
ments  des Etats-rrenbres ooi  vent fournir les finances et 1 'organi.saticn des· 
rroyens  adaptes. 
Les  Posi  ticns  H  et I  font  une  recarmandati.cn  pratiqueme.."'lt  identi.que 
ccnce._TTI.ant  un  "sui  vi" s t::: £ct et contirru des  activi  tes  d'  exploi  tatim (can-
merciales)  des  ACnini.strations  des  Telecarmuru.cations 
1
'  et  "ee  tous  les 
prestataires dans les secteurs r.ouvellement ouverts".  Cependant,  en ce qui 
OJnC.erne  les Mninist:rations de Te!ec.o:mu..uu.cati.ons, il  y fliL  une :re<:Xliillai'l-
tion supplerrentaire qui 00  S  I applique quI a  celles-ci..  Geci  dans  1~ but que 
1'  e..~ s'  applique  "tout· particullerement  ~ux pratiques de sulMmticn des 
activites dans  le secteur d€s  services  concurrentiel.S et des activites de 
production"  .. 
La distinction faite entre les Mn.inistrations et les fourn.isseurs pri-
ves  est injustifiee. En effet,  a  la page 104,  le Livre Vert lui-mE:me recon-
IT'.Cl"'.Ce  :  '' il f audra  assurer un contr6le strict des  pratiques ee  subvention 
c:roi_s.:.~  d.2ns  les  activites  de  1
1 ad:ninistration  des  telec.o:mu..uu.cations  et 
ces  prestat-..aires  prives,  ~  les secteurs  recemne..'1t  ouverts  a  la concur-
rene~ des ta.lillinaux et des services". 
Nous  reconnar:ecn.s  que  la Ccrrmission remplace  le te."rte  actt;el de  la Po-
S\.":  ..  ~cn I  par la fcT.7rn.llation  ci-dessus. 
£T)  presentant ros cannentaires St.Wlenentaires sur la perE:Q.!ation tari-
ra:!...::-e,  reus  reus  n2ffu:Dns  aux  declarations  qui  figurent a la page  103  du 
"Livre Vert'' et avec lesquelles nous sarrnes d' accord:  "Dans tcute entrepri-
se oommerciale  un ce-rtain  degre de  subventicn croisee est acceptable.  Ain-
si,tcute  s~ategie Ce  commercialisation d'ur.e entreprise peut ccrr.porter le 
t .:j-:.cr.cenent  ce  f'CL.'"'Jeau:-::.  prcdui  ts par des  ligr.es  ce  procucticn e:dstantes, 
c~~~~L la  ~r?_se  c~~ciale de  pene~aticn L~tiale sJ.::- le  marc~e". 
Ces:e  r.-~.!.e  dci  t  s · appliquer aussi  bie.'1  au;-::  ~listraticrs ee  teleeon-
:7."....:.......:.cat:icr.s  <:;:'..1' at.::·:  fcu..-rnisseurs  prives de serJi.ces-
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En outre,  la subvention croisee par les Adninistrations de Teleo:mnuru.-
cations ooit  ~tre autorisee afin de  fourni.r les  fonds  necessaires pour des 
se.tVices  soc..ialernent  souh.aitables,  tels  que  cabines  publiques,  S&Vices 
d'U%'9ence,  ainsi que des tarifs reduits pour les usagers oofavortses,finan-
cierement ou autrement. 
Le  Con.ite  Eurcpeen  de  1'  IPI'T  ronnait  et soutient  le  progr-arrme  STAR; 
dans cet esprit, il prq:ose 1 'adjonction  de la Position sui_va'1te:  · 
"La  Conn.issicn prendra  d?5  mesures  €cxJncmiques,  financieres,  techniques 
et de reglementatioo. a£in d r assurer le cteveloppement des telecx:xrm.mcations 
dans  taus  les  Etats-membres,  en particulier,  dans  ceux oU.  ils sent insuf-
fisants par rapp:>rt a des plus OOVP-loppes,  afin que toutes les adn:ini.st:ra-
tions europOOnnes scient en mesure de contribuer a atteindre les objectifs 
definis dans le "Livre Vert." 
Nous :recx::mnan0:.r eg-alement que la Carmissicn ajoute des posi  t:imr sup-
plementaires a:ocernant 1 • impact s:x:ial des politiques ~  et les be-
4  soins de  forma;ti.cn et de recyclage du personnel.  A n:rt:re avis, ces ajoots, 
les reccmnandaticns  de la Coniss:icns  ~ent  ~letes. ~  p:cup:)eons 
.._  ce qui suit:  · 
..  .. 
1.  La nScess.ite d'u:ne analyse cx::mnune  de 1 'impact soCial et des ccnditicns 
neces~  a une transiticn saJple doi  t  etre reo:xli'llle.  Dans la fODml-
lation des p:>liti.ques et ri:gle:nents concernant les teleo::mnun:i.cations, 
il  ooi·t etre tenu o:rnpte de  1 'impact sur l'ernploi, et des mesures d:ll.-
vent etre prises afin de garantir la sOCurite de l'  emploi, ainsi que la 
creation de ra.tVeaUX eroplois,  p::>ur remplacer ceux qui disparaissent. 
2.  La  formation  et le reclyclage  du  personnel  font partie integrante  de 
tout prograrrrne d'  ensemble p::x.zr  les teleccm:nunications.  Des  fCX1ds  suffi-
sants .  doi  vent etre accordes p:llt' ces acti  vi  tes ains.i que IXJl.tr  la forma-
tion de  repr~'1t&lts syrrlicaux afin de leur permettre de participer de 
maru ere  efficace,  aux  niveaux  lccal  et national,  aux  discussions  sur 
1 'introdu.ct:i.cn de  cb.arxJements  techzx>logiques,  structurels et ee  regie-
mentation dans les tel9o:::mrunications  . 
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. ...  ~. Com&nenw by RAttE on the Green Paper ··rowards a Dyruunk F.uropu.n 
F..conomy" OR tbe dtVoklpmcnt ur tht conunon market fOI' 
TelttommMkatJor.tl Services and Equipnwnt 
1.  ltARE•t ltlrtla1 polat 
RARe (Rc:Aeaux  Auod.:s pear la  Recherche  l'::urnreenne)  has examined  the  Green  Paper  in 
dct.U.  We believe  that th' creAtiOD  C1f  I Strong 'Unified Buropcan tclccommuuicttiOll infrutrUC· 
Nrc I' vital for  the continued growth  <lf  oollahorative re&careh activities. It is only t.hrouah such 
reaurch that Europe will maintain atd exteod ltl podtion within the world economy. 
~.  Tbt a\'CCI tor •n opeta  •~twork 
Collaboration betwet-D  research  partil:i~nt. r~ulra ea1y  accea to  a cost effective infraatruc-
turc.  Collaboration on a l!uropcan acalc lmpllet that th~ Euro~n  infrutnacruu 'hould ba\'o e 
qua.Lty end cozt  cocuparable to that hvaU•blc un  the  natloftal  levol.  Bardors to comrnuniudon 
withlo Europe reprcacot barricrt to cooperation. and  therefore c:Oit  ponaltic:~ with rcapcct to our 
competiton. 
Tt.ae requirements apply cqtlaUy to muvc:mcnt of cquirmentp  movement of research pcraonnel 
and mov~m-cnt ot lnfottnation. 
We  therclore  woloome  propoNls  lt•  ct'tablixh  ~n  network  provision  to  cover  equipment 
requirem~nta, administrative prwcchJ res  met  by  &he  traveller ulina tclccommuRicaUon  lerVicea 
whtle aw.y from home end  ~rtfft. 
It 11  to be  hn,PQI  that sreatcr oompctitioa  will  improve the quality of the  tnfraatn.acn.ro avaU· 
tbf~~ and  chat  the  removal  of  replatory barricra  will  encour•s~ tbc  lntroductlon  of  ~ervlcel 
uilored to the r:u:cds of individual usct communitJCA where neceuary. 
1n patdcutar • we deplore the current 
11&riatloo and level of tariff• within the Huropean commun-
ity.  Yarladon in  ~hara• lnr a llinsle .-orvice c•n be by a factor of aa much at five or ton botW'CIOn 
admimtratf.on•.  fruatratJaa attempts  to harmonir.e national  rctearch  nctwurkina •ttatepca, ud 
the  bamt:r  to  l!~topcan  communi~tion il rrohtbidve.  The  CORt  rttio between  nation-'.  aDd 
B!.lnlpOin KM* b  paenlly hipor than  that between  accea w the  ra~t of Burup: •nd to 
Nort:\ ...  mcrica. 
":":1oae  ra'.loe  arc  clctrly  not  baaed  c1n  cost  of  rJroviaion.  The  rre~,ceta frtr  arc.ady  incrcaeed 
r-::s.t·atcl\  cOll-.bot&cJOn  wfthln  ~\U'tl~ WOUld  be  JtCitly lncteaM'd  by a robalanclng of tariffs tO 
'~lOCI ~r... atabliablaa a lloalc tA1rllf  atructuro  for wide  area  data tranami•ion  thrau1hout 
Furcpe without nati(•nal banicn. 
:\.  n.  aaMd  for a uDiquSloue ae(wOtk 
The research community is not concoltratcd only in the  traditional bv.taoa centre$. Tht tiuroa 
pe&ll aetwork  fafrutruetur~  nt~.Uit COV :r ttl f'lrtl of the  ~mmunity  t  and rmvide a welt maft&Jed 
•nd •CCOIJI!blo IOMQe 'Mt.h • svarantccd mltdrtlUJ'Q 1evo1 of performance. 
Tbe movt.t  ;.owarde :-apid deploymcrn of !ntcm~&tionai ISDN  arc welcomed  for the facilldt::e they 
provide,  bu~ they do oot  repr~nt a unique so!utlon to the neee• of the research community. 
Acccu to the  rcH~eJe  dial~' w.-viQC.tt 1  mrUcU in ISDN  ~1  aaaitt man)' of the medium sized data 
tncsfer req,tiremezua,  but J»raUe.l  enhancement~ ot oomplementary services will be nccoaary: 
'.1  Q1 
r:;  t...!  tr_;: . 2 . 
•)  1hr:  r·~·'-Or:~  (~· 1 , 1nt.•'l:ty  ,·  .. .m,.Jnt&  ot  ra  very  hvic  number  of lndividvala.  lncrouingly tup-
f")."1(d  i·y  l<·lll".m~l  'M1r ll.ll~U';;b,  In  OIJanlr..Jo.tion•  t.orl .inatitutlona of a wide:  rtm•c of ILzcl. 
l\J,;•tnl.lllh.:  .  .atlnn  from  thca.e  1no::.T :tution.s  will genwally be via  •  14ln&}e  polnt, accc:NCd  by  a 
touiabl:  local  network.  m~tn!Jed by  the  institution.  The very  larao number of 1m1ll piece& 
d  1ntormatioo to divene lo~r:tic·n• ~£uch M confiauratlon gencratce arc better handled by aa 
c.x·.c.n~oo of the  c~h·till~ puhUc  packt.t IWitchod  Krvicoai theac also offer the r~rcct  of a 
mor(  r~tpid r.olutio::  to ~~.~rrent problcrna Uum  d~  tsnN. 
b)  at  tbe  otile~ extrrA'Lc.,  tr.~  rt-~r:h community ha! a a.maU  nam\J.cr  of •wt1cat.Jans;,  1uch u 
•u~rt"'mputer ~;  roqu!ria.1  aigwtiQtatly  high1:r  pcrfurtt'anoc;  arowth  ot  sorvloes  Sn 
thi' l!Hea  NUl  become the Umitius  factor on  rroa~·~.  We  believe that it ia importaut that 
oew  ~i.cc.  ;.hou!d  Pc: planned irom the beainn.tna on a European bul~. 
4.  Tb.e ;ultb'le.atkua  f4lf"  totn~ uche~l"'~ provWoc 
We  ackn~·'ed8c the noed  fo1  ~ntirHina contrOl  of aome  bade:  prcYidon of telecommunl~adon 
to  eA~Ur-~ thet  a X1Jffldeot  critical  m  ar.s  i1  maint.aitlcd.  However,  we  believe that the areaa la 
which thlt control lt applied 1\hould  be kept to a minimum . 
•  ,.. c nN~ that  one  cf me  jtntificatlons  for restrlction  is  the very  h.igll  t011t  of dcvclopme.tt  of 
Jarse  U!!ocommunica.Uon  &f9terns~ an  alternative to  protoctlna the providers is to in•tlaate 1tep1 
to  red'.!~ th*  ¢01~  W·:.  ~herofore 'IVOlcome  the ateps  under the Pramcwurk Pruarantme. and 
apt:dfig&'Jy  within  Espr1t.  to devdor cnainccrlna techniques for tho more efficloat dcvelopmont 
ot l!!rae wftwarc  sys~rn~; \:,tie W)\1  heoefit EuropNn telecornmunic:adon  fiCCtur.  amonaat many 
othoa .;.r!thln  Lurope4rt  ti-udut~t7, ):))'  lmprovf.ns  out ability  to create: larae IOftwaro &yl\oraalo a 
nlo~ cott effective W•Y· 
S,  Tbt DMd !or • 11roq IICflod•rdLI.aUOat  ~1,.;; 
A~dcm.!c usm atma3ly  wc.uxwe  il:tO\"e&  ;;..n'l'fi.rQ~  l.ib<;rali"tioa  of  the  market  for  tcrmiaal 
equipment.  Howt.v:~. ~:ott. tho ux.r JP<ill't\  o~ view, a is vi._.l  that the  ~tratcp malntalM: 
a)  a ttrnna  ~uiremcnt for  e-.,nformatac.\!  to OSI Jtandatd-' for eccosa to public  telematic ser· 
vica; to e~Jm~re  tt.~&t  ~~~nvoridD8 ;~tween oquipment from different MJ\Ir~  iM  maintained; 
b)  a e1.aarantec o! ir.terworif.ii'f\  ;xtw~a new aervioee and ¢1ittins aorvlc. 10 •• to avoid traa· 
rne.1t..9;ion.  of tht- ,-::ultomer  N«::  'fhulp for eumple, great importaneo i• v.tt.ait:hed to lntcr-
workina  hetw«*i  me  cunen1  p;~atk.et data  oetwork.a  and  ISDN,  and  between  the  varlms• 
evo1adunary awsca in the proviaion of mcua1c  handlina~ervicca. 
Tfwle ..,b)ectivc:a  c.an  ocly  be  r~et it thcrt arc clear and timely  standard• for  the ettachmoat of 
equipreent.  We,  <li'ti  u~en, welcome movca to reduce delay• tn the producdon of staudarda; 1m:b 
tcdot'\i  ~U  ~~lilt ~he inttoduelion  ~f new tcchnologiea.  However,  the firat prlarity m\llt be for 
tho  st&ud~.f0!1 w be cl..ar and tCChn.lcully preclac, Iince uandard& of inadequate technical quality 
are countl.1'  prod&Att:.~~. 
In perticularo  RARE  welcomea  tho  ut&bl!Jhment  of HWOS.  and hopes  that it will  evemtually 
t .  .er~me., foe~~ fo•  the full rtr4ge  trformation TcchmJlogy and Tclceommunle.tion AtandardA, it 
11  'Nell  ph.o::d w hed BurO(Jeir.;  views into the lotern~tional diacuuions, allowing the creation of 
a Jell.W~dy 9ia.tld wide  ~~t ,,f ~tan\l•r~J11. not juttt • i::uropcan one. 
Furalr;u:.mu;,  t.:.1e  ut#~'dilrrlf •houit• apply equally to aU  parties: the equipment AUJ')pliera,  the ear-
rlera ud "ho  UY.Ta,  Om~ of  tb~ 1"nt.in  u~r cunccml' a\ prtKnt Is  with the varlntion of f1dlidca 
and  rcqui~m~t.ta ht  th:a  gff~~,ng; ol the various European P1'Ts.  U a atrona Rtandarda poUey  ill 
to be  ~ppbod ~.:~.  ·!he  Atppty indv.ttrJ. h ia  only  rca!Wlnahlc  that the same roHcy should establish 
uniform rrJnimmn rcquircm~ntl cf  the~ fiT111. 
The  ~tttJnmt:n1. oi m~  reqt.dreMC&l~• b~ ih"  YIT~t, pMrticularly  with res•rd tu quality of aor• 
"'t~:e.  ~ye1.: ~c 0.:  ~utJ~ w  m~rJ~orhtt; "").an inoopcadent body.  11\e re&ultJ of such monltorlna 
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Finally,  the  creation  of  a clear  potltton  on  tho  lt'CC31  to  public  tclccoromunicatioo  servicca 
Jhould  Jn  oo  Wily  constrain,  oo  a rcjul•tory  bas.Ja,  attachment or pcrlotmanoc of equlpmCAt 
ooonec:tcd to pri'iate local are-a  nctwork.l,  C\'Cft where these are uted to give a~  to (JUbUc aer-
'li~.  Whllc attndAtdt in  thCAC dou-publlc lir=M uc lr:1portant. their u"C when procurlna eq\.dp--
meot lhowd be detorhliocd by utera utter eotsaldetltion of the cost bc.Dt~tita to thcrn . 
.. 
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1.  The  society of Telecom· Executives  (STE)  is a  member  of  the 
Poetal,  Telegraph  and  Telephone  Internetional  (PTTI).  It 
endorses  the  PTTI  European Committee's statement on  the 
green paper,  as  adopted  by  the Committee on  16-17  September 
1987  in Madrid.  The  STB  wishes  to take  this opportunity to 
enlarge on  some  aspects of  the  PTTI's  ~tatement, 
particularly those  which arise out of  the circumstances of 
the  telecommunications  sector  in  the United  Kingdom •. 
2.  The  STE  w•lcomes  the green paper  as a  valuable 
consideration of  the  regulatory  iasuea to be addressed  by 
all thoaa  concern~d with  the  future of the 
telecommunications  industry in Europe. 
3.  The  STE  accepta  the main  thrust of  tho paper.  The 
regulatory changes  taking  plaoe  in  the member  states muet 
be oo"Ordinated  so that  the  completion of the Community•a 
internal market  is not  hindere~.  At  the  same  time it will 
be  necessary  for  the Community  to set a  framework  for  the 
dev•lopment of  a  genuinely European market  for 
telecommunications  equipment  and  aervioae. 
4.  The  STE  welcomes  the Commission's  recognition  in  the green 
paper  that the  exclusive provision by TA's  of  'reserved' 
services is justified by  the  need  to safeguard TA's 
financial health.  The  green paper  accepts  the oase  for  TAs 
to maintain  a  monopoly  of  the  voice  telephony business  (as 
is the situation  in all member  states except  the UK).  It 
al&o  endorses member  state~'  avoidance of  'extre•e'  ere~ 
akimming.  Nevertheless,  it does  not deal with  the anomaly 
~reated by  the British Teleoom/Maroury duopoly  in the 
United  Kingdom.  This  is of special  conc~rn to the  STE,  as 
Mercury's  'cream-skimming•  depreaaea BT's  return on  capital 
and  leads to the aeleotivs rebalancing  by  BT  of its tariffs 
for  domestic oonaumers  in contravention of its public 
service role. 
s.  In  the discussion on  cream-skimming  on pages  75-76 of  the 
green paper,  the Commission  takes  no  account of Mercury's 
rights to operate a  voice  telephony system  in competition 
with  BT  and  to interconnect with  BT  on  ~avourable terms. 
These  interconnect  terms~ being  bas~d on BT's marginal 
coats,  do not  refleot total coats and  are  thu~ ~.source of 
distortion in the network.  The green papet  appears to 
ignore  the  fact  that,  'in  the  STE'a  view,  Mercury  is a 
licensed  •monopoly'  cream-eki~~er.  This  is an  important 
lacuna  in  the Commission'e· argument  in favour  of  removing 
.,  ••  O~OftOOD in  po11GLOD·~O~W0Gft moMbO- ~~--Q~  CORD~~ 
facilitate the provision of  cross-borde~  services~  For,  if 
Mercury  is permitted  to compete  unfairly with  BT  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  it could also cream-skim  from  other 'l'As  in 
the Community  in the event of TAn  accepting obligations to 
interconnect with,  and  provide access  for,  erose-border 
services.  A  general obligation to interconnect is deemed 
esBential by  the commission  in oraer  to bring about ·a 
competitive common  market  in  telecommunications  services.~ 
Yet  tbe Cammisaion offers pa  ~~ution 3:B?Pe  problem posea 
•  ~.~;'  ••  1•1 •• ... ..J'-''  .  ·-- .1.~'  J.O• ::> r  ~Ul- it: I Y  I t:.Lt:LUM  EXECS  01  943  2547  P.03 
by Mercury  in  relation to  the  voice  telephony  buaine•• of 
TA' a  in  the Comn1munity.  The  STE  believe•  that 'l'Aa  ahould 
not  be  obliged  to  interconnect with Mercury. 
6.  The  existence of Mercury  has  significant  implications  for 
the question or  the discharge of aooial obligation• which, 
the Commission  accepts,  should  be  incumbent  on  BT  and  other 
TAa.  However,  the green paper  does  not  taoe  up  to  the 
danger  that continental TAa  may  be  forced  to  respond  to  the 
challenge presented  by  Mercury  by  rebalancing  their  tariffs 
and  standards of service  in  favour  of business  users  and  to 
the diaadvanta9e of  domestic  consumers.  Technical  progreas 
and  the  ~evelopment of  the  common  market muat  not  come 
about at  the  expense of  the  ~~estie nnnRum•r- Moreover, 
the growth  of  the market of services and  equipment  would  be 
inhibited,  if domestic  consumers  were  charged excessively 
high prices.  This  would  be particularly so  in  the poorer 
partA nf  t.hP.  Community.  - 7.  A common  market  in  telecommunication• services cannot come 
about  in  an orderly way,  if the  finaoial viability of TAs 
is not sustained.  In  an  increasingly integrated Community 
it will  be  the  responsibility of  the Community's 
institutions to maintain  such  a  guarantee.  The  STE, 
thereforet  oalls  upon  the Commission  to make  appropriate 
proposals  to ensure  that  the  financial viability of  the TAs 
is maintained  through  the effective prevention of  resale of 
leased lines.  Resale  undermines  the  integrity of  the 
network  and  poses  a  real threat to its financial  viability. 
Any  limitations placed  on  resale  would  also need  to apply 
on  an  international basis. 
8.  The  STE  also recognises  that TAs,  as defined  in Article 90 
of  the  BEC  T~eaty,  muHt  a~hece to  the  T~eGty•e provisions 
regarding  fair competition within  the common  market,  in 
particular Articles  85  an4  86.  However,  in  return TA's 
must  be protected  from  anf  legal  threat to  their  voice 
telephony business.  Such  protection might  best be  achieved 
by  a  Commission  regulation giving  TA'a  block  exemption  from 
Article 85  (1)  of  the  EEC  Treaty.  Similarly,  TA•  will  look 
to the Commiaaion  to ensure  that operators of value-added 
services,  in competition with  TAs,  do  not  hinder  the 
development of TAs'  services by  threatening  to  invoke 
Article 86  in  an  irresponsible and  unjuatified manner. 
9.  The  STE  in general ·supports  the Commiaaions's  statements on 
competition.  However,  we  must  emphasise  that where 
competition  is to exist,  Telecommunications Administrations 
must  be able  to compete effectively.  Similarly,  the 
commission  needs  to  take aoccount or  tbe susceptibility of 
European providers of services and  equipment  t6 the  threat 
posed  by products  from  non-BEC  countries.  It should  be 
borne  in mind  that  in many  of  these countries there are  no 
reciprocal  arrangements  for  European  product entry. 
10.  The  STE  sees  the  necessity for  strong  regulatory 
authorities  in all the member  states.  However  the  form 
that  this  takes will depend  on  the different curcumatances 
operating  in different countries. 
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ll.  The  STB  understands that  the Commission  ia considering 
undertaking  a  study of likely employment  trends  in the 
telecommunlcationa  sector  in  the light of  the current 
chanvee  toward•  increased di;itisation.  The  STB  would  be 
pleaaed  to contribute  information  to the study. 
12.  Th•  STB  would  urge  the Commission  to examine  the 
possibility of proposing  the allocation of Community  monies 
to the  retraining of personnel  in  the sector.  This might 
be done  in various ways,  including  the creation of a 
special fund  or  the amendment  of the criteria applied  to 
disbursements  from  the community's Social  fund. 
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Most  of the  comments  which  follow are  on  the  Commission's  proposals  in 
Figure  13  and  for  convenience  we  have  used  the  same  main  paragraph letters. 
There  are however  a  few  general points we  would  like to make  at the outset. 
1  GENERAL  COMMENTS 
1.1  It should be  said first of all that there are many  parts of the Green 
Paper with  which  we  wholeheartedly agree.  The  admirable  brevity of  the 
proposals  may  also have  resulted in some  of the apparent ambiguity  to which 
we  will  make  reference.  Most  of the  other  reservations  we  have  are 
concerned with the practical application  of the proposals rather than  the 
principles.  Our  overall  impression is  that  the problems  with  European 
telecommunications are generally well observed,  that the proposed solutions 
are apt and that they should be applied wi~h minimum  delay. 
1.2  There  is one  area which,  in  our view,  is not adequately addressed  in 
the Green Paper  and  that is the  subject of tariffs,  on which  so much  will 
depend.  The  Commission  appears  to  regard  usage  sensitive  tariffs  as 
acceptable for  leased circuits.  It is difficult to  reconcile the wish  to 
bring tariffs closer to  costs with a  tariff  method which is unrelated  to 
the costs of  provision.  It  is,  however,  interesting  that the  Commission 
evidently views  usage sensitive tariffs as  a  kind of deterrent  - at  least 
in a  voice  telephony  context.  This,  in our  view,  would be  the  inevitable 
effect of  the application  of such  methods  to  the basic  infrastructure. 
since value  added services  could not  possibly thrive  under  such  tariff 
conditions. 
The  Commission  refers frequently  to  the  "cream skimming"  argument as 
an undesirable aspect of competition.  This reflects ·the familiar  argument 
of the  monopoly  suppliers  but it  is  far  less convincing  to  users 
particularly the  large users who  bear the brunt of the burden. 
The  obligation  to  provide  universal  service  is  the  excuse  most 
frequently used  to  explain the  existence of highly  lucrative pockets  of 
telecommunications Administrations  revenues.  Little  is  said  about  the 
disproportionate  impact on  the  European business  community  and  the  heavy 
economic  penalty created by  the distortion of telecommunications  tariffs. 
We  support  the  view  that it  is  the monopoly  situation which creates  the 
opportunity  to  generate  the cream. 
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Much  of  the  so  called  __ "cream"  in  European  telecommunications  is  in  the 
Jntra-Europcan  trans-bord~£_area on  which  the  attention of  the  Commission 
might  n_tost  frui.tfu~ly  be·  focussed.  The  European  Parliament  and  the 
Commission  itself have  in fact both drawn  attention to  the excessively high 
trans--border  tariffs  con,pared  with  the  national  tariffs.  OG  XIII' s  own 
Information Market  publication  number  47  contains  an article which  draws 
attention  to  the  extraordinarily  high  levels  of  intra·European  packet 
switching  tariffs  compared  with  national  tariffs.  This  disparity  is 
referred to quite rightly as  a  European  "barrier factor•!  A similar picture 
can be  seen with leased circuit tariffs where  the  intra·European rates  are 
disproportionately high  in comparison with most national tariffs  ·  and also 
with  the  Europe  to  USA  rates.  Rates  from  Europe  to  the rest of the  world 
are  also disproportionately high.  The  inevitable conclusion is that,  in the 
absence  of  competition,  the  Administrations  will  continue  to  apply 
exorbitant tariffs on  these vital trans-border links. 
1.3  It is our  firm view  that tariffs must be  related to costs of provision 
and  we  believe  that  this will most  likely be  the  case  in a  non-monopoly 
market.  The  Commission might usefully address  the question as  to the  most 
appropriate.staging  mechanisms  for  moving  from  the  present  anomalous 
structures  in most of the Member  States to a  logical.  cost based regime. 
1.4  The  Commission's  frequent  reference  to  the  need  to safeguard the 
financial viability  of telecommunications  Administrations  seems  at  odds 
with  the  requirement  to  foster  a  truly  European  business  dimension. 
Intra-European  telecommunication  is  unquestionably  one  of  the  most 
profitable areas for Administrations.  The  business distortions·thus created 
cannot  readily be  costed in aggregate although specific examples  are  legion 
and  can readily be  subjected to  rigorous  economic  analysis.  We  contend that 
there  is no  doubt  that  these  distortions are  a  significant barrier to  the 
development  of a  unified European market.  Of  course  the financial viability 
of the  Administrations must  be  assured,  but this  should not  be at  the 
e~pense of  European  husiness  as  a  whole.  The  questions  are  those  of 
emphasis  and priorities and  the  Green  P~per seems  on occasion to present  a 
confused picture in this  respect  . 
1.5  One  last  comment  on  this  point  of  financial  viability. 
A.dmi.nistrations,  nut just  in Europe,  are  now  (reluctantly)  beginning  to 
~droit  that  they  have  not been  the  most  efficient operators  in a  business 
::.ense.  Examples  ar~ known  where  the Administration just does  not  know  what 
is  the  true  cost of providing  specific  facil~ties and services.  They  will 
,"Jdmit  t.::hat,  even  given  the  philosophical challenges posed by  the  integrated 
nature  c.f  tPleco'1Lllunications  facilities,  accounting practices are only  now 
~tarting tu  he  adopted which will  identify costs  and  hence  lead to  vastly 
improverl  ccntrol  and  hence  reduction  in costs. 
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2  PROPOSED  POSITIONS 
2.1  Preamble 
This  appears  to put  the cart before  the horse.  Teleco~nunication is  a 
means  to  an end not  an end  in itself. 
From  the  Commission's  own  estimates  {page  2  of Presentation)  the 
telecommunications sector represented only 2\ of the Community  GNP  in  1984 
perhaps rising to 7\ by  the end of the century;  i.e.  by  the year  2000  93\ 
of the Community's  GNP  will be  from  other sources. 
It follows  that  the  primary  objective should  be  to  provide  the 
European user with a  broad variety of  telecommunications  services on  the 
most  favourable  terms.  The  rest.  including  the strong  telecommunications 
infrastructure,  should clearly be seen as  the means  whereby this  objective 
might best be achieved. 
This  change of emphasis  is  not semantic.  Clarity in establishing  the 
objectives  and  the  priorities  in  the  telecommunications  area  is  of 
fundamental  importance  to  the healthy development of the European economy. 
A.  Exclusive  Provision of the Infrastructure 
A.l  'The  arguments  for exclusive  provision and operation  of the  network 
infrastructure are unquestionably strong  - at this  time. 
The  Commission  has  rightly recognized  that  in one  area  at  least 
(two-way satellite  systems)  the  question of  competitive provision  needs 
further analysis and should be allowed under certain circumstances. 
It would be  unwise  to grant  exclusive provision on  the  rest of  the 
infLastructure  in perpetuity for  the  following  reasons: 
* Developments  in terrestrial telecommunications  technology are 
advancing too  rapidly for  the  future  to be  seen clearly. 
* To  grant exclusive provision rights for  ever would  in effect be 
an act of  preservation providing little  incentive  to  introduce 
changes  in infrastructure  which  could benefit  the users  and/or 
competitive suppliers of services . 
* Much  has yet  to be  learned  from  the  experience of network 
competition in the U.K. 
* The  possibility of future  competition,  particularly on 
intra-European  links,  could  provide  a  spur  to  improve  the 
efficiency of  the  PTTs  and  to  reduce  the  existing  trans-border 
tariff barriers . 
.  ;  ....  ~·-: 
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*The effectiveness of  the  Community's  competition  rules  in  the 
telecommunications  area,  though  promising,  remains  to be  proven. 
*  The  possibility of future  competition would  provide  an  added  and 
necessary safeguard against unfair practices and/or abuse  of 
dominant  positions. 
It would  therefore  be  prudent  to  leave  the door  open for  competition 
in  the  infrastructure area should it prove necessary and/or provide  better 
means  of achieving  the  primary objective. 
B.  Exclusive  Provision of a  Limited  Number  of Basic Services 
B.l  The  Commission  is  to  be  congratulated  for  not  perpetuating  the 
fruitless debate on  telecommunications boundaries  (basic/value added  etc). 
It is,  in  our view,  correct  in the opinion  that voice  telephone  service 
should be  the only one  to qualify  as  reserved  - and that even this  should 
be  subject  to  review.  It is  assumed  that this  exclusive right  is  not 
intended,  and  could not  be  extended  to  embrace  private voice  telephone 
networks.  Nevertheless it is suggested that it should be  made  clearer  that 
it is  public  voice  telephone  seryices  which  are referred  to  in  this 
section. 
The  Commission  is undoubtedly aware  of services such as voice  mailbox 
which  add  value  to  the public  voice  services.  It  is assumed  that  the 
Commission  is not advocating that Administrations  should have  the exclusive 
provision of services of this  type but this should also be  made  clearer. 
C.  Unrestricted  Provision of  All Other  (than reserved  as  in  B.  above) 
Services. 
C.l  The  proposal  to have  unrestricted  provision of all other services  is 
applauded.  We  do  however  have  the  following concerns: 
* Cross-subsidisation of different services by Administrations 
seems  inevitable  - particularly in an  ISDN  environment. 
*  Page  81  of the  Green  Paper refers  to separate tariff offerings 
for  "bearer"  and  "value  added"  components.  It would  be vital  to 
ensure  that Administrations  and would-be  competitors  in the value 
added  area  would be  offered  the  same  tariffs for  the  bearer 
components.  Some  bulk purchase  discounts  might  also be  in  order. 
Indeed  one  could  argue  an  analogy with  normal  commercial  practice 
\lhich  provides  for  wholesale  and  retail  rates.  In  the 
telecommunications  case.  this  would  lead  to  one  rate  for,  say,  a 
2  mb  circuit for  exclusive  use  by  the  lessee  and  another.  lower 
rate  for  the  same  2  mb  circuit  when  used  for  the  provision  of 
value  added  services  for  resale. 
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* The  conditions  for  the  use  of  the  network  infrastructure 
(discussed  under  E.  below)  appear  to  leave  room  for 
anti-competitive behaviour  by  Administrations  from  which  there 
seems  little or no  protection under  the  Community's  competition 
rules. 
Under  these circumstances it is difficult  to see how  the benefits  of 
true  competition could be  realized in  practice  - even bearing in mind  the 
monitoring arrangements  envisaged in paragraph H of Figure 13. 
D.  Standards  for  the  Network  Infrastructure and  Services Provided by  the 
Administrations or Service Providers of Comparable  Importance 
D.l  Community-wide  inter-operability is a  laudable aim and standards are  a 
necessary element  in achieving this goal.  The  Commission is also right  to 
draw  attention  elsewhere  in  the  Green  Paper  to  the  importance  of 
international standards and  the role of the  CCITT  in this connection. 
As  the  Commission  is aware  standards  can  stifle as  well as  foster 
progress.  It must be  recognized also  that standards can be  (and  indeed are) 
used as  a  competitive weapon.  The  users are  inevitably the sufferers  when 
3tandards  are used  to protect or  extend the  commercial  interests of  the 
standards makers. 
The  idea of a  European Standards  Institute  appears attractive  - but 
only if  it will  redress  the  existing situation  where users  are  rarely 
~onsul·ted or given an adequate opportunity to comment. 
0.2  In this  context it is disappointing to  note  that the  Commission's  own 
record in  consulting  telecommunications  users has,  in  the  past,  left 
something  to  be  desired.  The  Council  Recommendation  on  ISDN  (86/659/EEC} 
a  subject of considerable  interest to many  users  - refers to the favourable 
co~uents of the  SOG-T  and  the  CEPT  but no  mention is made  of the  users 
which  ISDN  is  intended to serve. 
E.  Open  Network  Provision  (0 N P) 
E.l  There  must  certainly  be  clear  access 
community  agreement  on  the means  whereby  this can 
~~s likely  that  Community  Directives  vould 
compliance. 
conditions  and  therefore 
be  made  possible.  It also 
be  necessary  to  ensure 
If the  process  of developing  these  access  conditions  were  to  be 
independent  from  the Administrations  then  truly Open  Network  Provision 
could  indeed become  a  reality.  If however,  as  appears  to be  the  more  likely 
case,  the  Administrations  would  have  a  major  - if not entirely dominant 
!Qle  in  the  process  then  the  network  is  likely  to  remain closed. 
- 6  -E.2  In  calling  for  a  clear  separation of  regulatory  and  operational 
functions  (e.g.  on  page  185}  the  Commission  quite  rightly points  out  that 
Administrations  cannot  continue  to be  both  referee  and player  (see also  G. 
below).  It  further  points  out  that  regulatory  functions  concern  in 
particular licensing,  control of  type  approval  and  binding  specifications, 
frequency  allocations,  and  surveillance of usage  conditions. 
It is however  not clear how  the  Commission  proposes  to separate  these 
functions  from  the Telecommunications Administrations. 
F.  Unrestricted Provision of Terminal  Equipment 
F.l  This  is happening already and is due  in no  small measure  to the action 
of the  Commission under  the  Co~unity  competition rules.  It is  a  very 
welcome  step in the  right direction. 
F.2  The  proposal  to have  unrestricted  provision of ROES  is also  welcomed 
but the need  for  type  approval  is  not understood,  unless  this is meant  to 
cover only  the  case where  the user  wishes  to  interconnect the  ROES  to  the 
public network. 
G.  Separation of Regulatory and Operational Activities of Administrations 
G.l  This  seems  ambiguous.  It would appear  that  the  Commission's  intention 
is  to  remove  the  regulatory function  from  Administrations  in which case the 
proposal  is warmly  applauded.  It could however mean  simply a  separation  of 
the  regulatory  and operational  functions  within  an Administration  which 
would achieve  nothing. 
G.2  We  suggest  that  the  establishment  of tariff  principles within  the 
Member  States  should  be  removed  from  the  exclusive  mandate  of  the 
Administrations  and  placed with an  independent regulatory authority. 
It would  seem  necessary  also  that  the  regulatory  bodies  should 
represent  their  respective  countries  on  regulatory  matters  at  the 
international level  (see J.below) 
G.3  This  proposal  for  separation of regulatory and  ORerttional  activities 
is  that on  which  all else hinges  and  it is vital that  there  should be  a 
clear  common  perception  of what  is  intended.  The  Commission  appears  to 
have  in mind  national  regulatory authorities  similar  to  OFTEL  in the  U.K. 
and if this could  be  made  clearer then  we  would  unreservedly support  the 
proposal. 
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H.&  I.  No  comment 
J.  Full  Application  of  the  Community's  Common  Commercial  Policy  to 
Telecommunications 
J.l  There  is no  logical  reason why  the  Community's  coromon  commercial 
policy should not apply now  to telecommunications. 
Regarding notification by Administrations  of their foreign  dealings: 
the  problems  in this area could  be  largely overcome by ensuring the  right 
kind of representation at the  international  level  (see G.  above).  In  this 
connection particular attention is drawn  to our comments  under  3.2 below. 
3  YATTC 
.  ')  3.1  In the last paragraph of Section  4~2  (page  172)  it is stated that "the 
~  WATTC  - 8S·conference  will  have  a  major  influence on  the  Community's 
external relations ....  ".This is rather  puzzling as it is the  individual 
Member  States rather  than the Commission  (or the Community)  who  are  the 
signatories  to  the  ITU  Convention and it would  seem,  therefore,  that  not 
only external but also intra-European relations would be  affected. 
3.2  The  very last  sentence of this same  section refers quite rightly  to 
the  n~ed for cooperation between the Member  States in the preparatory  work 
leading up  to  the  WATTC.  As  the  Commission  is  no  doubt  aware  the 
preparatory work  (of  the  PC/WATTC)  is now  at an end  - an  end which  we 
believe  to have been premature.  Observers at the  PC/YATTC  have been  struck 
by  the  obviously close cooperation between the  CEPT  member  Administrations 
in that  forum;  this  is  in  marked contrast  to  the  clear  lack  of  a 
coordinated position  among  the  Member  States.  Indeed it  is  regrettable 
that,  with  the exception of the United Kingdom,  the  European representation 
at the  PC/YATTG  was  from  the Administrations.  Here  was  a  classic case  of 
the  players acting as  referee and  the results were entirely predictable. 
The  resulting draft Regulations  produced  by  the  PC/WATTC  are,  in  our 
view,  unnecessarily restrictive  and  indeed  inimical  to  the  interests  of 
users.  They  are also  in many  respects diametrically opposed to  many  of  the 
positions advocated by  the  Green Paper.  It  is therefore entirely  fitting 
that  the Green  Paper  does  suggest  that "The  Community  will  therefore  have 
to  def.ine  a  co~non  position  with  regard  to  the  conference  and  its 
preparation".  We  would  urge  the  Commission  to take  the  initiative at  an 
early date  to facilitate Member  States arriving at such a  common  position. 
This  would,  if based  on  the principles  propounded  in the  Green  Paper,  be 
more  liberal that is presently envisaged  in the  Draft Regulations.  We  see 
this as  being particularly  important  for  the  reason  set out  in  paragraph 
3.1  above. 
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CEC  Green  Paper  on  the  Development  of  the  Common  Market  for 
!elecommunication Services  and  Equipment  (COM(87)290  Final) 
A  TEMA  POSITION  PAPER 
Introduction  ----
The  Consultative  Green  Paper,  COM(87)290,  was  published  by  the  CEC  in 
Brussels  on  30  June  1987.  Its  purpose  is  to  initiate  a  debate  which, 
re~ognising  the  vital  contribution  of  improved  European  telecommunica-
tions  to  the  economic  well  being  of  Europe,  will  enable  the  Commission 
to  consult  widely  and,  by  the  end  of  1987,  generate  plans  for  the 
achievement of :-
a  harmonised  and  competitive  market  for  telecommunications  services 
and  equipment  by  the  1992  target  date  for  completion  of  the  single 
internal community  market. 
a  European  telecommunications  industry  capable  of  competing  with  US 
and  Japanese  suppliers  in  both  domestic  and  export  markets. 
European  telecommunications  infrastructures  and  services  that  are 
vi tal  to  the  achievement  of  European  economic  development  and  social 
policies. 
The  Current  UK  Environment 
The  Green  Paper  identifies  the  progress  already  made  towards  a 
compet!tive  telecommunications  environment  in  several  member  nations, 
especially  in  the  UK.  It  recognises  that the  UK  already  has  :-
a  Iiberalised  and  competitive  equipment  supply  market  (including  the 
first  telephone); 
a  competitor  to  the  principal  Public  Telephone  Network  Operator 
(PTNO),  itself  a  private company  rather  than  national agency; 
a  series  of  General  Licences  for  Value  Added  Data  Services  (VADS), 
and  Branch  Systems  as  well  as  a  number  of  specifically  licensed 
network  operations. 
There  are,  however,  certain  key  features  of  the  UK  environment  which  are 
not  individually  mentioned,  but  which  have  a  bearing  on  the  view  to  be 
taken  of  the  Green  Paper  by  any  UK  based  organisation. 
The  UK  government's  retention  of  49%  of  the  shares  of  BT  until  at  least 
1988  and  their duopoly  policy  have  led  to decisions  that :-
Simple  Resale  of  voice  telephony  using  spare  capacity  on  privately 
leased  network  lines  is  not  to  be  allowed  before  1989  at  the 
earliest-
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No  new  PTNO  will  be  licensed  to  provide  basic  voice  telephony  before 
1990  in  order  to  give  the  newer  PTNO,  Mercury  Communications  Limited 
(MCL),  a  fair  chance  to  establish  itself. 
The  TEMA  View 
Against  that  background,  and  based  on  its  experience  over  th~  last  four 
years  of  the  liberalised  UK  telecommunications  environment,  TEMA  gives  a 
warm  welcome  to  the  general  approach  suggested  by  the  CEC  - albeit 
implementation  of  all  its  suggestions  would  not  take  the  Community 
beyond  the  stage of  liberalisation  already  achieved  in  UK. 
Some  of  the  particular  topics  and  proposals  mentioned  in  the  Green  Paper 
are  not  covered  in  sufficient  depth  for  all  the  problems  and  pitfalls  to 
be  exposed  to  scrutiny.  It  is,  therefore  on  these  areas  that  TEMA's 
detailed comments are  centred. 
Policy  Orientations 
The  policy  orientations  set  out  on  pp.  14-15  of  the  Green  Paper  are 
accepted  as  valid  goals.  Insofar  as  it  is  widely  accepted  that,  if  the 
objectives  for  Europe  are  to  be  achieved,  the  telecommunications  service 
must  be  universal  in  nature,  the  Public  Telecommunications  Administra-
tions  (PTAs)  must  have  a  central  responsibility  for  the  development  and 
maintenance  of  the  required  network  infrastructure. 
This  requires  the  regulatory  arrangements  to  be  such  that  the  financial 
viability  of  PTAs'  operations  is  assured  be  they  a  monopoly  or,  as  in 
the  UK,  a  duopoly. 
The  extent  to  which  financial  viability  depends  on  the  reserved  right  to 
be  the  sole  providers  of  basic  services  and,  in  particular,  voice 
telephony,  is  dealt  with  in  more  detail  later.  What  cannot  be  over-
emphasised  is  the  need,  recognised  in  the  Green  Paper,  to  ensure  the 
integrity  of  network  standards  and  inter-operability  on  a  Community  wide 
basis. 
Equally,  the  Commission's  declared  intent  to  apply  the  competition  rules 
of  the  Rome  Treaty  to  PT  As'  commercial  activities  as  well  as  those  of 
their  comp~titors  is  an  essential  foundation  for  the  development  of  a 
fair  competitive telecommunications  market. 
It  must  also  be  stressed  that  one  of  the  most  important  policy  tasks  is 
to  cred  te  a  regulatory  environment  which,  whilst  basically  stable,  is 
capable  of  further  evolution  as  telecommunications  continue  to  develop 
in  the  future. 
In  this  respect,  adequate  definitions  of  the  'network  infrastructure' 
and  'reserved  services'  are  critically  important  and  account  must  be 
:2 ken  of  the  implication  of  services  which  are  or  will  be  coming 
available,  such  as  those  of  CENTREX  ISDN· and  IBC,  and  of  the  growth  of 
mobile  radio,  broadband  cable  networks  etc. 
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Financial  Viability  of  Infrastructure  Networks 
At  several  points  the  Green  Paper  addresses  the  problem  of  how  the 
financial  viability  of  PTAs  is  to  be  preserved.  That  must  be  achieved 
if  even  the  most  fundamental  objective  is  to  be  attained  and  so  that  the 
furads  are  available  for  essential  and  costly  investment  in  network 
infrastructure,  particularly  digital  and  broadband,  without  which 
neither  the  network,  nor  competitively  supplied  services,  nor  terminal 
equipments,  will  be  developed  at the  requisite  pace. 
At  the  same  time,  the  provision  of  a  universal  telephone  service,  based 
ultimately  on  common  European  tariffs,  is  recognised  as  an  essential  but 
costly  social  goal. 
Against  that  background,  the  requirement  for  reasonable  regulation  to 
prevent  'cream  skimming'  can  be  accepted  but  there  must  be  reservations 
as  to  the  viability  of  the  means  proposed.  The  two  main  regulations 
·'- proposed  are  :-
.. 
the  reservation  of  basic  voice  telephony  i.e.  the  confirmation  of  the 
ban  on  voice  resale; 
the  introduction  of  usage  based  tariffs,  sufficiently  harmonised 
across  national  boundaries  to  prevent  distortion  in  Community  wide 
service  provision. 
The  underlying  weakness  of  both  regulatory  solutions  lies  in  the  growing 
introduction  of  digital  technology  and  ISDN  services.  The  identification 
of  what  is  voice  and  what  is  data  will  become  increasingly  difficult  and 
costly to  undertake. 
Moreover,  the  reservation  of  PTNO  rights  to  operate  'basic  services' 
needs  to  be  balanced  against  their  rights  to  operate  more  advanced  value 
added  services  if  they  are  not  to  attain  such  a  dominant  market  position 
that  effective  competition  in  both  services  and  equipment  supply  is 
stifled.  Tariff  structures  could  have  a  decisive  role  in  achieving  a 
fair  balance. 
A  solution  to  this  difficult,  interlinked  set  of  problems  requires 
further  and  deeper  study.  Whilst  there  are  understandable  reasons  for 
the  statement  in  the  Green  Paper  that  the  setting  of  tariff  principles 
and  rates  is  for  each  Administration  to  determine,  the  process  of 
introducing  compatible  tariff  systems  which  would  encourage  the  intro-
duction  of  competitive  services  would  be  much  easier  if  the  Commission 
were  to  ta~e the lead  in  the  necessary  studies  • 
These  studies  will  need  to  cover  the  distinctive  needs  of  the  three  main 
sectors  of  use  i.e.  residential,  small  businesses  and  large  businesses, 
for  which  separate  tariff criteria  may  need  to be  applied. 
Cross  Subsidisation  and  its Prevention 
The  Green  Paper·' recognises  that  limited  cross  subsidisation  is  a 
legitimate  l?l;J~i~ess  tactic,  indeed  may  be  inevitable  when  a  new  product 
or  service· is  ·~eing developed  and  launched. 
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profits  made 
The  practice 
of  the  Treaty 
to  engage  in 
In  many  undertakings,  the  costs  of  development  are  met  from 
in  other  business  areas  or  from  existing  product  lines. 
bP-comes  illegal  only  when,  under  the  terms  of  Article  86 
of  Rome,  a  dominant  undertaking  abuses  that  position 
predatory  pricing. 
The  Commission  has  powers  to  investigate  suspected  or  alleged  abuses  but 
these  powers  can  only  be  exercised  effectively  where  the  activities  of 
the  dominant  undertaking,  the  telecommunications  authorities  in  this 
case,  are  financially  transparent.  That  would  require,  as  a  minimum, 
separately  accountable  business  divisions. 
Transparency  will  not  be  easy  to  achieve.  In  considering,  for  example, 
Centrex,  or  any  value  added  service  provided  by  the  PTA  using  equipment 
embedded  irr  the  Public  Switched  Network,  the  regulatory  or  monitoring 
authority  will  need  to  be  able  to  satisfy  itself  that  the  tariffs 
include  an  appropriate  part  of  the  cost  of  providing  the  installed 
equipment  and  its  maintenance. 
Even  so,  the  determination  of  a  truly  cost  related  tariff  may  be 
unrealistic.  If  the  PTNO  is  to  be  prevented  from  distorting  the 
terminal  equipment  supply  market,  then  the  prevention  of  unreasonable 
cross  subsidisation  will  need  to  be  linked  with  a  regulatory  regime 
which  allows  other  service  providers  to  operate  comparable  and 
competitive  value  added  services  over  the  network,  subject  to  the  same 
basic  cost  terms  as  the  PTNOs  themselves. 
Alternative  Networks  - Cable  Systems 
The  Green  Paper  is  unclear  as  to  the  future  status  of  local  cable 
systems  and  responsibility  for  their  infrastructure.  In  the  UK  local 
area  cable  systems  have  been  licensed  on  a  basis  which  did  not  take 
account  of  basic  telecommunications  needs  and  thus  the  implications  of 
integrating such  systems  into  a  national  telecommunication service. 
To  enable  such  systems  to  be  fully  integrated  into  a  national  switched 
network,  due  regard  needs  to  be  taken  of  several  factors  including 
transmission  performance  and  numbering  plans.  The  impact  that  such 
systems  could  have  in  Europe  needs  further  study  for  such  systems,  if 
licensed  for  telephony  and  data  purposes,  could  play  a  part  in  the 
development  of  privately  operated  business  networks. 
Copyright  and  IPR,_  Fraud  and  Security 
The  Commission  rightly  draws  attention  to  the  problems  that  the 
expansion  of  electronic  information  distribution  will  exacerbate  in  the 
areas  of  copyright/IPR,  fraud  and  security.  Failure  to  find  effective 
solutions  to  these  problems  will  inhibit  or  retard  the  growth  of 
~ervices and  diminish  their  overall economic  effect. 
M  ~reover,  these  solutions  need  to  be  applicable  Community  wide.  TEMA 
therefore  welcomes  the  Commission's  intentions  to  identify  and  try  to 
reduce  divergences  within  the  member  states. 
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The  External  Dimension 
Having  welcomed  the  general  thrust  of  the  Commission's  proposals  to 
create  an  open  Community  market  in  telecommunications  equipment  and 
services,  it  is  also  necessary  to  add  a  note  of  caution.  UK  experience 
has  shown  that  the  very  act  of  creating  an  openly  competitive,  coherent 
market,  makes  that  market  more  vulnerable  to  import  penetration, 
especially  during  the  transitional  phase.  However,  we  do  not  wish  to 
press  for  restrictions  in  international  trade  agreements  to  provide 
protection. 
Actual  abuses  of  these  agreements  should  be  disallowed.  At  the  same 
time,  the  whole  Community  should  press  vigorously  for  removal  of 
restrictions  by  our  intern  a tiona  I  competitors  on  access  to  their 
internal  markets.  Some  means  of  achieving  concrete  reciprocity  must  be 
sought  as  a  counter-balance  to  opening  European  markets  to  com~tition 
from  outside. 
It  will  also  be  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  advantages  of  a  single 
internal  market  are  denied  to  overseas  competitors  who  claim  EEC  status 
on  the  basis  of  cosmetic operations with  little or  no  EEC  added  value. 
Network  and  Service  Boundaries 
The  paper  rightly  recognises  that  a  stable  natural  boundary  line  between 
a  reserved  basic  services  sector  and  a  competitive  services  sector  is 
not  possible. 
For  the  reasons  already  stated  in  this  paper,  it  is  TEMA's  view  that  a 
· deeper  study  of  this  problem  is  required  aimed  at  achieving  a  properly 
balanced  solution  that  admits  of  future  evolution.  But  that  is  not  the 
only  boundary  problem. 
The  introduction  in  particular  of  digital  technology  also  raises  the 
question  of  defining  the  network  electronic  boundary.  That  in  turn 
calls  into  question  what  constitutes  network  equipment  and  terminal 
equipment,  to  be  supplied  and  installed  by  public  procurement  or 
competitive  supply  and  installation,  what  standards  regimes  apply  at  and 
on  each  side  of  the  Network  Termination  Point  (NTP),  how  impairments  are 
to be  allocated. 
It  seems  certain  that  a  universal,  permanent  solution  is  not  possible 
and  the  definition  may  need  to  change  with  each  major  technological 
advance.  What  must  be  recognised,  however,  is  the  crucial  importance  of 
universal  adoption  by  the  Community  of  the  right  definition  at  the 
appropriate  time. 
In  this  respect,  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  that  full  and  careful 
consideration  also  be  given  to  the  problems  related  to  the  connection  of 
approved  equipment  to  the  network,  its  installation  and  subsequent 
maintenance.  Non-liberalisation  of  these  activities  can  seriously  under-
mine  or  undermine  the competitiveness of  liberalised  supply. 
- 6- 405 
J -
TEMA  Position  Paper,  Response  to COM(87)290  Final-Nov  .87 
Because  of  its  enormous  importance,  the  process  of  definition  cannot  be 
the  prerogative  of  PTAs  who  could,  perhaps  unwittingly,  use  the 
d~finition  to  maintain  or  C'xtend  their  monopoly  position. 
For  these  reasons,  TEMA  believes  that,  as  a  matter  or  urgency,  the  CEC 
should  commission  a  study  of  this  problem  with  the  full  participation  of 
all  interested  parties.  The  aim  of  the  study  should  be  to  derive  an 
initial  definition  of  NTP  in  a  digital  network  and  to  set  down 
principles  by  which  future  redefinition  can  be  evolved  as  technology 
progresses. 
Having  regard  to  the  need  for  that  work  and  the  other  studies  which  TEMA 
believes  to  be  necessary,  it  is  clear  that  an  enormous  effort  will  be 
required  by  all  concerned  to  achieve  the  objectives  envisaged  in  the 
Green  Paper.  That  effort  will  be  of  no  avail  if  there  is  not  also  set 
up  a  means  of  further  developing  in  the  futur~  an  environment  which 
maintains coherence of  approach. 
This  will  need  an  ongoing  specialist  regulatory  body  with  appropriate 
terms  of  reference  and  duties.  We  believe  such  a  European  Telecommuni-
cations  Regulatory  Authority  to  be  an  essential  requirement. 
Standards  Making  and  Equipment  Approval  Procedures 
The  Green  Paper  deals  at  length  with  the  problem  of  standards  making  and 
harmonised  approval  procedures  and  recognises  the  pivotal  role  that 
these  activities  play  in  the  creation  of  a  commQn  mark~t  in  telecoms 
equipment  and  services. 
It  recognises  the  complexities  and  ~nortcomings  of  the  present 
procedures  and  the  importance  of  accelerating  the  standards  making 
process  if  the  1992  target  is  to  be  met.  The  Commission  therefore 
proposes  substantial  reinforcement  of  the  development  of  standards  and 
specifications,  and  the  creation  of  a  European  Telecoms  Standards 
Institute  (ETSI).  Based  on  the  current  co-operation  of  the  PTAs  within 
CEPT  and  with  CEN/CENELEC,  the  jointly  fin~nced ETSI  would  have  a  small 
cadre  with  the  ability  to  draw  on  experts from  both  PTAs  and  industry. 
TEMA  notes  the  parallels  with  the  situation  in  the  UK  where,  at  the 
early  stages  of  liberalisation,  it  was  recognised  that  standards  making 
and  approval  procedures  for  interfaces  and  terminal  equipment  could  not 
be  left  to  the  control  or  dominant  influence  of  BT,  if  the  aims  of  fair 
competition  and  liberalisation  were  to be  met. 
In  this  respect,  it  is  necessary  to  recognise  that  three  distinct  types 
of  standards are  involved  :-
1.  Pub lie  network  standards,  particularly  those  designed  to  prevent 
harm  to  the  network,  injury  to  individuals,  and  interference  to 
other  users. 
2.  Standards  for  Information  Technology  attachments and  services. 
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3.  Standards  for  Telecommunications  attachment  products  and  services. 
Network  standards  must  be  the  responsibility  of  the  PTNOs  and  to  achieve 
universality  throughout  the  Community,  CEPT  has  a  vital  role  to  play. 
The  objective  of  their  activities  must  be  ior  the  networks  to  present  to 
attachments unambiguous  consistency  in  respect of  interface criteria. 
With  regard  to  standards  for  attachments,  be  they  telecommunication  or 
information  technology  products,  the  responsibility  cannot  be  that  of 
the  PTNO  alone.  In  certain  areas  they  are  not  even  the  most  expert  in 
the  field. 
In  the  UK,  the  standard  making  task  for  attachments  was  entrusted  to  BSI 
an  independent  body  whose  work  is  complemented  by  a  further,  equally 
independent  watchdog  body  - OFTEL.  OFTEL  itself  can,  when  necessary, 
produce  standards and  is  responsible  for  producing  Codes  of  Practice. 
The  major  PTNO,  British  Telecom,  continues  to  have  a  pivotal  role  in  the 
definition  of  a  base  standard  for  the  network  and  a  strong  but  not  over-
riding  influence  on  the  definition  of  interfaces  and  standards  for 
terminal  equipment, of which  it is  just  one  competing supplier. 
Furthermore,  in  the  UK  it  was  found  necessary  to  cater  for  situations 
where  standards  were  not  available  in  good  time  or  were  not  sufficiently 
comprehensive  for  new  product  testing.  This  resulted  in  the  creation 
for  use  by  the  independent  British  Approvals  Board  for  Telecommunic-
ations  (BABT)  of  the  'Special  Investigation  Test  Schedule'  (SITS) 
procedure  which  effectively  has  eliminated  the  problem  of  lack  of 
availability  of  standards. 
It  is  agreed  that  there  is  a  need  to  achieve  and  maintain  Community-wide 
interoperahility  of  services  and  terminal  equipment.  To  achieve  this 
there  is  a  need  for  harmonised  standards  for  interfacing  to  the  services 
and  for  attachment  to  the  networks  of  terminals  which  can  apply  those 
services.  This  principle  applies  in  the  context  of  both  reserved  and 
competitive supply  of services. 
It  is  noted,  however,  that  over-specification  in  general  and  in 
particular  of  attachment  requirements  adds  unnecessary  product  costs  and 
will  inhibit  innovation.  This  must  be  avoided. 
TEMA  members  are  convinced  that  the  essential  foundation  for  fair 
competition  in  a  liberalised  European  telecommunications  market  is  a 
truly  independent  standards  authority.  Just  as  the  Com mission 
recognises  that  there  needs  to  be  a  clear  separation  of  regulatory  and 
operational  functions,  so  too  it  should  recognise  that  PTNOs  cannot  be 
both  referees and  players  in  standards setting and  approvals. 
If  the  process  of  standards  setting  is  dominated  or  unduly  influenced  by 
CEPT  then  it  is  inevitable  that  CEPT  members  have  the  power  to  dictate 
the  progress  and  extent of  liberalisation. 
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TEMA  is  strongly  of  the  view  that  the  principles  underlying  the  UK  model 
with  its  independent  standards  setting  and  approvals  bodies,  suitably 
modified  to  reflect  other  national  and  community  organisations,  should  be 
applied  to  the  creation  of  ETSI,  which  should  have  strong  links  with, 
but  not  be  controlled  or  unduly  influenced  by,  existing  organisations 
such  as  CEPT and  CEN/CENELEC. 
TEMA  urges  the  Commission  to  consider  alternatives  to  the  current  CEPT 
proposals  for  ETSI  and  suggests  that  a  consortium  established  by  member 
governments  with  representation  from  PTNOs,  industry,  users  and  the  CEC 
may  be  an  appropriate  body  to  control  the  formulation  and  administration 
of  standards. 
Whatever  form  of  standards  making  body  emerges  from  that  further 
consideration,  the  imposition  of  another  layer  on  existing  standards 
making  procedures  will  not  help  the  position,  and  could  impose  an 
intolerable  burden  on  Europe's  already  over-burdened standards experts. 
To  reduce  that  burden,  it  is  suggested  that  ETSI's  activities  should  be 
confined  to  new  digital  products  and  that  they  should  not  dissipate 
their  energies  on  established  analogue  products.  It  is  further 
suggested  that  against  agreed  criteria  the  ETSI  would  take  over  such 
responsibilities  from  the  national  standards  institutions,  thereby 
eliminating  wasteful  duplication  of effort. 
TEMA  also  believes  that  if  European  standards  are  to  become  effective 
within  the  necessary  timescale,  the  ETSI  and/or  the  Regulatory  Authority 
we  propose,  should  have  the  authority  to  impose  a  solution  in  the 
absence  of consensus. 
Numbering  Plans  and Signalling  Systems 
In  dealing  with  the  topic  of  interconnection  of  networks  - particularly 
in  the  context  of  cross  border  provision  of  services  - the  Commission 
recognises  the  need  for  PT  As  to  accept  clear  obligations  to  provide 
access  to  competitive  service  providers.  But  obligation  is  not  confined 
to  that  area,  it  also  applies  to  inter-connection  between  alternative 
networks,  perhaps  competing  PTNOs  as  in  the  UK,  or  in  course  of  time, 
cable  networks. 
Moreover,  the  mere  setting  of  regulations  in  place  and  the  adoption  of 
compatible  technologies  and  interface  standards  such  as  OSI  in 
particular,  will  not  be  sufficient  of  themselves  to  achieve  fully 
viable  interconnection  working. 
The  generation  of  a  fairly  based,  coherent  numbering  plan  and  customer-
to-network  signalling  system  is  also  required.  No  amount  of  hi-tech 
equipment  will  encourage  the  user  to  attempt  to  use  alternative  networks 
1f  it  is  not  equally  convenient  to  gain  access,  or  if  a  range  of 
different  conditions  apply  to  the  called  party  depending  on  the  route  or 
network  chosen. 
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The  process  of  generating  a  coherent  numbering  plan  is  complex  but  it  is 
one  that  needs  to  be  tackled  if  the  full  benefits  of  future  developments 
are  to  be  realised.  The  extent  of  what  needs  to  be  done  is,  of  course, 
dependent  on  the  final  form  of  network  which  is  envisaged  and  how  it  is 
expected  to  develop. 
A  Regulatory  Authority 
The  need  for  a  regula  tory  authority  has  already  been  touched  upon  in 
earlier  sections  of  this  paper.  TEMA's  experience  of  liberalisation  in 
the  UK  market  leaves  it  convinced  that  the  fundamental  pre-requisite  for 
effective  fair  competition  is  a  regulatory  authority  wholly  independent 
of  the  PTAs. 
The  Green  Paper  does  not  indicate  whether  such  an  authority  will  be 
established  and,  if  so,  what  will  be  the  role  of  national  regulatory 
authorities. 
Neither  the  US  Federal  Communications  Commission  nor  the  UK's  Office  of 
Telecommunications  (OFTEL),  provide  an  ideal  model  for  a  European 
regulatory  authority.  For  just  as  their  role  and  powers  are  set  in  the 
framework  of  Federal  or  National  legislation,  so  the  European  authority 
would  need  to  work  within  the  framework  of  Community  law.  Its  relation-
ships  and  modus  operandi  with  the  CEC,  particularly  DGs  XIII  and  IV, 
would  need  to  be  defined  and  that  will  require  detailed  study  and 
consultation. 
Whatever  arrangements  emerge  from  that  study,  it  is  essential  in  TEMA's 
view  that  the  regulatory  authorities  have  the  power  to  prevent 
potentially  anti-competitive  activities  by  action  before  abuse  occurs, 
rather  than  applying  sanctions  afterwards. 
TEMA  believes  this  to  be  a  particularly  important  safeguard  for  small  to 
medium  size  undertakings  for  whom  short  term  damage  may  be  too  severe 
for  them  to  survive. 
Conclusion 
Rather  than  attempt  to  summarise  the  views  expressed  above,  this 
conclusion  briefly  details  TEMA 's  stand  on  each  of  the  Proposed 
Positions  set out  in  Figure  13  of  the Green  Paper. 
A.  TEMA  accepts  the  need  for  continued  privileges  for  PTAs  regarding 
public  network  infrastructure  provision  and  operation  and  strongly 
supports  the  need  for  safeguarding  its  integrity.  The  definition  of 
'network  infrastructure'  however,  needs  careful  and  continuing 
refinement. 
B.  TEMA  accepts the  need  for  PT As  to be  able  to ensure  the 
financial  viability  of  infrastructure  networks  and  therefore  the 
need  to  prevent  cream  skimming  of  their  revenues. 
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It  questions,  however,  whether  the  reservation  to  the  PT As,  even  on 
a  narrow  1  y  defined  and  temporary  basis,  of  the  right  to  exclusive 
operation  of  the  voice  telephony  service  is  justified,  desirable  or 
practical.  It  recommends  a  deeper  study  of  that  privilege  and  their 
rigl1t  to  enter  the  competitive  service  -sector  in  order  to  evolve  a 
properly  balanced  solution. 
C.  TEMA  supports  the  unrestricted  competitive  provision  of  all 
services,  subject  only  to  the  qualification  in  B above. 
D.  TEMA  recognises  and  supports  the  need  to  maintain  or  create, 
community  wide  inter-operability  and·  therefore  for  there  to  be 
harmonised  standards  for  that  purpose.  These  should  not,  however, 
be  so  framed  as  to  discourage  innovation. 
Based  on  its  experience  in  the  process  of  liberalisation  in  the  UK, 
TEMA  emphasises  that an  independent  standards  making  body  is  a 
fundamental  pre-requisite  for  a  liberalised  and  openly  competitive 
market.  TEMA  therefore  urges  the  Commission  to  consider  the  means 
by  which  such  an  independent  body  can  be created. 
E.  TEMA  agrees  the  need  for  clear  definition,  by  Directive, of the 
general  requirements  for  infrastructure  provision  and 
interconnection/  access  arrangements  and  of  the  need  for  a  Community 
led  study  on  the  definition  of  a  Network  Termination  Point. 
It  also  draws  attention  to  the  need  for  a  coherent  numbering  plan 
and  customer-to-network  signalling  system  in  the  pursuit  of 
effective and  economic  inter-operability. 
F.  TEMA  strongly  supports  the  open,  competitive  provtston  of  terminal 
equipment  on  a  Community  wide  basis,  but  sees  no  reason  why  that 
should  not  also  apply  to  the  first  telephone.  Reservation,  even  on 
a  temporary  basis,  of  the  right  to  supply  the  first  telephone  will 
sustain  existing  monopoly  powers. 
G.  TEMA  strongly  supports  the  need  for  the  separation  of  the  regulatory 
and  operational  activities  of  PT As  and  considers  that  there  is  a 
need  for  a  European  Telecommunications  Regulatory  Authority. 
H&:I.  TE\1A  accepts  the  need  for  the  activities  of  both  PTAs  and  emergent 
providers  of  network  services  to  be  subject  to  continuous  and  strict 
review  in  order  to  avoid  abuse  of  dominant  market  positions. 
J.  TEMA  would  welcome  the  full  application  of  the  Community's  common 
commercial  policy  to  the  telecommunications  services  and  equipment 
market.  Coupled  with  the  welcome  is  the  caution  that,  particularly 
in  the  transitional  stages,  the  growth  of  a  coherent  Community 
market  will  render  it  more  vulnerable  to  import  penetration  and  some 
safeguarding  may  be  required  whilst  arrangements  for  true 
reciprocity  are  negotiated. 
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As  a  final  comment,  TEMA  believes  that  change  must  take  place  and  that 
greater  regulatory  coherence  must  come about  throughout  the  \.ommunity. 
The  concepts  set  out  in  the  Green  Paper,  taken  as  a  whole,  should 
achieve  the  desired  purposes  but  there  are  many  topics  which  require 
further  detailed  study. 
Moreover,  any  changes  need  to  be  carefully  co-ordinated  since  their 
purposes  and  effects  are  interdependent.  As  a  simple  but  crucial 
example,  the  absence  of  suitable  standards  at  the  right  time  would  be  a 
major  impediment  to  progress  in  other  areas. 
Thus,  a  fully  timed  implementation  plan  needs  to  be  evolved  which  takes 
account  of  both  the  further  pre  para  tory  work  needed  and  the  inter-
dependencies  of  the changes  to be  made. 
These  changes  need  to  be  introduced  in  an  evolutionary  and  we  11 
understood  manner  so  as  not  to  create  a  destabilised  situation,  even  on 
a  temporary  basis.  Such  a  situation  would  not  only  impede  the  proper 
development  of  telecommunications  in  the  Community  but  could  also 
threaten  the  survival  of  important  elements  of  manufacturing  industry 
who  have  such  a  vital contribution  to  make. 
---**---**---**---**---**---**---**---
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comments by the Swedish Telecom Administration 
Summary 
Swedish Telecom considers that the Green Paper gives an excellent 
presentation of the international development trends and gives its 
general endorsement of the main thrust of the proposals presented. 
Backll'ound 
Before  presenting  some  more  detailed  comments,  a  few 
characteristics of the Swedish situation should be emphasized.  A 
basic fact is that there has never existed any legal regulation of the 
right  to  conduct  telecommunications  activities  in Sweden.  Thus 
there is neither any statutory monopoly for Swedish Telecom on the 
installation of networks and the provision of telecommunications 
services,  nor  any  legal  regulation  of  the  right  to  provide 
telecommunications  based  services.  No  legal  definition  has 
consequently  been  needed  for  "basic"  or "value-added"  services 
which is a  thorny issue in other counbies. Swedish Telecom  has 
been able to cooperate with other actors to develop services in areas 
which could otherwise have been subject to conflict. 
This has been based on the tacit conviction that the public interest is 
best  served  by an administration  which  is  not prevented  from 
. entering markets  outside  the  traditional basic services.  Swedish 
Telecom has achieved a dominating market position. The essential 
rules governing the Swedish telecommunications market have thus 
been the rules for access to and use of the public network. These rules 
have been relaxed step-by-step during the 1980s. 
Further, postal and telecommunications services have always been 
separated. Swedish Telecom  has never been obliged to subsidize 
postal operations nor other activities under the state budget. It has 
however an obligation to  provide basic public telecommunications 
services nationwide. like in almost all other countries, there exist 
substantial internal subsidies inside the telecommunications system. 
The imbalance between tariffs and costs has been recognized as  a 
fundamental problem. Government and Parliament have endorsed 
a  policy  of gradual rebalancing  in order  to  forestall  a  serious 
deterioration of the economic situation through aeamskimming. 
The  terminal  market  has  been  liberalized  in  steps.  The  only 
remaining items are high-speed voice-band modems, which will be 
liberalized on 1  March  1988 and  P ABXs which are expected to be 








The thrust of  the decisions  made by Goverrunent and Parliament 
since 1980 has been to give Swedish Telecom better and more flexible 
conditions  for  its  activities  and  to  liberalize  the  market  for 
equipment and services and at the same time to create safeguards 
against abuse of its dominant position. Since 1981  Swedish Telecom 
is  required to keep and publish separate accounts for expenses and 
earnings of  its  operations  exposed  to  competition. The national 
Audit  Bureau  examines  these  separate  accounts.  A  set  of new 
proposals are at present lL"lder  consideration by the  G~vernment. 
They are based on considerations l\'hich a.re well in line with those of 
the Green Book. 
Comments on the ptoposed positions in the Green Book 
Position A 
There  is  no exclusive  prov1stons  or  special  rights  for  Swedish 
Telecom  regarding  the  network  infrastructure.  We  continue  to 
believe that the integrity of the public network infrastructure can ·be 
safeguarded  provkied  cll  actors  in  the  market are  given  equal 
conditions for competing in the marketplace. 
Competitive offering of two-way satellite communications systems is 
under active consideration by the Swedish Government 
Position B 
There is  no special  right for  Swedish Telecom  to provide voice 
telecont service. But Swedish Telecom has an obligation to provide 
telecom  services  in general.  There  is,  at the  mom~t, no precise 
definition of this obligation. Whether customers use their telephone 
network  access  for  voice,  facsimile,  data  transmission  or  a 
combination of these is entirely their choice. It is not even known by 
us.  All terminals, induding the first telephone set, are supplied on 
an open  mark~t. ~'ve~i!>h Telecom  has however an obligation to 
deliver a standard telep  ho~~ set v::'"'h  ;r).ayan.reed performance and at 
the same price all over Sweden if the customer so desires. 
Position C 
The provision of all other setvices is already liberalized 
Position D 
Swedish Teleconl is  applying international standards for  network 
infrastructure and  services to the extent that they exist in order to 
ensure  internatlona1  intercperability. It is  in  the interest of our 
custonters  that  the  -vv·idest  possiblf'  choice  is  provided.  Swedish 
Tclecorn is  a finn supporter oi rhe efforts to create a pan-european 
digital mobile telephone system. 
The  Nordic cooperation  in  the  creation  of a  joint data  network 
(Datex) and a joint mobile telcphc-nc- net~Nor1: (NMTl could be set!n ------------
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as precursors for wider European efforts. We have inCEPT taken the 
initiative to start planning for  the joint European introduction of 
switched digital networks. 
Swedish Telecom is making strong efforts to participate actively in 
the RACE MAIN programme. 
Position E 
The need for dear definition of the general requirements imposed by 
Swedish Telecom on providers of competitive services for use of the 
network has been recognized. We have so far, in accordance with 
CCITT recommendations, not allowed straight third party resale of 
leased line capacity.  Such  restrictions  are however increasingly 
difficult to uphold and Swedish Teleoom has declared its intention to 
open for third party traffic as soon as the tariff/cost relationship has 
been  rebalanced.  This  proposal  Is  under  consideration  by  the 
Government.  Swedish Telecom  does  not have  the intention  to 
introduse usage-related tariffs for leased lines. 
Interconnect and access conditions should in our opinion be dictated 
by ~~mmercial considerations. 
We  do  support  an  intensified  international  effort  to  provide 
standards. To this end we take active part in TRAC and the efforts to 
create a European Telecommunications Standards Institute. 
Position F 
Swedish Telecom supports the creation of an open terminal market. 
We expect to join in an international scheme of mutual recognition 
of type approval  . 
Position G 
A proposal for separation of regulatory and operational activities and 
the transfer of  the former  to  a  separate agency is  already under 
consideration by the Swedish Government. It is vividly supported by 
Swedish Telecom. 
Position H 
The Swedish  government has imposed on Swedish Telecom  the 
requirement that competitive activities must not be subsidised from 
other activities. To this end they must be accounted separately or 
carried out in the form of joint-stock companies. 
Position I 
All  actors in the  Swedish market including Swedish Telecom, are 
subjected  to  general laws on fair  competition. This is  in order to 
avoid the abuse of dominant positions.  - · 
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~  , 
415 
:I 
J  •! 
~l 
I  . 





2 December 1987 
Sweden has advocated the notification in GATI of all  rules which 
may affect competition. 
Conclusion 
Swedish Telecom's basic philosophy is that the development is best 
served  by  an  open  competition  on  commercial  terms  in  the 
marketplace,  not by restrictive  rules which tend to be  outdated 
quickly.  The costs of any legitimate deviations required by public 
service objectives should be borne by all actors. A major problem is 
the  skewed  tariff/cost  relations,  both  internationally  and 
domestically.  The  accounting  rates  must  be  rebalanced  in  the 
international organisations in order to avoid sending false signals to 
the market. 
Swedish Telecom  is  seeking improved cooperation internationally 
and in particular with the EEC  in order to seek truly pan-european 
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UNION  DES  CONFEDERATIONS  DE  L'INDUSTRIE  ET  DES  EMPLOYEURS  D'EUROPE 
UNION  OF  INDUSTRIAL  AND  EMPLOYERS'  CONFEDERATIONS  OF  EUROPE 
3.12.1987 
LIVU VEBl'  DB  LA  COMHISSIOH  BIJKOPDBiiB  SO tBS TBJ.BaJIIIDJIC&riOIIS 
(COK  87-290) 
COMMBNTAIU.S  DE  L 'UHICE 
INTRODUCTION 
L'UNICE  appuie Energiquement  l'objectif du  Livre Vert de la Commission  qui  .  , 
est  d  instaurer  une  concurrence  saine  et  ouverte  sur  le  march&  des 
telecommunications  partout  dans  la  Communautl,  de  maniare  1  crier  l'e~i­
ronnement  requis  pour  le  developpement  d'entreprises  euro~ennes 
perfo~antes et competitives  au  plan international. 
L 'UN ICE  n 'a  pas  juge  utile  de  fa ire  un  co11111entaire  dltaillE,  point  par 
point,  du  Livre  Vert •  Le  but  du  pd!sent  avis est plut8t de mettre  en evi-
dence  les  mati~res  sur  lesquelles  la  Collllllission  devrait  rlfllchir  en  vue 
d''viter que  des difficultes ne  surgissent dans la suite, en raison d'ambi-
guites  et  de  malentendus.  U  oil  cela  a  ete  possible,l'UNICE  a  esquis"'  i 
1'  intention  de  la  Commission  1'  approche  qui  lui  paralt  la  plus  iodiquie 
pour  traiter  les  probl~mes  identifies,  en  tenant  coapte  de  la rialitl des 
regimes  de  telecommunications  actuels dans les !tats Meabres. 
Bien  que  les  comment aires  presentes  ci-dessous  portent  sur  1'  industrie  de 
la  Communaute  et  des  Etats  Membres,  les  F'derations membres  de  l'UNICE  des 
pays  communautaires et non  communautaires ont  adopte le  present document  et 
approuvent  1' idee  que  toute  politique  europeenne  des  t&l.6coauaunications 
doit  inclure  les  Etats  non  membres  de  la  CEE  reprlsentls  au  sein  de 
1 'UNICE. 
DEFilliTIONS  ET  CONCEPTS  DB  BASE 
Infrastructure de  telecommunications 
L'UNICE  accepte la conclusion  de  la Commission  que  les  Administrations  na-
tionales  des  telecommunications  (a)  ont  besoin  d'un  certain  degre  de 
protection  leur  permettant  de  financer  la  fourniture  de  services  de  tel~ 
communication  socialement  souhaitables,  mais  qui  ne  sont  pas necessairement 
~conomiquement  viab les.  Toute  protection  du  droit  des  Administrations  1 
fournir  !'infrastructure de  base  du  reseau  devrait  ltre limitee,  aux  yeux 
de  l'UNICE,  a la fourniture des  infrastructures de  telecommunications.  Ceci 
appelle  une  definition claire et non  ambigu~ de  la notion d'infrastructure 
de  telecommunications.  Cette  definition devrait ltre periodiquement  reeva-
luee  pour  tenir compte  du  progres  technologique et en  particulier de  l'~vo­
lution vers  une  infrastructure  num~rique. 
(a)  Aux  yeux  de  l'UNICE,  ce  terme,  bien qu'il soit  syst~atiquement utilise 
dans  le Livre  Vert  et  dans  le  present  document,  peut  induire  en  erreur 
etant  donne  quI il  evoque  Une  aC tiVite  gOUVernementale  OU  SOUDliSe  aU 
contr8le  d'un  gouvernement.  En  fait,  ce  terme  dEsigne  tout  fournisseur 
et operateur  d'une  infrastructure de  reseau  public. 
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L'UNICE  constate  que,  dans  certains  pays,  on  dlsigne  par  •infrastructures 
de  tel~communications"  uniquement  les  infrastructures  pouvant  prendre  en 
charge des  communications  bidirectionnelles,  ou  interactive&, ce  qui  exclut 
les  infrastructures  utilisies  dans  le  seul  but  de  fournir  les  services 
suivants  : 
telemesure unidirectionnelle, 
diffusion TV  par clble en mode  unidirectionnel, 
teletext, 
toute  emission unidirectionnelle  d'ondes  radio  ou  d'images  tll6vis&es, 
meme  lorsque  1'  information  transmise  est  codee  de  fa~on i  ne  pouvoir 
etre captee que  par des  groupes  fermes  d'utilisateurs. 
A !'inverse,  certains  Etats-Membres  reglementent  !'ensemble  ou  une  partie 
des  activites reprises ci-dessus. 
En  definissant  !'infrastructure des  telecommunications,  la Commission  dolt 
avoir  le  souci  d'eviter  d'.introduire  des  distorsions dans  le developpement 
nature!  des  infrastructures  requises  pour  les  communications  interactives 
modernes.  Ceci  pourrait etre le cas si l'on fixait des dEfinitions  poussant 
les  fournisseurs  potentiels de  services  A concevoir  leurs  syst~es en pri-
vilegiant le  souci  d'echapper  1  la reglementation  au dEtriment  du  d&velop-
pement  des  techniques  interac  tives  avancEes.  L'  exclusion  des  sya thles 
unidirectionnels pourrait stimuler de  tels dEveloppeaents  indEsirables. 
L'UNICE  souhaite egalement  que  : 
tout droit reserve  des  Administrations  des  t~lcommunications concerne 
uniquement  la fourniture de  services sur les r'seaux publics et que 
les droits  speciaux accordes  aux Administrations des  t~Ecoamunications 
pour  la  fourniture  de  certains  services  ne  permettent  pas  !'intrusion 
de  ces  Administrations  sur  les  reseaux  prives  (que  ceux-ci  incluent  ou 
non  certains  elements  fournis  par  une  Administration  des  'nlecommu-
nications).  Ceci  necessitera  de  d&limiter  clairement  les  reseaux 
publics et les reseaux prives. 
Les  services  porteurs et les services d'application 
L'UNICE  note  que,  dans  l'environnement  actuel des  telecommunications analo-
giques,  le  client  associe !'infrastructure avec  le ·service porteur·fourni 
par  !'Administration des  Telecommunications  et  avec  le ·service d'applica-
tion"  qui  peut  etre fourni  par !'Administration ou  par un  autre prestataire 
de  services.  C'est  ainsi  que  les  services  d'application constitu€s  par  le 
telephone  et  le  telex  sont  fournis  au  moyen  d'infrastructures  physiquement 
di3tinctes  (au  moins  au  niveau  des  !ignes  de  raccordement)  et  impliquant 
par  consequent  des  "services  porteurs"  egalement  distinct&  (bien que  tech-
niquement  assez  semblables) • 
.  .; 
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Dans  1'  environnement  RNIS  cependant,  1'  infrastructure  et  les  "services 
porteurs"  seront communs  A tousles services d'application.  Il est das lors 
essentiel  que  les  r~flexions de  la  Commission  sur la notion  de  droits rE-
serv~s  pour  la mise  a disposition d' infrastructures  (notion  qui  implique, 
pour  les  Administrations  des  T~lEcommunications, le devoir  de  fournir  des 
"services  porteurs")  ne  scient  pas  m~l~es 1  sea  r&flexions  sur  la  r~erva­
tion eventuelle de  certains "services d'application" 1  ces Administrations. 
Lea  services de  base ou  r~servEs 
La  d~finition des  services  de  base,  ou  rEserv,s,  donn~e par le Livre Vert 
et  qui  sera reprise dans  les  propositions  l~gislatives  ult~rieures devrait 
@tre  limitative et  non  susceptible  d'~tre ~argie par les Etats Membres  en 
vue  d'  Etendre  le  champ  des  services  rEservEs  aux  Administrations 
nationales.  La  difinition  initiale  de  cette  notion  de  services  r~erv~s 
soulevera  sans  aucun  doute  des  questions  ~pine  uses  de  politique.  L 'UNICE 
appuie  l'objectif de  la Commission  d'introduire la concurrence  sur  la plus 
large  Echelle  possible. 
La  revision  envisagEe  de  la  d~finition des  services  de  base,  ou  r~serv~s, 
(quelle  qu'en  soit  la  dEfinition  adoptEe  au  dEpart)  ne  devrait  pas 
permet tre  un  Elargissement  de  1'  ~vent  ail  de  ces  services,  mais  uniquement 
de  r'duire  ou  de  maintenir  cet  Eventail  initial.  Si  la  Commission  dEcide 
d • inclure d'  aut  res  services  que  le service til.Ephonique vocal  dans la dEfi-
nition  des  services  r~servEs,  1'  engagement  devrait  @tre  clairement  pris 
d''liminer ces exceptions  selon un  calendrier court et bien dEfini. 
Services reposant  sur les satellites 
L  'UN ICE  estime  que  1' utilisation  des  satellites  A  des  fins  de 
telecommunication  devrait  ~tre  considir~e  de  la  m~e  maniere  que 
!'utilisation  de  !ignes  terrestres  et  done  ftre  reservEe  aux 
Administrations  des  T~l~communications.  Une  approche  au  cas  par  cas 
pourrait conduire a des  inconsequences  et creerait un  climat d'incertitude. 
Le  point  de  terminaison du  r~seau 
Un  il~ent essentiel  pour  assurer la creation et le bon  fonctionnement  d'un 
march~ ouvert des  terminaux de  tilEcommunication  sera  l'~tablissement d'une 
d~fini  tion  claire  et  certaine  du  point  auquel  le  reseau  s'  arr@te  et  ou 
1'  ~quipement  terminal  fait  son  apparition.  Il  convient  d'emplcher  .que  le 
reseau  d'un  opirateur  n'empi~te sur  le domaine  considEr~, pour  des  raisons 
objectives,  comme  constituant  1 'iquipement  terminal.  Similairement, 
l'utilisateur ou  le fournisseur  d'equipements  terminaux ne devrait  pas  etre 
autoris~  a  repousser  les  limites  du  reseau  l  1'  interieur  du  domaine 
correctement  pris  en  charge par l'opirateur du  r&seau. 
"  r. 
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Equipement  terminal 
Il devrait  @tre  pr~cis~ de  mani~re tout  ~ fait claire que  toute liste d'ap-
pareils  constituant  un  ~quipement  terminal  (comme  par  ex.  celle  prEsentEe 
au  tableau  8  du  Livre  Vert  )  est illustrative et  non  exhaustive. Les  Etats 
Membres  prioccup's  de  d€fendre  des  int~r~ts nationaux ou  sectoriels itroits 
ne  devraient  avoir  aucune  latitude  de  limiter  1'  ouverture  du  marchi  des 
€quipements  terminaux  en  excluant  du  champ  de  la lEgislation nationale  des 
€quipements  qui  n' ont  pas  encore  it! pris  en  considlration,  tels  que  des 
appareils  ~  caract~re innovateur. 
Transition progressive 
La  Commission  devrait  examiner  la  n!cessitf  iventuelle  d' introduire  cer-
tains aspects  de  sa  politique par !tapes successives,  dans  le but d'assurer 
une  transition ordonn!e  m!nageant  les  intlr~ts des utilisateurs,  des fabri-
cants  {sp€cialement  ceux  de  petite et moyenne  taille),  des  nouveaux  comp'-
titeurs  de  dimension modeste  faisant  leur entrEe  sur le march! des  services 
et  des  iquipements,  et  des  Administrations  des  T'licommunications.  De  tels 
arrangements  devraient  @tre  d!finis  clairement  1  l'avance,  pour  maintenir 
un  environnement  suffisamment  stable.  Un  environnement  insuffisamment  cer-
tain serait pr!judiciable pour  toutes  les parties concernles. 
NORMALISATION  ET  cnnne&nOR 
La  n€cessit! d'agir 
L'objectif  de  disposer  en  1992  d'un  marchf  europien concurrentielimplique, 
entre autres,  !'adoption acc,lEr!e de  normes  europiennes aussi bien dans  le 
domaine  des  tllicommunications que  dans  celui des  techniques d'information. 
L 'UNICE  insiste  done  sur  la  nAcessit~  d'intensifiser  les  activitis  de 
normalisation  europ~enne,  au  dltriment  des  normalisation&  nationales,  en 
augmentant  simultan!ment  la  vitesse  de  la  prlparation  des  normes  et  la 
rapidit~  de  leur  adoption  en  Europe.  Le  but  final  de  la  normalisation 
europ~enne devrait  @tre  son intigration iRt:ernationale et la reconnaissance 
mondiale. 
Les  participants 
La  participation a ce  travail  important  pour  l'Europe  devrait  @tre  ouverte 
a tous  les groupes  d'int,r@t  concern!s  :  les Administrations des  Tilicommu-
nications,  les fabricants  d''quipements,  les utilisateurs et les prestatai-
res  de  services.  Le  r81e  des  organismes  de  normalisation est d'organiser la 
cooperation des  parties interessees. 
L 'UNICE  appuie  1' avis  de  la  Commission  pranant  q.ue  la  r~alisation de  ces 
o'bjectifs  dans  un  d~Hai  et  avec  un  volume  raisonnables  n~cessite,_ d'une 
part,  d'augmenter  consid~rablement  les  ressources  humaines  et  finaAci~res 
consacr€es  a  la  normalisation  europeenne  en  t~l~communications  et  en 
techniques  d'information et, d'autre  part,  de  mieux  structurer une  c~op~ra­
tion  active  entre  les  administrations,  les  producteurs  et  les 
consommateurs. 
L'UNICE  insiste  particuli~rement  pour  que  les  producteurs  et  utilisateurs 
industri.els  puissent  collaborer  aux  decisions  et  1  la , programmation  de 
cette normalisation et participer au  vote  final des  projets de  normes. 
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Il  importe  cependant  d'6viter  de  multiplier  le  nOmDre  d'organis.es. 
effectuant  des  travaux  paralleles  A celui  de  l'€laboration des  normes.  Le 
nombre  d'experts  industriels  disponibles  pour  participer  aux  travaux 
techniques  est en effet  limit~ et  impose  !'exclusion de  tout double  emploi. 
Le  travail  actuel  de  normalisation  devrait  dans  1'  avenir  Atre  organisE 
davantage  en se basant  sur  des  groupes  de  travail •ad hoc•  tr~s  sp~cialis~s 
se r6unissant  avec  un  mandat  bien defini  pendant  une  pfriode limit6e en vue 
de  produire un  projet de norme  sp~cifique. 
Organisation 
Dans  ce.  contexte,  et  6tant  donn~  la  convergence  croissante  entre  les 
technologies  de  traitement,  et de  transmission d'informations,  l'UNICE  est 
d'avis  que  les  fonctions  remplies  dans  ce  domaine  par le  CEN/CENELEC  et la 
CEPT  devraient  @tre  6troitement  coordonnles,  une  distinction  claire  entre 
les  technologies  de  !'information,  d'une  part, et des  ttl6communications, 
d'autre  part,  ~tant de  plus  en  plus  difficile  1  Etablir.  L'ITSTC  effectue 
dljA  une  coordination  CEPT/CEN/CENELEC,  mais  cet  arrangement  pourrait 
n6cessiter des  am~liorations.  -
L'organisation  pour  l'Qaboration  des  NET's,  normes  et 
europ€ennes  dolt  @tre  simple,  souple  et  bien  dlfinie  et 
d'atteindre,  d~s que  possible, les objectifs suivants 
prfnormes 
permettre 
assurer  une  interop~rabilit€ compl~te et mondiale  au niveau des rlseaux 
garantissant  des  connections  dans  le  monde  ent ier  pour  chaque  usage 
utile et au meilleur rapport  performances/prix; 
assurer  une  compatibilite  complete  des  terminaux  avec  les  reseaux  et 
les  services  porteurs  avec  lesquels  ces  terminaux  sont  destines  a 
travailler; 
conduire  1  une  economie  d' €chelle  pour  les  fournisseurs  industriels, 
les exploitants des  reseaux et les prestataires des  services. 
L'UNICE  est d'avis  que  : 
Les  Insti.tuts  Europeens  de  Normalisation  que  constituent  le  CEN  et  le 
CENELEC  conviennent  pour  la  preparation  de  normes  et  prlnormes 
europ~ennes  (EN  et  ENV)  pour  autant  que  leur  structure  et  leur 
programme  de  travail soient renforces; 
1' initiative  prise  par  la  CEPT  - dans  la  foulee  du  Livre  Vert  - de 
creer  dans  un  futur  proche,  un  lnstitut  Europ6en  des  Normes  de 
T€lecommunications .(ETSI)  est acceptable pour  autant  que 
A')1  l:J.:  i'  ;  ~ 6 
o  les  fabricants  et  les  utilisateurs  soient  pleinement  associ's  1  la 
d~finition des  normes 
o  1 'Institut  fasse  partie  de  la  structure  europ~enne de  normalisation 
(la  cr~ation d'EWOS  dans  cette  structure  constitue  une  illustration 
du  type  de  d~arche a suivre). 
Les  travaux  devraient  ~tre  effectu~s  par  des  experts  techniques  en  dehors 
de  l'Institut et  se  baser  sur  les  ressources  disponibles,  dans  le  domaine 
des  technologies  de  !'information et  des  t~licommunications,  au  niveau  du 
CEN/CENELEC,  de  la CEPT,  de  l'ECMA,  d'ECTEL  et fventuellement  d'EWOS. 
Les  activit~s de  normalisation dans  le domaine  des  technologies de  !'infor-
mation doivent  faire !'objet d'une  coop~ration tr~s  ~troite  ~taut  donn~ que 
les  d~veloppements intervenant dans  ce  domaine  et dans  celui des  t616commu-
nications  ne  peuvent  pas  @tre  consid~r~s  s~pariment.  L'61aboration  de 
normes  en  vase  clos  au  sein  de  diff~rents  organismes  doit  ltre  6vit~e 1 
tout  prix. 
L 'OPEN  lf!TWBK PROVI SIO'N  - ONP  (L  'OFFRE  D'  OR  IESEAU  OOVIItt Alii UTILISATEDRS 
ET  PRESTATAIB.'ES  D'UR  SERVICE) 
Introduction 
L'ONP  est  vue  comme  un  pilier essentiel d'un  environnement  de  tilicommuni-
cations  con~u pour  favoriser  l'offre de  services  concurrentiels  dans  toute 
!'Europe,  permettant  par  la  de  stimuler  l'~conomie de  la  Communauti.  Pour 
r~aliser cet  objectif,  il sera  n~cessaire que  les  fournisseurs  de  services 
jouissent  d' un  acc~s  transfronti~res  aux  services  de  riseau  et  que  ces 
.. services  de  base"  soient  d' un  niveau  comparable  dans  tous  les  Etats-
Membres. 
La  mise  en  place  de  1 'ONP  dependra  de  la  resolution  de  problbes  majeurs 
qui  peuvent  etre  regroup~s en  4  cat~gories principales  : 
Services  de  r~seau 
11  faudra  se  mettre  d' accord  sur  les  installations  qui  forment  1' infras-
tructure  de  base  du  r~seau,  laquelle,  d'apr~s  le  Livre  Vert,  pourrait 
contin~er a etre  fournie  par  les  seules  Administrations  des  T'licommunica-
tions. 
Quelle.que  soit la limite  tracee entre  les services de  base et les services 
concurrentiels,  les  services  de  base  devraient  com porter  des  services  de 
,:ommunication  de  donn~es. 
Dans  le  contexte  du  RNI S,  le  concept  d'  ONP  devra  surtout  viser a a•surer 
l'acces  aux  services  porteurs  transparents  de  fa~on A favoriser une  concur-
rence  dynamique  au  niveau  des  services  d' application  (~  1'  exceptiE)n  du 
service  t~l~phonique  commut€  standard,  au  cas  oil  celui-ci  recevrait  le 
statut de  service d'application  r~serv~). 
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Comme  la technologie  du  r~seau de  base  progresse  constamment  et offre  des 
innovations  toujours  plus  sophistiquees  pour  un  coBt  n~gligeable ou  nul,  le 
b~n~fice  de  ces  progr~s  devrait  !tre'  report~  sur  les  fournisseurs  de 
service  concurrentiels  et  finalement  sur  1'  usager.  Par  exemple,  11  est 
important  que  les fournisseurs  de  services concurrentiels alent  acc~s a une 
large  gamme  de  signaux  d' information  (p.  ex.  pour  11 identification  d 'un 
appel  entrant)  sous  une  forme  pratique et standardisEe,  de  fa~on 1  assurer 
que  1'  intelligence  croissante  incorpor~e  dans  le  r~seau  b~n~ficie  aux 
usagers  acc~dant  aux  services  concurrentiels,  en  c:e  c:ompris  les  services 
offerts par les Administrations  des  T€l~communications. 
Normes  et  d~finitions 
Pour  permettre  la  pres tat  ion  de  services  transfronti~res, les  services  de 
r~seau devront  @tre  transparents dans  toute la  Communaut~.  Ceci  n~cessitera 
bien  ~videmment  des  mesures  poussees  d' interconnexion,  d~passant  celles 
existant  dans  un  contexte  international.  En  particulier,  les  limitations 
qui  existent  dans  certains  Etats  Membres  concernant  la  disponibilit~  de 
lignes  louies  et  la  connexion  de  celles-ci  aux  services  commutEs  devront 
ltre ilimin~es en temps  voulu. 
Dans  toute la  Communaut~, il faudra garantir la  continuit~ des  services  qui 
seront,  le  cas  Echeant,  classifi~s  comme  services  de  base  relatifs  au 
reseau  et  qui,  i.  ce  titre,  devront  obligatoirem.ent  ltre assur6s  par  les 
Administrations des  Telecommunications. 
Ces  services  doivent  @tre  fournis  dans  des  conditions  comparable&  a tous 
les  prestataires  de  services  concurrentiels  et  ils ne  devraient  pas  @tre 
exploites  par  une  Administration  de  Taec<XDmunications  individuelle  pour 
fournir  elle-m@me  des  services  concurrentiels,  1  moins  que  cela  se  fasse 
sur  une  base  comparable garantissant une  concurrence loyale  avec  les autres 
prestataires.  11  convient  de  remarquer  que  les  services de  base relatifs au 
r€seau et  fournis  sous  un  regime  d'ONP  (p.exemple le service X 25  de  commu-
tation de  paquets)  ne  devraient  pas  tous  @tre  rEservEs  aux  Administrations 
des  Telecommunications. 
La  mise  en  oeuvre  des  principes  com.muns  en  mati~re  d 
1 acc~s  necessitera 
d1assurer  la  compatibilit~  avec  une  serie  de  protocoles  d'acc~s relatifs 
aux  couches  inf~rieures, protocoles  qui  devraient  @tre  harmonis~s au  niveau 
de  toutes  les  Administrations  des  Telecommunications.  Les  protocoles 
d'aucun  fabricant  de  commutateurs  ne  devraient  devenir  dominants.  Un  enga-
gement  ferme  en  faveur  de  l'OSI  pourrait minimiser le risque de divergences 
nationales. 
L  1 acc~s  au  reseau  devrait  @tre  aussi  transparent  que  les  possibili  tes 
techniques  le  permet tent,  laissant  aux  fournisseurs  et  utilisateurs  de 
services  concurrentiels  un  maximum  de  flexibilite  pour  le  choix  des 
protocoles  de  couches  superieures  les  plus  adapt~s aux  exigences  de  leurs 
applications. 8 
11  est  n~cessaire  de  coordonner  1' introduction  du  RNIS  dans  toute  la 
Communaute.  11  est  evident  qu'il  existe  peu  de  consensus  actuellement  sur 
la notion  de  RNIS  et  que  ce  probl~me doit  etre  r€solu  en  ayant  le concept 
d'ONP  A !'esprit.  Le  debat  sur  le  RNIS  devra utiliser l'ONP  comme  point de 
rep~re pour  assurer  que  la definition  finale  du  RNIS  repond  aux  exigences 
de  l'ONP.  Dans  le RNIS,  des  interfaces  supplementaires  et/ou une  extension 
des  normes  proposees  pourraient  etre  necessaires  pour  assurer  1'  accas  aux 
signaux  d' information  et  aux  paquets  de  donn~es  trausportls  sur  le  canal 
"D" • 
Ces · questions  rel~vent  d 'ores  et  deja  de  diverses  organisations  cc:maae  la 
CEPT  et le  CCITT;  les  problemes  identifies  dans  cette  section  ne  peuvent 
etre  resolus  qu'avec  leur  cooperation.  Une  solution efficace  exige  igale-
ment  la  coop~ration des  fabricants  d'equipements  terminaux et d'iquipements 
de  reseau,  comme  celle  des  fournisseurs  et  des  utUisateurs  de  services 
concurrentiels. 
Structures tarifaires 
Les  structures  tarifaires devraient  @tre  elabories 1  partir de  tarifs bases 
sur  les  couts.  Ceci  est  un  point  essen  tiel,  sur  lequel  l'UNICE  insiste 
forteoient.  Le  niveau  des  tarifs  peut  varier  entre  les  different&  Etats 
Membres,  compte  ~enu  du  ni  veau  variable  des  co6ts  r'els,  mais  ceci  ne 
justifie pas  des  differences dans les  principes de  tarification. 
Les  differences entre les structures tarifaires nationales et internationa-
les devront  etre minimisees  de  fa~on a ce  que  certains  fournisseurs  de  ser-
vices  concurrentiels  ne  soient  pas  desavantages  du  fait  de  leur  implanta-
tion  dans  certains  Etats  Membres.  Les  Etats  Membres  devraient  reconnattre 
que  des  tarifs  excessivement  ~!eves  font  supporter  par  leurs  usagers  des 
telecommunications  un  fardeau  qui  peut  rendre leurs biens et services moins 
competitifs sur les marches  communautaire et mondial. 
L'interdiction  de  la  revente  pure  et  simple  de  capacit~s  devrait  @tre 
consider€e  seulement  comme  une  mesure  transitoire visant a r~duire la perte 
de  revenus  dont  souffrent  les  Administrations  des  T'-lecommunications  du 
fait  de  1' "ecremage",  perte  qui est ,due  aux  dis torsions  existant  actuelle-
ment  dans  le  plupart  des  Etats  Membres  entre  les  tarifs  et  coGts  et  aux 
possibilites d'arbitrage  que  ceci entraine. 
La  "simple  revente''  de  capacite devrait etre definie comme  l'utilisation de 
lignes  louees  pour  offrir  un  service de  telephone  commute  ordinaire. 
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Un  r'iquilibrage des  tarifs devra  @tre  effectu~  par  certaines  Administra-
tions  des  T~l~communications  afin  d' €!!miner  les  disparitis  entre  les 
tarifs pour les communications locales et 1  longue distance.  L'UNICE  appuie 
totalement ce riequilibrage.  Ce  reequilibrage sera non  seulement  positif du 
point  de  vue  d'un  traitement  equitable  de  tous  les  utilisateurs,  mais  en 
outre il minimisera  le  potentiel  de  pertes  de  revenus  que  les Administra-
tions des  T~lecommunications peuvent  subir en raison de  l'"~cr&mage•. 
Raccordement  des  equipements 
Les  fournisseurs  de  services devront  pouvoir  raccorder  leurs  equlpements  1 
!'infrastructure  de  base  du  reseau  dans  toute  !'Europe.  Ceci  exigera  des 
normes  europeennes  pour  1'  acc~s  au  reseau  et  une  reconnaissance  mutuelle 
des  agr&lents  en  Europe,  mai s  les  normes  obligato  ires  devraient  8tre 
limitees  1  celles  necessaires,  d'une  part,  pour  assurer  la  securite  des 
utilisateurs et du  personnel  du  reseau et,  d'autre  part,  pour  prot&ger  le 
reseau contre d'€ventuels dommages.  La  compatibilite fonctionnelle  avec  les 
services d'application ne  devrait  pas  faire l'objet d'une  procedure d'agre-
ment,  etant  donne  que  les  exigences  fonctionnelles  d~pendent des  caracte-
ristiques  particuli~res qu'un  fournisseur  de  services decide de  conf~rer i 
ses  services.  Ces  exigences  fonctionnelles  sont done  une  mati~re 1  n~gocier 
par  les  fournisseurs  de  services  avec  les  fournisseurs  d'equipements  de 
leur  choix. 
Les  fournisseurs de  services devront  avoir  l'assur~nce que  les utilisateurs 
de  leurs  services  pourront  acc~der  1  ces  services  dans  toute  1 'Europe, 
ce  qui  exigera des  sp~cifications d'interface simples  et uniformes  pour  le 
raccordement  des  equipements  terminaux  au  reseau  de  m@me  que  la  liberte 
pour  les  fournisseurs  de  services  d 'implementer  partout  en  Europe  toutes 
interfaces de  haut niveau  (couches  superieures)  permettant de  satisfaire au 
mieux  les besoins de leurs utilisateurs. 
LA  B.EGLEHKN'lATIOH  DE  LA  CONaJIUlBRCE 
La  necessite d'une reglementation 
L'UNICE  reconna1t  que  les  propositions  du  Livre Vert  visant  1  maintenir  le 
monopole  du  reseau et 1  permettre d'etablir un  monopole  des  Administrations 
des  Telecommunications  sur  certains services ne sont  pas  incompatibles  avec 
1'  article  90(1)  du  Traite  CEE.  Ces  propositions  entra1nent  inevitablement 
un  systeme  de  riglementations de  contrSle compliquees  1  l'€gard  des  agences 
de  telecommunications  publiques  et  privies,  tras  difficile  1  faire  fonc-
tionner.  Cependant,  m@me  en  Grande-Bretagne, ou  la concurrence  est admise  1 
tous  les  niveaux des  t'lecommunications,  des dispositifs  r~glementaires de 
sauvegarde  sont  consideres  comme  necessaires  pour  garantir une  concurrence 
loyale et  prot€ger les  inter@ts des  utilisateurs. 
En  outre,  les  Administrations  des  Telecommunications  ont  pris  une  position 
solide sur le march~  gr~ce a des  actions  entamees  il y a  plusieurs  annees, 
cet  avantage  se  trouvant  conforte  par  leur  dimension  et  leurs  liens 
mutuels.  La  solidite  de  cette  position  necessite  igalement  de  riglementer 10 
la  concurrence  de  mani~re attentive  dans  les  domaines  particuliers ou  les 
Administrations des  T~lecommunications seront  en  concurrence  avec  des  four-
nisseurs  priv~s  (offrant  des  terminaux  et certains  services,  notamment  en 
mati~re d'installation et d'entretien), cette rlglementation devant  splcia-
lement  veiller  1  eviter  des  distorsions  de  marchE  provenant  de  subsides 
. .:f.:ro.i s es • 
Les  objectifs de la reglementation 
La  reglementation  de  la  concurrence  doit  exiger  dis  le  dlpart  des 
conditions  figales  pour  l'acc~s au  marche  et le dlploiement  des  activites. 
Elle  doit  aussi  prevoir  des  sanctions  contre  la violation  des  rigles  de 
concurrence dans les relations suivantes  : 
entre  les  Administrations  des  Tel,communications  et leurs  concurrents 
sur  les marches  liberalises, ainsi que  dans la relation entre les four-
nisseurs  prives  et  les  prestataires  de  services  eux-mlmes  sur  ces 
marches, 
entre les  fournisseurs  de  service  et de  terminaux  sur  les marches  con-
currentiels et les  utilisateurs des  t~l,communications (souci  d'eviter 
l'abus d'une position dominante  sur  le marchi), 
entre  les  Administrations  des  Telecommunications  et  les  utilisateurs 
dans  les  domaines  monopolistiques,  specialement  pour  ce  qui  concerne 
les  conditions  d'utilisation,  les  tarifs  et  les  redevances  pour  la 
location de  !ignes. 
entre  les  Administrations  des  Telecommunications  et les  fabricants,  de 
maniere  a eviter  !'exploitation  abusive  d'une  situation  d'integration 
verticale. 
Les  propositions contenues  dans le Livre Vert  rencontrent dans  une  certaine 
mesure  ces  exigences  politiques,  juridiques et  ~conomiques. Elles demandent 
a juste titre !'elimination des  subsides croises inequitables, une  transpa-
rence  aussi  grande  que  possible  dans  la  comptabilite  des  Administrations 
des  Telecommunications  et  une  separation  (comptable)  entre  le  secteur 
postal et celui des  telecommunications.  Cependant,  aux yeux  de  l'UNICE,  le 
Livre  Vert  devrait  faire  une  distinction  entre  les  subsides  croises 
legitimes et ceux qui  ne  le sont  pas. 
Subsides  croises 
D'un  cote,  il  est  legitime  de  financer  la  recherche  et le developpement, 
1' introduction  de  nouveaux  services  et  1'  extension  de  1'  infrastucfure  de 
telecommunications  au  moyen  des  revenus  des  services rentables  parce  que  : 
la recherche et le developpement  ameliorent l'efficience du  secteur des 
tele.::ommunications  dans  son  ensemble; 
des  subsides  initiaux  pour  1' introduction  de  nouveaux  services  sont 
essentiels  pour  creer  de  nouveaux  marches,  sur  lesquels  des  four-
nisseurs  de  services  independants  peuvent  subsequemment  faire  leur 
entree.  Une  subvention  ini  tiale  presuppose  de  recouvrir  pleinement,  a 
moyen  terme,  les depenses  engagees et d'atteindre la  rentabilit~ a long 
terme; 
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1e  financement  de  !'extension de  !'infrastructure de  tEl~communications 
en  ligne  avec  la  demande  des  utilisateurs  (mbe  si  cette  extension 
n' assure  pas  directement  le  remboursement  de  ses  coOts)  correspond  i 
l'inter@t  g~nfiral et  am~liore la productivit& de  tousles services. 
D'un  autre c8te,  des  revenus  obtenus  grice  1  une  position  privilegi~e  ne 
doivent  pas  @tre  utilis~s pour  casser  les  prix sur  un  marche  concurrentiel 
afin  de  prendre  possession  de  celui-ci.  Par  exemple,  des  entreprises  qui 
bEnEficient  dans  les  faits  ou  en  vertu  du  droit  d'une  position dominante 
sur  le  march€  (qu'il  s'agisse  d'Administrations  des  Til~ccmnunications, 
d' import  ants  fournisseurs  d' €quipements  ou  de  gros  prestataires  de 
services) ne doivent  pas  @tre  autoris€es 1  utiliser cette position dominan-
te pour  subsidier au  pla_n  interne les activit&s  particuli~res dans lesquel-
les  elles  sont  expos~es  1  la  concurrence.  Les  incitants  commerciaux  qui 
poussent  l  de  telles opErations de  subvention interne dependent  de  la forme 
de  la r€glementation des  prix et des  profits, lorsqu'il en  existe une.  Dans 
un  regime  de  contr8le  reglementaire  du  taux  de  rendement  tel  que  celui 
existant aux  USA,  de  tels  incitants  sont  puissants,  mais  dans  un  regime  de 
contr8le  de  prix  du  type  britannique,  on  peut  dire  que  de  tels  incitants 
sont  inexistants.  Cependant,  des  subsides  croises  contra  ires  l  la  con-
currence  peuvent  egalement  avoir  des  mobiles  politiques  tenant  i  la politi-
que  &conomique  ou  sociale  nationale.  11  ne  faut  pas  permettre  aux 
Gouvernements  des  Etats Membres  de  subsidier eux-m8mes,  ou de  pousser indi-
rectement  i  subsidier,  les activitEs concurrentielles de  leurs  Administra-
tions  des  T~lecommunications  pour  ces  raisons  ou  pour  toute  autre  raison 
quelle  qu'elle soit. 
Les  fonctions  r&glementaires  des Administrations de  Telecommunications 
L'UNICE  appuie  vigoureusement  la  proposition du  Livre  Vert  de  scinder  les 
fonctions  reglementaires  et  operationnelles  des  Administrations  des  TElE-
communications  en  entites legales distinctes.  Cette distinction est essen-
tielle si l'on veut  eviter des conflits d'interlt dans le fonctionnement  du 
march~ concurrentiel envisage  par le Livre Vert.  Cette  separation fonction-
nelle  necessitera  des  changements  institutionnels  dans  certains  Etats 
Membres,  changements  qui devront  ~tre realis~s avec le souci de  sauvegarder 
la concurrence dans  un  contexte europeen, et pas  seulement  national. 
Institutions communautaires  pour  la mise  en  vigueur de la riglementation 
Si cette separation fonctionnelle  est realisee, la d~arche la plus effica-
ce  pour  atteindre les objectifs de  la politique europ&enne  des  telecommuni-
cations  sera  de  s'  appuyer  sur  les  institutions  communautaires  existantes 
(en  particulier les  DG  IV  et  XIII  de  la  Commission),  agissant  en  cheville 
avec  les  organes  de  reglementation  nationaux.  Ceci  refleterait  la  fa~on 
dont  la  DG  IV  travaille  d'ores  et  deja  avec  les  Autorites  responsables  de 
la concurrence  dans  chaque  Etat membre.  Pour  les  pays  membres  de  l'AELE,  un 
dispositif  institutionnel  similaire doit  @tre  ere€  pour  la mise  en vigueur 
des  reglementations • 
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Des  propositions  visant  a introduire  des  niveaux  supplementaires  dans  la 
pyramide  institucionnelle  (par  exemple,  cr~er  un  "Euroftel")  posent  des 
problemes  certains  au  plan  de  la  delimitation  des  responsabilit's  et  au 
plan  de  leur  mise  en  oeuvre  concrete,  vu  le manque  de  personnel  suffisamr 
ment  qualifi~ et  experiment€.  Les  organes  qui  existent  au niveau national 
et  au  niveau  de  la  Commission  devront  fonctionner  en  tout 'tat de  cause  et 
l'adjonction d'echelons  suppl~entaires ne  ferait  qu'augmenter le poids (et 
les  conts)  de  la  reglementation.  En  outre,  ceci  entratnerait  des  duplica-
tions d'efforts et  pourrait  en  fait  entraver  bien plus  qu'aider la d'fini-
tion  d'une  politique  europ&enne  des  t&l6communicatious  ainsi  que  le  con-
trole de  sa mise  en oeuvre. 
HAH.CHES  PUBLICS 
La  decision prise par les  Chefs de  Gouvernement  au  sommet  de Milan de  para-
chever  le marche  interieur  pour  1992  exige  une  ouverture r'ciproque rapide 
des  marches  publics.  Il  faut  creer  des  march~s permettant  aux  entreprises 
europeennes  de  s 'affirmer  avec  succes  sur  les  marches  CEE  et  mondiaux. 
L'UNICE  appuie des lors le principe  que  le Administrations des  T€lecanmuni-
cations  devraient  regarder  au-dela  de  leurs  fronti~res  nationales 
lorsqu'elles doivent  choisir leurs  fournisseurs d''quipements. 
Etant donne  la nature complexe  des  t6lecommunications,  il convient de  s'en-
tourer de  toutes  les  precautions  necessaires  pour  que  la mise  en oeuvre de 
ce  principe ne mette  pas  en  peril les  interits des  fabricants europlens. 
Un  segment  de marche  caracterise par une  concurrence effective au niveau de 
l'utilisateur  final  n'a  pas  besoin  de  faire  !'objet  d'une  directive/ 
recommandation  en matiere d'achats  publics.  Si  une  reglementation 'tait ~­
posee  aux  administrations  des  Telecommunications  actives  sur  des  segments 
de  marche  de  ce  type'  sans  etre  appliqu~e  egalement  a leurs  concurrents, 
ces  Administrations  subiraient  un  prejudice reel.  Une  telle  reglementation 
aboutirait en fait a  des distorsions de  concurrence. 
L 'UNICE  recoi.Omande  par  consequent  que  les  recommandations  en  mati~re  de 
marches  publics  ne  s' appliquent  pas  aux  achats  d'  €quipements  terminaux 
effectues  par  !'Administration des  Telecommunications  d'un  pays 
a)  dont  le  marche  des  equipements  terminaux  est  effectivement  concur-
rentiel et 
b)  ou  aucun  role  n'est devolu  a  !'Administration des  T€lecommunications 
pour  reglementer les  procedures  d'agrement des  appareils 1 connecter 
a son  reseau. 
~28 
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LIS ICIIANGBS  COMHBB.CI.ADX  ET  LES  ULATIOHS  AVIC  LIS PAYS  riDS 
Le  GATT  et le bilat6ralisme 
Il est indispensable de  conforter !'approche communautaire vis-a-vis de  ses 
partenaires et  plus  particuli~rement 1  !'occasion des  n~gociations GATT. 
Malgr~ leur  sp~cificite, les  t~ecommunications - tant  sous leur  aspect  de 
service  que  sous  leur  aspect  d'equipement  - ne  doivent  pas  @tre  sEpar~es 
des  autres activites et produits mais  negociies de  mani~re globale.  En  par-
ticulier,  elles  ne  doivent  pas  faire  l'objet  d'accords  bilat~raux 
contraires  1  l'esprit du  GATT  mais  bien @tre  soumises  au  statu quo  et i  la 
recherche de  solutions  multilat~rales, afin d'lviter de  rltrograder - l  la 
fois  dans  leur  r8le  de  vlhicule de  la communication  done  du  commerce  et de 
l'echange  inernationaux et dans leur aspect de  participation a l'accroisse-
ment  des  exportations  et de  dlveloppement  du  PIB  - sous les pressions  pro-
tectionnistes  tant  de  la  part  des  pays  nouvellement  industrialis~s  que  du 
Japon ou des  U.S.A. 
La  n6cessaire reciprocite 
L'UNICE  considere essentiel  que  l'ouverture du  marcbe  europeen des  tlllcom-
munications  1  la concurrence des  fournisseurs  de  services et  d'lquipements 
basEs  hors de  la  Communaut~ se  fasse  en  tenant compte  des  inter@ts de l'in-
dustrie  europlenne.  Ceci  veut  dire  que,  sur  les  marches  des  Etats  ou  sont 
bases ces  fournisseurs,  les entreprises  europeennes devraient  pouvoir pren-
dre.  part a la competition dans  des conditions  ~quitables, en vertu du  prin-
cipf:  de  la  reciprocite.  Les  avantages  com.petitifs  dont  benificient 
certaines  entreprises  non  communautaires  en  raison  de  facteurs  tels  que 
leur statut d'entreprise publique)  ou  !'absence de  l~gislation nationale  en 
mati~re de  s~curit€ sociale devraient  etre pris en  compte  pour  appr~cier le 
caractere  €quilibre  des  concessions  mutuelles  faites  sur  le  plan  de 
l'ouverture des  march~s. 
11  serait  dangereux  pour  les  industries  de  la  Communaut~  que  la  transpa-
rence et !'information concernant  aussi bien les  accords  que  les r6sultats 
des  consul tat  ions,  tout  a fait  souhaitables  1  1'  'chelon  europien,  soient 
utilises a leur  detriment  par  des  pays  tiers  qui  exploiteraient ainsi des 
informations  sans contrepartie. 
.·.,  a,  ~C)9  I.  ,• 
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La  Communaut~ devrait riposter  aux  accusations  de  protectionisme  profiries 
contre elle a !'occasion d'aspects  positifs de  la  cr~ation du  Grand  Marchi 
Int~rieur (telle que  les  normes  europ~ennes)  en  exigeant  une  stricte r~ci­
proci te  aux  pays  a  structure  f~erale  ou  la  disparition  officielle  de 
barri~res  tarifaires  ou  non  tarifaires  au  niveau  de  la  f~d~ration laisse 
place  a la multiplication d'obstacles  au  niveau  des  &tats  ficliris.  Il_  est 
essential  que  de  tels  obstacles  soient  egalement  iliminis  sans  quoi  tout 
accord  de  r~ciprocite ne  serait qu'un  leurre. 
D'autre  part,  du  fait  de  leur  nature,  les  telficommunications doivent binE-
ficier de  !'application du  principe  de  non-discrimination aux  tenaes duquel 
les benefices  acquis dans le cadre·d'un accord bilatiral doivent aussi  pro-
fiter  aux  autres  Parties  Contractantes  du  GATT  (cas  des  accords  u.s.A.  -
JAPON). 
Enfin,  la Communaute  doit obtenir  l'~imination d'obstacles  techniques  tels 
que  les  normes  de  caract~re regional  ou  priv€  et  1 'ouverture  des  aaarchis 
publics  des  pays  tiers lorsqu'il s'agit  d'entit~s territoriales ou locales 
- toujours  dans  un  esprit  de  reciprocite.  n  en  est  de  a@me  pour  la 
propriete intellectuelle et industrielle. 
Il  importe  que,  lorsque les marches  publics de  tilicommunication des  ~tats 
membres  seront  ouverts,  la  notion  de  preference  communautaire  aoit 
prevalente et  qu'en  soient  exclus  les  pays  qui  n'accorderaient  pas  une  ou-
verture de  leurs achats gouvernementaux  strictement rlciproque.  Cela posera 
le  probleme  des  pays  tiers ou  les  decisions  sont  prises  par  des  firmes  ou 
entites  privies  (ou  considerees  comme  telles)  qui  ne  se  consid~rent  pas 
liees  par  des  engagements  internationaux. 
En  conclusion, !'article J  des  recommandations  est reconnu  souhaitable dans 
la mes.ure  ou  une  reciprocite  reelle  confirmee  par  des  contr8les  multila-
teraux dans  les domaines  des  achats  publics,  du  dumping,  des  subventions  et 
de  la  propriete  industrielle, est obtenue  des  partenaires de  la Communaut€ 
par une  negociation tres  ferme. 
X 
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GLOSSAIRE  DE  TERMES  TECHNIQUES  - GLOSSARY  OF  TERMS 
Access  protocols/Protocoles d'acces 
Recognised  interfaces  to  communication facilities  independent  of 
manufacturers'  individual  protocols 
Analogue  telecommunications/ T€l,communications analogiques 
Service  provided by a  circuit which  gives  a  direct representation of a 
phenomenon  in another  form  eg.  representation of voice sounds  as  electrical 
audio  signals 
Applications  service/Services d'application 
That  part of a  telecommunications  service which  provides  the distinct 
features of  the particular service, eg.  voice  telephony,  telex or d&ta 
transmissions 
Bearer services/Services porteurs 
The  conveyance  of a  signal  by  means  of  the physical infrastructure provided 
by a  Telecommunications  Administration  (TA),  providing the appropriate 
medium  by  which  either the  TA  or another service provider can offer 
applications  services 
Digital  telecommunications/Til€communications num&rigues 
Service  provided  by  a  circuit which  transmits  signals in digital form 
NETs 
Nonnes  Europeennes  de  Telecommunications  -common  confoDaity specifications • 
Integrated Services Digital Network  (ISDN)/  Riseau Num6rique  a Int6gration 
.  '  a  de  Services  (RNIS)  . .. :·. 
An  integrated  digital network in which  the same  digital switches  and 
digital paths  are  used  for different applications  services. 
Leased Lines  (also known  as  private circuits)/Lignes loules  (~galement 
appel€es circuits priv€s) 
An  unswitched  ci.~cuit, nonnally made  available  to  a  user for his exclusive 
use. 
43t Simple  resale/simple revente 
Occurs  when  a  person uses  a  leased  line to  convey  telecommunications 
traffic of others,  bypassing the  TA's  switched public network 
Telemetry/t~limesure 
A method  of remote  sensing or measurement  in which  the data collected  by 
sensing or measuring devices  in one  place are  transmitted to another  place 
for display and/or recording. 
Terminal apparatus/equipement  terminal 
Equipment  located on  the customer's  premises on the customer's  side of  the 
















Oomit€  Consultatif  International T€l&graphique  et T(l&phonique 
Conf€rence  Europ€enne des  Administrations des  Postea et 
Tel€communications 
European  Computer  Manufacturers'  Association 
European Trade  Association of Telecommunication Apparatus 
Manufacturers 
Norm.e  Europeenne 
Prenorme  Europeenne 
European  Workshop  for Open  Systems 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs and  Trades 
Commission  Electrotechnique  Internationale 
International  Standards  Organisation 
Information Technology  Steering Committee 
Open  Systems  Interconnect 
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UN  ICE 
UNION  DES  CONFEDERATIONS  DE  L'INDUSTRIE  ET  DES  EMPLOYEURS  D'EURO 
UNION  OF  INDUSTRIAL  AND  EMPLOYERS'  CONFEDERATIONS  OF  EURO 
3  December  1987 
THE  EUROPEAN  COMMISSION  GREEN  PAPER  ON  TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
(COM  87/290) 
COMMENTS  FROM  UNICE 
INTRODUCTION 
UNICE  wholeheartedly supports the objective of the 
commission's Green  Paper,  to promote fair and  open 
competition in the telecommunications market throughout the 
Community  so as to provide an appropriate environment for 
the development of strong,  internationally competitive 
European enterprises  . 
We  consider that it would  be  inappropriate to comment  in 
detail  on  the text of the Green  Paper.  Rather,  we  seek to 
emphasise those areas to which the Commission  must 
give attention so as to avoid subsequent-difficulties 
arising  from  ambiguities  and misunderstandings.  Where 
possible,  we  suggest how  the Commission  might best approach 
the areas of difficulty which are identified,  bearing in 
mind the realities of the current telecommunications  regimes 
in the Member  States. 
Although the comments  set out below refer to.the industry in 
the  Community  and  in Member  States,  the members  of UNICE 
from  Community  and  non-community countries have expressed 
their approval  of this paper and  agree that any policy on 
European  telecommunications  should include non-Member  States 
represented by  UNICE. 
DEFINITIONS  AND  BASIC  CONCEPTS 
Telecommunications  Infrastructure 
UNICE  accepts the Commission's  conclusion that the national 
Telecommunications Administrations*  require a  degree of 
protection so as to enable  them to finance the provision of 
socfally desirable telecommunications services which may  not 
necessarily be  economically viable.  Any  protected right of 
a  Telecommunications Administration to provide the network 
infrastructure should,  we  believe,  be  limited to the 
*This  term,  although used  in the Green  Paper and  throughout 
this document,  is regarded  by  UNICE  as misleading since it 
implies  a  Government  or Government  controlled activity.  In 
fact,  it means  any  provider and  operator of a  public network 
infrq~:Iucture. 
1  433 ... provision of telecommunications  infrastructure.  This will 
necessitate a  clear and  unambiguous definition of what 
constitutes telecommunications  infrastructure,  which 
should be periodically revised to take account of 
technological  development  and particularly the evolution 
towards  a  digital infrastructure. 
We.  note that in some  countries telecommunications 
infrastructure is considered to  include only infrastructure 
technically capable of two  way,  or interactive, 
communication,  thus excluding  infrastructure used only  for 
such purposes as: 
- one-way  telemetry, 
- one-way  cable TV  diffusion, 
- radiopaging  and 
- all one-way broadcasting of sound  radio or television, 
even where the  information transmitted is encrypted so as 
to be  receivable only by  a  closed group of users. 
On  the other hand,  some  Member  States apply 
telecommunications regulation to all or some  of these 
activities. 
In defining telecommunications  infrastructure the Commission 
must,  in our view,  avoid distorting the natural development 
of interactive,  modern  communications  infrastructure by 
offering definitions which  induce potential market entrants 
to design their systems  so as to avoid regulation but at the 
cost of  omitting advanced  interactive capabilities.  The 
exclusion of  "one-way"  systems  could  introduce such 
undesirable incentives. 
We  should  also wish to ensure that any rights reserved to 
Telecommunications Administrations of Member  States related 
only to the provision of services over public networks  and 
that any  special rights of the Telecommunications 
Administrations to provide certain services could not be 
extended onto private networks  (whether or not these  include 
certain elements provided by  a  Telecommunications 
Administration).  This will require a  clear distinction to 
be  drawn  between public and  private networks. 
Bearer Services and Applications Services 
UNICE  notes that,  in the present analogue telecommunicatioris 
envir,onment,  the infrastructure,  as perceived by the 
customer,  is identified with the "bearer"  service provided 
by the Telecommunications Administration and with the 







Administration or by  a  different service provider.  Thus, 
the applications services of voice telephony and telex are 
provided over infrastructures which are physically distinct 
(at least at the exchange line level)  and therefore involve 
physically distinct  (though  broadly  ~imilar)  "bearer" 
services.  In the  ISDN  environment,  however,  the 
infrastructure and  "bearer"  services will be  common  to all 
applications services.  It is therefore essential that the 
commission's thinking on  the reservation of infrastructure 
rights,  which necessarily entails the duty of 
Telecommunications Administrations to provide  "bearer" 
services,  should not  become  confused with its ~hinking on 
the possible reservation of certain ."applications" services 
to those Administrations  • 
Basic.  or Reseryed.  Services 
The  definition of basic,  or reserved,  service in the Green 
Paper  and  in any  ensuing legislative proposals should be 
limitative and  should not be  capable of extension by Member 
States so as to increase the scope of the services reserved 
to national Administrations ..  The  initial definition of the 
scope of the reserved services will undoubtedly be a 
difficult matter of policy.  UNICE  support.s the Commission•.s 
aims to introduce competition to.the greatest possible 
extent. 
The  proposed  review of the-definition of basic,  or·reserved, 
service  (however defined initially)  should not be capable of 
extending the scope of such service but only of reducing or 
retaining the initial scope.  If the  Commission  decides to 
include services other than voice  telephony in the 
definition of reserved services,  there should be a  clear 
commitment  to phasing out these exceptions within a  short 
and definite period. 
satellite Services 
UNICE  believes that the use of satellites for 
telecommunications  purposes should be considered in the same 
way  as  land lines and thus reserved to the 
·relecommunications Administration.  A case-by-case approach 
could lead to inconsistencies and  would result in 
uncertainty." 
Th~ Network Termination Point 
An  essential  element  in ensuring the creation and  proper 
functioning of a  free  and  open market  in telecommunications 
terminals will  be  a  clear and certain definition of the 
point at which the network ends  and  terminal  apparatus 
begins.  The  network operator should not be permitted to 
extend. the -network  into the area properly considered to be 
~  ~.·/  ..  ~·  .  .• '.  I  •  - . .  ~ ..  ~  ..  3  43.5 terminal  apparatus;  nor  should the user or terminal 
apparatus supplier be  permitted to push the boundary of the 
network back  from  the user's premises  into the area properly 
served  by  the network operator. 
Terminal  Apparatus 
It should be made  expressly clear that any list of  items 
which  constitute terminal  apparatus  (for example as  in 
figure  8  of the Green  Paper)  is illustrative and not 
exhaustive.  No  opportunity should be  allowed  for member 
state Governments,  pursuing  narrow national or sectoral 
interests,  to limit the  free market  in terminal apparatus  by 
excluding  from  the  scope of national  legislation items  not 
yet contemplated,  such as  subsequent apparatus 
developments. 
Phasing  In 
We  also think that the  Commission  should consider the need 
for gradual  phasing of  some  aspects of its policy,  in the 
interests of  an orderly transition for the ·benefit of users, 
suppliers  (especially those of  small  and  medium  size), 
embryo  competitors  in the service and apparatus field and 
Telecommunications Administrations.  Such  phasing 
arrangements must  be clearly defined  in advance so that 
certainty prevails.  Lack of certainty would  be  damaging to 
all concerned. 
STANDARDISATION  AND  CERTIFICATION 
The  Need  For Action 
If we  are to enjoy  a  competitive European market by  1992, 
European  standards will have to be adopted quickly both in 
telecommunications  and  in  information technology.  UNICE 
therefore stresses the need to intensify European 
standardisation efforts,  thus shifting the emphasis  from 
national standardisation,  by  speeding up  both the drafting 
of  standards  and their adoption  in Europe.  The  final 
objective of  European standardisation should be to achieve 
international  acceptance and  world-wide  recognition. 
The  Participants 
It should be  possible for all the interest groups  concerned 
to take part in this task which  is so  important for Europe: 
~elecommunications Administrations,  equipment manufacturers 
and  users  and  providers of services the role of the 
stantlardisation bodies  is to organise co-operation of the 
interested parties. 
UNICE  supports the Commission's  view that in order to 
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achieve  a  reasonable  number  of these objectives within a 
reasonable time,  the human  and  financial  resources devoted 
to standardisation in telecommunications and  information 
technology will have to be  increased considerably,  and 
active co-operation between the authorities,  producers  and 
consumers will have to be better organised."  UNICE  stresses 
in particular.the fact that industrial producers··and users 
should be able to collaborate in the decision-making and 
programming  involved  in standardisation,  arid  take part.in 
the final voting on draft standards.  However,  it is 
important to avoid a  proliferation of the bodies that carry · 
out  wo~k parallel to the drafting of standards;- the number 
of industrial experts available for technical work  is,  in 
fact,  quite limited and means  there is no  room  for 
duplication of work. 
current standardisation activities should be better 
organised in future,  and  should be carried out by very 
specialised ad  hoc working groups  which have  a  well-defined 
mandate  for a  limited period and are aiming at producing a 
specific draft standard. 
Organisation 
In view  of this,  and given.the  increasing convergency of the 
technologies  fQr  information processing ·and  transmission,  · 
UNICE  believes that the function  in this area of CEN/CENELEC 
and  CEPT  should be closely co-ordinated as it is becominq 
more  and  more  difficult to distinguish between  information 
technology  on the one hand  and  telecommunications  on  the 
other.  ITSTC  already provides  for  CEPT/CEN/CENELEC 
co-ordination,  but this arrangement  may  need  some 
improvement. 
The  arrangements  for preparing European NETs,  standards and 
pre-standards should be  simple,  flexible and properly 
defined  and  should enable  one to achieve the following 
objectives as  soon  as possible: 
- there should be  full,  world-wide  compatibility of networks 
which would  ensure that any service required could  .. be 
obtained with an  optimum  performance/price· ratio; 
all terminals should be  fully compatible with the networks 
and  bearer services for which  they are to be used; 
- industrial suppliers,  network users and providers of 
services  should be  able to avail  themselves of economies 
of scale. 
UN1CE  thinks that: 
-a strengthen~d'::more active CEN/CENELEC  (the European 
5 Standardisation Institutes)  would  be qualified to prepare 
European standards and  pre-standards  (EN  and  ENV); 
- the initiative of  CEPT  - on the basis of the Green 
Paper  - to establish in the near future  a  European 
Telecommunication Standards Institute  (ETSI)  may  be 
acceptable so long as the manufacturers  and  users are 
fully  involved  in the setting of standards  and the 
Institute is part of the European  standards structure. 
(The  establishment of  EWOS  in this structure sets an 
example.) 
Work  should therefore be carried out by technical experts 
outside the Institute,  depending,  in the telecommunications 
and  information technologies field,  on  the resources 
available at CEN/CENELEC,  CEPT  and  ECMA,  ECTEL  and possibly 
EWOS. 
Close  co-operation in  information technology 
standardisation is essential because developments  in the 
fields  of telecommunication  and  the whole  ranqe of 
information technology cannot  be  seen separately.  The 
separate development of standards  in different bodies  mu~t 
be  avoided at all costs. 
OPEN  NETWORK  PROVISION  (ONP) 
Introduction 
ONP  is seen as  an essential feature of a  telecommunications 
environment designed to allow the provision of competitive 
services throughout  Europe  and  hence act as  a  stimulus to 
the  economy  of the Community.  To  achieve this aim it will 
be  necessary  for service providers to have trans-border 
access  to network services and  for these  'basic services'  to 
be  of  a  comparable standard throughout the Member  States. 
The  creation of  ONP  will  depend  on the resolution of  a 
number  of major  i~sues which  can  be  assembled under  4  main 
categories: 
Network  Services 
There will  need to be  agreement  on  what facilities 
constitute the basic network  infrastructure which the paper 
suggests might continue to be provided by the 
Telecommunications Administrations alone.  Whichever way  the 
boundary between basic and  competitive services is drawn  the 
tasic services should  include data services. 
In the  ISDN  context,  the concept of ONP  should  focus  on 
access  to the transparent bearer services so as to  · 
facilitate effective competition  in applications services 
6 -· 
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(except to the extent that standard switched voice telephony 
might  be  a  reserved application service). 
As  the technology of the basic network advances  and can 
provide more  sophisticated features,  at little or no  extra 
cost,  th~ benefits should be  passed on  to the providers of 
competitive.:lier.Vice$ ·and  ult;imat_e-~y the--end. users.  __  For ..  __ _ 
example,  it is important that competltive··-se·rvtce· ·providers-
have  access to a  wide  range of signalling information  (eg. 
calling number  identification)  in some  efficient,  · 
standardised form ·to ensure that the increasing intelligence 
being incorporated in the network will benefit users 
accessing any competitive service,  including those of the 
Telecommunications Administrations. · · 
Standards and  Definitions 
To  enable trans-border services to be provided the network 
services will need to be transparent throughout the 
Community.  This will obviously require extensive 
interconnect arrangements  beyond  those existing in an 
international context.  In particular,  limitations in some 
Member  States on the availability of leased lines,  and their 
interconnection with switched services will have to be 
removed  in due  course~ 
There will need to be continuity throughout the Community  on 
those services which  should be considered as basic network 
services which.the Telecommunications Administrations are 
obliged to provide.  These  services must  be provided on 
comparable  terms to all providers of competitive services, 
and  should not be used  by the Telecommunications 
Administration concerned  in order to provide competitive 
services itself except  on  a  comparable basis providing fair 
competition with other.providers.  The  distincton must be 
made  that not all basic network services provided under ONP 
(eg.  X.25  packet switching service)  should be reserved to 
the Telecommunications Administrations. 
Common  access arrangements will require compatibility with a 
set of lower  layer access protocols,  which should be 
harmonised  among  all Telecommunications Administrations.  No 
one  switch manufacturer's protocol  should become  dominant. 
Commitment  to OSI  could minimise the danger of national 
divergences. 
Access  to the network  should be  as transparent as 
practicable,  leaving the maximum  flexibility for competitive 
service providers and  users to select the higher layer 
protocols best suited to their application requirements. 
The  introduction of  ISDN  needs  to be co-ordinated throughout 
the Community;  i~ is evident that there is little consensus 
7  4.39 on  the definitions of  ISDN  at the moment  and this must  be 
r•solved with the concept of ONP  in mind.  The  ISDN  debate 
will need to use  ONP  as  a  reference point to ensure that the 
final definition sits comfortably with the requirements of 
ONP.  In  ISDN,  additional  interfaces andjor extensions to 
the proposed standards may  be  required to provide access to 
signalling capabilities and data  pack~ts being transported 
over the signalling  'D'  channel. 
These  issues are already the responsibility of a  number  of 
bodies  such as  CEPT  and  CCITT;  the problems  identified in 
this section can only be  resolved with their co-operation. 
Effective resolution also requires the co-operation of 
terminal  equipment  and  network equipment manufacturers, 
competitive service providers and users. 
Tariff Structures 
Tariff structures should be built around cost orientated 
tariffs.  This is an essential point strongly emphasised by 
UNICE.  Tariff levels may  vary between the Member  States, 
given varying levels of actual cost,  and differing financial 
strategies,  but .that does  not  justify differences ;n tariff 
principles.  · 
The  differences in national  and  international tariff 
structures will need to be minimised so that competitiv7 
service providers are not disadvantaged when  operating 1n 
certain Member  States.  Member  States should recoqnise that 
excessive tariffs impose  a  burden  on their 
telecommunications users that may  make  their qoods  and 
services less competitive  in Community  and world markets. 
The  prohibition of simple resale should be  considered only 
as  an  interim measure  to reduce the loss of revenue to the 
Telecommunications Administrations  from  'cream-skimming', 
which  is due to current distortions of tariff structures 
in relation to cost in most  Member  States and the potential 
for arbitrage that this represents.  'Simple resale'  should 
·be  defined as the use  of  leased circuits to provide an 
ordinary switched telephone service. 
Tariff rebalancing will be  required of some 
Telecommunications Administrations to remove  the 
inequalities between  local  and  long distance tariffs.  UNICE 
fully supports this rebalancing.  In addition to being fair 
to all users,  it will also minimise  the potential of revenue 
losses to the Telecommunications Administrations due to 
e cream-skimming' .. 
Equipment  Attachment 
Service providers will  need  to be  able to attach their 
.  - ... 
8 equipment to the basic network  infrastructure throughout 
Europe.  This will  require Europe-wide  standards  for. access 
to the ne_twork  and mutual  recognition of type  appro."?al. 
throughout  Europe,  but mandatory  standards should be limited 
to those necessary to ensure safety of users and  network 
personnel  and to prevent harm to the network.  Functional 
compatibility with applications services should.not be 
required  for type approval,  since  functional ·requirements 
will depend  on  the particular features  a  service provider 
chooses to implement  in his service and are a  matter for 
service providers to negotiate with their choice of 
equipment suppliers. 
Service providers will  need to be  assured that users of 
their services will be  able to access those services 
throughout Europe which will require .simple,  uniform 
interface specification for attachment of terminal  equipment 
to the network  and  the  freedom  of service providers to 
implement throughout  Europe whatever higher layer interfaces 
best serve the needs  of their users. 
THE  REGULATION.OF  COMPETITION 
The  Need  For Regulation. 
UNICE  acknowledges ·that the Green  Paper's proposals  for 
retaining the network  monopo~y and  for allowing the 
possibility of establishing a  monopoly of the  . 
Telecommunications Administrations  for certain services are 
not prohibited under Article 90  (1)  of the EEC  Treaty. 
These  proposals  inevitably entail  a  system of complicated 
supervisory regulations against private and public 
telecommunication agencies  which  would  be very difficult to 
put  into practice.  But  even  in the United Kingdom,  where 
competition  is admitted at all levels of telecommunications1 
regulatory safeguards are considered necessary to ensure 
fair competition and  to protect interests of users. 
In addition,  the Telecommunications Administrations have 
acquired  a  strong market position on  account of haying 
established themselves  over the years,  with the further 
advantages given by  size and  mutual  association.  The 
strength of this position also necessitates a  precautionary 
competition regulation  in those areas where  the 
TeJ,..ecomrnunications  Administrations are to compete with 
private suppliers  (terminals and  certain services, 
includlng installation and  maintenance),  with the special 
aim  of avoiding market distortions  stemming  from 
cross-subsidisation. 
The  Scope  of Reaulation 
The  regulc{ti.on  of competi  ton must  therefore .  .from  the outset 
9 require equal  conditions of market access  and  exercise of 
operations and  must provide  for sanctions against 
infringements of the competition regulations where the 
following  relationships are concerned: 
- between the Telecommunications Administrations and their 
competitors in the competitive markets,  as well  as in the 
relationship between the private suppliers and service 
providers themselves  in these markets, 
- between the suppliers of services and terminals in the 
competitive markets  and  the telecommunications users  (from 
the point of view of avoiding market  abuse). 
- between the Telecommunications Administrations and  the 
users  in monopoly  areas,  especially with reference to the 
conditions of use,  tariffs,  and the charges  for leased 
circuits 
- between Telecommunications Administrations and 
manufacturers,  so as to avoid abuses  from vertical 
integration. 
The  proposals contained  in the Green  Paper go  some  way  to 
meet  these political,  legal,  and  economic  requirements. 
They  rightly demand  the  removal  of unfair 
cross-subsidis~tion,  as much  tran~parency as possible in the 
cost accounting of the Telecommunications Administrations 
and  a  separation  (in accounting)  between postal .and 
telecommunications sectors.  However,  the Green  Paper should 
in our view distinguish between  legitimate 
cross-subsidisation and unfair cross-subsidisation. 
Cross-subsidisation 
On  the  one  hand,  it is legitimate to finance  research and 
development,  the  introduction of new  services and the 
expansion of the telecommunications  infrastructure by means 
of the  revenue  from  profitable services because: 
- research  and  development  improve the efficiency of the 
telecommunication~ sector as  a  whole; 
- the initial subsidising of the  introduction of new 
services is essential to the creation of new  markets, 
which  independent service providers may  subsequently 
enter.  Initial subsidising. presupposes  full cost recovery 
in the medium  term  and profitability in the long term;  and 
- the  financing  of an  expansion  of the telecommunications 
infrastructure  in line with user demand  (even where  such 
expansion does  not directly recover its costs)  is in the 






On  the other hand,  revenues generated  from  a  privileged 
position must  not  be  used  to enable predatory pricing to 
take place  in a  competitive area ..  For  exa~ple, enterprises 
which  enjoy  a  de  facto  or  ~e jure dominant position in a 
market  (whether Telecommunications Administrations or large 
suppliers of apparatus or providers of services)  must  not be 
permitted to use that dominant position so as  to engage in 
cross-subsidisation of those activities in which  they are 
subject to competition.  The  commercial  incentives for such 
cross-subsidisation depend  upon  the  form,  if any of price or 
profit regulation.  Under  rate of return regulation as 
exercised in the us,  such  incentives are strong,  but under 
price cap regulation as  in the UK,  it can be argued that 
there is no  such  incentive.  However,  anti~competitive 
cross-subsidisation can also arise from  political motives  of 
national  economic or social policy.  Governments  of Member 
States must  not  be  allowed to subsidise or cause to be 
subsidised,  competitive activities of their 
Telecommunications Administrations  for these or any other 
reasons. 
~Regulatory Functions of Telecommunications 
Administrations  . 
UNICE  vigorously supports the proposal ·of  the Green  Paper to 
split the  regulatory and  operational  functions  of 
Telecommunications Administrations  into distinct legal 
entities.  This distinction is essential if conflicts of 
interest are to be  avoided  in the operation of the 
competitive market  envisaged  by  the Green  Paper.  This 
functional split will necessitate institutional changes  in 
some  Member  States which  must  be  carried out with a  view to 
safeguarding competition  in a  European,  not just national, 
context. 
k9mmunity  Institutions of Enforcement 
If this is done,  then the objectives of European 
telecommunications policy can best be achieved through  . 
existing Community  institutions  (particularly DGs  IV  and 
XIII  of the  Commission)  working  with national  regulatory 
bodies.  This  would  reflect the way  in which  DGIV  already 
works  with the competition authorities in each Member  state. 
For members  of EFTA,  a  similar institutional arrangement . 
for  enforcement has  to be  set up. 
Proposals  to establish completely  new  layers of regulation 
(eg  a  "Euroftel")  pose  significant problems  in terms  of 
delineation of responsibilities  and  practicablity in the 
face  of  a  shortage of  suitably qualified and  experienced 
people.  Tfi~~-~pmmission and  national  layers will have to 
:;  ._,~  ~  . 
11 exiat in any  case and  adding to this would  only  increase the 
burden  (and costs)  of  regulation:  it would  certainly lead to 
duplication and could actually hinder rather than help the 
implementation and  enforcement of  European 
telecommunications policy. 
PROCUREMENT 
The  Milan decision by  the heads  of states and  government  on 
the completion of the  internal market by  1992  demands  a 
speedy  and  reciprocal  opening  up  of public procurement 
markets.  Markets must  be  created which allow European 
industry to operate successfully in the  EEC  and world 
markets.  UNICE  therefore  ~upports the principle that  . 
Telecommunications Administrations should be  required to 
look beyond their national boundaries  in choosing sources of 
supply of apparatus. 
Due  to the  complex nature of telecommunications,  the 
greatest care must  be  exercised so that the progressive 
introduction of these principles does  not  jeopardise the 
interests of European manufacturers. 
There  is no  need  for  a  procurement  recommendation;  directive 
in  a  market  sector which  is fully competitive at the end 
user level.  Indeed  any  such rules would  operate unfairly if 
applied to Telecommunications Administrations  in these 
competitive areas without being applied equally to their 
competitors.  This would  e~fectively dist~rt competition; 
UNICE  therefore recommends  that the procurement 
recommendation  should not apply to the procurement of 
terminal apparatus by  the Telecommunications Administration 
of  a  country  in which: 
(a)  the market  for terminal  apparatus is 
effectively competitive,  and 
(b)  the Telecommunications Administration has  no 
regulatory role in the approval of apparatus  for 
connection to its network. 
TRADE  AND  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS 
GATT  and  Bilateralis~ 
It is essential to reinforce  and  confirm the European 
Community  approach vis-a-vis its partners and particularly 
on  the  occasion of the current GATT  negotiations  (Uruguay 
round). 
Telecommunications,  1n  spite of their specific nature  ~s 
regards  both service and  equipment aspects,  should not be 
12 separated  from  other activjties and  products,  but should be 
negotiated on  a  global,  overall,  basis.  They  should not be 
made  the object of bilateral agreements  contrary to the  GATT 
spirit,  but should rather be  kept at "stand-still" and  be 
subject to multilateral solutions,  in order to prevent their 
regression  {both  in their role as  a  communication medium  for 
trade and  international  exchange  and  in the part they 
play  in the growth  of exports  and  the development of the 
GNP)  due to protectionist pressure  coming  from  both the 
newly  industrialised countries and Japan  ~nd the  US~. 
The  Need  For Reciprocity 
_,.·. 
UNICE  considers it essential that the opening of the 
European  telecommunications market to competitive pressures 
from  suppliers of apparatus  and  providers of service 
located outside the  Community  should take account of the 
interests of  European  industry in securing reciprocal 
rights to compete  fairly  and  openly  in the home  markets  of 
those  non-Community  companies.  The  competitive advantage 
given to  non-Community  enterprises by  such  factors as state 
ownership  and  the  absence  of national  legislation on social 
welfare  should be  taken  into account  in assessing the 
fairness of reciprocal  opportunities for competition. 
It would  be unwise  for  EEC  industries that a  transparent, 
open  approach  and  voluntary information concerning its 
agreements  and  result of tenders  - most desirable on  a 
European  scale  - should  be  used to their detriment by third 
countries  (non  European  or  non  EEC  countries),  who  would 
explctt  s~ch openness  and  information  on  a  non-counterpart 
basis. 
Accusations  of protectlonism brought against the Community 
with  regard  to positive factors  in the setting up  of the 
internal market  (such  as  Europe2n  standards)  should be 
countered by  firm  demands  from  the  Community  for strict 
reciprocity  froru  countries with  a  federal  structure where 
the official elimination of tariff or non-tariff barriers at 
a  federal  level  may  be  frustrated  by  an  increase  in 
obstacles at the  level  of the  federated states.  It is 
essential that such obstacles are also eliminated otherwise 
any  supposed  "reciprocity"  is bogus. 
On  the  oth~r hand,  telecommunications  should,  by their very 
nature,  benefit  from  the application of the 
non-discrimination principle,  according to which  the 
~enefits acquired  from  a  bilateral  agreement  should also 
~refit other  GATT  contracting parties  (in the case of USA  -
Japan  agreements) .  .  . 
I~stly,  the  Community  must  achieve  the elimination of 
technical  obstacles  such  as  standards of  a  regional  or 
13 private nature  and the opening of public contracts  from 
third countries when  territorial or local administrations 
are  involved  - always  in a  spirit of reciprocity.  This 
necessarily applies to industrial and  intellectual property 
rights. 
It is important that when  public telecommunication markets 
between Member  states are open,  the  idea of  community 
preference should prevail  and that countries which  do  not 
agree to a  strictly reciprocal  ~pening to their government 
purchases should be excluded.  This poses the problem of the 
third countries,  where decisions are taken by  companies or 
private bodies  (or considered as  such)  who  do  not regard 
themselves as bound  by  international commitments. 
In conclusion,  Article J  of Table  13  is recognised as 
desirable insofar as  a  real  and positive reciprocity by 
multinational controls with regard to public purchases  -
dumping,  subsidisation and  industrial and  intellectual 
protection - is obtained  from  community partners by  means  of 
a  firm  negotiation policy. 
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Acceaa  protocols 
.·  J 
Analoque  Telecommunications 
Applications Service 
Bea.rer  Services 
Eurcpe~;n NETS  . 
·f. 
ANNEX  A 
recognised  interfaces to 
communication facilities 
independent of 
manufacturers'  individual 
protocols 
service provided by a 
circuit which gives a 
direct representation of 
a  phenomenon·  in another 
form  eg.  representation 
of voice sounds as 
electrical audio signals 
that part of a 
telecommunications 
service which provides 
the distinct features 
of the particular 
service,eq.  voice 
telephony,  telex or 
data transmission. 
the conveyance of a 
siqnal by means  of the 
physical  infrastructure 
provided by  a 
Telecommunications 
Administration,  providinq 
the appropriate medium  by 
which either the TA 
or another service 
provider can offer 
applications services 
service provided by  a 
circuit which transmits 
signals in digital  form 
Normes  Europeennes 
de Telecommunications  -
common  conformity 
specifications 
- ··-. Integrated servicea Diqital 
Network  (ISDN) 




Terminal  Apparatus 
. .  .  ; 
an  integrated digital 
network  in which  the same 
digital switches and 
digital paths are used to 




normally made  available 
to a  user for his 
exclusive use. 
occurs when  a  person uses 
a  leased line to convey 
telecommunications 
traffic of others, 
bypassing the TA's 
switched public 
network. 
a  method  of remote 
sensing or measurement 
in which the data 
collected by sensing or 
measuring devices  in one 
place are transmitted to 
another place for display 
andjor recording. 
equipment  located on the 
customer's premises on 
the customer's side of 
the Network Termination 
Point and used for the 
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The  purpose of this paper is to provide the official response  of 
the Government of the United states to the recently published 
European  Community  "Green  Paper on the Development of the  Common 
Market  for Telecommunications Services and Equipment".  The  Green 
Paper establishes as its "overriding aim"  the development of 
market conditions which provide "users with a  greater variety of 
telecommunications services,  of better quality,  and at lower 
cost".  The  United States welcomes  these aims,  which are similar 
to the policy objectives underlying our own  liberalization. 
The American experience with liberalization leads us to conclude 
that the objectives enumerated in the Green Paper can best be 
achieved in a  market which  emphasizes competition from all 
sources,  both intra- and  extra-European.  Anything less than 
truly international competition would  fundamentally  compromise 
these objectives and would prevent European  industry from  taking 
full advantage of the rapidly evolving  innovations  in telecom-
munications  equipment  and services. 
Although the United States heartily welcomes  the potential 
liberalization of the European telecommunications market represented 
by the Green Paper's proposals,  their effects on  future competition 
will only be made  clear upon  the Commission's  further definition 
of the extent,  andjor limitations,  of these proposals.  We  look 
forward to seeing how  the Green Paper's proposals are translated 
into EC  directives,  and  we  hope that we  will have  a  similar 
opportunity to comment  on draft directives before their adoption 
by the Council  of Ministers. 
In this paper,  we  examine the Commission's proposals as presented 
in the Green  Paper,  and offer our views  on those proposals,  as 
summarized below. 
The u.s.  Government  agrees with the Green Paper's conclusion 
that the regulatory and operational  functions of Telecommuni-
cations Administrations must  be  separated .. This principle is 
fundamental  to the success of the EC's efforts. 
Unless  PTT  cross-subsidization is prohibited,  the Commission's 
policy objective of fair and  open competition will prove 
illusory.  The  U.S.  Government  agrees that transparency must 
be  created to assure against such cross-subsidization 
practices by the Telecommunications Administrations.  The 
EC's  hard-won progress  in liberalization,  common  standard-
ization,  and  common  type approval will be  in vain if the 
Telecommunications Administrations are allowed to subsidize 
either equipment  sales or competitive services with  revenues 
from  monopoly  services. 
In  order to achieve the goals  set_  -~-~~th  in the Green  Paper,  ·the 
:~-55 -2 
EC  must  ensure that non-PTT  suppliers of both competitive 
services and  equipment have  equitable access to the network. 
For example,  in the area of competitive services,  such access 
should be ensured by Open  Network  Provision. 
We  also believe the Community  should make  an explicit 
commitment to place European Telecommunications Administrations 
under the GATT  Government  Procurement Code,  and to agree on 
expanding the Code  to include telecommunications  services. 
The United States encourages the Commission to think broadly 
about what  can be done to further promote the rapid interna-
tionalization of trade in telecommunications services through 
Uruguay Round  negotiations on trade in services. 
We  believe that the Community's objective to develop its 
telecommunications market can best be established through 
international competition in which  EC  and non-EC  firms, 
including those of the u.s.,  are allowed to participate. 
This should apply to the provision of services and to the 
procurement of both network and terminal equipment. 
One  of the most significant shortcomings in the proposals for 
liberalization is in the area of provision of network equipment. 
It is the position of the u.s.  Government that the EC  should 
accelerate its action program to open the market for network 
equipment just as it is envisioned for terminal  equipment  and 
competitive services. 
We  support the Commission's efforts to realize a  broad 
liberalization in the area of services.  It must be said, 
however,  that the United States sees a  significant divergence 
in the Green Paper's provisions for reserved voice telephony 
services and its more liberal provisions for competition in 
other services.  Much  remains to be accomplished in 
specifying those areas to be opened to competition. 
The United States Government  supports the Commission's view 
that there should be unrestricted provision of terminal 
equipment.  However,  we  are especially concerned that the 
Commission's  recommendations  do not focus  on opening  EC 
markets to international competition.  This operates directly 
to the disadvantage of users and manufacturers.  As  the Green 
Paper notes  (p.52),  "an excessively restricted structure of 
supply deprives the emerging technologies of the creative 
impulses of a  competitive market." 
o  Thus  far the type approval  scheme relies upon test data 
generated only by European testing laboratories.  We 
are concerned that this places  non-EC-produc~rs.and 
laboratories at a  disadvantage. .  .  .  .  ~, 
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o  We  urge that government  procurement be  opened  up  for 
conventional terminal  equipment as rapidly as for 
new  terminal  equipment. 
o  A key to the promotion of competition is a  restriction 
on the boundaries of what  constitutes the Telecom-
munications Administrations'  networks  and,  conversely, 
a  broad definition of what constitutes the customers' 
premises. 
The United states also urges the Commission  to further 
examine the present standards-setting and  standards-implement-
ation procedures in the Community. 
o  We  believe that an  open standards-development and 
frequency allocation process allowing for the 
direct and  equal participation of all interested 
parties,  including but not limited to manufacturers, 
user groups  and  PTT  administrations,  is an  essential 
prerequisite for  dynamic  competition. 
o  The  United States strongly supports the use of a  "no 
harm to the network/spectrum"  rule as the basis for 
approving terminal  equipment. 
o  The  United States welcomes  the proposal to create a 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute. 
However,  such an  institute should provide for  input 
from both European  and  non-European users  and 
manufacturers  in the standards-setting process,  and 
avoid diverting efforts to achieve  international 
standardization. 
Regarding the provision of mobile  radio and satellite 
equipment  and services,  areas of particular importance to the 
future of the telecommunications  industry,  the United States 
urges the Commission to continue its laudable efforts to open 
competition in these areas.  We  believe that competition in 
these areas should not merely  include the provision of 
services by private firms,  but also the provision of equipment 
to both the infr.astructure and to the users by private suppliers. 
We  believe that the criteria by which the Commission  pursues 
its competition policy towards  telecommunications should be 
no  more  burdensome  than that which is applied to other 
sectors,  and  should not discriminate with regard to nationality 
or couritry of origin. 
we  welcome  the Commission's  initiative toward  fostering  a  more  open 
and  competi  t·i~"ff ;;·telecommunications market  in Europe.  In addition 
.  ~fi' 
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to our comments  on the Green  Paper,  we  also have questions which 
we  hope to have  an opportunity to clarify at the next U.S.-EC 
pl~.n'ary meeting  on telecommunications  in early 1988.  We  appreciate 
the opportunity to comment  on the Green Paper's far-reaching 
proposals,  and offer the comments  herein in a  spirit of construc-
tiveness and cooperation. 
4. 58 
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II.  NETWORK  EQUIPMENT 
It is the position of the United States Government that the EC 
should accelerate its action program to open the  EC  market for 
network equipment  just as rapidly as  for terminal  equipment  and 
competitive services. 
The United States Government is concerned that the EC  Green  Paper, 
while recognizing in principle the need to open the market  for 
network equipment in order to complete the "internal market"  plan 
by  1992,  does not include specific proposals to adequately 
address this goal. 
Because network equipment is the  foundation  for the infrastructure, 
lack of competition in this important market segment has serious 
implications for the telecommunications  equipment  and service 
sectors.  Advanced  telecommunications networks  require efficient, 
feature-rich hardware  and software which are best provided in 
open markets.  The  same  advantages that will accrue to both the 
providers  and the users of services  from  the establishment of a 
competitive market  for terminal  equipment are also available in 
the network equipment market. 
We  are concerned that the  EC  Commission  postpones consideration 
of a  directive for network equipment until 1989  and  only proposes 
that the current Recommendation  (84/550)  be  expanded to include 
40  percent of network equipment.  We  are concerned that this pace 
is too slow and that PTTs  may  not adhere to even this minimal 
recommendation. 
The United states strongly encourages the Commission to include 
network as well  as terminal  equipment  in the initiative that 
intends to convert Recommendation  84/550 to a  directive.  We  also 
encourage the Commission to specify that procurement in the EC 
should be fully  open to international competition,  including non-
EC  suppliers. 
•'  . 
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III.  PROVISION  OF  TERMINAL  EQUIPMENT 
The United States Government  is pleased to note in the Green 
Paper that the  Commission  is determined to open up the terminal 
equipment market to fair and  open competition.  The United States 
is supportive of these efforts and  agrees with the Commission 
that progress is being made.  However,  as  Deputy u.s.  Trade 
Representative Michael  B.  Smith noted in his September  22,  1987, 
letter to  DG  XIII  Director General  Michel  Carpentier,  the United 
states continues to be concerned that the Commission's  recommend-
ations do  not  focus  also on opening  EC  markets to international 
competition.  u.s.  Government analysis of the Green Paper's 
proposals,  and the specifics of the Community policies to date, 
reinforce the u.s.  opinion that the Commission has  promoted  a 
policy that favors  European suppliers and businesses in the 
development of the Community's  telecommunications market.  our 
specific concerns  and  comments  follow. 
The u.s.  supports the Commission's efforts to use its authority 
under Article 90(3)  to enforce the competition provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome  and to keep the Member  States from  extending their 
state monopolies to terminal  equipment.  In the Commission's 
quest  for liberalization of the terminal  equipment market, 
however,  the United States encourages the Commission to promote 
solutions that allow u.s.  manufacturers,  as well  as Member  State 
manufacturers,  to sell directly to European users in all Member 
States. 
The  United States is concerned that the EC's plans for  a  type 
approval  scheme will discriminate against u.s.  suppliers and 
businesses.  The  type approval effort provides for reliance upon 
test data developed by European testing laboratories.  Despite 
repeated u.s.  reques~s, the  EC  will not provide assurances that 
similar treatment will be  accorded to u.s.  laboratories.  Ambassador 
Smith stressed the fact that Member  States should be authorized 
to approve  non-European laboratories to provide test data under 
the EC's  type  approval  scheme.  Furthermore,  the United States 
believes that the type approval  scheme  should  include manufacturers' 
self-testing,  and that testing requirements  should be limited to 
"no harm to the network"  and  safety. 
The  EC  should promote  a  system permitting the attachment of  any 
terminal  equipment to the network if that equipment meets  minimum 
no  harm to the network and safety standards. 
The u.s6  is supportive of the Commission's desire to replace 
Recommendation  84/550  with  a  directive.  However,  the United 
states  beli~ves the proposed directive on this issue should·open 
public  tele·~ommunications ·contracts to international,  and  not 
just intra-European,  competition. 7 
We  are concerned that only new  terminal  equipment will be treated 
in the proposal  for a  directive.  Full  opening for conventional 
terminals will be reached progressively  (40  percent by  1989  and 
100 percent by  1992)  and  by  a  separate directive "after careful 
discussion and evaluation of mutual benefits and  of the results 
obtained in this sector" by the current recommendation  (p.  131). 
The u.s.  wishes to point out that the u.s.  terminal  equipment 
market is open to all European terminal  equipment,  new  or conven-
tional.  We  hope  the Commission will consider these points when 
drafting the proposal  for a  directive. 
In sum,  while replacing Recommendation  84/550 with a  directive 
would represent further progress in the Commission's effort to 
introduce transparency into the procurement procedures of the 
Telecommunications Administrations,  the u.s.  Government urges 
that u.s.  suppliers be  included  among  those eligible to participate. 
Even if PTTs  are directed to allow u.s.  terminal  equipment 
companies to tender for their contracts,  we  are concerned that 
conventional terminal  equipment procurement will not be meaningfully 
opened  up  for  some  time,  due to  (1)  difficulty in reaching consensus 
on  NETs,  and  (2)  an unclear Community-wide definition as to where 
the line between  new  and conventional terminal  equipment should 
be drawn.  These difficulties could be alleviated by allowing 
NETs  for conventional  equipment to include qrandfatherinq and  a 
transition period. 
1 
The  EC's  suggestions regarding the provision of terminal  equipment 
me.y  fail to ensure competition among  suppliers.  A key to the 
promotion of competition is a  restriction on the boundaries of 
what constitutes the Telecommunications Administrations'  networks 
and,  conversely,  a  broad definition of what constitutes the 
customer's premises. 
The United States is concerned that in reaching its goals,  the EC 
will adopt  rules that encourage only limited competition. 
Specifically,  the dividing line between terminal  and  network 
equipment will likely validate the control that Telecommunications 
Administrations currently have  over equipment  on  customers' 
premises.  An  example of this policy is the continued role for 
Telecommunications Administrations  in leasing customers the first 
telephone. 
i  . 8 
Suppliers should benefit from  the Green Paper's proposals provided: 
the development  of European  standards is based  on existing 
international standards at their current level; 
a  European Telecommunications Standards Institute is constituted 
on  an  open participation and procedural basis; 
open network interconnection rules are equitable. 
The  Commission  notes that network interface specifications of 
PTTs  will have to be mandatory based on NETs,  ENs,  ENVs,  or other 
European regional  standards.  We  are concerned that mandatory 
application of these specifications will create unnecessary  and 
burdensome  requirements which will hinder competitive suppliers 
of network equipment. 
The  effort to draft European  standards should be open to direct 
and  equal participation by all interested parties,  including 
foreign-based manufacturers  and users,  as is the case in the 
United States.  The  proposed Institute shoUld not divert attention 
from  international standardization.  In carrying out its activities, 
it should be  open to participation by u.s.  industry.  Currently, 
industry experts are permitted only limited participation in key 
European standards bodies  (i.e.,  CEN,  CENELEC,  CEPT  and  TRAC).  In 
cases where participation is allowed,  experts  from u.s.  companies 
are not.  Similarly,  the United States believes that all interested 
parties should be  involved in the development of open  standards 
fer  interconnecting with networks.  Of  equal  importance,  mandatory 
European standards should be based on protecting networks  from 
harm  and  should not dictate interoperability requirements  . 
.... i. ... 
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v.  PROVISION  OF  SERVICES 
Reserved Services 
In the United States,  the Federal  Communications  commission has 
promoted competition in the provision of private and public 
interstate and  international  common  carrier services.  The u.s. 
experience strongly suggests that the goal of promoting universal 
service is not inconsistent with the development of a  competitive 
telecommunications market structure.  The  introduction of this 
competition has led to substantially lower prices for competitive 
common  carrier services and to increased use of the u.s.  telephone 
network.  Indeed,  since 1984,  interstate long distance rates have 
declined by thirty percent in the United states and interstate 
long distance usage has  increased an  average of 12.9 percent per 
year.  At the same  time,  the subscriber penetration level  in the 
United states has  increased  from  91.8  percent in 1984  to 92.3 
percent today. 
The  United States supports,  and has authorized,  the introduction 
of private cable and satellite facilities in the North Atlantic. 
Moreover,  the u.s.  has authorized multiple international voice 
and  record carriers to provide service between the United states 
and the EC  Member  States.  Therefore,  the United States strongly 
urges that the development  of  any policies by the EC  or any of 
its Member  States concerning the provision of international 
telecommunications services between Europe  and the United states 
recognize and  accommodate  the interest of the United States in 
the competitive provision of  international telecommunications 
facilities and services. 
In as much  as the u.s.  experience suggests that improved  respons-
iveness to user requirements  and greater network operational 
efficiencies are possible with competition in basic services,  we 
believe reserving all voice telephony services to the Telecommun-
ications Administrations may  be  premature.  However,  if compelled 
to do  so,  the  EC  should ensure that Member  States reserve for 
Telecommunications Administrations the provision of no  more  than 
voice telephony.  Leaving this situation unresolved will result 
in a  lack of competition for competitive services which will limit 
innovation· and  growth  in Europe,  frustrate the formation  of an 
internal market  and constitute a  disincentive for service providers 
and users. 
The  problem is compounded  by  the  Commission's  acceptance of the 
fact that  " ..•  because of changing technological  developments, 
this necessarily means  that the  (reserved arid  competitive) 
categories are fluid."  Providers  of competitive services would 
have  no guarantees that their services would  not  become  a  reserved 
service,  and  would  have  no ability to judge .the  future  conditions 
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of real competition. 
Fin~lly,  the experience  in the United States has been that the 
exclusive provision of the network  infrastructure is not necessary 
in order to safeguard its integrity.  since the Green  Paper 
states that it seems  likely that the positions in the Member 
States will converge  on maintaining exclusive provision of 
network infrastructure on their territory by  a  single Telecommuni-
cations Administration or a  very limited number of Administrations, 
we  would  encourage those Member  States that do grant their PTTs 
such exclusive provision to reconsider the premises upon which 
such  a  system is based.  In this respect,  we  also strongly 
support the Commission's determination to see that the exclusive 
network infrastructure provision is narrowly defined.  In addition, 
in the Commission's consideration of satellite and mobile  communi-
cations infrastructure,  we  would  strongly urge that those infra-
structures be  fully competitive. 
Competitive Services 
In the United States,  enhanced service providers are not required 
to obtain a  license,  or to register before offering their service. 
Moreover,  enhanced service providers need  not file tariffs:  in 
short,  they are unregulated.  The u.s.  Government believes the EC 
should  focus  on developing  a  similar approach. 
Indeed,  the u.s.  Government  strongly endorses the opening of the 
competitive services market to non-PTT,  including foreign, 
service providers.  PTT  provision of competitive services must  be 
closely monitored  and  safeguards should be developed to ensure 
against cross-subsidization of competitive services by  revenues 
from  monopoly  reserved services.  We  also urge non-discrimination 
in the treatment of non-PTT  and  foreign service providers,  i.e. 
equal  terms  and conditions for all competitive service providers. 
The United states opposes the  EC  Green  Paper acceptance of usage-
sensitive rates on  leased lines in order to protect the financial 
viability of  PT'I's  and  prevent  "cream-skimming"  of voice traffic. 
Cost-based tariffs and the elimination of restrictions on use of 
leased lines are among  the most crucial u.s.  market access 
objectives.  As  presently formulated,  the recommendations  included 
in the  EC  Green  Paper  do  not adequately address these concerns. 
Ws  do  not believe that usage  sensitive tariffs are an effective 
way  to prevent voice cream-skimming.  They  would  prevent voice 
resale,  but at the  same  time,  will produce  a  negative  imp~ct on 
service offering and  on  users.  Moreover,  restrictions on  the use 
of  leased lines may  actually reduce the potential revenues  which 
PTTs  could realize from  a  fully  liberal policy. I  . 
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WATTC 
The  u.s.  Government  is concerned that while the  Con~ission is 
proposing the liberalization of services,  the traditional  telecom~ 
munications representatives to the  ITU/CCITT  from  a  number  of EC 
Member  States have  been  leading efforts to extend  international 
regulation,  and hence their own  authority as Telecommunications 
Administrations,  over new  international telecommunications 
services through the  December  1988  World Administrative Telegraph 
and Telephone conference  (WATTC-88).  The  United States encourages 
the Commission to work to assure that broad Member  State and  EC 
interests are reflected in the WATTC  process. 12 
VI.  MOBILE  RADIO 
In the United states,  the mobile radio communications  field consists 
of  two  divergent classes  the first being locally licensed, 
competitively supplied private systems  for specific private 
purposes,  and the second being public systems which provide 
public mobile  telephone  and  radio paging services. 
In the u.s.,  we  have  found that private systems  should only be 
subject to a  minimum  of regulations to assure efficiency in the 
use of radio spectrum and the avoidance of interference with 
other systems  and services.  The  imposition of national,  Community-
wide  or European  system standards for signaling protocols,  data 
rates,  etc.  should be  avoided to encourage new  technological 
opportunities.  The u.s.  firmly supports  "no harm to the spectrum" 
as the only standard necessary for private radio communications 
systems. 
Local  private mobile  radio systems  should be encouraged through 
liberal practices for the eligibility and  licensing of private 
users.  Regulatory provisions should permit the introduction of 
third party private systems that offer competitive communications 
services to private groups throughout the Community.  Regulatory 
provisions should also permit local private mobile  communications 
systems to interconnect to the public switch telephone networks 
on  a  reasonable basis. 
The United States supports competition in the mobile  radio 
communications  area,  but asserts that this competition should not 
merely  include competition in providing the service to the 
public,  but also to providing the supply of equipment to both the 
infrastructure and to the users. 
The  United States beiieves that the conditions for  a  Community-
wide mobile  communications  system should not  impede  non-EC 
companies  from  providing mobile services and  equipment to the 
Community.  We  urge that more  than one  company  be  licensed to 
provide mobile radio service  in a  given geographic area,  and that 
non-EC  companies  be eligible to apply for licenses to operate 
private systems. 
While  some  interoperability is desirable for cellular systems  in 
order to promote  EC-wide  compatibilty,  interoperability should 
not be  a  requirement  for all mobile  radio systems,  particularly 
local,  private mobile  radio systems.  In the latter case,  while 
we  agree that interoperability should be available as  an option 
for the user,  an  interoperability requirement will unacceptably 
limit the range  and  use  of services by users,  and  could limit the 
selection of services and  equipment. 
pI~ 
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VII.  SATELLITE 
The United states Government  is pleased that the  EC  Commission 
recognizes that competition should exist in the ownership  and 
operation of satellite ground stations.  We  urge the  EC  to move 
even  further in encouraging competition in ownership of separate 
satellite systems. 
The  primary competition that exists in the area of satellites 
exists not  from  competing satellite systems but  from  cable 
technology.  With the recent advances  in fiber optics,  cable 
offers both increased capacity and flexibility of services. 
A fundamental  principle of separate systems is that once  a  party 
buys  a  transpond~r, it is not receiving a  satellite service,  but 
has bought equipment that becomes  part of its infrastructure.  A 
PTT  could be the party to purchase_the transponder in a  manner 
analogous to the purchase of a  cable company.  While  a  separate 
system may  put pressure on  INTELSAT's  and  EUTELSAT's  "monopoly", 
it need not challenge a  domestic Telecommunications Administration's 
monopoly,  since the separate space  segment and  access to it may 
still be controlled by the domestic monopoly. 
We  recognize that EUTELSAT  and  other European satellite systems 
are examples  of the large number  of separate systems that are 
already authorized in Europe.·  We  hope that the  EC  will promote 
similar competition in Europe  with other separate satellite 
systems.  Furthermore,  the United States has authorized the 
introduction of private cable  and satellite facilities in the 
North  Atlanti~; therefore,  we  strongly urge that the development 
of any policy by the EC  concerning the provision of international 
telecommunications services between  Europe  and the United States 
promote  competitive provision of international telecommunications 
facilities and services. 
In the United States,  the increase of competition,  with its 
consequences of new  and more  numerous  service options  and better 
services at lower rates,  has  extended  beyond the terrestrial 
services.  Domestic satellites for  communications  have  been 
licensed under an  "open entry"  policy since 1966.  Recent policies 
first allowing carriers,  and  then non-carriers,  to own  and 
operate their own  satellites have  spurred growth  and  innovation 
in this field.  Rapid technological  advances  allow for ever 
greater benefits,  as  reduced spacing provides more  satellite 
"slots",  and narrowband  and  spotbeam technologies allow for 
greater  effici~ncy in spectrum use. 
·.~  { .  .. .  -· 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION:  THE  U.S.  PERSPECTIVE 
As  noted  in the introduction,  the United States welcomes  the 
broad liberalizing objectives of the Green  Paper  and their pro-
competitive thrust.  We  hope that the specific comments  provided 
herein will be useful to Commission efforts to accomplish these 
goals. 
By  way  of conclusion,  however,  we  believe it important to emphasize 
to the commission the perspective in which the Green Paper must 
inevitably be viewed  in the United States. 
The u.s.  experience has convinced us that the goals of providing 
users with the latest and most  innovative technologies,  the most 
reliable networks,  and the broadest range of quality services, 
can only be accomplished  in a  telecommunications environment that 
is fully liberalized and  open to competition.  In order to ensure 
the conditions  for  such  an environment,  governments  should 
mandate policies which will lead to transparency at every level. 
Having already gone  through the experience of liberalization, 
thereby opening the u.s.  telecommunications market to fair 
competition,  the United states is compelled to approach the  EC 
Green Paper in a  trade as well  as telecommunications policy context. 
As  telecommunications takes on  an  increasingly important role in 
the competitiveness of national  economies,  and as the world's 
major telecommunications  companies  become  increasingly global 
entities,  trade policy must  seek to ensure that the provision of 
telecommunications equipment and  services is conducted through 
open  and fair competition. 
The  United States Government  appreciates that the Green  Paper is 
essentially addressing the internal market,  yet its emphasis  on 
"safeguarding the financial viability of Telecommunications 
Administrations"  and  "preserving the monopoly of P'I'Ts  in the 
provision of network  equipment"  leads us to be concerned that the 
Commission views  telecommunications  in a  perspective other than 
one  of open  and  fair trade policy.  While the safeguarding of 
telecommunications authorities may  serve to meet certain European 
social and public policy goals,  it also carries a  strongly 
protectionist connotation,  and at a  time when  European telecom-
munications  firms  are expanding rapidly into the u.s.  market. 
It is the hope  of the United States Government that this emphasis 
on  open international competition will serve to influence· the 
Commission to emphasize trade policy goals  in proposals to 
liberalize the European market.  The  United States urges the 
Community  to adopt these goals of  open  and  fair  internationa~ 
competition more  rapidly than the  1992  timeframe set forth  in the 
Green  Paper.  It is only  in this way  that both  Europeans  and .  .__ 
·---
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Americans will derive the full benefits of new  technological 
innovations,  and  the most  advanced networks providing the maximum 
of  ~lobal services.  . 
.. ·-
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Belgium  w 
f.a.o.  The Director General 
Dear Sirs, 
Re:  Green Paper on the Developrent of the camnn  Market for 
Telecarmm.ications Services and Equj.J;;rrent 
---~~...._ 
Unilever has welccm::rl  the initiative taken by the Council to 
contribute to a  useful and large-scale discussion on te1e-
camru.nications Services and Equiprent by issuing the Green Paper. 
The- general c:x:mtents  of Unilever regarding the Green Paper have been 
camrunicated via the International Telecarmunications User Group 
INTUG,  of which Unilever is an associate member.  There is one 
elenent, l'laYever  1  of special interest to Unilever which I  would like 
to bring to your attention separately. 
Unilever does not intend to have an own European network for voice 
and data camuni.cations.  The  Group has decided to make best use of 
services provided by Facilities Managarent suppliers. 
According to the Green Paper a  Public Telecamru.nications 
Administration  (Pl'A)  could provide us with the service of a  network 
without any legal limitation. That PTA  could set up a  Unilever 
network,  canbine our voice and data traffic, even when  no processing 
at all would take place in that nebrlork  1  and for our benefit make 
econanical use of circuits by canbining our traffic with other 
traffic, even without us knowing that. 
At the rrorent only the UK  alla.vs other ne~rk suwliers than a  PTA 
to arrange such facilities.  The  Green Paper indicates that also in 
future  such a  service of canbined voice traffic and non-added value 
data transmission should exclusively be provided by a  PTA. 
-2-
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'Ihls may  force our Carpany to set up  and  maintain an  CMn  network. 
Moreover  1  it is unlikely that PTA's will be able to cooperate 
sufficiently well to provide us with a  service on the laJ:qe 
international scale that we  requil:e. 
~  therefore abject to this element in the Green Papex-.  It is clear 
that no open caq;;>etition will be  all~  if the ideas of the Green 
Paper would be  inplenvmted without change. 
This would be to the detriment of European b.tsi.ness,  and in the end 
also to the disadvantage of national administrations. 
Yours sincerely  1 
Prof.  H.  Meij 
Copy to: Mrs.  N.  Smit-Kroes 
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SUMMARY 
The  United States Council  for  International Business is pleased to have the 
opportunity to comment  on  the European  Commission's  "Green  Paper  on  the 
Development  of the  Common  Market  for Telecommunications Services and 
Equipment."  We  would  like to express  our  support for  the pro-competitive 
recommendations  contained  in the Green  Paper.  We  are pleased that the 
European Commission  strongly endorses the need for  a  competitive 
marketplace for  telecommunications  services and  equipment. 
Efforts by  the European  Community  to reduce  inconsistent and restrictive 
country poli_Gies  th_at  hamper  the ability of all firms  to compete  on  a 
worldwide  basis are extremely beneficial.  As  the Community  begins  to 
formulate  the details of  common  policies on  telecommunications  equipment 
and  services,  the U.S.  Council urges that all interested parties,  including 
users,  service providers,  and  equipment manufacturers,  be  consulted 
directly throughout this process.  The  success of the Commission's 
initiatives will be  enhanced if these views  are properly and effectively 
addressed. 
In addition to providing  its own  comments,  the U.S.  Council would  like to 
express its support for the comments  submitted by  the International Chamber 
of Commerce.  We  hope  that our  comments  and  those of the ICC  will be 
helpful to the Commission  as it begins to determine  how  to  implement  the 
Green  Paper's objectives. 
1.  SEPARATION  OF  REGULATORY  AND  OPERATIONAL  FUNCTIONS 
We  support the Commission's position that there must  be  a  clear separation 
of  regulatory and operational functions.  We  believe that appropriate 
institutional and procedural mechanisms  need to be  established at the 
Member  State level and,  preferably outside the domain  of the 
Telecommunications  Administrations.  Vigorous application of the 
Com..tlmnity' s  competition policy to Administrations will be  essential. 
')  2.  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  EQUIPMENT 
Terminal  Equipment 
User  and  network  safety should  be  the only criteria used to develop 
technical specifications for  equipment  type approval.  Additional 
requirements to ensure functionality,  such as  interworking of terminals, 
sl1oulJ  be  constituted within the  framework  of voluntary compliance; 
otherwise,  their inclusion in the type approval  process will increase the 
cost and  time of getting new  products to the marketplace. 
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We  also believe that manufacturers  should have  the option  to self-verify a 
product or have  independent testing laboratories perform the verification 
for  them.  A time  limit should  be  set for  completion of the testing process 
by  laboratories.  In addition,  mutual  acceptance of test data should  be 
extended to test data generated outside the Community. 
Furthermore,  all equipment  located on  the customer's premises,  including 
the first telephone  and  digital and  ana~og network  termination equipment, 
should  be  open  to competition. 
Network  Equipment 
~le  urge the Commission  to carry out its plans as  soon  as  possible to 
replace Council Recommendation  84/550,  pertaining to public contracts for 
switching  and  transmission equipment,  with a  Directive and  accelerate its 
implementation.  We  also urge the Commission  to ensure that all suppliers, 
regardless of their nationalities,  are covered  by  its initiatives. 
)  3.  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  AND  INFORMATION  SERVICES 
) 
Provision of Network  Infrastructure 
We  agree that Telecommunications Administrations must  be  assured of the 
ability to carry out their public service obligations,  but we  believe that 
exclusive provision of the network  infrastructure may  not  be  the only or 
best way  to carry out these obligations.  Alternative provision and 
operation of  infrastructure should not  only be  permitted but encouraged. 
Two-way  satellite communications  systems are an example  of a  good  candidate 
for competitive provision. 
Exclusive Provision:  Reserved Services 
We  support the Commission's position that exclusive provision of 
telecommunications  services should be narrowly defined and  subject to 
periodic review.  We  believe that switched voice telephony should be  the 
only candidate for exclusive provision.  All other services should be 
provided on  a  competitive basis.  In addition,  we  believe that there should 
be  enough  flexibility in the framework  to allow voice resale in those 
countries that decide that it would  be  in the public interest. 
Competitive Provision 
We  urge the Commission  to act quickly to remove  existing barriers so that 
value-added service providers  based  in one  country will be  able to serve 
directly the end-users  in all Community  countries.  In addition,  the 
Commission  should not  impose  mandatory  standards on  competitive services 
because  they will discourage  innovation of new  functions  and  subject 
service providers to unnecessary risks. 
~  ;".  (! 
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Nondiscriminatory access  to  the Telecommunications Administrations' 
networks will  be  essential to  the development  of  competitive services.  The 
participation of users  and  industry  in the definition of Open  Network 
Provision will be  required to ensure that the needs  of all parties are met 
and  the use of  the network  is optimized.  The  Commission  will need to 
require Administrations  to provide equal access to the underlying 
transmission service at the  same  tariffs and  conditions that they provide 
to their own  competitive service entities. 
The  marketplace for  competitive services will need  to  be  safeguarded 
through either non-structural or structural mechanisms  that detect and 
nullify opportunities for anti-competitive abuse  and  cross-subsidy.  These 
safeguards are a  necessary  supplement  to  ONP  because anti-competitive 
practices  can  continue regardless of the equality of the technical access. 
We  welcome  the Commission's  recommendation that tariffs should follow 
overall cost trends.  We  believe that cost-based pricing and  the aim  of 
universal service need not  be  incompatible goals.  Cost-based pricing for 
universal services will encourage greater efficiency in the provision of 
)  the infrastructure. 
We  also believe that usage-sensitive tariffs for  leased circuits and  the 
banning of simple voice resale will not protect the financial viability of 
Administrations  because  they repress  demand  for  the very services 
reportedly protected and,  therefore,  deny  revenue to Administrations. 
Application of usage-sensitive tariffs for  leased circuits  imposes 
unjustified costs and  measurement  burdens upon  both providers of private 
networks  and Administrations. 
4.  Standards Process/Institute 
We  believe that there is a  need  for users  and  industry to play an  equal 
role with Administrations  in developing  telecommunications standards. 
Industry should  be  permitted to participate in CEPT  meetings where  action 
items  and  schedules are determined,  and  in the TRAC  decision process on 
NETs. 
We  support the development of Community-wide  NETs.  We  believe that the 
standards definition included  in NETs  should  be  harmonized with the most 
current versions of international standards.  Unique national requirements 
proposed for  inclusion in NETs  should  be  eliminated or reduced to an 
absolute minimum.  CEPT  should also be  urged to extend the current sixty 
day period for  comment. 
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5.  External Relations 
Relations  ~ith Tra·di.na.._l>artnets 
We  urge  the Commission  not to overlook the  importance of opening the 
Conununity  l'narket  t·o  international competi:tion.  Creating a strong internal 
market  by  excluding non-European products  ant\  services will serlously 
hamper  the cdmp'etit:iveness  of Europ·ean  firms because they will not be  able 
to benefit from  innovations  taking place elsewhere  in the world. 
Relations with Int·ernation.ll.l  .. O:rr&anizations 
The  Connnission  should extend sp-ecial consideration to ·the question of 
whether the D Series Recommendations  of the CClTt'  (dealing with permissable 
uses of  leased lines)  remain appropriate under  the precepts of the treaty 
of Rome  and  in light of the Green  Paper's recomme-ndations.  These 
)  Recommendations  are contrary to the Green  Paper"' s  pos:i:tions  regarding 
network  infrastructure,  reserved service  p~ovision, and  competit.ive ·service 
provision. 
'"\  .., 
The  U.S.  Council notes that,  under  the CEPT  proposal for managed  data 
network  services  (MDNS),  T·elecommunications  Administrat1<>ns  would  have the 
opportunity and  incentive to exempt  themselves  from  prohibitions of the D 
Series while prohibiting competitors  from offering MDNS-like  services. 
Such unfair application of the D Series Recommendations  appears  contrary to 
the Treaty of Rome. 
WATTC 
The  U.S.  Council would  also urge the Commission  to examine  the Draft 
Regulations which have  been prepared for the upcoming  World  Administrative 
Telegraph and  Telephone Conference of the ITU.  We  believe that sections of 
these Draft Regulations  r~n counter to the global  deregulat~ry trends for 
services and  contradict the Green  Paper's  int~ntions.  The  Co~issidn 
should initiate discussions with a  wide  range of national policy makers, 
beyond  Administrations,  on  the possible  impact of these Draft Regulations. 
The  U.S  Council endorses the need for discussions on  telecommunications  in 
the GATT.  We  believe that many  of the Green  Paper'-s  pro-competitive tenets 




The  United States Council  for  International Business  appreciates the 
opportunity to  comment  on  the European  Commission's  "Green  Paper  on  the 
Development  of the  Common  Market  for  Telecommunications  Services  and 
Equipment.''  We  are pleased that the Green  Paper  strongly endorses  the need 
for  a  competitive marketplace for  telecommunications  services and  equipment 
and  believe that it launches  a  thoughtful  and critical debate  on  future 
European  telecommunications  policies. 
The  United States Council  is a  business  policy-making association dedicated 
to promoting  an  open  system of world trade,  finance,  and  investment.  As 
the U.S.  affiliate of the International Chamber  of Commerce  (ICC),  the 
Business  and  Industry Advisory  Committee  to the OECD,  and  the International 
Organization of Employers  (IOE),  the U.S.  Council represents American 
business interests in the major  intergovernmental institutions and  to the 
Executive  and  Legislative branches  of  the U.S.  government. 
The  U.S.  Council's  Committee  on  International Information and 
Telecommunications  Policy consists of users of  telecommunications  equipment 
and services,  service providers,  and  equipment manufacturers.  It espouses 
the business user perspective because it believes that the objectives of 
telecommunications policies should  be  to serve the needs  of end-users  in 
the most  effective and efficient manner  possible. 
The  committee  seeks  the establishment of an  international  information and 
telecommunications  environment characterized by  open  and fair competition 
with minimal  government  intervention.  It also tries to increase awareness 
within the U.S.  and  international business  communities  of the potential 
impact of  information and  telecommunications policies,  laws,  and 
regulations,  and encourage their active participation to shape  these 
policies. 
The  Green  Paper clearly recognizes the  impact that telecommunications 
policies have  on  the competitiveness of European  firms  and,  ultimately,  the 
future  location of  economic activities.  Access  to the most  advanced  and 
innovative telecommunications  services and  equipment will contribute to the 
efficient operation of  companies.  It will enable companies,  both inside 
and outside the telecommunications  industry,  to adapt  to the rapid changes 
occurring and  incorporate the latest innovations  into their products  and 
services. 
Since the trading  system is now  global  in nature,  inconsistent and 
restrictive country policies hamper  the ability of all firms  to  compete  on 
a  worldwide  basis.  Therefore,  we  believe that efforts by  the European 
Community  to reduce  these  inconsistencies and  restrictions are extremely 
beneficial.  As  the  Community  begins to  formulate  the details of  common ) 
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policies on  telecommunications  equipment  and  services,  the  U.S.  Council 
urges  that all interested parties,  including users,  service providers,  and 
manufacturers,  be  consulted directly  t~roughout this process.  The  success 
of the Conunission's  initiatives will be  enhanced if these views are 
properly and effectively addressed. 
In addition to providing our  specific comments  below,  the U.S.  Council 
would  like to express its support for  the conunents  submitted by  the 
International Chamber  of  Commerce  on  the Green  Paper.  We  hope  that our 
comments  and  those of  the  ICC  will be  helpful to the Commission  as it 
begins  to determine  how  to  implement  the Green  Paper's objectives. 
1.  SiPARATION  OF  REGULATORY  AND  OPERATIONAL  FUNCTIONS 
The  U.S.  Council agrees with the Commission  that,  in a  true competitive 
environment,  it will not  be  possible for  Telecommunications Administrations 
to continue to be  both a  regulator and  a  market participant.  There must  be 
a  clear separation of regulatory and  operational functions,  particularly if 
the Administrations wish to participate in the competitive marketplace. 
Even  if they  do  not  compete,  separation of these functions  is still 
required because a  neutral arbiter will be needed to determine the public 
interest. 
In our  view,  institutional and procedural mechanisms  need  to be established 
at the Member  State level so that each member  state may  tailor them  to its 
particular domestic situation.  However,  we  believe that these functions 
can  be best performed outside the domain  of the Administration.  Functions 
that will need  to  be  carried out  include: 
--safeguarding fair competition  (protecting against abuse of  a 
Telecommunications Administration's position); 
--ensuring nondiscriminatory availability of cost-based and reasonably 
priced basic transmission services; 
--establishment of attachment policy to public networks  for terminal 
equipment  and  requirements  and  procedures for type approval; 
--establishment of fair  interconnection policies to enable providers of 
competitive services to connect to public networks; 
--ensuring adequate appeal procedures for disagreement with an 
Administration;  and 
--involving users  in future regulatory decision-making processes. 
The  ability of Member  States and  the Community  to monitor  and enforce 
compliance  and  ensure transparency will be critical.  Vigorous  application 
of the Community's  competition policy to Administrations will be essential. ,; 
• 
'•)  .. ,· 
...,. ... 
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2.  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  EQUIPMENT 
TERMINAL  EQUIPMENT 
The  U.S.  Council  endorses  the  Commission's efforts to open  the terminal 
market  to competition.  We  also support the Commission's efforts to 
simplify the  type approval process.  However,  we  are concerned  about  the 
criteria to be  used  for  type  approval. 
We  support the  approach of employing user and  network  safety as criteria 
for the technical specifications.  However,  additional requirements  to 
ensure functionality,  including the  interworking of terminals,  should  be 
left to the marketplace  and  constituted within the  framework  of voluntary 
compliance.  Suppliers will be motivated to ensure that any  terminal 
equipment offered in the marketplace meets  interoperability and 
functionality requirements;  otherwise,  their products will fail in the 
marketplace.  Inclusion of interoperability requirements  in the type 
approval  process will increase the cost and  time of getting new  products  to 
the marketplace. 
The  situation the European  Community  faces  in trying to grapple with  12 
different and  sometimes  incompatible telecommunications  systems  is not 
unlike the situation in the United States--although the U.S.  is often 
perceived  incorrectly as  a  single telecommunications  system.  There are 
over  a  thousand telephone  companies  throughout  the fifty States that have 
their own  systems.  The  fact that terminal equipment  copnected to a  system 
in one state will function  and  interwork with services and  equipment  in 
another state is indicative of the success of U.S.  voluntary compliance 
with interoperability and  functionality requirements. 
Furthermore,  all users are best served  by  procedures  in which  a 
manufacturer has  the option to self-verify a  product against a  standard set 
of criteria.  In our view,  costs of type approval  under  such an  approach 
are reduced to a  minimum,  benefiting small manufacturers.  Self-
verification provides the greatest efficiency to both manufacturer and the 
Telecommunications Administration,  and,  as  a  result,  to the user.  We 
believe that the European Community  should  both authorize qualified 
manufacturers  to perform this verification and  recognize  independent 
testing laboratories to perform it for manufacturers who  do  not elect to do 
their own  testing. 
The  Commission  should set a  time limit for  European  laboratories to 
complete the testing process.  Currently,  the process  can  be  delayed for  an 
open-ended period,  thereby discouraging  the use of new  equipment. 
Shortening  the process will reduce costs and uncertainty for all equipment 
suppliers and,  ultimately,  benefit the users.  In addition,  the U.S. 
Council also urges  the Commission  to ensure that mutual  acceptance of test 
data is extended to test data generated outside of the Community.  Member 
States should  be  authorized to approve  non-European  laboratories to provide 
test data for type approvals.  Otherwise,  the  Community's  type approval 
procedures will  impose  an unfair burden  on  non-E.C.  suppliers  . ) 
) 
-4-
With  respect to Network  Termination  Points  (NTPs),  the Commission  should 
propose  to the Council that the Recommendation  on  ISDN  be  amended  so that 
all equipment  located on  customer  premises  including the first telephone 
and digital as well as  analog network  termination equipment  be  open  to 
competition.  Such action would  be  in accordance with the Commission's 
efforts to open  fully  the terminal market to competition and its prior 
action on  cordless telephones  and  modems. 
NETWORK  EQUIPMENT 
A truly integrated,  competitive European market for telecommunications 
services and  equipment would  be  incomplete without the inclusion of network 
equipment  in the Commission's  proposed Community  positions.  Because 
network  equipment  is the foundation  for  the telecommunications  network 
infrastructure over which services travel and  to which terminal equipment 
is attached,  lack of competition in this  important market  segment has 
direct implications for  telecommunications  services and  terminal 
equipment.  The  Commission  has  recognized that the development of a  common 
market  in network equipment has  a  direct correlation with an  increase in 
the transparency of procurement procedures of the Telecommunications 
Administrations. 
It is important to realize that an efficient market for network equipment 
is a  concern of all companies  that use basic telecommunications network 
services.  The  largest expenditure item in any  company's  telecommunications 
budget  is for the use of basic telecommunications  services,  and the price 
and quality of these services is in part a  function of the price and 
quality of the network  equipment that produces  them.  An  allocated or 
protected network equipment market directly affects the competitiveness of 
all telecommunications-dependent  industries  in Europe. 
Toward  that end the Commission  seeks to accelerate the development of 
common  specifications for  network equipment  and their use in public 
purchasing.  The  Commission  is also considering replacing the Council 
Recommendation  84/550 with a  Directive and  accelerating its implementation. 
The  U.S.  Council urges the Commission  to carry out these plans as  soon as 
possible and ensure that these efforts will be  extended to all suppliers, 
regardless of their nationalities.  Further study will also be needed to 




3.  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  AND  INFORMATION  SERVICES 
PROVISION  OF  NETWORK  INFRASTRUCTURE 
The  Commission  has  accepted the continued exclusive prov1s1on  of the 
network  infrastructure by  the Telecommunications Administrations,  but notes 
that exclusive provision must  be  narrowly  defined.  The  U.S.  Council  agrees 
that it will  be  important to establish the definition and  scope of the 
public service mandate.  We  agree that Telecommunications Administrations 
must  be  assured of the ability to carry out their public service 
obligations,  but we  believe that exclusive provision of the network 
infrastructure may  not  be the only or best way  to carry out these service 
obligations.  Alternative provision and  operation of infrastructure should 
not only  be permitted but encouraged,  particularly where  provision of 
private,  internal systems  is involved or where  infrastructure is 
unavailable  from  the Telecommunications Administrations. 
In our view,  a  two-way  satellite communications  system is an  example of  a 
good  candidate for  competitive provision.  Its unique properties  could be 
exploited more  fully under  a  competitive  scheme.  Consequently,  we  believe 
that these  systems  should not  be  subject to artificial regulatory 
constraints and urge the Commission  to eliminate restrictions on 
competitive provision. 
EXCLUSIVE  PROVISION:  RESERVED  SERVICES 
We  support the Commission's position that exclusive prov1s1on  of 
telecommunications  services should  be  narrowly defined  and  subject to 
· periodic review,  provided that such reviews  do  not expand  the range of 
reserved services offered by  the Administrations  in the future.  We  believe 
that switched voice telephony should  be  the only candidate reserved for 
exclusive provision by  Administrations.  Although there may  be  a  voice 
element  in other services,  this fact  should not be used as  a  justification 
~  by  an  Administration to expand  its monopoly. 
An  Administration that wants  to expand  its monopoly  beyond  voice telephony 
to  include other services should only  be  allowed  to do  so if the government 
decides that it would  be  in the users'  interest.  The  Commission  should 
ensure that the so-called 
11new  basic services",  such as  packet-switched 
data networks,  circuit-switched data networks,  teletex,  electronic mail, 
and  videotex,  offered by  some  Administrations are provided on  a  competitive 
basis and not defined as  reserved services. 
While  some  countries may  opt for  exclusive provision of switched voice 
telephone service,  others may  want  to open  this service to competition. 
There  should  be  enough flexibility in the  framework  to allow voice resale 
in those countries that decide it would  be  in the public interest.  Rather 
than serve to divert  important  revenues  from  Adminstrations,  voice resale 
could result in  increased demand  for  services and  infrastructure. ) 
) 
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The  U.S.  Council also urges  the  Commission  to ensure that Member  States 
develop  parallel definitions of  reserved  services.  In addition,  without 
some  guarantee that  a  newly  offered service will not  be  reclassified later 
as  a  reserved service,  service providers will be  reluctant to offer them, 
and  thus,  deny  users the benefits of new  innovations. 
COMPETITIVE  PROVISION 
The  Commission  proposes unrestricted prov1s1on of all services other than 
those  basic services explicitly reserved to the Telecommunications 
Administrations.  These  competitive services,  which would  include value 
added services,  would  be  provided within  and  between Member  States  in 
competition with the Administrations. 
We  are pleased that the Commission  has  recognized that the 
telecommunications  environment  has  changed dramatically and that 
competition is now  an essential ingredient.  The  new  policy being advocated 
in the Green  Paper wisely relies on  the competitive marketplace to overcome 
fragmentation within Europe  and provide  a  unified basis for  European 
strength.  It also recognizes  the need  for nondiscriminatory access  to and 
use of the basic transmission  infrastructure for all interested parties in 
order to meet  a  diversity of users•  needs. 
We  urge  the Commission  to act quickly to remove  the existing barriers that 
are fragmenting  the  telecommunications marketplace among  the Member  States, 
so that value-added service providers  based  in one  country will be able to 
serve directly the end-users  in all Community  countries.  A consistent 
infrastructure across  the Community  will facilitate the offering of 
Community-wide  value-added services  by  multiple providers. 
Standards  requirements 
The  success  of a  competitive marketplace for value-added services is 
dependent  on  the establishment of  interface standards for  attachment to 
basic telecommunications  networks.  The  application of international 
standards to the network  infrastructure benefits  both end-users  and value-
added providers.  However,  the  imposition of mandatory standards  on 
competitive services will be  counterproductive to achieving the 
Commission's  desire for widespread  service availability. 
Mandatory  compliance could  limit value-added services to a  common  set of 
application features  and  discourage  innovation of new  functions.  Even  if 
the provision of  features  beyond  the mandatory  standards were permitted, 
competitive providers would  be  inhibited from  tailoring their services to 
marketplace requirements  by  network  design  and structure constraints.  Such 
constraints will discourage  innovation of new  functions.  Furthermore,  the 
imposition of mandatory  standards may  subject service providers to 
unnecessary risks.  Costs will be  incurred whether  or not  demand 
materializes,  and unless sufficient demand  is realized for  the standardized 





Users,  in turn,  would  then  have  a  limited variety of services  from  which  to 
choose.  For  example,  users  who  need  only  a  subset of  the  fixed  set of 
functions  might  be  forced  to  pay  for  more  than  they need  or  forego  the use 
of the service.  Or,  users  who  require greater function  than offered would 
not  be  given  an  adequate solution to their needs. 
Implicit to the operation of  a  competitive marketplace for value-added 
services is that providers will strive to meet marketplace needs,  both  in 
the specifics of the application they offer and  in their prices.  Value-
added  services are,  therefore,  inherently customized  and not standardized 
services.  Mandatory  compliance with specified technical standards would 
not permit  the economic  forces  of competition to work  fully.  Standards 
have  a  place within the competitive marketplace,  but  compliance should  be 
voluntary,  otherwise the benefits of competition will  be  lost. 
We  also caution the Commission  with respect to the extensive set of 
standardized universal services it proposes  be  offered by  the 
Telecommunications Administrations.  Has  a  valid demand  for  these 
standardized services  been  demonstrated?  If such services  incorporate a 
multitude of functions  beyond  those necessary for  communication,  the 
development  and  implementation of these services  by  Telecommunications 
Administrations may  consume  public  funds  in ventures that may  not  be 
justified.  If incentives such as  subsidies are given,  the competitive 
marketplace  can no  longer operate. 
In order to facilitate the rapid  introduction of a  variety of value-added 
services on  a  Community-wide  basis,  we  suggest the Commission  refrain from 
imposing  standards  on  competitive services and restrict mandatory 
application of international standards solely to the infrastructure.  Value-
added  network providers will have  the natural  incentive to meet  a 
multinational marketplace demand  if they are allowed to participate fully 
in that marketplace with the underlying basic transmission service 
available at cost-based tariffs  ~n a  nondiscriminatory basis. 
Requirements  for use of the network  infrastructure 
Nondiscriminatory access  to the Administrations'  networks  is essential to 
the development  of competitive services.  The  Commission's  plans to ensure 
this access  by  establishing Open  Network  Provision  (ONP)  and seeking 
acceptance  by  the Administrations of clear obligations to interconnect with 
and provide access  for  trans-frontier providers are very positive steps. 
To  ensure that the needs of all parties are met  and  the use of the network 
is optimized,  participation by  users and  industry in the definition of ONP 
will be critical. 
In order to have  true ONP,  the Commission  will need  to require 
Administrations to provide equal access to the underlying transmission 
service at the same  tariffs and  conditions that they provide to their own 
competitive service entities.  In addition,  the Commission  should  examine 
the existing usage restrictions,  such as those on  resale and  shared use, 
third party traffic,  and  interconnection of public and  private networks. 
Some  Administrations also  impose  usage-sensitive tariffs on  leased lines or 
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force  service providers  to  build up  their offerings  over  the  public 
switched networks.  These  restrictions,  if continued,  will serve as  serious 
impediments  to the development  of  competitive services. 
Furthermore,  the  Commission  should also extend special consideration to the 
question of whether  the D Series Recommendations  of the CCITT  (dealing with 
the permissable uses  of  leased  lines)  remain  appropriate under  the precepts 
of the Treaty of  Rome  and  in light of  the Green  Paper's  recommendations. 
Safeguarding  competition 
Participation of Administrations  in the marketplace  for  competitive 
services should  be welcomed  and  encouraged  as  beneficial to  international 
users,  so  long  as  such participation is conducted fairly and  in a  manner 
that fosters  competition.  The  operation and  provision of competitive 
services  by  Administrations  should  be  accomplished pursuant to competitive 
safeguards that detect and nullify opportunities for  abuse of their 
dominant  position through anti-competitive practices and  cross-subsidy. 
These  safeguards are a  necessary  supplement to  ONP  because anti-competitive 
practices can  continue regardless of the equality of the technical access. 
Safeguards  can  include a  range  of non-structural mechanisms  designed to 
identify and nullify opportunities for  anti-competitive abuse  and  cross-
subsidy.  This nonstructural approach to  safeguards  requires more  than a 
periodic  review  to ensure  compliance.  Oversight  on  a  continuous  basis  by 
an  independent  regulatory authority will be  needed.  Another  possible 
safeguard would  be to require an  Administrations to  conduct its competitive 
activities through structurally separate subsidiaries acting  in an arm's-
length manner  with its Administration parent. 
Non-structural safeguards  can  include cost allocation and  accounting rules 
for  reserved and  competitive services,  as well as  a  number  of non-
discrimination requirements to ensure that an Administration's competitive 
enterprise takes its underlying facilities and  is otherwise treated 
pursuant to the  same  terms,  conditions~  and principles as are applied to 
non-affiliated competitors.  Non-discrimination requirements necessitate 
the provision of  information and  timely reporting  by Administrations. 
Tflu~IFF  PRINCIPLES 
The  U.S.  Council  welcomes  the  Commission's  recommendations  that 
telecommunications tariffs should  follo~ overall cost trends  and  that a 
rebalancing of tariffs will be  inevitable.  The  Green  Paper  correctly notes 
that the strategy for  the  Community's  economic  development  is dependent 
upon  the correct development  of tariff principles among  the Member  States. 
Cross-subsidization can  impede  this development  and restrict growth and 





We  would  like to point out,  however,  that certain aspects of the 
Commission's  recommendations  appear  to  be  in conflict with this overall 
policy.  The  paper  expresses  concern that universal service considerations 
will temper  this rebalancing of rates.  We  would  submit that cost-based 
pricing and the aim of universal service need not  be  incompatible goals. 
Cost-based pricing for universal services will eliminate the  burden  placed 
on  large users of telecommunications  services resulting from  cross-
subsidization and will encourage greater efficiency in the provision of the 
infrastructure.  Universal service providers  should  be able to receive a 
sufficient return to encourage  them  to continue to  invest  in network 
development.  If additional incentives are required,  then nonprice-related 
mechanisms  such as  incentive-based programs  or financial assistance can  be 
provided. 
The  Green  Paper also advances  the premise that the financial viability of 
the Telecommunications Administrations needs  to  be  protected.  In order to 
provide this protection,  the Commission  accepts  the adoption of usage-
sensitive tariffs for  leased circuits and  the banning of simple voice 
resale as  appropriate alternatives.  Restrictions on the simple resale of 
voice service may  provide a  manageable  short term solution;  however, 
neither of these alternatives represents acceptable ultimate solutions. 
They  are not solutions because they repress  demand  for the very services 
reportedly protected,  and,  therefore,  deny  revenue to Telecommunications 
Administrations. 
In particular,  the Commission  should note that the application of usage-
sensitive tariffs for  leased circuits  imposes unjustified costs and 
measurement  burdens  upon  both providers of private networks  and 
Administrations.  Certainly,  the profitability and  international 
competitiveness of European  firms  are thus negatively affected.  The  U.S. 
Council urges the Commission  to maintain cost-based,  flat rates for  leased 
lines and ensure that the availability of these circuits is guaranteed 
throughout the Community. 
4.  STANDARDS  PROCESS/INSTITUTE 
The  Green  Paper briefly discusses the possibility of establishing a 
standards  institute.  Although it does  not provide much  information about 
the institute, this body,  properly constituted,  may  be  a  good  way  to ensure 
direct user and  industry participation in the development of standards in 
the  long  term.  However,  the Commission  should ensure that the institute 
does not duplicate the work  being  done  in other standards bodies or diverge 
from  established international standards. 
There is also a  need for users and  industry to play an  equal role in 
developing  those standards created outside the framework  of the standards 
institute.  The  U.S.  Council notes that the Commission  has delegated much 
of the responsibility for  standards-setting to the CEPT.  Inasmuch as  CEPT 
is an association whose  membership  is comprised of Telecommunications 
Administrations,  it is likely that the development of-standards may  not 
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meet  the needs  of users,  manufacturers,  and  service providers,  but rather, 
may  reflect only the views  and  needs  of  the Administrations. 
While  organizations  such as  ISO  and  CCITT  recognize that the development  of 
acceptable  industry standards  demands  the participation of all interested 
and affected parties,  CEPT  has  only recently permitted industry 
participation,  and  only on  a  limited basis through national delegations  and 
manufacturer associations.  This action represents  an  important step  in the 
right direction,  but there remains much·room  for  improvement. 
Industry should be  permitted to participate in CEPT  meetings where  action 
items  and  schedules are determined,  and  in the TRAC  decision process  on 
NETS.  Participation of  industry groups  should  be  extended to  include 
qualified user bodies.  In addition,  no  arbitrary limitations should be 
imposed  on  the number  of  industry representatives allowed on  national 
delegations,  otherwise Member  States cannot call upon  adequate support of 
private sector technical expertise,  and  instead,  their interest may  be 
dominated  by  Telecommunications Adminstrations who  are not necessarily 
obliged to represent country positions. 
Normes  Europeennes  de  Telecommunication  (NETs) 
The  U.S.  Council supports the development of Community-wide  NETs.  We 
believe that the establishment of NETs  will facilitate the removal  of 
unique and different national requirements  for  the attachment of  customer 
premises  equipment to public telecommunications networks  and  thereby 
promote the establishment of a  pan-European market  in terminal equipment. 
However,  we  are concerned with a  number  of aspects of the current process 
for  the development  and  approval  of NETs. 
In particular,  the standards definition included in NETs  should be 
. harmonized with the most  current versions of  international standards. 
Approval of NETs  based on  outdated definitions will necessitate further 
changes  in the near future  and  thus will only serve to add to the burden on 
manufacturers  by  requiring compliance with a  temporary solution. 
Therefore,  we  would urge the Commission  to recommend  that the TRAC  ensure 
that the latest CCITT  definitions are  incorporated prior to approval of 
NETs. 
Furthermore,  unique national requirements proposed for  inclusion in NETs 
should be  eliminated or reduced to an  absolute minimum.  The  inclusion of 
these national requirements  contradicts the essential goal of the NET 
program,  which is to harmonize  such disparate national requirements.  In 
addition,  the U.S.  Council recommends  that NETs,  once defined and  approved, 
should serve as  the sole requirement  for  type approval.  No  additional 
requirements  should be  imposed  by  a  country,  otherwise the benefits of 
harmonization will not  be  realized. 
The  U.S.  Council also urges  the Commission  to encourage  CEPT  to extend the 
current sixty day  period for  comment.  We  believe that this period is not 
sufficient time to conduct  a  comprehensive technical review  and to 





5.  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS 
RELATIONS  WITH  TRADING  PARTNERS 
While  the Commission  is primarily concerned with creating a  strong internal 
market  for  telecommunications  equipment  and  services,  it cannot  overlook 
the  importance of  opening  the Community  market  to  international 
competition.  Creating a  strong internal market  by  excluding non-European 
products  and  services will seriously hamper  the competitiveness of European 
firms  because they will not be  able to benefit from  innovations taking 
place elsewhere  in the world.  Unfortunately,  though,  the Community  may  be 
tempted to wait for  GATT  negotiations on  telecommunications  before it opens 
its telecommunications markets  to international competition.  If such a 
delay does  occur,  it can only serve to undermine the Green  Paper's 
objectives. 
RELATIONS  WITH  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS 
International Telecommunication Union 
The  Commission  should extend special consideration to the question of 
whether the D Series Recommendations  of the CCITT  (dealing with the 
permissable uses of leased lines)  remain  appropriate under the precepts of 
the Treaty of Rome  and  in light of the Green  Paper's recommendations.  It 
. would  appear that the time has  come  to revisit the legality and  legitimacy 
of the D Series Recommendations,  particularly D.l,  D.S,  and D.6. 
The  Council believes that these Recommendations  are contrary to the Green 
Paper's positions regarding network  infrastructure,  reserved service 
provision,  and  competitive service provision.  In addition,  the D Series 
Recommendations  involving private leased facilities provide substantial 
incentives and opportunities for Administrations to deter and frustrate 
competition and to engage  in cross subsidy. 
In the case of the CEPT  proposal for managed  data network services  (MDNS), 
Administrations jointly offering MDNS  to multiple,  unaffiliated customers 
would  exempt  themselves  from the prohibitions of the D Series 
Recommendations  regarding resale and  shared use of a  leased line.  However, 
these  same  Administrations would  have  the opportunity and  incentive to 
prohibit unaffiliated competitors  from  using  leased facilities to offer 
MDNS-like  services to multiple,  unrelated customers--as  a  violation of the 
D Series provisions prohibiting uses of leased lines that "infringe the 
[transmission and  switching]  functions of an Administration."  Such unfair 
and  obvious result of application of the D Series Recommendations  appears 
contrary to the Treaty of Rome. 
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World  Administrative Telegraph and  Telephone Conference 
We  would  urge the Community  to examine  closely the Draft Regulations which 
have  been  prepared  for  the upcoming  World  Administrative Telegraph and 
Telephone  Conference of the International Telecommunication Union. 
Sections of these Draft Regulations,  in our view,  run counter to the global 
deregulatory trends  for  telecommunications  services and  contradict the 
spirit and  intention of the Green  Paper.  In particular,  the Draft 
Regulations,  if adopted,  could create an  environment  in which  a  service 
provided  between  Member  States would  be  more  burdened  by  regulation than  a 
service provided solely within a  Member  State--a result that is clearly 
inconsistent with the Treaty of Rome.  We  also note that a  rigid set of 
WATTC  regulations  could be used  by  Administrations to  impede  achievement of 
the objectives of the Green  Paper. 
Given  the short time available before the Conference,  we  urge that the 
Commission  take steps to alert Member  States to the possible  impact of the 
Draft Regulations.  We  suggest that the Commission  might prepare background 
documentation on  the WATTC  and  that it initiate discussions with a  wide 
range of national policy makers,  beyond  Administrations,  with broader 
interests in the development  of  telecommunications services and  the conduct 
of international business 
GATT 
The  U.S.  Council endorses  the need  for  discussions on  telecommuncations  in 
the GATT.  We  believe that many  of the Green  Paper's pro-competitive tenets 
will serve as  the basis for future  GATT  discussions on  telecommunications. 
In our view,  a  competitive environment for telecommunications  services and 
equipment will need to contain the following  elements: 
--nondiscriminatory access to and  use of telecommunications transport 
services; 
--freedom for users to  choose  customer  premises equipment; 
--market access  for  telecommunications  equipment manufacturers  and 
value-added and  information service providers; 
--establishment of safeguards to prevent  discr~inatory and anti-
competitive behavior; 
--reasonable regulation and  transparency;  and 
--unrestricted movement  of  information among  countries and  companies. 
We  urge the Commission  to assist in fostering  such an  international 
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CONCLUSION 
The  U.S.  Council appreciates the opportunity to comment  on  the Commission's 
Green  Paper.  We  hope  that our  comments  will be helpful to the Commission 
as it begins  to  implement  the Green  Paper's  recommendations . 
We  believe that the Commission  has  shown  considerable foresight and 
understanding of the key  issues  by  the way  in which it has  shaped the 
debate on  the future of  EC  telecommunications policy.  Prompt 
implementation of the Green  Paper's  recommendations will be  needed  in order 
to meet  the Commission's  1992  deadline for  completion of the internal 
market. 
We  urge the Commission  to continue to allow public comment  as it begins to 
implement  the report's recommendations.  Extensive consultations with users 
and  industry at every stage will be critical to the success of the 
Commission's  endeavor. 